New York Law Review

Tag: special proceeding

  • Solkav Solartechnik, G.m.b.H. v. Besicorp Group Inc., 91 N.Y.2d 482 (1998): Whether Confirmation of Arbitration Award Requires a New Special Proceeding

    Solkav Solartechnik, G.m.b.H. v. Besicorp Group Inc., 91 N.Y.2d 482 (1998)

    When a prior special proceeding to stay arbitration ends in a final judgment, a subsequent application to confirm the arbitration award must be brought as a new special proceeding.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a motion to confirm an arbitration award can be brought under the same caption and index number as a previously dismissed petition to stay arbitration. The New York Court of Appeals held that it cannot. Because the dismissal of the initial proceeding constitutes a final judgment, a subsequent application to confirm an arbitration award requires the commencement of a new special proceeding. This ruling clarifies the interpretation of CPLR 7502(a) and ensures proper procedural handling of arbitration-related disputes in New York courts.

    Facts

    Solkav and Besicorp entered into a licensing and distribution agreement with a broad arbitration clause. A dispute arose regarding royalty payments, leading Besicorp to initiate arbitration. Solkav, an Austrian corporation, objected to the application of the AAA’s Commercial Rules instead of the Licensing Rules and requested a non-U.S. citizen arbitrator. When these requests were denied, Solkav commenced a special proceeding in New York Supreme Court to stay the arbitration.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially transferred venue to Ulster County and then dismissed Solkav’s petition to stay arbitration under CPLR 7503(b) because Solkav had “participated” in the arbitration; Solkav did not appeal. Arbitration proceeded, resulting in an award favoring Besicorp. Besicorp then moved in the original 1992 special proceeding to confirm the award. Solkav cross-moved to dismiss, arguing that the initial proceeding had terminated. Supreme Court granted Besicorp’s motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, after the dismissal of a party’s initial petition to stay arbitration, a later application to confirm an arbitration award can be brought by way of motion under the same caption and index number as the initial proceeding, or whether a new proceeding must be brought.

    Holding

    No, because the dismissal of the initial proceeding is a final judgment, a subsequent application to confirm an arbitration award requires a separate special proceeding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the interpretation of CPLR 7502(a), which states that “[a] special proceeding shall be used to bring before a court the first application arising out of an arbitrable controversy which is not made by motion in a pending action… All subsequent applications shall be made by motion in the pending action or the special proceeding.” The Court emphasized that a special proceeding terminates with an order directing judgment and determining the rights of the parties. Referencing Matter of Wilaka Constr. Co. [New York City Hous. Auth.], 17 NY2d 195, 204, the court noted that the special proceeding ends once arbitration has been stayed or compelled.

    The Court reasoned that a post-arbitration application to confirm or vacate an award must be framed within a new special proceeding because the pre-arbitration proceeding has concluded. It stated: “It follows, therefore, that a postarbitration application to confirm or vacate an award must be framed within a new special proceeding because the prearbitration proceeding has ended” (Matter of Village of Greenwood Lake v Mountain Lake Estates, 189 AD2d 987). The Court interpreted the word “pending” in CPLR 7502(a) to apply both to actions and special proceedings.

    The Court acknowledged arguments that all arbitration-related applications should be treated as one continuing proceeding but deferred to the legislature to make such changes if desired. The practical implication is that parties must initiate a new special proceeding, with a new index number, to confirm an arbitration award after a prior proceeding to stay arbitration has been concluded by a final judgment. The Court concluded that Besicorp’s failure to commence a new proceeding was a “fatal misstep.”

  • Goodman v. Hayduk, 45 N.Y.2d 804 (1978): Consequences of Filing an Unverified Petition in Election Law

    45 N.Y.2d 804 (1978)

    In special proceedings under Article 16 of the Election Law, the proceeding must be initiated with a verified petition, as an unverified petition does not meet the statutory requirements.

    Summary

    This case concerns a special proceeding brought under Article 16 of the Election Law. The petitioners initiated the proceeding with an order to show cause accompanied by an unverified petition. The New York Court of Appeals held that because Section 16-116 of the Election Law requires the proceeding to be “heard upon a verified petition,” the unverified petition was insufficient to institute the proceeding. The court reasoned that requiring a verified petition serves practical purposes and advances the policy behind the statute, emphasizing the importance of adhering to the statutory requirements in election law matters.

    Facts

    Petitioners, Arthur Goodman et al., commenced a special proceeding under Article 16 of the Election Law against Albert T. Hayduk et al., who constituted the Board of Elections of Westchester County, and Raymond McNamara. The proceeding was initiated via an order to show cause. The petition annexed to the order to show cause was unverified. Respondent challenged the initiation of the proceeding based on the lack of verification.

    Procedural History

    The petitioners sought relief in a lower court, which ruled against them. They appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the lower court’s decision. The petitioners then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a special proceeding under Article 16 of the Election Law is properly commenced when the initial petition served with the order to show cause is unverified, despite Section 16-116 requiring that such proceedings be “heard upon a verified petition.”

    Holding

    No, because Section 16-116 of the Election Law explicitly requires that special proceedings under Article 16 be heard upon a verified petition, and allowing an unverified petition to initiate the proceeding would undermine the statute’s intent and practical application.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, emphasizing the statutory requirement for a verified petition in special proceedings under Article 16 of the Election Law. The court reasoned that adherence to this requirement serves practical purposes and advances the policy behind Section 16-116. The majority opinion stated, “To find an unverified petition nonetheless acceptable to institute the special proceeding would not serve practical purposes or advance the policy behind section 16-116 of the Election Law.” By requiring verification, the statute ensures a level of certainty and accountability in election-related challenges. The dissent argued that serving a verified petition before the hearing, even if not at the commencement of the proceeding, complies with the law’s literal requirements. The dissent noted, “There is of course no express statutory requirement that the proceeding be commenced by service of a show cause order with a verified petition annexed, nor is there any authority from this court for imposing such a requirement.” However, the majority’s focus on the practical implications and policy considerations suggests a strict interpretation of the statute to maintain the integrity of election proceedings.

  • State Commission for Human Rights v. Lieber, 23 N.Y.2d 253 (1968): Appealability of Orders in Special Proceedings

    23 N.Y.2d 253 (1968)

    An order in a special proceeding brought by the State Commission for Human Rights to enforce its order is appealable as of right to the Appellate Division, as it is treated as an appeal from a judgment in a special proceeding.

    Summary

    The State Commission for Human Rights appealed the dismissal of its appeal concerning an order denying its application to enforce its order against Sary Lieber. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds, deeming the Special Term’s order an unappealable intermediate order. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the order was appealable as of right because the proceeding was not an Article 78 proceeding but a special proceeding to enforce the Commission’s order under Section 298 of the Executive Law. This distinction meant CPLR 5701(a)(1) applied, allowing an appeal as of right in a special proceeding.

    Facts

    The State Commission for Human Rights sought to enforce an order against Sary Lieber. The Supreme Court, Special Term, denied the Commission’s application and vacated the Commission’s order, remitting the matter for a new hearing with proper notice. The Commission appealed this decision to the Appellate Division.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Special Term, denied the Commission’s application to enforce its order. The Appellate Division dismissed the Commission’s appeal, holding that the order of the Special Term was an intermediate order and not appealable as of right. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and subsequently reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an order of the Supreme Court, Special Term, denying the State Commission for Human Rights’ application to enforce its order, vacating the Commission’s order, and remitting the matter for a new hearing, is appealable as of right to the Appellate Division.

    Holding

    Yes, because the proceeding was instituted by the Commission to enforce its order pursuant to Section 298 of the Executive Law, making it a special proceeding rather than an Article 78 proceeding. As such, it falls under the purview of CPLR 5701(a)(1), which allows appeals as of right in special proceedings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from those involving Article 78 proceedings, where intermediate orders are not appealable as of right under CPLR 5701(b)(1). The court emphasized that this proceeding was initiated by the Commission to enforce its order under Section 298 of the Executive Law, which at the time, provided that Supreme Court determinations should be treated as appeals from a judgment in a special proceeding. CPLR 5701(a)(1) allows appeals as of right from any final or interlocutory judgment in an “action” originating in the Supreme Court. CPLR 105(b) defines “action” to include a special proceeding. The court reasoned that since this was not an Article 78 proceeding, the general language of 5701(a)(1) applied, making the order appealable as of right. The court stated, “At the time this proceeding was instituted, section 298 provided that the Supreme Court would have exclusive jurisdiction in such proceedings, and review from their determinations should be treated in the same manner as any appeal from a judgment in a special proceeding.” Thus, the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter for a consideration of the merits, clarifying that the appeal should have been heard on its merits rather than dismissed on procedural grounds.

  • State Commission for Human Rights v. Senti, 29 N.Y.2d 254 (1971): Appealability of Intermediate Orders in Special Proceedings

    State Commission for Human Rights v. Senti, 29 N.Y.2d 254 (1971)

    An order of the Supreme Court vacating a State Commission for Human Rights order and remitting the matter for a new hearing is appealable as of right to the Appellate Division because it is a final or interlocutory judgment in a special proceeding, and is not an Article 78 proceeding.

    Summary

    The State Commission for Human Rights appealed the Appellate Division’s dismissal of its appeal from a Supreme Court order. The Supreme Court had vacated the Commission’s order against the respondents and remitted the matter for a new hearing, citing improper notice. The Appellate Division dismissed the Commission’s appeal, holding the Supreme Court’s order was an unappealable intermediate order. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Supreme Court’s order was appealable as of right because the enforcement proceeding initiated by the Commission was a special proceeding, not an Article 78 proceeding, thus falling under the general rule allowing appeals from final or interlocutory judgments.

    Facts

    The State Commission for Human Rights issued an order against the respondents, presumably related to a human rights violation. The respondents contested the order, arguing they did not receive proper notice of the initial proceedings. The Supreme Court, Queens County, agreed with the respondents after reargument, vacated the Commission’s order, and remitted the case back to the Commission for a new hearing, directing that proper notice be given this time.

    Procedural History

    1. The State Commission for Human Rights issued an order against the respondents.
    2. The respondents challenged the order in Supreme Court, Queens County.
    3. The Supreme Court vacated the Commission’s order and remitted the matter for a new hearing.
    4. The Commission appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Department.
    5. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal, deeming the Supreme Court’s order an unappealable intermediate order.
    6. The Court of Appeals granted the Commission leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an order of the Supreme Court vacating a State Commission for Human Rights order and remitting the matter for a new hearing is appealable as of right to the Appellate Division.

    Holding

    Yes, because the proceeding to enforce the Commission’s order is a special proceeding under the CPLR, and the Supreme Court’s order was a final or interlocutory judgment, not an unappealable intermediate order in an Article 78 proceeding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on whether the Supreme Court’s order was appealable as of right. The Appellate Division relied on cases involving Article 78 proceedings, where intermediate orders are generally not appealable as of right. However, the Court of Appeals distinguished this case, noting that the proceeding was initiated by the Commission to enforce its order under Section 298 of the Executive Law, making it a special proceeding, not an Article 78 proceeding. The Court cited CPLR 5701(a)(1), which allows appeals as of right from any final or interlocutory judgment in an action originating in the Supreme Court. CPLR 105(b) defines “action” to include a special proceeding. The court stated that 5701 (subd. [b], par. 1), which restricts appeals from intermediate orders in Article 78 proceedings, does not apply here. Therefore, the general rule allowing appeals from final or interlocutory judgments in special proceedings applied. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for consideration of the merits, concluding that an appeal as of right did lie. The court noted that at the time of the proceeding, Section 298 provided that review from Supreme Court determinations should be treated in the same manner as any appeal from a judgement in a special proceeding.