New York Law Review

Tag: Special Use Permit

  • Metro Enviro Transfer, LLC v. Village of Croton-on-Hudson, 5 N.Y.3d 236 (2005): Special Use Permit Renewal Based on Past Violations

    Metro Enviro Transfer, LLC v. Village of Croton-on-Hudson, 5 N.Y.3d 236 (2005)

    A village board’s decision to deny renewal of a special use permit is upheld when supported by substantial evidence of repeated and willful violations of the permit’s conditions, even without proof of actual harm, as long as the violations demonstrate a potential for harm to health or the environment.

    Summary

    Metro Enviro Transfer, LLC sought renewal of a special use permit for a solid waste transfer facility. The Village Board of Trustees denied the renewal based on Metro’s repeated violations of the original permit’s conditions, including exceeding capacity limits and accepting prohibited waste. Metro argued that the Board needed to show the violations caused actual harm. The New York Court of Appeals held that substantial evidence of willful violations, even without proof of actual harm, was sufficient to support the Board’s denial, emphasizing that the board reasonably concluded the violations created an unacceptable risk of future harm. This case clarifies the scope of a local board’s discretion in permit renewal decisions.

    Facts

    Metro Enviro, LLC (later acquired by Metro Enviro Transfer, LLC) operated a solid waste transfer facility under a special use permit from the Village of Croton-on-Hudson. The permit contained 42 conditions, including restrictions on waste types and capacity. Over three years, Metro repeatedly violated these conditions by exceeding capacity, falsifying records to conceal excesses, accepting prohibited waste, and inadequately training personnel. Metro admitted to these violations, paid fines, and lost a bid to increase capacity due to the violations.

    Procedural History

    After Metro applied to renew its permit, the Board granted temporary extensions and held hearings. The Board ultimately denied the renewal. Metro filed an Article 78 proceeding, arguing the denial was improper. The Supreme Court granted Metro’s petition, but the Appellate Division reversed, upholding the Board’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted Metro leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a village board, in deciding on the renewal of a special use permit, must demonstrate substantial evidence of actual harm resulting from permit violations, or whether evidence of repeated and willful violations with the potential for harm is sufficient to justify denial of the renewal.

    Holding

    No, because substantial evidence of repeated and willful violations of permit conditions, even without demonstrating actual harm, is sufficient to justify a village board’s decision to deny renewal of a special use permit, provided those violations indicate a potential for harm to health or the environment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a board has discretion in deciding whether to grant a special use permit or its renewal. While generalized community objections alone are insufficient, the Board is not required to demonstrate actual harm resulting from the violations. The court reasoned that repeated, willful violations of permit conditions designed to protect health and the environment can create an unacceptable risk of future harm, even if no single violation is dangerous in itself. The Court distinguished this case from situations involving minor or insignificant violations that would not justify denial of renewal. The Court noted that the Board had reviewed substantial evidence and expert opinions, and was entitled to conclude that Metro’s history of violations undermined its assurances of future compliance. The court stated, “[A] reviewing court ‘may not substitute its own judgment for that of the board, even if such a contrary determination is itself supported by the record’ (Matter of Retail Prop. Trust v Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 98 NY2d 190, 196 [2002]).” This case demonstrates that local boards have latitude in assessing permit renewals based on a history of non-compliance, and courts will defer to their judgment when it is supported by substantial evidence of violations indicating a potential for harm.

  • Real Holding Corp. v. Town of Wappinger, 1 N.Y.3d 298 (2004): ZBA Authority to Grant Area Variances for Special Use Permits

    Real Holding Corp. v. Town of Wappinger, 1 N.Y.3d 298 (2004)

    A zoning board of appeals (ZBA) has the authority to grant area variances from any requirement in a zoning regulation, including those for a special use permit, pursuant to Town Law § 274-b (3).

    Summary

    Real Holding Corp. (RHC) sought to develop a gasoline filling station on a parcel of land but was unable to meet the distance requirements for a special use permit. RHC applied to the Town of Wappinger’s ZBA for area variances, which were denied based on the ZBA’s belief that it lacked jurisdiction to grant variances from special use permit requirements. The New York Court of Appeals held that Town Law § 274-b (3) grants ZBAs the authority to issue area variances from special use permit requirements, clarifying the relationship between subdivisions (3) and (5) of the statute. This decision affirms the ZBA’s role in mitigating the rigid application of zoning regulations.

    Facts

    RHC acquired land in a Highway Business District previously used as a gas station. To re-establish a gas station, RHC needed a special use permit, but the property did not meet the Town Code’s distance requirements: 1,000 feet from residentially zoned lands and 2,500 feet from other gas stations. RHC’s initial variance request was denied by the ZBA, which cited a lack of jurisdiction. After being denied a special use permit by the Planning Board in 2000, RHC again requested variances from the ZBA, which again denied the application, maintaining it lacked the power to grant area variances from special use permit requirements absent explicit authorization from the Town Board.

    Procedural History

    RHC filed a CPLR Article 78 proceeding to annul the ZBA’s decision. Supreme Court granted RHC’s petition, remitting the matter to the ZBA, holding that Town Law § 274-b (3) authorizes ZBAs to grant area variances from special use permit requirements. The Appellate Division affirmed. The ZBA appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Town Law § 274-b (3) authorizes a zoning board of appeals (ZBA) to grant area variances from special use permit requirements.

    Holding

    Yes, because Town Law § 274-b (3) plainly states that “application may be made to the [ZBA] for an area variance” where a special use permit does not comply with zoning regulations, “[n]otwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the plain language of Town Law § 274-b (3), which allows application to a ZBA for an area variance when a special use permit does not comply with “zoning regulations.” The Court noted that the statute does not differentiate between general zoning requirements and those specific to special use permits. The court stated, “To hold that a ZBA may vary certain zoning provisions only if expressly empowered to do so by the town board overlooks the entire purpose of the ZBA, which is to provide relief in individual cases from the rigid application of zoning regulations enacted by the local legislative body.” The Court further reasoned that Town Law § 274-b is entitled “Approval of special use permits,” and subdivision (3) directs that application for an area variance may be made to the ZBA “pursuant to” section 267-b, which supplies the procedures for a ZBA to follow when issuing an area variance. The Court also clarified that subdivision (5), which allows a town board to empower an “authorized board” to waive special use permit requirements, does not conflict with subdivision (3); subdivision (5) provides a broader waiver authority, while subdivision (3) specifically addresses area variances granted by the ZBA. The Court emphasized that ZBAs are “vested with the exclusive power to grant or deny, in the first instance, a variance from the zoning ordinances” (Matter of Commco, Inc. v Amelkin, 62 NY2d 260, 266 [1984]). The Court found that the legislative history supported the distinct purposes of subdivisions (3) and (5), with subdivision (3) addressing dimensional difficulties through area variances granted by the ZBA.

  • Matter of Hub Recycling Corp. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 86 N.Y.2d 1000 (1995): Special Use Permits & Community Opposition

    Matter of Hub Recycling Corp. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 86 N.Y.2d 1000 (1995)

    A town board’s denial of a special use permit must be supported by substantial evidence and cannot be based solely on generalized community objections when the applicant has demonstrated compliance with applicable regulations.

    Summary

    Hub Recycling Corp. sought renewal of a special use permit to operate an asphalt recycling plant in an industrially zoned area. The Town Board denied the renewal based on community opposition, despite Hub’s evidence of compliance with regulations and expert testimony supporting the renewal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ annulment of the Town Board’s decision, holding that the denial was not supported by substantial evidence and was improperly based on generalized community objections rather than specific failures to meet permit criteria. The court emphasized that permitted uses in zoning districts are presumed to be in harmony with the general zoning plan.

    Facts

    Hub Recycling Corp. operated an asphalt recycling plant in an area zoned for industrial use in the Town of Oyster Bay under a special use permit granted in 1982. The initial permit, issued after a negative environmental impact finding, allowed for a five-year renewal. In applying for renewal, Hub presented the original permit, expert testimony on asphalt recycling, traffic, and land use values, a judgment dismissing a public nuisance claim, and EPA proof of regulatory compliance. Opposition to the renewal came primarily from local residents complaining about the plant’s operation. The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) had not found the facility in violation of any regulations.

    Procedural History

    Hub Recycling Corp. applied for renewal of its special use permit, which was denied by the Town Board. Hub challenged the denial in court. The lower courts annulled the Town Board’s determination. The Town of Oyster Bay appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Town Board’s denial of Hub Recycling Corp.’s application for renewal of its special use permit was supported by substantial evidence, or whether it was improperly based on generalized community objections.

    Holding

    No, because the Town Board’s decision was based on generalized community pressure and not on substantial evidence that Hub Recycling Corp. failed to meet the applicable criteria for permit renewal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Town Board’s denial of the special use permit was not supported by substantial evidence. The court emphasized that the classification of a particular use as permitted in a zoning district is “tantamount to a legislative finding that the permitted use is in harmony with the general zoning plan and will not adversely affect the neighborhood” (Matter of North Shore Steak House v Thomaston, 30 NY2d 238, 243). While the Town Board retains discretion to evaluate special use permit applications, its determination must be supported by substantial evidence. The court found that the denial was based on generalized community objections, which are insufficient to justify denying a permit when the applicant has demonstrated compliance with applicable regulations. The court cited Matter of Pleasant Val. Home Constr. v Van Wagner, 41 NY2d 1028, 1029, noting that a board may not base its decision on generalized community objections. Because Hub Recycling Corp. had presented evidence of compliance and the denial was driven by community pressure, the Court affirmed the annulment of the Town Board’s decision. The absence of any findings of violations by the DEC further weakened the Town’s position.

  • Twin County Recycling Corp. v. Yevoli, 90 N.Y.2d 1000 (1997): Special Use Permits and Substantial Evidence

    90 N.Y.2d 1000 (1997)

    A zoning board’s denial of a special use permit must be supported by substantial evidence and cannot be based solely on generalized community objections.

    Summary

    Twin County Recycling Corp. sought renewal of a special use permit to operate an asphalt recycling plant. The Town Board of Oyster Bay denied the renewal based on community opposition. Twin County challenged the denial, arguing it was not supported by substantial evidence. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Town Board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence, as the denial was based on generalized community pressure rather than specific failures to meet applicable criteria. The Court emphasized that while a Town Board retains discretion in evaluating special use permit applications, its determination must be grounded in evidence, not merely community objections.

    Facts

    Twin County Recycling Corp. owned premises in an area zoned for industrial use in the Town of Oyster Bay.

    Twin County operated an asphalt recycling plant under a special use permit granted by the Town Board in 1982.

    The initial permit was for 10 years with a provision for a five-year renewal.

    In applying for renewal, Twin County presented the original permit, expert testimony regarding the plant’s operations and impact, and proof of compliance with EPA regulations.

    Opposition to the renewal came primarily from residents of nearby neighborhoods.

    The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation had not found the facility in violation of any regulations.

    Procedural History

    Twin County sought judicial review of the Town Board’s denial of the special use permit renewal.

    The lower courts ruled in favor of Twin County, annulling the Town Board’s determination.

    The Town Board appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Town Board’s denial of the special use permit renewal was supported by substantial evidence, or whether it was improperly based on generalized community objections.

    Holding

    No, because the Town Board’s decision was based on generalized community pressure rather than a failure by Twin County to meet the applicable criteria for renewal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decision to annul the denial of the special use permit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that classifying a use as permitted in a zoning district implies a legislative finding that the use aligns with the zoning plan and won’t adversely affect the neighborhood, citing Matter of North Shore Steak House v Thomaston, 30 N.Y.2d 238, 243.

    While a Town Board has discretion to evaluate special use permit applications, its decisions must be supported by substantial evidence, referencing Matter of Market Sq. Props. v Town of Guilderland Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 66 N.Y.2d 893, 895, and Matter of Pleasant Val. Home Constr. v Van Wagner, 41 N.Y.2d 1028, 1029.

    The Court noted that while expert testimony is not always required, a board cannot base its decision solely on generalized community objections, again citing Matter of Pleasant Val. Home Constr. v Van Wagner.

    The Court found that Twin County had established a sufficient record to warrant renewal, including compliance with environmental regulations and expert testimony. The denial, therefore, appeared to be driven by community pressure rather than objective criteria.

    The Court explicitly stated, “Given the present record established by petitioner, it is evident that the application was denied not because it failed to meet the applicable criteria but because of generalized community pressure. The determination was, therefore, properly annulled.”

  • Sunrise Plaza Associates, Ltd. v. Town Bd. of Town of Babylon, 479 N.E.2d 833 (1985): Upholding Discretion in Special Use Permits

    Sunrise Plaza Associates, Ltd. v. Town Bd. of Town of Babylon, 479 N.E.2d 833 (1985)

    When a local legislative body reserves the power to grant special exceptions, it is not necessarily required to provide specific standards for exercising that discretion, and the courts will generally defer to the board’s decision unless it is arbitrary or based on impermissible grounds.

    Summary

    Sunrise Plaza Associates sought to annul the Town Board’s grant of a special use permit to a nursery in an R-2A residential district. The ordinance allowed nurseries with a special permit, which the Town Board granted. Sunrise Plaza argued the Board exceeded its authority. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the Town Board had not exceeded its permissible bounds by granting the permit. The Court emphasized that the Board’s discretion is broad when granting special permits and that the court should not interfere unless the decision was based solely on impermissible grounds.

    Facts

    An intervenor applied for a special use permit to operate a nursery in an R-2A residential district. Sunrise Plaza Associates, a nearby property owner, opposed the permit. The Town Board granted the special use permit, subject to certain conditions designed to mitigate potential negative impacts, such as noise. Sunrise Plaza Associates then brought an action to annul the permit grant arguing the board overstepped its authority.

    Procedural History

    Sunrise Plaza Associates initiated a proceeding to annul the Town Board’s decision. The Special Term initially ruled in favor of Sunrise Plaza, finding a violation of the ordinance’s noise standards. However, the Appellate Division reversed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order upholding the Town Board’s grant of the permit.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Town Board exceeded its authority and discretion by granting a special use permit for a nursery in an R-2A residential district, despite arguments that the nursery’s operations might generate higher noise levels than typical residential uses and that the ordinance did not explicitly allow for commercial sale and display of nursery products.

    Holding

    No, because the Town Board has broad discretion in granting special use permits, and the court should only interfere if the board acted solely on grounds that, as a matter of law, may not control the discretion of the Board. The board’s determination that the nursery application met the ordinance standards was not contrary to those standards or beyond its discretion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that when a legislative body reserves the power to grant special exceptions, it need not set forth specific standards for the exercise of its discretion. Citing Matter of Larkin Co. v Schwab, the court stated that the decision is left to the “untrammeled, but of course not capricious discretion” of the Board. The courts may only interfere when the Board has acted “solely upon grounds which as matter of law may not control the discretion” of the Board. The court found that the standards in section 435 of the ordinance were met as the board imposed conditions to mitigate potential problems. Specifically, the court addressed the noise issue: “The Board’s conclusion that noise from interve-nor’s nursery “can produce higher noise levels” does not constitute a finding that it will “be more objectionable.” The court emphasized that the board’s determination, with the imposed conditions, was neither contrary to the ordinance standards nor beyond its discretionary power. The court also noted that even if the ordinance sets forth standards, it does not divest the board of the power of further regulation unless the standards are so complete as to preclude the Board from considering other factors without amending the ordinance.

  • Preble Aggregate Inc. v. Town of Brookhaven, 43 N.Y.2d 1002 (1978): Zoning Board Approval Prevents Planning Board Disapproval

    Preble Aggregate Inc. v. Town of Brookhaven, 43 N.Y.2d 1002 (1978)

    When a zoning board of appeals approves a special use permit determining that a proposed use complies with the town code, the planning board lacks the authority to disapprove a site plan based on a violation of the same town code.

    Summary

    Preble Aggregate obtained a special use permit from the Brookhaven Zoning Board of Appeals to operate an automobile shredder plant. The Brookhaven Planning Board subsequently disapproved Preble’s site plan, arguing the proposed use violated the Brookhaven Town Code. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the Zoning Board had already determined the use was compliant with the Town Code when issuing the special use permit, the Planning Board lacked the authority to disapprove the site plan based on the same code violations. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Facts

    Brookhaven Zoning Board of Appeals issued a special use permit to Preble Aggregate Inc. to operate an automobile shredder plant.
    The Brookhaven Planning Board subsequently disapproved Preble’s site plan.
    The Planning Board’s disapproval was based on the argument that Preble’s proposed use violated the Brookhaven Town Code.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Suffolk County, initially ruled in favor of Preble Aggregate.
    The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Brookhaven Planning Board had the authority to disapprove Preble Aggregate’s site plan based on violations of the Brookhaven Town Code, after the Zoning Board of Appeals had already issued a special use permit determining the use complied with the same code.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Brookhaven Zoning Board of Appeals had already approved the proposed use by issuing a special use permit and determining the use was in compliance with the Brookhaven Town Code, the Brookhaven Planning Board was without power to disapprove the site plan on the grounds that the use violated the Brookhaven Town Code.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that once the Zoning Board of Appeals, the body authorized to determine compliance with the Brookhaven Town Code for special use permits, had already deemed the proposed use compliant, the Planning Board could not subsequently disapprove the site plan based on the same code violations. The court relied on Brookhaven Town Code, § 85-160A and 2 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning [4th ed], § 30.04. The court stated: “The Brookhaven Zoning Board of Appeals, having issued petitioner a special use permit to operate an automobile shredder plant, determined that petitioner’s proposed use was in compliance with the Brookhaven Town Code. The use being so approved, the Brookhaven Planning Board was without power to disapprove petitioner’s site plan on the ground that petitioner’s use violated the Brookhaven Town Code.” The court also noted that the validity of the special use permit itself was not challenged in a separate proceeding and thus was not properly before the court. The dissenting judges agreed with the Appellate Division’s analysis and disposition, emphasizing the importance of upholding the stipulation of judgment absolute.

  • Pleasant Valley Home Construction, Ltd. v. Van Wagner, 41 N.Y.2d 1028 (1977): Zoning Board’s Denial of Special Use Permit Based Solely on Community Opposition is Impermissible

    41 N.Y.2d 1028 (1977)

    A zoning board’s denial of a special use permit for a use specifically contemplated and permitted by the zoning ordinance is impermissible if the denial is based solely on generalized community opposition rather than on specific, supportable findings that the proposed development fails to meet the ordinance’s criteria.

    Summary

    Pleasant Valley Home Construction sought a special use permit to develop a mobile home complex in an area zoned for such use. The Zoning Board of Appeals denied the permit, citing community opposition. The Court of Appeals held that the denial was impermissible. Because the zoning ordinance contemplated and permitted mobile home developments, the board could not deny the permit solely based on the undesirability of more mobile homes in the area. While the board retains discretion to evaluate permit applications against specific criteria, it cannot bow to generalized community pressure against a permitted use. The court affirmed that the board could impose reasonable conditions on the permit to mitigate any adverse effects of the development, but it could not deny the permit outright based on public opposition alone.

    Facts

    Pleasant Valley Home Construction, Ltd. applied for a special use permit to construct a mobile home complex within the Town of Pleasant Valley. The proposed site was located in an area where the town’s zoning ordinance permitted mobile home developments. The Zoning Board of Appeals denied the application.

    Procedural History

    The applicant appealed the Zoning Board’s denial. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, which had likely annulled the Zoning Board’s denial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a zoning board may deny a special use permit for a use contemplated and permitted by the zoning ordinance solely on the basis of generalized community opposition to that use, rather than on specific findings related to the ordinance’s criteria.

    Holding

    No, because the zoning ordinance contemplates and permits mobile home development, the zoning board is estopped from denying a special permit solely because more mobile homes in the area would be undesirable. The denial of the application was impermissible as it was based primarily on community pressure rather than specific objections to the proposed development’s compliance with the zoning ordinance criteria.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the town’s zoning ordinance already designated mobile home developments as a permissible use within the specified zone, the zoning board’s discretion was limited. The board could not deny a special use permit simply because the community opposed further mobile home development in general. The court distinguished between denying a permit based on legitimate concerns about a specific project’s failure to meet the ordinance’s requirements and denying it solely because of generalized opposition to the permitted use itself. The Court cited North Shore Steak House v. Board of Appeals, noting that the ordinance itself reflects a legislative determination that the use is acceptable. However, the court emphasized that zoning boards retain the authority to impose “authentically reasonable conditions” on the permit to minimize any adverse effects on the surrounding community. The court explicitly stated, “On the entire record in this case, however, it is evident, despite the reasons assigned by the Board of Appeals, that petitioner’s application was denied not because of any objection peculiar to the proposed development, but because of community pressure directed against allowing any additional mobile home development in the area zoned for mobile homes.” This made the denial impermissible and subject to annulment.

  • Matter of Larkin v. Schwab, 24 N.Y.2d 56 (1969): Upholding Zoning Board Discretion for Multiple Theaters on a Single Lot

    Matter of Larkin v. Schwab, 24 N.Y.2d 56 (1969)

    A zoning board’s interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference if not irrational or unreasonable, and a special permit can be granted for multiple uses on a single zoning lot if it aligns with the zoning resolution’s intent.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a zoning board abused its discretion by granting a special permit for two 500-seat theaters within a single building on one zoning lot, despite the zoning resolution seemingly limiting permits to one theater per lot. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Board of Standards and Appeals (Board) did not abuse its discretion. The Court reasoned that the Board’s interpretation of its zoning resolution was reasonable, especially considering the unique design elements mitigating potential negative impacts and the absence of an explicit prohibition against multiple theaters on a single lot. This case demonstrates judicial deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations when those interpretations are reasonable and further the underlying goals of the regulatory scheme.

    Facts

    Solow sought a special permit to construct a 45-story building with two 500-seat movie theaters in the basement, located in a Cl-9 Zoning District where theaters require special permits. The initial plan included a shared, depressed plaza waiting area. The Board granted the permit for both theaters, requiring staggered showtimes and off-street waiting areas to minimize disruption to the neighborhood. Petitioner, a nearby property owner, challenged the permit grant.

    Procedural History

    The Board of Standards and Appeals granted Solow a special permit for two theaters and extensions for construction. The lower court confirmed the Board’s determination. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, annulling the permit for the second theatre. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Board abused its discretion or acted illegally by granting a special permit for two 500-seat theaters on a single zoning lot, considering the zoning resolution’s limitations on theater capacity and the potential impact on the surrounding neighborhood.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Board’s interpretation of the zoning resolution was reasonable and not irrational, and the design features mitigated any adverse effects on the community. The Zoning Resolution does not explicitly prohibit granting a special permit for more than one 500-seat theater on a single zoning lot. There is no reason to distinguish two theaters on a large single zoning lot from two theaters on separate, adjoining lots.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that zoning resolutions should be construed to effectuate their intended purposes: maintaining local retail shops and minimizing inconvenience to nearby residents. The Court found the Board’s approval reasonable, especially considering the staggered showtimes, separate exits onto parallel streets, and the depressed plaza waiting area accommodating up to 1,000 patrons. The Court noted that the zoning resolution did not explicitly prohibit multiple theaters on a single lot. Comparing the situation to separate theaters on adjacent lots, the Court deemed the proposed arrangement more beneficial to the neighborhood due to the coordinated scheduling and design. The Court also deferred to the Board’s interpretation of its own regulations, stating that “the construction given statutes and regulations by the agency responsible for their administration, if not irrational or unreasonable, should be upheld.” The court found substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination that the theaters would benefit the community, enhance property values, and boost the local economy. The court concluded that granting extensions for construction completion was also within the Board’s discretion, as delays were due to tenant eviction issues, not the developer’s ineptness. The Court explicitly states “The Zoning Resolution (§ 73-20) “does not prohibit granting a special permit for more than one 500-seat theater on single zoning lot. There is no reason to distinguish two theaters on a large single zoning lot from two theaters on separate, adjoining lots.”