New York Law Review

Tag: special circumstances

  • In re Jamar A., 86 N.Y.2d 387 (1995): Establishing ‘Special Circumstances’ for Adjournment of Juvenile Delinquency Hearings

    In re Jamar A., 86 N.Y.2d 387 (1995)

    A juvenile’s unexpected appearance in court after a warrant was issued for their arrest, coupled with the presentment agency’s witness unavailability due to the unscheduled appearance, constitutes a ‘special circumstance’ justifying an adjournment of the fact-finding hearing under Family Court Act § 340.1, even without explicit use of the term ‘special circumstances’ by the court.

    Summary

    Jamar A. was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for unauthorized use of a vehicle. The Appellate Division reversed, citing a violation of Jamar’s speedy trial rights under Family Court Act § 340.1. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the Family Court Judge appropriately granted an adjournment due to “special circumstances” when Jamar A. unexpectedly appeared in court after a warrant had been issued for his arrest for failing to appear at two prior scheduled hearings, and the presentment agency indicated its witnesses were unavailable on that unscheduled date. The court emphasized that the judge’s on-the-record inquiry regarding witness availability and the setting of a mutually agreeable future date satisfied the statute’s requirements for prompt adjudication.

    Facts

    A delinquency petition was filed against Jamar A. on December 3, 1992, charging him with various crimes, including grand larceny and unauthorized use of a vehicle. A fact-finding hearing was initially set for January 11, 1993. The presentment agency requested and received an adjournment to January 20th. Jamar failed to appear on January 20th and February 1st, resulting in a warrant for his arrest and an adjournment to March 1st. Unexpectedly, Jamar and his mother appeared in court on February 25, 1993, before the March 1st scheduled hearing.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court, Bronx County, adjudicated Jamar A. a juvenile delinquent. The Appellate Division reversed the Family Court’s decision and dismissed the petition, concluding that Jamar A. was deprived of his right to a timely fact-finding hearing. Two justices dissented. The presentment agency appealed to the Court of Appeals as of right.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Family Court Judge erred in adjourning the fact-finding hearing based on “special circumstances” under Family Court Act § 340.1(5) and (6) when the juvenile unexpectedly appeared in court after a warrant had been issued for his arrest, and the presentment agency’s witnesses were not available on that date?

    Holding

    Yes, because the unexpected appearance of the juvenile, coupled with the presentment agency’s witness unavailability due to the unscheduled appearance, constituted a “special circumstance” justifying the adjournment under Family Court Act § 340.1, and the Family Court Judge’s on-the-record inquiry and setting of a new date satisfied the statutory requirements.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Family Court Act § 340.1(5) requires the court to state on the record the reason for an adjournment, and subdivision (6) requires a “showing” of special circumstances. The court found that the Family Court Judge satisfied these requirements. The court noted that the judge made an explicit inquiry regarding witness availability after the juvenile’s unexpected appearance. The combination of the unscheduled appearance, the outstanding warrant, and the witness unavailability, all reflected on the record, constituted “special circumstances.” The court distinguished this case from Matter of Frank C., 70 NY2d 408, Matter of Randy K., 77 NY2d 398, and Matter of Nokia L., 81 NY2d 898, emphasizing that the special circumstances were evident on the face of the record. The court stated, “The words spoken and the action taken in the nisi prius setting constitute an effective and valid satisfaction of what the statute and we require.” The Court reasoned that it was unrealistic to expect police witnesses to be readily available on an unscheduled date. The Court emphasized that its ruling applied the statute to the particular facts of the case as governed by pre-statutory amendment precedents.

  • Guggenheim v. Guggengeim, 48 N.Y.2d 615 (1979): Discretion to Require Bond for Delivery of Property

    Guggenheim v. Guggenheim, 48 N.Y.2d 615 (1979)

    Under CPLR 2701, a court has the discretion to require a party seeking the delivery of personal property held by another to post a bond, especially when special circumstances warrant such security.

    Summary

    This case addresses the court’s discretion under CPLR 2701 to require a party seeking the return of personal property to post a bond. The plaintiff sought the return of artwork held by the defendants, and the lower courts required him to post a bond. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the lower courts did not abuse their discretion. The court reasoned that CPLR 2701 authorizes the court to order the delivery of personal property with such security as the court directs when special circumstances exist. The court also rejected the argument that the bond requirement constituted a de facto attachment violating due process.

    Facts

    The plaintiff sought to compel the defendants to return artwork held by them. The artwork was held in conjunction with a contractual relationship that was in dispute between the parties. The lower court, finding special circumstances, required the plaintiff to post a bond to secure the delivery of the property.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff appealed the lower court’s decision requiring him to post a bond. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the lower courts abused their discretion in requiring the plaintiff to post a bond pursuant to CPLR 2701, given the facts of the case.
    2. Whether the requirement of a bond transforms the court’s action into a de facto attachment, thereby violating the plaintiff’s due process rights.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the court found that special circumstances existed, which is a factor that allows a court to exercise its discretion.
    2. No, because the bond afforded the defendants nothing more than something analogous to a possessory lien, and it was not the lien itself, but the subsequent ex parte sale executed pursuant to that lien which violated the requirements of due process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found no abuse of discretion by the lower courts in requiring the plaintiff to post a bond under CPLR 2701. CPLR 2701 allows a court to order personal property delivered to a party with security as the court directs if, among other reasons, “a party has such property in his possession, custody or control and it belongs or is due another party, where special circumstances make it desirable that payment or delivery to such other party should be withheld”. Since the lower courts found “special circumstances” existed, the Court of Appeals deferred to their discretion.

    The court dismissed the plaintiff’s argument that the bond requirement was a de facto attachment. It reasoned that “The greatest right this bond could be construed to afford to the defendants would be something analogous to a possessory lien.” Citing Sharrock v Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45 NY2d 152, the court noted that due process violations occur when an ex parte sale is executed pursuant to that lien, not the lien itself. The court concluded that the plaintiff received adequate due process during the court’s consideration of his motion under CPLR 2701.