Smith v. Shell Oil Co., 85 N.Y.2d 1000 (1995)

New York Labor Law § 240(1), which imposes strict liability on owners and contractors for elevation-related risks, does not apply to routine maintenance activities such as changing a lightbulb, even when the task is performed on a structure covered by the statute.

Summary

The plaintiff, a maintenance mechanic, was injured when he fell from a ladder while attempting to change lightbulbs on a Shell Oil sign. He sued Shell Oil, alleging a violation of New York Labor Law § 240(1). The Court of Appeals held that while the sign qualified as a “structure” under the law, replacing a lightbulb constituted routine maintenance, not “repairing” or any other enumerated activity covered by the statute. Therefore, § 240(1) did not apply, and the defendants were not liable. This decision clarifies the distinction between repair and routine maintenance in the context of New York’s scaffolding law.

Facts

The plaintiff, employed by Island Pump and Tank Corp., was assigned to fix an illuminated Shell Oil sign at a Shell service station. He climbed an eight-foot A-frame ladder to inspect the sign. The ladder tipped, causing him to fall and sustain injuries. After the fall, he completed the task and determined that four lightbulbs needed replacement and replaced them.

Procedural History

The plaintiff sued Shell Oil and Rye Shell, relying on Labor Law § 240(1). The defendants initiated an indemnification action against Island Pump and Tank Corp., the plaintiff’s employer. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the defendants and Island, dismissing the complaint, finding the sign was not a structure. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that changing a lightbulb was not “repairing” under the statute. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the Shell sign constitutes a “structure” within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1)?

2. Whether changing a lightbulb constitutes “repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure” under Labor Law § 240(1)?

Holding

1. Yes, because the Shell sign is a “production or piece of work artificially built up or composed of parts joined together in some definite manner”.

2. No, because changing a lightbulb is considered routine maintenance, not “repairing” or any other enumerated activity under Labor Law § 240(1).

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals determined that the Shell sign qualified as a “structure” based on its precedent in Lewis-Moors v. Contel of N.Y., where a telephone pole was deemed a structure. The court reasoned that the sign, like the telephone pole, was artificially built and composed of connected parts. However, the Court distinguished the act of changing a lightbulb from activities covered under Labor Law § 240(1). The Court stated, “An illuminated sign with a burnt-out lightbulb is not broken, and does not need repair. Rather it needs maintenance of a sort different from ‘painting, cleaning or pointing,’ the only types of maintenance provided for in the statute.” By framing the task as routine maintenance rather than repair, the Court limited the scope of § 240(1). The Court emphasized that the statute does not apply to all maintenance activities, only those specifically enumerated. This interpretation narrows the application of the strict liability imposed by § 240(1), preventing it from encompassing every task performed at an elevated height on a structure. The Court’s decision reflects a concern about broadening the scope of the statute beyond its intended purpose, which is to protect workers from the exceptional hazards of elevation-related tasks involving construction, demolition, and significant alterations or repairs. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions.