New York Law Review

Tag: special law

  • Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. City of New York, 97 N.Y.2d 378 (2001): Constitutionality of Special Laws Under Home Rule Doctrine

    Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. City of New York, 97 N.Y.2d 378 (2001)

    A special law that relates to the property, affairs, or government of a locality is constitutional if enacted upon a home rule message or if the provision bears a direct and reasonable relationship to a substantial state concern.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute between the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA) and the City of New York regarding collective bargaining. The central issue is the constitutionality of Chapter 641 of the Laws of 1998, which amended the Taylor Law, giving the State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) jurisdiction over impasse resolution for police and fire unions. The Court of Appeals held that Chapter 641 is a constitutional special law because it serves a substantial state concern related to public safety. Furthermore, PERB has jurisdiction over scope of bargaining issues when resolving impasses, but the City Board of Collective Bargaining (BCB) retains jurisdiction in other contexts.

    Facts

    The PBA and the City were in a collective bargaining dispute after their most recent agreement expired. The City filed a scope of bargaining petition with the BCB, arguing some of the PBA’s demands were not mandatory subjects of bargaining. The PBA argued the BCB lacked jurisdiction, asserting that PERB had final say. The PBA filed a declaration of impasse and a declaratory ruling petition with PERB. The City then filed an improper practice charge with BCB, alleging the PBA had not engaged in good faith bargaining. Both parties then filed declaratory judgment actions.

    Procedural History

    The actions were consolidated in Albany County Supreme Court, which granted the PBA’s motion, upholding the constitutionality of the statute. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding Chapter 641 a general law of statewide application. The City appealed to the Court of Appeals as of right on constitutional grounds, and the BCB appealed by leave granted.

    Issue(s)

    1. Is Chapter 641 a special law that violates the home rule provisions of the New York State Constitution?

    2. Which agency, PERB or BCB, has jurisdiction to determine the scope of mandatory collective bargaining in negotiations between the City and the PBA?

    Holding

    1. No, because Chapter 641, although a special law, serves a substantial state concern, and thus the home rule requirements were not implicated.

    2. PERB has jurisdiction over scope of bargaining issues between the PBA and the City only to the extent necessary for PERB to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction to resolve impasses. Until such time, BCB retains jurisdiction to determine scope of bargaining outside of the impasse context.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while Chapter 641 is a “special law” because it primarily affects New York City and a few surrounding counties, it addresses a substantial state concern: fostering orderly resolution of collective bargaining disputes involving police and fire units to enhance public safety. The Court relied on the stated purpose and legislative history of the act. “The substantial State concern supporting the enactment of chapter 641 is expressed in section 1 of the statute: it is to foster “orderly resolution of collective bargaining disputes involving police and fire bargaining units * * * to enhance public safety and prevent the loss or interruption of vital public services” (L 1998, ch 641, § 1).” Therefore, the home rule requirements were not triggered.

    Regarding jurisdiction, the Court held that PERB’s jurisdiction is limited to resolving impasses. To do so, PERB must determine what qualifies as a proper condition of employment. While the BCB also has the power and duty to determine whether a matter is within the scope of collective bargaining under New York City Collective Bargaining Law § 12-309, Chapter 641 did not divest BCB of all authority to determine scope of bargaining issues arising from collective negotiations between the City and police and fire unions. The Court noted the legislature did not amend Civil Service Law § 205 (5) (d), which authorizes BCB to exercise jurisdiction over improper practice charges, including a charge that a party is refusing to negotiate in good faith concerning terms and conditions of employment. The Court found that the legislature intended to equip PERB with all the powers it needs to resolve impasses but not to otherwise disturb BCB’s improper practice jurisdiction.

  • Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 64 N.Y.2d 744 (1984): Upholding Special Laws Related to State Concerns Despite Local Impact

    Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 64 N.Y.2d 744 (1984)

    A special law that affects the property, affairs, or government of a local entity is constitutional if its subject matter is of sufficient importance to the state generally, even if it has a localized application and directly affects basic local interests.

    Summary

    This case concerns the constitutionality of ECL 27-0704, a special law limiting solid waste disposal by landfill in Nassau and Suffolk Counties. The Town of Islip challenged the law, arguing it violated the home rule provisions of the New York Constitution. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the law was constitutional because its purpose—protecting the Long Island aquifer, a crucial water source—was a matter of state-wide concern. The Court emphasized that the state can legislate on matters of state concern even if such legislation affects local matters.

    Facts

    The New York State Legislature enacted ECL 27-0704 to phase out landfilling on Long Island to protect the sole source aquifer from pollution. The legislative findings stated that land burial of solid waste posed a significant threat to groundwater quality in Nassau and Suffolk Counties, where the potable water supply derives from a sole source aquifer. The statute restricted landfill disposal in these counties. The Town of Islip, affected by the law, challenged its constitutionality.

    Procedural History

    The Town of Islip initiated a proceeding seeking review of administrative action and a declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court, Suffolk County, declared ECL 27-0704 invalid, finding it violated the home rule provisions of the New York Constitution because it was a special law concerning only Nassau and Suffolk Counties without a statement of state-wide concern. The respondents appealed directly to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether ECL 27-0704, a special law limiting landfill disposal in Nassau and Suffolk Counties, violates Article IX, Section 2(b)(2) of the New York Constitution, which restricts the legislature’s power to act by special law in relation to the property, affairs, or government of a local government.

    Holding

    1. No, because the law addresses a matter of significant state concern—protecting the drinking water supply—and therefore falls within the legislature’s power under Article IX, Section 3(a)(3) of the New York Constitution, which allows the legislature to act on matters other than the property, affairs, or government of a local government.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the constitutional limitation on the legislature’s power to enact special laws concerning local governments must be read in conjunction with the provision that allows the legislature to act on matters other than local property, affairs, or government. The Court emphasized that the protection of the drinking water for a substantial portion of the state’s population is a matter of general state concern. The court cited previous cases upholding state legislation affecting local interests, such as legislation protecting the water supply of Rochester and establishing a sewer authority for Buffalo.

    The court quoted Matter of Kelley v McGee, 57 NY2d 522, 538 stating that if “the subject matter of the statute is of sufficient importance to the State generally to render it a proper subject of State legislation * * * the State may freely legislate, notwithstanding the fact that the concern of the State may also touch upon local matters”.

    The court acknowledged that ECL 27-0704 was a special law limited to Nassau and Suffolk Counties. However, it found that this did not invalidate the statute because the subject matter—protection of the Long Island aquifer—was a matter of state-wide concern. The court concluded that the state’s interest in protecting its natural resources, as mandated by Article XIV, Section 4 of the New York Constitution, justified the enactment of ECL 27-0704, even though it directly affected the towns’ use of their property for landfills.