New York Law Review

Tag: Site Plan Approval

  • E.F.S. Ventures Corp. v. Foster, 71 N.Y.2d 30 (1987): Limits on Reconsideration of Site Plans After Construction

    E.F.S. Ventures Corp. v. Foster, 71 N.Y.2d 30 (1987)

    When a developer seeks approval for modifications to a site plan after initial construction is completed and the statute of limitations has run on challenges to the original approval, a planning board’s power to impose remedial measures is limited to those demonstrably connected to the environmental impact of the proposed modifications; the board cannot use the modification application as a pretext to correct previously unaddressed issues.

    Summary

    E.F.S. Ventures Corp. sought to develop an oceanside resort. After initial site plan approval and substantial completion of the first phase of construction, a challenge based on SEQRA violations led to a requirement to resubmit a modified site plan. The newly appointed planning board then imposed significant new conditions, including demolition of existing structures. The court held that while the board wasn’t estopped from reviewing the development, it acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The board’s conditions were unrelated to the environmental impact of the proposed modifications and impermissibly sought to address previously approved aspects of the development now protected by the statute of limitations.

    Facts

    E.F.S. Ventures Corp. acquired land in East Hampton, NY, in 1982, planning to develop a motel. The initial site plan was approved in September 1982 for construction on the rear of the property (Phase 1). Construction began immediately and was substantially completed by January 1983. A second application was submitted in January 1983 to modify the original plan, concerning only the front of the property (Phase 2), including a new motel structure, swimming pool, and tennis courts. The Planning Board issued a formal negative declaration under SEQRA, and building permits were issued in March 1983. Construction began promptly. Adjoining landowners commenced an Article 78 proceeding, alleging that the Planning Board approved the modified site plan improperly. At this point 90% of the development proposed in the original site plan had been completed.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially granted a temporary restraining order, which was then lifted. The Nielsen petitioners’ request for a preliminary injunction was denied. Later, the Supreme Court granted the Nielsen petitioners’ Article 78 petition, setting aside the resolution approving the modified site plan and enjoining the issuance of certificates of occupancy. The petitioner resubmitted a modified site plan in November 1983. The Planning Board then issued a positive declaration under SEQRA. In September 1984, the Planning Board approved the modified site plan, subject to conditions objectionable to the petitioner. The petitioner commenced an Article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the September 1984 Planning Board resolution. The petition was dismissed. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s order in the Nielsen case, agreeing that the January 1983 modified site plan was improperly approved but holding the petitioners were foreclosed by the statute of limitations from preventing certificates of occupancy for the previously approved construction. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgments dismissing the petitions in both proceedings. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Planning Board should be equitably estopped from imposing new conditions on the development, given the prior approvals and the developer’s reliance on them.

    2. Whether, upon resubmission of the modified site plan, the Planning Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously by imposing conditions requiring the destruction of improvements completed under a prior approval that was no longer subject to legal challenge.

    Holding

    1. No, because estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental agency to prevent it from discharging its statutory duties under SEQRA.

    2. Yes, because the Board’s conditions were unrelated to the environmental impact of the proposed modifications and impermissibly sought to address previously approved aspects of the development now protected by the statute of limitations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while estoppel generally prevents a party from contradicting prior actions relied upon by another, it cannot be used against a governmental agency to hinder its statutory duties. Applying estoppel would violate the separation of powers by preventing the Planning Board from implementing SEQRA’s environmental review requirements. The court emphasized the state’s strong policy of environmental protection. The Court noted that SEQRA requires consideration of both environmental and economic factors. It found that the Planning Board’s conditions (demolishing existing units) were unrelated to the proposed modifications (construction of Oceanside). The Board used the modification application to address previously existing problems, such as emergency vehicle access, that existed regardless of the new construction. The Court stated, “Specifically, when a Planning Board is considering whether to approve a modification to a site plan where the developer has taken prior action, impervious to attack on SEQRA grounds because of the Statute of Limitations, it is arbitrary and capricious for a Board to condition approval of the modification on the developer’s compliance with remedial measures unless those remedial measures have some demonstrable connection with the environmental impact of the proposed modification.” Because the conditions lacked a demonstrable connection to the environmental impact of the Oceanside construction, the Board’s actions were deemed arbitrary and capricious, warranting the reversal of the lower court’s order.

  • Preble Aggregate Inc. v. Town of Brookhaven, 43 N.Y.2d 1002 (1978): Zoning Board Approval Prevents Planning Board Disapproval

    Preble Aggregate Inc. v. Town of Brookhaven, 43 N.Y.2d 1002 (1978)

    When a zoning board of appeals approves a special use permit determining that a proposed use complies with the town code, the planning board lacks the authority to disapprove a site plan based on a violation of the same town code.

    Summary

    Preble Aggregate obtained a special use permit from the Brookhaven Zoning Board of Appeals to operate an automobile shredder plant. The Brookhaven Planning Board subsequently disapproved Preble’s site plan, arguing the proposed use violated the Brookhaven Town Code. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the Zoning Board had already determined the use was compliant with the Town Code when issuing the special use permit, the Planning Board lacked the authority to disapprove the site plan based on the same code violations. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Facts

    Brookhaven Zoning Board of Appeals issued a special use permit to Preble Aggregate Inc. to operate an automobile shredder plant.
    The Brookhaven Planning Board subsequently disapproved Preble’s site plan.
    The Planning Board’s disapproval was based on the argument that Preble’s proposed use violated the Brookhaven Town Code.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Suffolk County, initially ruled in favor of Preble Aggregate.
    The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Brookhaven Planning Board had the authority to disapprove Preble Aggregate’s site plan based on violations of the Brookhaven Town Code, after the Zoning Board of Appeals had already issued a special use permit determining the use complied with the same code.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Brookhaven Zoning Board of Appeals had already approved the proposed use by issuing a special use permit and determining the use was in compliance with the Brookhaven Town Code, the Brookhaven Planning Board was without power to disapprove the site plan on the grounds that the use violated the Brookhaven Town Code.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that once the Zoning Board of Appeals, the body authorized to determine compliance with the Brookhaven Town Code for special use permits, had already deemed the proposed use compliant, the Planning Board could not subsequently disapprove the site plan based on the same code violations. The court relied on Brookhaven Town Code, § 85-160A and 2 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning [4th ed], § 30.04. The court stated: “The Brookhaven Zoning Board of Appeals, having issued petitioner a special use permit to operate an automobile shredder plant, determined that petitioner’s proposed use was in compliance with the Brookhaven Town Code. The use being so approved, the Brookhaven Planning Board was without power to disapprove petitioner’s site plan on the ground that petitioner’s use violated the Brookhaven Town Code.” The court also noted that the validity of the special use permit itself was not challenged in a separate proceeding and thus was not properly before the court. The dissenting judges agreed with the Appellate Division’s analysis and disposition, emphasizing the importance of upholding the stipulation of judgment absolute.