96 N.Y.2d 164 (2001)

The continuous representation doctrine tolls the statute of limitations in legal malpractice cases where the ongoing representation pertains specifically to the matter in which the attorney committed the alleged malpractice, and the client is not informed or put on notice of the attorney’s withdrawal.

Summary

David Shumsky and Marjorie Scheiber hired attorney Paul Eisenstein to sue a home inspector, Charles Fleischer, for breach of contract. Eisenstein failed to file the lawsuit within the statute of limitations and avoided communicating with his clients. After a grievance was filed, Eisenstein admitted his error. Shumsky and Scheiber then sued Eisenstein for legal malpractice. The court addressed whether the continuous representation doctrine tolled the statute of limitations. The court held that it did because the plaintiffs reasonably believed Eisenstein was still working on their case and they were not notified he had withdrawn from representation, making their malpractice claim timely.

Facts

In April 1993, Shumsky and Scheiber retained Eisenstein to commence an action against Fleischer for breach of contract regarding a home inspection. Eisenstein failed to file the action before the statute of limitations expired in March 1994. He then avoided the clients’ inquiries about the case status. In September 1997, the clients filed a disciplinary grievance. Eisenstein admitted he had failed to file the action on time and was too embarrassed to discuss it with them.

Procedural History

On December 5, 1997, Shumsky and Scheiber sued Eisenstein for legal malpractice. The Supreme Court denied Eisenstein’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the continuous representation doctrine tolled the statute of limitations. The Appellate Division reversed, granting Eisenstein’s motion and dismissing the complaint. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether the continuous representation doctrine tolls the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice action when the attorney fails to take action on the client’s case, but the client reasonably believes the attorney is still representing them.

Holding

Yes, because the plaintiffs retained the defendant for a specific contract claim, reasonably believed the representation was ongoing, and were not informed of the attorney’s withdrawal until shortly before they filed the malpractice claim. The continuous representation doctrine tolls the statute of limitations in such cases.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that a legal malpractice claim accrues when the malpractice is committed. Here, it was when the statute of limitations expired on the underlying breach of contract claim in March 1994. Although CPLR 214(6) was amended in 1996 to shorten the limitations period to three years, the plaintiffs had until September 4, 1997, one year from the amendment’s effective date, to bring suit. The action commenced on December 5, 1997, was therefore time-barred, unless the continuous representation doctrine applied.

The court discussed the continuous representation doctrine, stating that it “recognizes that a person seeking professional assistance has a right to repose confidence in the professional’s ability and good faith, and realistically cannot be expected to question and assess the techniques employed or the manner in which the services are rendered.” The court emphasized that the doctrine applies only to the specific matter in which the malpractice occurred. It distinguished this case from situations where an attorney fails to act, but the client is unaware of the need for further services. Here, the plaintiffs were aware of the need for further representation and were left with the reasonable impression that the attorney was addressing their legal needs. The court highlighted that the plaintiffs’ attempt to contact the defendant in October 1996, inquiring about the status of their case, confirmed this understanding. The court concluded that the continuous representation continued at least until the plaintiffs were put on notice that the representation had ceased, which was no earlier than October 1996. Therefore, the malpractice claim filed less than 14 months later was timely. Even though the attorney was not actively working on the case, the client’s reasonable belief that he was, coupled with his failure to notify them of his withdrawal, triggered the tolling provision. As the court noted, “where the physician and patient reasonably intend the patient’s uninterrupted reliance upon the physician’s observation, directions, concern, and responsibility for overseeing the patient’s progress, the requirement for continuous care and treatment for the purpose of the Statute of Limitations is certainly satisfied”. The same principle applies to attorney-client relationships.