New York Law Review

Tag: Social Services Law

  • Matter of Corr v. Westchester County Dept. of Social Services, 33 N.Y.2d 111 (1973): Establishing Residency for Medical Assistance

    33 N.Y.2d 111 (1973)

    An out-of-state resident who enters New York and is immediately hospitalized or placed in a nursing home can establish residency for medical assistance purposes if they demonstrate a genuine intent to remain in New York, regardless of the duration of their stay or the location of their residence.

    Summary

    Jessie Corr, an elderly widow with a long history of living in New York, moved from New Jersey back to New York to be closer to her family and entered a nursing home. She applied for medical assistance, but the Westchester County Department of Social Services denied her application based on her short residency in the state. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the denial, holding that Corr had established residency in New York despite being in a nursing home, and that the state could not impose a minimum residency requirement for medical assistance. The court emphasized Corr’s intent to remain in New York and her deep-rooted connections to the state.

    Facts

    Jessie Corr, born and raised in New York, lived in Westchester County from 1915 to 1962. After selling her home in 1962, she moved to New Jersey to live with her son. Following her son’s death in 1969, Corr, suffering from arteriosclerosis and unable to care for herself, lived alone in New Jersey. With limited income and most of her family in Westchester, she moved back to New York in November 1971 and was admitted to a private hospital, then transferred to a nursing home in Westchester a week later. She registered to vote in Westchester in February 1972, listing the nursing home as her address.

    Procedural History

    Corr applied for medical assistance in January 1972. The Westchester County Department of Social Services denied her application. Special Term reversed the Department’s decision, finding that Corr had established residency in New York. The Appellate Division reversed Special Term’s decision, reinstating the denial of medical assistance. Corr appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an individual who moves to New York from out-of-state and is immediately placed in a hospital or nursing home can establish residency in New York for the purpose of qualifying for medical assistance payments, despite not residing outside of an institution.

    Holding

    Yes, because Corr demonstrated a genuine intent to establish residency in New York, supported by her lifelong connections to the state and her desire to be closer to her family, regardless of the fact that she resided in a nursing home.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while generally an inmate of an institution does not gain or lose residency, an exception exists when the individual pays their own way, is free to come and go, and has no other place of abode, demonstrating an intent to establish the institution as their permanent home. The court emphasized Corr’s 78 years of life in New York, her family in Westchester, her abandonment of her New Jersey home, and her registration to vote in Westchester. The court cited Shapiro v. Thompson, stating that states cannot impose minimum residency requirements for public assistance, as such requirements violate the Equal Protection Clause and the right to travel. The court distinguished this case from situations where someone enters a state solely for medical care. The court found that Corr’s primary motivation was to be closer to family and re-establish her life in New York, not simply to obtain medical assistance. The court held that once residence is established, New York cannot deny assistance based on the short duration of the renewed residence. As the court noted, the petitioner established “bona fides of her residence in New York.”

  • Lascaris v. Wyman, 31 N.Y.2d 386 (1972): Public Assistance Eligibility for Striking Workers

    Lascaris v. Wyman, 31 N.Y.2d 386 (1972)

    Striking workers who register with the Department of Labor and meet all other eligibility requirements are entitled to public assistance under New York Social Services Law § 131, as being “unable to maintain themselves,” and receiving such assistance does not violate the state’s policy of neutrality in labor disputes or federal labor law preemption principles.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether striking workers are eligible for public assistance in New York State. The Onondaga County Commissioner of Social Services sought to deny public assistance to striking workers, arguing that they were not “unable to maintain themselves” as required by Social Services Law § 131. The New York Court of Appeals held that striking workers who register with the Department of Labor and meet other eligibility requirements are entitled to public assistance. The court reasoned that the state’s long-standing administrative policy allowed such assistance and that the legislature had not clearly prohibited it. Furthermore, providing public assistance to strikers does not violate the state’s neutrality in labor disputes or federal labor law.

    Facts

    Members of the Communication Workers of America went on strike against the New York Telephone Company in 1971. Certain members of local unions applied for public assistance from the Onondaga County Department of Social Services. As required by Social Services Law § 131(4), the applicants registered with the local employment agency of the Department of Labor. Their applications were denied by the County Commissioner.

    Procedural History

    The County Commissioner brought an action against the State Commissioner seeking confirmation of his decision to deny assistance. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing collateral estoppel and res judicata based on a prior case, Lascaris v. Wyman (61 Misc.2d 212). The Supreme Court, Special Term, ruled in favor of the County Commissioner. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the State Commissioner and directing the county to pay public assistance to eligible striking workers.

    Issue(s)

    Whether striking workers who register with the Department of Labor and meet all other eligibility requirements are entitled to public assistance under New York Social Services Law § 131.

    Holding

    Yes, because the state’s long-standing administrative policy allows such assistance, the legislature has not clearly prohibited it, and providing public assistance to strikers does not violate the state’s neutrality in labor disputes or federal labor law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the language of Social Services Law § 131(1), which states that social services officials have a duty to provide for those “unable to maintain themselves.” Subdivision 4 of the law stipulates that assistance should not be given to an “employable person” who has not registered with the Department of Labor or has refused to accept suitable employment. The court reasoned that a person on strike does not necessarily “refuse” employment merely by going on strike. Citing Strato-O-Seal Mfg. Co. v. Scott, 72 Ill. App. 2d 480 and ITT Lamp Div. of Int. Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Minter, 435 F.2d 989, the court noted that other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion under similar statutes. The court also noted the 1971 amendment to subdivision 4 which defined “employable” person. The court suggested that the amendment could be considered legislative approval of the State Commissioner’s long-standing construction of the statute.

    The court addressed the argument that providing welfare benefits to strikers is equivalent to state subsidization of the strike, violating the state’s policy of neutrality. The court stated that such a policy is often an “admirable fiction.” It argued that the State may not be acting neutrally if it allows strikers to obtain public assistance, but it also may not be neutral if it denies them benefits to which they would otherwise be entitled. The court quoted ITT Lamp Div. of Int. Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Minter, 435 F.2d 989, 994-995, that welfare programs address a more basic social need than unemployment compensation. The court concluded that if the legislature considers the current policy impermissible, it should manifest its design in clear and unmistakable terms. Until then, the court will construe the statute as it stands and has been administered.

    The court rejected the argument that a striking worker should be deemed ineligible for assistance because they will likely return to their “struck” employer, thus “refusing to accept any other employment.” The court pointed out that the applicants in this case have registered for other employment and that there is no evidence that they failed to attend job interviews or refused referrals.

    Finally, the court dismissed the argument that granting public assistance to strikers constitutes an unconstitutional interference with federal labor law. The court stated that the State’s interest in providing welfare to its needy citizens is substantial, and it will not assume that Congress has deprived the State of the power to serve that interest absent a clear expression of congressional intent.

  • Matter of Brown v. Wyman, 22 N.Y.2d 433 (1968): Interpreting ‘Like Catastrophe’ in Social Services Law

    Matter of Brown v. Wyman, 22 N.Y.2d 433 (1968)

    When interpreting a statute, the term ‘other like catastrophe’ should be construed in light of the preceding terms, encompassing only events similar in nature, and an administrative agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute it administers should be upheld.

    Summary

    A welfare recipient, Brown, sought replacement of stolen clothing and furniture after a burglary, citing Section 131-a(6) of the Social Services Law, which allows for replacement of necessities lost due to “fire, flood or other like catastrophe.” The New York City Social Services Department denied her claim, a decision upheld by the State Commissioner of Social Services. The lower courts reversed, but the Court of Appeals reversed again, holding that ‘other like catastrophe’ does not include burglary. The court reasoned that the legislative intent, as well as the administrative interpretation, limited the phrase to natural or man-made disasters similar to fire or flood, and that a burglary was too dissimilar to be included.

    Facts

    Brown, a welfare recipient and mother, had her apartment burglarized, resulting in the loss of clothing and furniture. She applied to the New York City Social Services Department for replacement of the stolen items, based on Section 131-a(6) of the Social Services Law. The Social Services Department denied her application.

    Procedural History

    The New York City Social Services Department denied Brown’s application. The Commissioner of the State Department of Social Services affirmed this denial after a hearing. Brown then initiated an Article 78 proceeding. The Appellate Division reversed the Commissioner’s decision, holding that a burglary constituted a “catastrophe” under the statute and remanded the case to determine the appropriate grant amount. The Commissioner appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the phrase “other like catastrophe” in Section 131-a(6) of the Social Services Law includes a burglary, thereby entitling the victim to replacement of stolen items.

    Holding

    No, because the phrase “other like catastrophe” should be construed in light of the preceding terms (“fire, flood”) and encompasses only events similar in nature, and a burglary is not sufficiently similar to a fire or flood to be included within that phrase.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the maxims of statutory construction, ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis, to interpret the phrase “other like catastrophe.” It reasoned that the legislature intended to include only natural occurrences, or man-made ones similar to a fire. The court deferred to the Commissioner’s interpretation, noting that the agency consistently interpreted the statute to exclude burglaries, stating that “statutory construction is the function of the courts ‘but where the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court’s function is limited’”. The court emphasized the importance of upholding administrative interpretations unless they are irrational or unreasonable. The court stated that, “The administrative determination is to be accepted by the courts ‘if it has “warrant in the record” and a reasonable basis in law’…‘The judicial function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the administrative body.’” The court acknowledged the unfortunate frequency of burglaries but stated that this did not justify labeling them as “catastrophes” within the meaning of the statute. Changing this interpretation would require legislative amendment, not judicial action.