New York Law Review

Tag: Slip and fall

  • Perez v. American Museum of Natural History, 7 N.Y.3d 836 (2006): Establishing Constructive Notice in Slip-and-Fall Cases

    7 N.Y.3d 836 (2006)

    To establish constructive notice in a slip-and-fall case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the dangerous condition was visible and apparent, and existed for a sufficient period of time prior to the accident to permit the defendant’s employees to discover and remedy it.

    Summary

    In this slip-and-fall case, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, finding that the tenant, Perez, failed to present sufficient evidence that the American Museum of Natural History had constructive notice of the dangerous condition that caused his fall. Perez claimed he tripped over a beer bottle on a stairwell at 5:00 a.m. The court emphasized that the beer bottle was not present the previous night at 8:30 p.m., and no evidence suggested the landlord was notified or that the bottle was present long enough for the defendant’s employees to discover and remove it. Therefore, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that any determination that the bottle was there long enough for the museum to remedy it would be pure speculation.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Perez, a tenant, allegedly tripped over a beer bottle while descending the stairs at the American Museum of Natural History at 5:00 a.m.
    Perez admitted that the beer bottle was not present on the steps at 8:30 p.m. the night before his fall.
    There was no evidence indicating that the landlord was notified of the beer bottle or that it had been present for a sufficient duration for the defendant’s employees to discover and address the hazard.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff initially brought a slip-and-fall case against the American Museum of Natural History.
    The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing lack of constructive notice.
    The Appellate Division ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether the landlord had constructive notice of the dangerous condition (the beer bottle) in the stairwell.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff failed to present evidence demonstrating that the beer bottle was present for a sufficient period to allow the defendant’s employees to discover and remedy the condition. The court concluded any other determination would be pure speculation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court based its reasoning on the established principle that to demonstrate constructive notice, the dangerous condition must be visible, apparent, and exist for a sufficient length of time before the accident to allow the defendant’s employees to discover and remedy it. The court cited Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836, 837 (1986), emphasizing the plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate that the beer bottle was present for a sufficient period. The court stated, “on the evidence presented, the [beer bottle] that caused plaintiff’s fall could have been deposited there only minutes or seconds before the accident and any other conclusion would be pure speculation” (id. at 838). The absence of evidence regarding the bottle’s duration on the stairs and the lack of notification to the landlord led the court to conclude that any finding of constructive notice would be based on speculation. This case highlights the importance of timing and evidence in establishing constructive notice in premises liability claims. Landlords are not insurers of their property, but they have a duty to maintain their property in a reasonably safe condition; this case emphasizes that a plaintiff must prove the landlord had adequate opportunity to address the specific hazard.

  • TSS Seedman’s, Inc. v. Nicholas, 94 N.Y.2d 770 (1999): Establishing Constructive Notice in Premises Liability Cases

    TSS Seedman’s, Inc. v. Nicholas, 94 N.Y.2d 770 (1999)

    The mere presence of a deteriorated condition (e.g., a blackened banana peel) on a premises does not, by itself, establish constructive notice to the property owner, which is necessary to prove negligence in a slip-and-fall case.

    Summary

    Plaintiff slipped on a blackened banana peel in defendant’s store and sued for damages, arguing the peel’s condition indicated the defendant had constructive notice of the hazard. The defendant initially sought summary judgment, which was denied. After a jury trial finding the defendant mostly liable, the defendant appealed, arguing insufficient proof of constructive notice. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s verdict, finding that the plaintiff did not establish constructive notice. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the mere fact that the banana peel was blackened was insufficient to establish constructive notice. The plaintiff had to prove that the store owner either knew of the condition or that the condition existed long enough that they should have known of it.

    Facts

    Plaintiff-wife slipped and fell on a blackened banana peel in the housewares section of a department store operated by defendant TSS Seedman’s, Inc.

    Plaintiff sued, contending the peel’s blackened state indicated the defendant knew or should have known of the dangerous condition.

    Defendant argued there was no triable issue of fact regarding notice.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

    The defendant appealed, but the appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute.

    After a trial, the jury found the defendant 95% liable and the plaintiffs 5% liable.

    The defendant appealed again, arguing insufficient proof of constructive notice.

    The Appellate Division reversed, concluding the plaintiffs didn’t establish constructive notice.

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in hearing the defendant’s appeal after the defendant failed to prosecute an earlier appeal on the same issue.

    Whether the blackened state of the banana peel, by itself, was sufficient to establish constructive notice of the dangerous condition to the defendant.

    Holding

    No, the Appellate Division did not err, because an appellate court has the discretion to entertain a second appeal even after a prior appeal on the same issue was dismissed for failure to prosecute.

    No, because the simple fact that the peel was blackened did not, by itself, establish constructive notice. There was no evidence the defendant knew about the banana peel or that it had been on the floor long enough for notice to be inferred.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals cited Bray v Cox, 38 NY2d 350, 353, stating that “a prior dismissal for want of prosecution acts as a bar to a subsequent appeal as to all questions that were presented on the earlier appeal.” However, the court also acknowledged the appellate court’s discretion to hear a second appeal on the same issue. Thus, the Appellate Division had the authority to hear the appeal.

    On the merits, the court relied on the principle that to establish constructive notice, there must be evidence the defendant either knew of the condition or that the condition existed long enough that notice might be inferred. Citing Anderson v Klein’s Foods, 73 NY2d 835, 836, and Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836, 837-838, the court emphasized the lack of evidence regarding how long the banana peel had been on the floor. The court reasoned that the condition of the banana peel alone was not enough to infer the store owner knew or should have known about it. The Court emphasized a plaintiff must present evidence beyond the mere existence of the hazard to prove constructive notice, focusing on the duration of the hazard to establish the store owner’s opportunity to discover and remedy it. The court stated: “There was no evidence that defendant knew about the banana peel, or that it had been on the floor long enough prior to the accident that notice might be inferred.”

  • Murphy v. City of Elmira, 84 N.Y.2d 963 (1994): Establishing Negligence for Slippery Conditions

    Murphy v. City of Elmira, 84 N.Y.2d 963 (1994)

    A claim of negligence based on a slippery floor requires evidence beyond the mere smoothness of the flooring; there must be evidence of a negligent application of wax or polish, or some other specific defect or dangerous condition.

    Summary

    Stephanie Murphy sued the City of Elmira and related entities for injuries sustained after she slipped and fell in the Eastowne Mall. She alleged negligence in maintaining a slippery and unsafe floor. The lower court denied summary judgment for the defendants based on expert testimony that the floor’s friction coefficient was below industry standards. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the expert’s opinion essentially stated the floor was too slippery, and absent evidence of negligent application of wax or polish, no liability could be imposed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiff failed to establish factual issues precluding summary judgment, as there was no evidence of the reason for her fall other than the tiles being smooth.

    Facts

    Stephanie Murphy fell on the floor of the Eastowne Mall, owned by the City of Elmira and maintained by the Elmira Urban Renewal Agency. She was walking in the common area of the mall, approximately six feet away from her employer’s doorway. Murphy testified that she fell, but was unsure why, other than the tiles being smooth. She sued, alleging the defendants were negligent in allowing the floor to be slippery and unsafe. There was no evidence that the tiles were wet, contained debris, or had been recently polished or waxed.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, relying on the plaintiff’s expert’s opinion regarding the floor’s friction coefficient. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish negligence on the part of the defendants for maintaining a slippery and unsafe floor in the Eastowne Mall.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff offered no evidence of the reason for her fall other than the tiles being smooth, and the expert’s affidavit was conclusory and insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a negligence claim based on a slippery floor requires more than just the floor’s smoothness. The court distinguished this case from situations involving wet floors, debris, or recent polishing/waxing. The Court acknowledged that expert testimony indicating deviation from industry standards could normally preclude summary judgment. However, in this case, the expert’s affidavit was deemed conclusory because it lacked specificity regarding the exact location of the fall and failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. The Court referenced Kline v. Abraham, stating that absent evidence of negligent application of wax or polish, liability would not be imposed based solely on a floor being slippery due to smoothness. The court stated, “Ordinarily, the opinion of a qualified expert that a plaintiff’s injuries were caused by a deviation from relevant industry standards would preclude a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.” However, the court found the expert’s opinion insufficient in this case. Because Murphy presented no other evidence to substantiate the alleged negligence, summary judgment was deemed appropriate.

  • Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History, 67 N.Y.2d 836 (1986): Establishing Constructive Notice in Premises Liability Cases

    Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History, 67 N.Y.2d 836 (1986)

    To establish constructive notice in a premises liability case, the defect must be visible, apparent, and exist for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to permit the defendant’s employees to discover and remedy it.

    Summary

    The plaintiff, Gordon, sued the American Museum of Natural History for injuries sustained after slipping on a piece of paper on the museum’s steps. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, dismissing the complaint because the plaintiff failed to prove that the museum had either actual or constructive notice of the paper. The court held that the mere presence of the paper, without evidence of how long it had been there or its condition suggesting prolonged existence, was insufficient to establish constructive notice. This case underscores the evidentiary burden on plaintiffs in premises liability cases to demonstrate that a defendant had adequate opportunity to discover and remedy a dangerous condition.

    Facts

    Gordon slipped and fell on the front entrance steps of the American Museum of Natural History. He testified that he slipped on the third step from the top and noticed a piece of white, waxy paper near his foot while falling. He alleged the paper came from a concession stand on the plaza and that the museum was negligent for failing to remove it.

    Procedural History

    The case was tried before a jury, which found the museum liable. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The Court of Appeals granted the museum leave to appeal, certifying the question of whether the Appellate Division’s order was properly made.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant had either actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition (the piece of paper) that caused the plaintiff’s fall.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff failed to provide evidence that the defendant had actual notice of the paper. Further, the plaintiff did not show that the paper was visible and apparent and existed long enough for the defendant’s employees to discover and remedy it, which is necessary to prove constructive notice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found no evidence that the museum had actual notice of the paper. To establish constructive notice, the court reiterated the standard: “a defect must be visible and apparent and it must exist for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to permit defendant’s employees to discover and remedy it.” The court emphasized the absence of evidence indicating how long the paper had been on the steps. The plaintiff didn’t describe the paper as dirty or worn, which could have suggested it had been there for a while. The court concluded that the paper could have been deposited just moments before the accident, making any other conclusion speculative. The court distinguished this case from others where constructive notice was established through additional evidence. The court stated that general awareness of potential litter or other papers in the area was insufficient to establish constructive notice of the specific paper the plaintiff fell on. The defect in the plaintiff’s case was the lack of evidence establishing constructive notice of the particular condition that caused the fall, not the inability to prove causation. As the court of appeals stated, a finding of liability based on the submitted evidence would be pure speculation.

  • Koehler v. Grace Lines, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 631 (1977): Establishing Negligence in Slip-and-Fall Cases Involving Waxed Floors

    Koehler v. Grace Lines, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 631 (1977)

    To establish a prima facie case of negligence for a slip and fall on a waxed floor, the plaintiff must present sufficient evidence demonstrating that a dangerous residue of wax was present on the floor.

    Summary

    Koehler sued Grace Lines, Inc. for injuries sustained after slipping and falling. The central issue was whether Koehler presented sufficient evidence to prove Grace Lines negligently applied wax to the floor, creating a dangerous condition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding that the evidence presented was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of negligence. The court emphasized that the plaintiff failed to adequately demonstrate that the fall was caused by a dangerous wax residue, distinguishing it from cases where such evidence was present.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Koehler, slipped and fell. Koehler then sued Grace Lines, Inc., alleging negligence in the application of wax to the floor. The specific factual details regarding the location of the fall or the circumstances surrounding it are not elaborated upon in the Court of Appeals memorandum opinion, but the key issue revolved around the nature of the floor’s surface after waxing.

    Procedural History

    The lower court’s decision was appealed to the Appellate Division, which ruled in favor of Grace Lines, Inc. The plaintiff then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, thus upholding the decision in favor of the defendant, Grace Lines, Inc.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of negligence by demonstrating that a dangerous residue of wax was present on the floor, leading to the slip and fall.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence presented was insufficient to establish that the plaintiff slipped on a dangerous residue of wax. The court distinguished this case from those where such evidence was adequately demonstrated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the principle that to establish negligence in a slip-and-fall case involving wax, there must be sufficient evidence of a dangerous wax residue. The court distinguished the case from precedents like Conroy v. Montgomery Ward & Co., where evidence of such residue was present. The court stated, “A prima facie case of the negligent application of wax may be established by evidence that a dangerous residue of wax was present on the floor.” However, the court found that in this specific instance, the plaintiff’s evidence fell short of demonstrating that the fall was caused by such a residue. The court explicitly referenced Rempe v. Betts, indicating a similar lack of evidence connecting the fall to a wax residue. The absence of sufficient evidence linking the fall to a dangerous condition created by the wax application was fatal to the plaintiff’s claim. The court focused on the evidentiary burden required to prove negligence in these types of cases, underscoring the need for concrete evidence of a dangerous condition directly resulting from the defendant’s actions.

  • Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History, 67 N.Y.2d 836 (1986): Establishing Constructive Notice of a Dangerous Condition

    Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History, 67 N.Y.2d 836 (1986)

    To demonstrate constructive notice of a dangerous condition, a plaintiff must show that the defect was visible and apparent, and existed for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to permit the defendant to discover and remedy it.

    Summary

    Plaintiff Gordon sued the American Museum of Natural History for injuries sustained when she fell on a broken step. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the museum had constructive notice of the dangerous condition. The court emphasized the importance of the defect’s appearance and duration in establishing constructive notice, noting the jury could infer, based on photographs and testimony, that the condition existed long enough for the museum to have discovered and remedied it through reasonable care. The court also addressed objections to the trial court’s jury instructions, finding no reversible error.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Gordon fell on a stairway within the American Museum of Natural History. She claimed the fall was caused by a broken or defective step. She introduced photographic evidence purporting to depict the condition of the step at the time of the accident. Plaintiff and her daughter provided testimony regarding the step’s condition. The defense argued lack of notice of the defect and challenged the accuracy and timing of the photographs.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff won a jury verdict at trial. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the defendant had constructive notice of the defective condition on the stairway.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in its jury instructions regarding notice and foreseeability.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the jury could infer from the photographs and testimony regarding the irregularity, width, depth, and appearance of the defect that the condition existed for a sufficient length of time that the defendant should have acquired knowledge of it in the exercise of reasonable care.
    2. No, because the court’s charge essentially paralleled the proffered instruction regarding notice, and the charge adequately incorporated the substance of the request regarding the absence of prior accidents.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on whether the record supported the jury’s verdict regarding constructive notice. It emphasized that the jury was entitled to consider the photographs and testimony presented by the plaintiff to determine if a negligent condition existed and if it proximately caused the plaintiff’s fall. The court stated, “Specifically, the jury could have inferred from the irregularity, width, depth and appearance of the defect apparent from the concrete surface exhibited in the photographs, that the condition had to have come into being over such a length of time that knowledge thereof should have been acquired by the defendant in the exercise of reasonable care.” The court cited prior cases, including Blake v City of Albany and Batton v Elghanayan, to support this principle.

    Regarding the defendant’s objections to the jury instructions, the court found that the trial court’s charge essentially paralleled the defendant’s requested instruction regarding the specific step where the defect was located. Furthermore, the court noted that no objection to the charge as given was lodged by defendant’s counsel as required by CPLR 4110-b. As for the absence of prior accidents, the court held that the charge, taken as a whole, adequately incorporated the substance of this request. The court referenced Spinelli v Licorich and Gross v City of New York to support its conclusion that the charge was adequate.