Tag: Slander of Title

  • Rosenbaum v. City of New York, 8 N.Y.3d 1 (2006): Sufficiency of Notice of Claim for Tort Actions Against Municipalities

    Rosenbaum v. City of New York, 8 N.Y.3d 1 (2006)

    A letter from an attorney to a city agency suggesting unmet demands might lead to litigation does not satisfy the requirements of General Municipal Law § 50-e for a valid notice of claim, particularly when special damages are an element of the cause of action and are not adequately described.

    Summary

    Rosenbaum sued the City of New York for slander of title, alleging that improperly filed liens caused him to lose a sale of his property. The City moved to dismiss, arguing Rosenbaum failed to comply with General Municipal Law § 50-e’s notice-of-claim requirements. Rosenbaum argued a letter from his attorney to HPD served as adequate notice. The Court of Appeals held the letter was insufficient because it was tentative, did not specify damages, and appeared as routine correspondence rather than a formal notice of claim, failing to provide the City with adequate information to investigate the claim.

    Facts

    Rosenbaum purchased an apartment building in the Bronx in 1993. He entered into an in rem installment agreement with the City to pay delinquent taxes. Prior to Rosenbaum’s purchase, HPD had loaned money for repairs to the building and subsequently filed liens. Rosenbaum disputed the validity of these liens. His attorney sent a letter to an HPD attorney on August 18, 1994, complaining about the liens and stating that Rosenbaum “may lose his current sale” if the liens weren’t removed, and that “if an action is brought” the owner would be entitled to costs and legal fees.

    Procedural History

    Rosenbaum sued the City in October 1994 for, among other things, slander of title. He served a notice of claim in January 1995 related to a tax foreclosure proceeding. The City moved to dismiss the slander of title claim for failure to comply with notice-of-claim requirements. Supreme Court granted the City’s motion. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the August 18, 1994 letter sufficient notice. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding the letter was insufficient.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a letter from an attorney to a city agency, suggesting that unmet demands might lead to litigation, satisfies the notice-of-claim requirements under General Municipal Law § 50-e for a tort action against a municipality.

    Holding

    No, because the letter was tentative, did not specify the items of damage or injuries claimed, and did not alert the recipient to the imminence of litigation, thus failing to provide the City with sufficient information to investigate the claim as required by General Municipal Law § 50-e.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that the purpose of General Municipal Law § 50-e is to enable the city to investigate claims. The Court stated, “[t]he test of the sufficiency of a Notice of Claim is merely whether it includes information sufficient to enable the city to investigate…” The Court found the August 18, 1994 letter insufficient because it used tentative language (“may lose,” “if an action is brought”), making it appear as routine correspondence rather than a formal notice of claim. The letter also failed to specify the items of damage, particularly the special damages required for a slander of title claim. The Court noted that special damages, such as a lost sale, must be identified with sufficient detail (e.g., the name of the prospective purchaser, the purchase price) to allow the city to investigate. The Court distinguished between ongoing negotiations and a clear notice of an impending lawsuit seeking specific damages. The Court directly quoted Brown v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 389, 393 (2000) stating that courts should focus on “whether based on the claimant’s description municipal authorities can locate the place, fix the time and understand the nature of the [claim].” The court concluded, “Section 50-e does not abet notice of claim by stealth.”