New York Law Review

Tag: Special District Attorney

  • Matter of Haggerty v. Rensselaer County, 84 N.Y.2d 918 (1994): Authority of Special District Attorney to Hire Staff

    Matter of Haggerty v. Rensselaer County, 84 N.Y.2d 918 (1994)

    A Special District Attorney, like a District Attorney, must obtain prior approval from the County Court or Board of Supervisors before hiring additional legal staff at public expense.

    Summary

    This case concerns the scope of a Special District Attorney’s authority to hire staff and receive compensation for their services. The Court of Appeals held that a Special District Attorney, possessing powers coextensive with those of a District Attorney, must obtain prior approval from the County Court or Board of Supervisors before hiring additional legal staff at public expense. Because the Special District Attorney in this case failed to obtain such approval, the County Court lacked the authority to order compensation for services rendered by anyone other than the Special District Attorney himself. This ruling reinforces the principle that the power to appoint a Special District Attorney should be invoked sparingly and not interpreted expansively.

    Facts

    An attorney was appointed as Special District Attorney pursuant to County Law § 701. He sought compensation for hours billed by associates in his law firm and for the services of a law clerk. The County Court authorized payment for these services. However, the Special District Attorney had not obtained prior approval for compensation to members of his staff. The County Attorney objected to payment for anyone other than the Special District Attorney himself.

    Procedural History

    The County Court initially authorized payment for the services of the Special District Attorney’s staff. The County Attorney objected. The Appellate Division rejected the County’s argument that only the appointed attorney could be compensated but reduced the award, finding the hourly rates excessive. The Special District Attorney appealed to the Court of Appeals, challenging the reduction in compensation and arguing for broader hiring powers.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a Special District Attorney has the authority to hire additional staff (associates and law clerks) and receive public compensation for their services without prior approval from the County Court or Board of Supervisors.

    Holding

    1. No, because a Special District Attorney’s powers are coextensive with those of a District Attorney, and a District Attorney requires approval from the County Court or Board of Supervisors before hiring legal staff at public expense; absent such approval, the County Court lacked authority to order compensation for services rendered by persons other than the Special District Attorney.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that County Law §§ 700, 701, 702, and 703 place strict limitations on a District Attorney’s power to hire staff, requiring approval from the County Board of Supervisors or County Judge depending on the position. Because a Special District Attorney possesses all the powers and duties of a District Attorney regarding the matter for which they were appointed, they are similarly constrained in their ability to hire staff at public expense. The court emphasized that a Special District Attorney’s powers are “coextensive with those of a District Attorney.” The Court cited People v. Leahy, stating that legislative authorization to appoint a Special District Attorney should be invoked sparingly and not interpreted expansively. The court declined to recognize broader hiring powers for a Special District Attorney than those conferred upon elected District Attorneys. Because the Special District Attorney did not obtain prior approval for compensating his staff, the County Court lacked the legal authority to order compensation for their services.

  • People v. Leahy, 72 N.Y.2d 510 (1988): Scope of Authority for Special District Attorney

    People v. Leahy, 72 N.Y.2d 510 (1988)

    A Special District Attorney appointed under County Law § 701 to investigate and prosecute a “particular case” is limited to that specific case and cannot investigate or prosecute other cases arising from the same incident without a separate appointment.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a Special District Attorney appointed under County Law § 701, with authority limited to a “particular case,” exceeded his authority by indicting an individual not named in the original appointing order, even though the indictment stemmed from the same incident. The court emphasized that the statute authorizing the appointment of a Special District Attorney must be narrowly construed to protect the authority of the elected District Attorney. The subsequent order appointing the Special District Attorney to prosecute Leahy did not retroactively validate the initial unauthorized indictment.

    Facts

    Thomas Leahy, an off-duty Housing Authority police officer, was allegedly beaten by five individuals. The District Attorney sought the appointment of a Special District Attorney due to a conflict of interest. The appointing order specified the case as “People v. Alexander Coules, Joseph Guiliani, Damon Hewlette, William Salvato and Robert Zambardi.” During the investigation, the Special District Attorney discovered evidence suggesting Leahy had also committed a crime. The Grand Jury returned indictments against the original five defendants and a separate indictment against Leahy for reckless endangerment.

    Procedural History

    The Nassau County Court dismissed the indictment against Leahy, finding that the Special District Attorney exceeded his authority. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the County Court’s dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Special District Attorney appointed under County Law § 701 for a “particular case” has the authority to investigate and prosecute individuals not named in the original appointing order, but whose alleged crimes arose from the same incident.

    Holding

    No, because County Law § 701 explicitly limits the court’s appointing authority to a “particular case” in which the duly elected District Attorney is unable or disqualified to act, and this exceptional superseder authority should not be expansively interpreted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the narrow scope of County Law § 701, designed to address specific instances where the elected District Attorney is unable to act. It stated, “Authority in these circumstances to displace a duly elected District Attorney, an officer of the executive branch of government, with a substitute appointed by a Judge from another branch of government, is derived solely from County Law § 701.” The court reasoned that allowing the Special District Attorney to investigate and prosecute other cases arising from the same incident would violate the statute and the original order of appointment. The court rejected the argument that a 1974 amendment to County Law § 701 broadened the scope of the Special District Attorney’s authority, finding that the amendment only expanded the *duration* of the appointment, not the *scope*. The court distinguished Executive Law § 63(2), which governs the Governor’s appointment of the Attorney General, because that statute does not restrict the appointment to a “particular case.” The court underscored that the judiciary must carefully protect the authority of elected prosecutors, referencing cases such as *Matter of Schumer v Holtzman, 60 NY2d 46*. The court concluded that the Special District Attorney acted *ultra vires* when presenting evidence to the Grand Jury and obtaining the indictment against Leahy, because it exceeded the scope of the “particular case” for which he was appointed. Even the elected District Attorney acknowledged Singer’s lack of authority. The court found it “dismaying” that the case was back to square one given that the special prosecutor could have sought re-presentation to a grand jury under a new, valid order.