New York Law Review

Tag: Special Injury

  • Marvin v. Village of Painted Post, 26 N.Y.3d 306 (2015): Standing in SEQRA Cases and the ‘Special Injury’ Requirement

    Marvin v. Village of Painted Post, 26 N.Y.3d 306 (2015)

    To establish standing in land use matters under SEQRA, a plaintiff must demonstrate a harm that is different in kind or degree from that suffered by the public at large, even if others in the community also experience the harm.

    Summary

    This case concerns a challenge to a water sale and rail loading facility project in the Village of Painted Post, NY, under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA). The central issue is whether a local resident, John Marvin, had standing to sue the Village based on increased train noise from the project. The lower courts disagreed on whether Marvin suffered a ‘special injury’ distinct from the general public’s. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that Marvin’s claims of noise pollution, arising from his proximity to the project and increased rail traffic, were sufficient to establish standing. The court clarified that harm need not be unique to confer standing, but must be different in kind or degree from that experienced by the general public. The court emphasized that to deny standing in this case would effectively shield governmental actions from judicial review and emphasized that multiple individuals experiencing similar harms does not negate the existence of a ‘special injury’ for purposes of establishing standing.

    Facts

    The Village of Painted Post entered into a surplus water sale agreement with SWEPI, LP, for the sale of water and leased land to Wellsboro & Corning Railroad (Wellsboro) for a water transloading facility. The Village determined the water sale was a Type II action and issued a negative declaration for the lease agreement. Construction began, and petitioners, including several organizations and individual residents, initiated an Article 78 proceeding. The petition alleged violations of SEQRA, including failure to consider environmental impacts and improper segmentation of the project review. John Marvin, a resident near the proposed rail loading facility, alleged he was adversely affected by increased train noise. Respondents moved to dismiss for lack of standing. Marvin submitted an affidavit stating the increased noise kept him awake.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted summary judgment for petitioners, finding Marvin had standing and the Village had violated SEQRA. The Appellate Division reversed, finding Marvin lacked standing because the noise he complained of was not different in kind or degree from the public at large, focusing that the source of the noise (i.e. the trains themselves) passed throughout the village. The Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether John Marvin, a resident near a water transloading facility, has standing to challenge the Village’s actions under SEQRA, based on allegations of increased train noise affecting his quality of life?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Marvin’s allegations of increased train noise constituted a harm different in kind or degree from the general public, thus establishing his standing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reaffirmed the principle from Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk that for standing in land use matters, a plaintiff must show a ‘special injury’ different from the public at large. The court distinguished Marvin’s situation from a scenario where the public experienced indirect effects. Marvin, like those in Save the Pine Bush was directly impacted. The court emphasized that the harm need not be unique, and that the fact that others may experience the same harm does not preclude standing. The court held that the Appellate Division applied an overly restrictive analysis, which would shield government actions from judicial review. The court noted that Marvin’s allegations about train noise were distinct because they were directly related to the increased train traffic.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the ‘special injury’ requirement for standing in SEQRA cases in New York. Attorneys should advise clients that standing is not automatically denied because others experience the same harm. A plaintiff can establish standing by demonstrating a direct, particularized harm resulting from a project’s impacts on their property. It is critical to emphasize the nature and degree of a plaintiff’s injury. This case suggests that if governmental action causes a real injury to a property, even if others in the vicinity are also impacted, standing may be present. When drafting pleadings, attorneys should ensure that the injury is described with enough specificity and that it falls within the zone of interests protected by SEQRA. The Court emphasized the need to avoid overly restrictive interpretations of standing rules to allow for judicial review of governmental decisions.

  • Engel v. CBS, Inc., 93 N.Y.2d 195 (1999): Establishing ‘Special Injury’ for Malicious Prosecution

    Engel v. CBS, Inc., 93 N.Y.2d 195 (1999)

    In New York, a malicious prosecution claim requires a showing of ‘special injury,’ meaning the defendant suffered a concrete harm considerably more burdensome than the typical demands of defending a lawsuit, akin to the effect of a provisional remedy.

    Summary

    Attorney Donald Engel sued CBS for malicious prosecution after CBS sued him in a prior action to allegedly interfere with his representation of his client, Donald Thomas Scholz. The Second Circuit certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the ‘special injury’ element of a malicious prosecution claim under New York law. The Court of Appeals held that New York law requires a showing of special injury, but it is not limited to situations where a provisional remedy was imposed. However, the Court found that Engel’s allegations, as presented in the certified question, did not demonstrate a sufficient undermining of his representation to constitute special injury.

    Facts

    CBS sued the rock group Boston and its leader, Donald Thomas Scholz, for breach of contract. Scholz hired Engel to represent them. Engel successfully negotiated a contract with MCA Records on Scholz’s behalf. CBS then sued MCA, Scholz, Engel, and others, alleging breach of contract and copyright infringement based on the MCA deal. Engel claimed CBS sued him, in part, to dissuade him from representing Scholz. Engel alleged that this created conflicts of interest, made effective service to Scholz more onerous, increased the burden of discovery requests, and caused him to absorb these costs. He also claimed to have lost at least one potential client and suffered emotional and financial harm due to damage to his reputation.

    Procedural History

    The District Court granted Engel’s motion for summary judgment in the CBS action, dismissing him as a defendant. Engel then commenced a malicious prosecution action in the Central District of California. The California Federal court granted CBS’s motion for summary judgment, which was reversed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that New York law applied. The case was transferred to the Southern District of New York, which granted CBS’s motion for summary judgment. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals then certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the special injury requirement under New York law.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an attorney, sued by his client’s adversary for the purpose of interfering with the attorney’s zealous representation of his client, and whose representation is actually undermined by the suit, may satisfy the required element of special injury in an action for malicious prosecution of a civil lawsuit under New York law where no provisional remedy is had against him.

    Holding

    No, because under the specific facts presented in the certified question, Engel did not demonstrate the requisite added grievance, or a sufficient undermining of his representation, to constitute special injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged the argument against the special injury requirement, noting its English origins and the American rule on attorney’s fees. However, the Court emphasized that New York law has consistently required special injury in malicious prosecution claims, citing Williams v. Williams and other cases. The Court stated that the special injury requirement ensures open access to the courts and prevents endless litigation. While special injury typically involves interference with person or property, such as through a provisional remedy (arrest, attachment, or injunction), the Court clarified that special injury is not confined to the imposition of a provisional remedy. The court found that a verifiable burden substantially equivalent to the provisional remedy effect can amount to special injury. It must be a concrete harm considerably more cumbersome than the physical, psychological, or financial demands of defending a lawsuit.

    Regarding Engel’s situation, the Court found that the allegations of injury presented in the certified question fell short of the special injury standard. The Court stated, “The question itself begs us to assume that an attorney-client relationship was ‘actually undermined,’ but on the facts given to us, we cannot so conclude.” The Court noted that Engel complained about the burdens imposed by the conflict of interest but that avoiding conflicts and dealing with actual conflicts are part of the lawyer’s profession. The court explained that although his burden was slightly increased, it did not form the critical mass necessary to be cognizable as special injury. The Court also noted that the claims of lost business were too general and not sufficient to establish special injury. The court emphasized the need to balance concerns of open access to courts with preventing the courts from being used for oppression and harassment, echoing the sentiment in Burt v. Smith. Although the court found CBS’s actions reprehensible, the consequences never materialized to the degree necessary to constitute special injury. The Court stated that a malicious civil prosecution is one that is begun in malice, without probable cause, and which, after imposing a grievance akin to the effect of a provisional remedy, finally ends in failure: “see, Burt v Smith, supra, 181 NY, at 5“. The Court explicitly declined to create a special rule for attorneys.