New York Law Review

Tag: Slander

  • Ricketson v. Village of Scarsdale, 56 N.Y.2d 535 (1982): Statute of Limitations and Summary Judgment in Slander Cases

    Ricketson v. Village of Scarsdale, 56 N.Y.2d 535 (1982)

    A cause of action for slander accrues upon utterance, and a subsequent reutterance does not restart the statute of limitations for the initial utterance; additionally, a summary judgment motion can be defeated by an affidavit explaining why direct evidence is unavailable, provided a reasonable excuse is given.

    Summary

    This case concerns a slander action where the plaintiff, Ricketson, alleged two instances of slander by the defendant, the Village of Scarsdale. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the second instance of slander revived the statute of limitations for the first and whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to defeat the defendant’s summary judgment motion. The court held that the statute of limitations barred the claim for the first instance of slander, but the affidavit submitted by the plaintiff was sufficient to overcome the summary judgment motion regarding the second instance. The court emphasized the importance of timely filing and the acceptance of reasonable excuses for failing to present direct evidence.

    Facts

    Ricketson alleged that the Village of Scarsdale slandered him on two separate occasions: in November 1979 and on February 9, 1980. Ricketson commenced an action on February 2, 1981. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the statute of limitations barred the claim based on the November 1979 statement. The plaintiff submitted an affidavit from Chatfield, who claimed Ricketson’s name, the occasion for the interview with Ricketson,. the substance of the slander Ricketson told Chatfield he had heard the defendant utter and, most important, which explained, on Chatfield’s direct knowledge, that Ricketson now refused to give an affidavit as to these facts (thereby supplying acceptable excuse for failure to meet the strict requirement of tender in admissible form).

    Procedural History

    Ricketson filed suit against the Village of Scarsdale. The defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming the statute of limitations barred the claim. The Appellate Division’s order was modified. The Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s order pursuant to rule 500.2(b) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.2[g]), modified the order with costs to the plaintiff, and affirmed it as modified.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the alleged reutterance of the slander on February 9, 1980, restarted the statute of limitations for the initial slanderous statement made in November 1979.

    2. Whether the affidavit submitted by Chatfield was sufficient to defeat the defendant’s summary judgment motion.

    Holding

    1. No, because the reutterance measured the time within which an action could be brought based on that utterance, but did not restart the time running anew for the one that occurred the previous November.

    2. Yes, because Chatfield’s affidavit indicated Ricketson’s name, the occasion for the interview with Ricketson,. the substance of the slander Ricketson told Chatfield he had heard the defendant utter and, most important, which explained, on Chatfield’s direct knowledge, that Ricketson now refused to give an affidavit as to these facts (thereby supplying acceptable excuse for failure to meet the strict requirement of tender in admissible form).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the one-year statute of limitations (CPLR 215, subd. 3) barred the slander claim from November 1979 because the action was commenced on February 2, 1981, more than a year after the initial statement. The court clarified that each instance of slander creates a new cause of action with its own statute of limitations. The second utterance in February 1980 provided a basis for a timely claim, but it did not revive the expired claim from November 1979. Regarding the summary judgment motion, the court found that Chatfield’s affidavit provided a sufficient excuse for not presenting direct evidence in admissible form. The affidavit explained that Ricketson refused to provide an affidavit confirming the slander, and Chatfield’s direct knowledge of the circumstances validated the excuse. The court cited Friends of Animals v. Associated Fur Mfrs., 46 N.Y.2d 1065, 1067-1068, emphasizing that a reasonable excuse for failing to meet strict evidentiary requirements is acceptable to defeat a summary judgment motion.

  • Shapiro v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 417 (1984): Insurance Coverage and Intentional Torts

    Shapiro v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 417 (1984)

    An insurance policy that excludes coverage for personal injury caused intentionally by the insured does not require the insurer to defend or indemnify the insured in a slander action where the complaint alleges the insured spoke maliciously with intent to injure.

    Summary

    Alexander Shapiro, a limited partner in a real estate syndicate, was sued for slander by the general partners. His insurer, Glens Falls Insurance Company, refused to defend him, citing a “business pursuits” exclusion and an exclusion for intentionally caused personal injury. Shapiro then sued the insurer seeking a declaration of coverage. The court found that while the “business pursuits” exclusion did not apply, the policy’s exclusion for personal injury caused intentionally barred coverage because the slander complaint alleged Shapiro acted maliciously with intent to injure the plaintiffs. Therefore, the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify.

    Facts

    Alexander Shapiro, president of a plumbing supply business, invested in a real estate syndicate as a limited partner.

    The general partners of the syndicate sued Shapiro for slander, alleging he falsely and maliciously told other limited partners that the plaintiffs were “phoneying and doctoring the books and records,” “flimflamming, cheating and stealing from the investors.”

    The complaint specifically stated that Shapiro’s statements were made “willfully and maliciously with intent to injure and damage the plaintiffs and their good name, reputation and credit.”

    Shapiro sought coverage from his insurer, Glens Falls Insurance Company, to defend against the slander action.

    Glens Falls denied coverage.

    Procedural History

    Shapiro commenced an action against Glens Falls Insurance Company, seeking a declaration that the insurer was obligated to defend and indemnify him in the slander action.

    The lower courts’ decisions are not specified in the Court of Appeals opinion, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Glens Falls Insurance Company was obligated to defend or indemnify Shapiro in the underlying slander action, given the policy’s exclusion for personal injury caused intentionally by the insured.

    Holding

    No, because the insurance policy specifically excluded coverage for personal injury caused intentionally by the insured, and the slander complaint alleged that Shapiro acted maliciously and with intent to injure the plaintiffs.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court focused on the policy’s definition of “occurrence” and the endorsement excluding coverage for intentional personal injury. The policy defined “occurrence” as “an accident…neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the Insured.” An endorsement to the policy further clarified that the policy “does not apply…to any personal injury…caused intentionally by or at the direction of the Insured.”

    The court reasoned that because the slander complaint alleged Shapiro spoke falsely, willfully, and maliciously with intent to injure, the exclusionary endorsement applied. This meant the alleged conduct fell squarely within the policy’s exclusion for intentional acts. The court distinguished this situation from cases involving negligence or unintentional torts, where coverage might be available.

    The court acknowledged that while the policy’s general summary of coverage indicated that perils like slander were included, this summary was explicitly stated not to be the contract itself and was subject to conditions and exclusions clearly stated in the contract. The exclusionary endorsement was deemed a valid and enforceable part of the insurance contract.

    The court emphasized that the nature of the claim, specifically the allegation of intentional and malicious conduct, triggered the policy exclusion, relieving Glens Falls Insurance Company of its duty to defend and indemnify Shapiro. In essence, the insurer only agreed to cover accidents, not intentional torts. The court effectively highlights the critical importance of aligning the allegations in the underlying complaint with the precise terms and exclusions of the insurance policy.

  • People v. Tylkoff, 212 N.Y. 197 (1914): Outraging Public Decency with Language

    People v. Tylkoff, 212 N.Y. 197 (1914)

    The utterance of vulgar and offensive language in a public place, without legitimate purpose, can constitute an act that openly outrages public decency under Penal Law § 43, even if the language could also be considered slanderous.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of violating Penal Law § 43 for using indecent language about a woman at a public meeting during a strike. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction due to an error in the trial judge’s instructions but addressed whether the indictment properly charged an offense. The court held that while the word “act” in the statute could encompass conduct consisting of words, the primary purpose of the statute was to punish public indecency, not slander. Therefore, using vulgar language publicly, without a valid purpose, can be deemed a violation of public decency, irrespective of whether it also constitutes slander.

    Facts

    A strike was ongoing at or near Mineville, New York, and public meetings were held in Heath’s Hall. The defendant, a strike leader, allegedly said of Marta Barkowska, who was encouraging workers to return to work, “she is a whore” at one of these meetings, in the presence of many people.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted and convicted under Penal Law § 43. He appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the indictment. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals initially overruled a demurrer, then reversed the conviction due to an error in the trial judge’s charge.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the word “act” in Penal Law § 43, which prohibits acts that openly outrage public decency, includes conduct primarily consisting of spoken words.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statute’s purpose is to punish public indecency, and conduct composed of words can be just as indecent and offensive as physical acts, especially when uttered publicly and without legitimate purpose.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Penal Law § 21 requires construing statutory words according to their fair import. Unless otherwise restricted, the word “act” is broad enough to include uttering foul and indecent language in a public gathering. The court refuted the argument that this construction would improperly criminalize slander, stating: “The purpose of the statute is not to punish slander but to punish public indecency, and it requires no argument to demonstrate that language which is intensely slanderous may not be indecent at all, and, conversely, that language which is just as indecent as possible may not involve any element of slander.” The court further noted that the determination of indecency should be tested by the prevailing common judgment and moral sense of the community, and may be influenced by the circumstances under which the act occurs. The court acknowledged that determining indecency in words is no more difficult than determining negligence in an act. Judge Hiscock dissented, arguing for a new trial based on the admission of evidence. “It seems to me quite immaterial whether a person, for instance, is guilty of vulgar and offensive actions and physical display or whether he describes such things by vile and expressive language. The statute is in the interest of decent conduct and for the protection of well-behaved people from the offensive conduct of others and it ought to receive a liberal application.”