New York Law Review

Tag: Special Facts Exception

  • Rocky Point Drive-In, L.P. v. Town of Brookhaven, 22 N.Y.3d 730 (2014): Applying the ‘Special Facts’ Exception in Land Use Cases

    Rocky Point Drive-In, L.P. v. Town of Brookhaven, 22 N.Y.3d 730 (2014)

    A landowner seeking to avoid the application of current zoning laws based on the ‘special facts’ exception must demonstrate both entitlement to the requested land use permit as a matter of right under the prior zoning law and that the municipality acted in bad faith, engaged in unjustifiable actions, or abused administrative procedures.

    Summary

    Rocky Point sought to develop a Lowe’s Home Improvement Center on its property in Brookhaven. After numerous attempts by the Town to rezone the property to a classification that would prohibit the development, Rocky Point argued that its site plan application should be reviewed under the prior, more favorable zoning provision, citing the ‘special facts’ exception. The Court of Appeals held that Rocky Point failed to meet the exception’s requirements. Specifically, Rocky Point was not entitled to the permit as a matter of right under the previous zoning law, and the Town’s actions did not constitute bad faith or abuse of administrative procedures. Therefore, the current zoning law applied.

    Facts

    Rocky Point owned land in Brookhaven previously used as a drive-in theater and golf range, uses that became nonconforming under a new “commercial recreation” (CR) zoning classification in 1997. The property was initially zoned “J Business 2” (J-2), which permitted retail stores but not “commercial centers” exceeding five acres. Rocky Point (and its predecessor) repeatedly sought approval to build a Lowe’s Center, a commercial center exceeding five acres. The Town attempted multiple times to rezone the property to CR, but faced legal challenges. Rocky Point argued the Town selectively enforced zoning requirements against it. Rocky Point’s site plan application did not comply with the J-2 zoning requirements because the proposed Lowe’s Center exceeded the acreage limit for commercial centers.

    Procedural History

    Sans Argent, Rocky Point’s predecessor, initially sued the Town after its rezoning efforts failed. Supreme Court initially declared the Town’s rezoning invalid twice. Rocky Point then filed the instant action seeking a declaration that its application was subject to the old J-2 zoning due to the Town’s delays. Supreme Court initially granted summary judgment to the Town, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding triable issues of fact. After a non-jury trial, Supreme Court found for Rocky Point, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding the determinations unsupported by evidence. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the ‘special facts’ exception to the general rule that a case must be decided based on the law as it exists at the time of the decision applies, such that Rocky Point’s site plan application should be reviewed under the previous J-2 zoning classification.

    Holding

    No, because Rocky Point failed to demonstrate entitlement to the requested land use permit as a matter of right under the J-2 zoning classification and failed to show that the Town acted in bad faith, engaged in unjustifiable actions, or abused administrative procedures.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied the general rule that land use cases are decided based on the law in effect when the application is decided. However, the “special facts” exception applies if the landowner establishes entitlement to the underlying land use application as a matter of right and demonstrates “extensive delay indicative of bad faith,” “unjustifiable actions” by municipal officials, or “abuse of administrative procedures.” The Court found that Rocky Point did not meet the threshold requirement of entitlement to the permit as a matter of right because the proposed Lowe’s Center exceeded the acreage limit for commercial centers under the J-2 zoning. The Court rejected Rocky Point’s argument that the Town selectively enforced the zoning requirements, agreeing with the Appellate Division that Rocky Point failed to provide sufficient factual support for this claim. The Court stated, “[t]he record clearly demonstrates that similarly situated applicants referred to by Rocky Point were not similarly situated at all; they either fell within an exception or were within compliance with the J-2 zoning classification.” The Court also clarified that even under a negligence standard, the special facts exception would not apply because Rocky Point could not meet the initial zoning requirements. Because Rocky Point failed to meet the threshold requirement of entitlement as of right, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

  • Putnam Armonk, Inc. v. Village of Ocean Beach, 45 N.Y.2d 732 (1978): The Special Facts Exception to Zoning Law Amendments

    Putnam Armonk, Inc. v. Village of Ocean Beach, 45 N.Y.2d 732 (1978)

    A property owner is entitled to a building permit if the application complies with existing zoning regulations at the time of submission, and the municipality’s unjustifiable delay in processing the application should not allow a subsequent zoning amendment to defeat the owner’s right to the permit.

    Summary

    Putnam Armonk, Inc. sought a building permit in the Village of Ocean Beach to expand his dwelling. The Village repeatedly delayed processing the application and ultimately denied it based on a zoning amendment enacted after the application was submitted but before it was decided. The New York Court of Appeals held that the “special facts exception” applied because the Village officials used dilatory tactics, presenting unsatisfactory reasons for the denial, and acted arbitrarily in an attempt to deny Putnam Armonk his right to expand his property. Therefore, the Court ordered the building permit to be issued.

    Facts

    Putnam Armonk, Inc. owned property in the Village of Ocean Beach with a four-bedroom dwelling. On September 28, 1972, he applied for a building permit to add two bedrooms, a bath, and a den. The application was rejected due to prior zoning violations. A revised application was submitted on March 28, 1973, seeking to add one bedroom, a bath, a den, and a deck. The Village officials delayed acting on the application, leading to an Article 78 proceeding compelling them to act. The building inspector finally denied the application on March 9, 1974. The Village then amended the zoning ordinance on May 4, 1974, limiting one-family dwellings to four bedrooms, effective May 19, 1974.

    Procedural History

    Putnam Armonk initially commenced an Article 78 proceeding to compel the building inspector to act on his application, which was granted by the Supreme Court. After the building inspector denied the application, Putnam Armonk appealed to the Zoning Board of Appeals, which also denied the application, citing prior zoning violations and the new four-bedroom limit. Special Term annulled the Board’s decision and ordered the permit’s issuance. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the amended zoning ordinance was controlling. Putnam Armonk then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “special facts exception” applies, preventing the retroactive application of a zoning amendment enacted after a building permit application was filed, where the municipality engaged in dilatory tactics and the applicant complied with existing zoning regulations at the time of application.

    Holding

    Yes, because Putnam Armonk complied with all zoning requirements when he submitted his application, and the Village officials engaged in unjustifiable delays and arbitrary actions to deny the permit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized the general rule that a case must be decided based on the law as it exists at the time of the decision. However, the Court invoked the “special facts exception,” which prevents the application of a zoning amendment if the permit should have been granted before the amendment’s enactment. The court stated that “This administrative procrastination, calculated to deny a property owner his right to use this land in a currently lawful manner, is supportable neither by law nor by sound and ethical practice”. The building inspector admitted that the application complied with all zoning regulations when submitted. The Court emphasized the Village’s dilatory tactics, including refusing to act on the application, delaying action after being compelled by court order, and relying on improper grounds for denial (prior violations and personal reasons). The Court found these actions arbitrary and designed to frustrate Putnam Armonk’s right to a building permit. As a result, the Court held that the zoning amendment should not apply and ordered the permit to be issued. The Court reasoned that, absent the Village’s improper delays, Putnam Armonk would have acquired a vested right to the permit before the amendment took effect.