New York Law Review

Tag: Showup Identification

  • People v. Howard, 22 N.Y.3d 388 (2013): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Showup Identifications

    People v. Howard, 22 N.Y.3d 388 (2013)

    A defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on discrete omissions must show that counsel failed to raise a “clear-cut” or “dispositive” argument; showup identifications are permissible under certain circumstances, and the determination of their reasonableness presents a mixed question of law and fact.

    Summary

    Malik Howard and Hilbert Stanley were convicted of first-degree robbery. They appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to pursue an affirmative defense (the displayed weapon was inoperable) and challenging the admissibility of a showup identification. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that counsel’s strategic choices were reasonable, given the misidentification defense pursued, and that record support existed for the lower courts’ determination that the showup was proper under the circumstances, even with a time lapse and distance from the crime scene. The court emphasized that showup determinations are fact-specific and should not be second-guessed absent clear error.

    Facts

    Domingo Lopez was robbed at gunpoint by two men who exited a gray car. One man pressed a gun to Lopez’s head, while the other rifled through his pockets. Lopez reported the crime. Shortly after, police officers stopped a silver car matching the description, driven by Stanley with Howard as a passenger. Officers observed open beer containers and smelled marijuana. A search of the car revealed Lopez’s wallet insert and a black imitation pistol. Lopez was taken to the scene and identified Howard and Stanley as the robbers in a showup identification.

    Procedural History

    Howard and Stanley were indicted for first-degree robbery and other charges. Their motion to suppress the showup identification was denied. They were convicted of first-degree robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed. One of the dissenting Justices granted Howard’s motion for leave to appeal, and a Judge of the Court of Appeals subsequently granted Stanley’s related motion.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Howard and Stanley were deprived of effective assistance of counsel due to their attorneys’ failure to (a) request dismissal of the first-degree robbery count, (b) request a jury charge on the affirmative defense that the displayed weapon was inoperable, and (c) request a clarifying instruction on the basis for the first-degree robbery count?

    2. Whether the showup identification was unduly suggestive and violated Howard and Stanley’s rights?

    Holding

    1. No, because the attorneys’ strategic choices were reasonable given the facts of the case and the misidentification defense pursued.

    2. No, because the showup identification was reasonable under the circumstances, and the lower courts’ determination was supported by the record.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that to establish ineffective assistance based on discrete omissions, a defendant must show that counsel failed to raise a “clear-cut” or “dispositive” argument. Here, there was evidence beyond the BB gun that something was pressed into Lopez’s back, which could legally constitute display of a firearm. The decision not to pursue the affirmative defense could have been strategic, as it would undermine the misidentification defense.

    Regarding the showup identification, the Court noted that while it occurred five miles from the crime scene and after some time had passed, these factors alone did not render it improper. The police stopped the car roughly one hour and 15 minutes after the crime, and Lopez identified the defendants about 45 minutes later. There was no improper suggestion by the police. The Court emphasized that showup determinations are fact-specific and present mixed questions of law and fact, and the lower courts’ determination had record support. The Court quoted People v. Harrison, stating, “[R]easonable minds may differ as to the inference to be drawn… and accords with the general principle long recognized in civil cases that questions of the reasonableness of conduct can rarely be resolved as a matter of law even when the facts are not in dispute.”

    The Court emphasized that showups must be reasonable under the circumstances and not unduly suggestive, but the determination of reasonableness is a mixed question of law and fact, beyond the Court of Appeals’ review if record support exists. The Court stated: “Viewing possible suspects is the entire point of a showup, and the lower courts reasonably found that none of the features of this showup rendered it more prejudicial than any other.”

  • People v. Gilford, 16 N.Y.3d 864 (2011): Admissibility of Showup Identifications and Exigent Circumstances

    People v. Gilford, 16 N.Y.3d 864 (2011)

    A showup identification is permissible if it is reasonable under the circumstances, justified by exigency or temporal and spatial proximity to the crime, and not unduly suggestive.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals upheld the defendant’s manslaughter conviction, finding the showup identification admissible. The showup occurred shortly after a stabbing at a roller skating rink, with the victim in critical condition. A witness identified the defendant, who was apprehended nearby and shown to the witness at the hospital. The Court reasoned that the showup was justified by its temporal and geographic proximity to the crime and the exigent circumstances of the victim’s condition. The Court deferred to the lower court’s finding that the showup was not unduly suggestive, emphasizing the importance of preserving fresh memories.

    Facts

    A fight broke out at a roller skating rink in the Bronx, resulting in the stabbing of James Earl Jones, who later died, and Kyle Williams. A female witness identified Terrell Gilford as Jones’s attacker to a police sergeant at the scene. Gilford fled and was apprehended by other officers a few blocks away. The officers placed Gilford, handcuffed, in their patrol car. The sergeant instructed these officers to transport Gilford to the hospital where Jones was taken for a showup identification, believing Jones was likely to die. At the hospital, the initial witness, along with a male companion, identified Gilford in a showup conducted in the parking lot approximately 45 minutes after the crime. The witness had already identified the defendant to the sergeant.

    Procedural History

    Gilford was indicted by a grand jury. He moved to suppress the showup identifications, arguing the absence of exigent circumstances and the suggestiveness of the procedure. The trial court denied the motion, citing People v. Duuvon. Gilford waived his right to a jury trial and was convicted of first-degree manslaughter for Jones’s death and first-degree assault for Williams’s injuries. The Appellate Division upheld the manslaughter conviction but reduced the assault conviction to attempted assault. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding no basis for suppression of the showup or in-court identifications.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the showup identification was admissible, considering the circumstances surrounding its execution?

    Holding

    Yes, because the showup was reasonable under the circumstances, justified by temporal and spatial proximity to the crime, and the lower courts found it was not unduly suggestive.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, deferring to its finding that the showup was reasonable under the circumstances and not unduly suggestive. The court emphasized that the showup occurred shortly after the crime and in close proximity to the scene, justifying its use to preserve the witnesses’ fresh memories. The court cited People v. Ortiz, stating that the due process inquiry for showups requires determining whether the showup was reasonable under the circumstances (i.e., justified by exigency or temporal and spatial proximity) and, if so, whether the showup as conducted was unduly suggestive. Because the lower courts already determined these to be the case and their decision was supported by evidence, the Court of Appeals held the decision to be beyond further review.

  • People v. Brisco, 99 N.Y.2d 596 (2003): Legality of Showup Identifications

    99 N.Y.2d 596 (2003)

    A showup identification is permissible if conducted in close geographic and temporal proximity to the crime and if the procedure is not unduly suggestive.

    Summary

    Frank Brisco was convicted of attempted burglary. The key evidence was a showup identification made by the victim at the crime scene approximately one hour after the burglary. Brisco, who matched the victim’s initial description, was asked to hold maroon shorts (matching the victim’s description of the perpetrator’s clothing) during the showup. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the showup was reasonable under the circumstances because it was conducted promptly at the crime scene as part of a continuous investigation and the procedure was not unduly suggestive. The court emphasized that the victim independently identified Brisco based on his height, hair color, and build.

    Facts

    On July 6, 1999, at 11:30 AM, police responded to a reported burglary at 51 Mills Pond Road. The victim described the suspect as a shirtless white male, 18-20 years old with brown hair, muscular build, and wearing maroon shorts. Officers found Brisco, who matched the description, at a nearby house at 11:55 AM. Brisco was shirtless, wearing a towel. Later, he wore tan shorts. Inside the house, officers found wet maroon shorts that Brisco claimed were his. At 12:25 PM, police transported Brisco to the victim’s house, where, while holding the maroon shorts, the victim identified him as the person she saw leaving her house, based on height, hair color, and build.

    Procedural History

    Brisco was charged with burglary in the second degree and petit larceny. He pleaded guilty to attempted burglary in the second degree, conditional upon his right to appeal the suppression ruling related to the showup identification. The trial court upheld the showup identification. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the crime scene showup identification of the defendant was unduly suggestive because the defendant, wearing tan shorts and no shirt, was asked to hold a pair of maroon shorts that matched the victim’s description of the perpetrator’s clothing.

    Holding

    No, because the showup was reasonable under the circumstances, taking place at the crime scene within an hour of the crime as part of a continuous investigation, and the procedure was not unduly suggestive, as the victim initially and independently identified the defendant based on his height, hair color, and build.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on precedent allowing showup identifications when conducted in close geographic and temporal proximity to the crime and when the procedure used was not unduly suggestive (citing People v Ortiz, 90 NY2d 533, 537 [1997] and People v Johnson, 81 NY2d 828, 831 [1993]). The court found that the showup took place at the scene of the crime within an hour of the crime’s commission as part of a continuous investigation. Crucially, the court emphasized that the victim had independently identified the defendant based on his height, hair color, and build *before* identifying the maroon shorts. The court stated, “the presence of defendant’s maroon shorts, admittedly his own, did not, as a matter of law, negate the reasonableness of the police action.” The dissenting judge argued that the showup was unduly suggestive because Brisco was required to hold the shorts, effectively singling him out as the perpetrator. The dissent also noted that a lineup would have been a more appropriate identification procedure given the circumstances. The majority distinguished this case from others where showups were deemed improper because those cases often involved a greater lapse of time between the crime and the identification. The court emphasizes that determining the timeliness of a showup should not be a “bright-line rule” and should be assessed case-by-case.

  • People v. Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d 533 (1997): Burden of Proof for Admitting Showup Identification Testimony

    90 N.Y.2d 533 (1997)

    The prosecution bears the initial burden of producing evidence demonstrating that a showup identification procedure was not unduly suggestive, even when conducted in close proximity to the crime.

    Summary

    Enrique Ortiz was convicted of attempted murder and weapons possession after being identified by two police officers he shot at. The officers identified Ortiz in a showup conducted after they received hospital treatment. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving the showup was not unduly suggestive because they presented no evidence about the circumstances of the identification procedure itself. The Court emphasized that while proximity to the crime makes a showup reasonable, the prosecution must still offer evidence of the showup’s fairness.

    Facts

    Two police officers, Colon and Sullivan, responded to a call and encountered Ortiz outside an apartment building. Ortiz shot at the officers, and they returned fire. Ortiz fled into the building. Colon and Sullivan were taken to the hospital for treatment. Another officer, Reardon, arrived and, after investigation, found Ortiz hiding in an apartment within the building. Ortiz was taken to the lobby. Colon and Sullivan were brought back to the scene and identified Ortiz as the shooter. Officer Reardon, the only witness who testified at the suppression hearing, did not witness the showup itself.

    Procedural History

    Ortiz was convicted in the trial court. He moved to suppress the identification testimony, arguing the People had not shown the showup was proper. The trial court denied the motion, finding the showup permissible due to its proximity to the crime. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People met their burden of demonstrating that the showup identification procedure was not unduly suggestive, thus warranting admission of the identification testimony at trial.

    Holding

    No, because the People failed to present any evidence concerning the circumstances of the showup itself to demonstrate the procedure was not unduly suggestive.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that showup identifications are inherently suggestive and disfavored. While showups conducted in close geographic and temporal proximity to the crime are not “presumptively infirm,” they still require careful scrutiny for unacceptable suggestiveness. The Court stated that while the defendant bears the ultimate burden of proving the showup was unduly suggestive, the People first have the burden to produce evidence validating the admission of such evidence. This includes demonstrating the showup was reasonable under the circumstances (proximity to the crime) and producing some evidence relating to the showup itself to demonstrate it was not unduly suggestive.

    The Court noted the absence of any witness who could testify to the circumstances under which Ortiz was identified, stating: “Indeed, from this record, it cannot even be ascertained whether the identification procedure utilized here was a true showup or an impromptu lineup.”

    The Court emphasized the People’s procedural burden is minimal, requiring merely some proof of the circumstances of the on-site identification procedure. The court cited People v. Chipp, stating that “the People have the initial burden of going forward to establish the reasonableness of the police conduct and the lack of any undue suggestiveness in a pretrial identification procedure.” Without such proof, the defendant is unduly prejudiced in their efforts to establish whether an identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive.

  • People v. Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541 (1991): Admissibility of Prompt Showup Identifications

    People v. Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541 (1991)

    Prompt showup identifications of a suspect by witnesses following an arrest at or near the crime scene are generally permissible and are not categorically condemned under the Due Process Clause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a hospital showup identification was impermissibly suggestive, violating the defendant’s due process rights. The victim identified the defendant in a hospital showup after being shot. The Court held that prompt showup identifications are not inherently improper, especially when conducted shortly after the crime. Given the victim’s injury and the need for a prompt identification, the showup was deemed permissible. The court emphasized that such identifications are generally allowed and not presumptively condemned.

    Facts

    On July 25, 1994, the defendant and others passed by James and Mary Webber’s home in Buffalo, New York. The defendant and his companions returned, and the defendant shot James Webber. Mary Webber identified the defendant at the crime scene, although she did not witness the shooting itself. The police transported the defendant to the hospital where James Webber was being treated for a gunshot wound to the abdomen. James Webber identified the defendant at the hospital while the defendant was in handcuffs and bleeding from a head wound.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree after a jury trial. The defendant appealed, arguing that the hospital showup was impermissibly suggestive and violated his due process rights. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the hospital showup identification of the defendant by the victim was impermissibly suggestive, violating the Due Process Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions.

    Holding

    No, because prompt showup identifications by witnesses following a defendant’s arrest at or near the crime scene are generally allowed and have never been categorically or presumptively condemned. Further, given the injury to James Webber and the necessity of a prompt identification, the showup was not unduly suggestive.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s argument that a hospital showup is inherently improper, citing People v. Duuvon, 77 NY2d 541, 544, which stated that “prompt showup identifications by witnesses following a defendant’s arrest at or near the crime scene have been generally allowed and have never been categorically or presumptively condemned.” The Court emphasized the importance of prompt identifications, especially when the victim is seriously injured and a quick determination is necessary. The court found that the showup was not unduly suggestive, considering the circumstances. The court also addressed the defendant’s argument that the identifying witness was told before the identification that the defendant was under arrest, but found that this argument was not supported by the hearing record. The Court’s reasoning centers on balancing the potential for suggestiveness against the practical necessities of immediate identification in the context of an ongoing investigation and the victim’s condition.

  • People v. Johnson, 81 N.Y.2d 730 (1992): Requiring Wade Hearings for Showup Identifications

    People v. Johnson, 81 N.Y.2d 730 (1992)

    A Wade hearing is required to determine if a showup identification procedure was unduly suggestive, unless it falls under a recognized exception such as a confirmatory identification.

    Summary

    Following a robbery, the victim identified the defendant in a showup after police apprehended him in a building. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in concluding, without a Wade hearing, that the identification was free from police suggestion. The Court emphasized that even though the victim initiated the pursuit of the suspect, the showup did not automatically qualify as a confirmatory identification. The court remitted the case for a Wade hearing to determine whether the showup was unduly suggestive, highlighting the potential for police influence during the pursuit and waiting period.

    Facts

    A robbery victim and his sister informed nearby police officers that he had been robbed of jewelry, allegedly at gunpoint, in his building’s elevator. The victim accompanied the officers in their marked police car, canvassing the adjacent block. The victim identified a person he believed to be the robber. As the police approached in their vehicle, the suspect, wearing a brown sheepskin jacket and a black baseball hat, fled into an apartment building. An officer pursued the suspect on foot. Backup officers arrived and searched the building. The jacket and hat were found on the third floor. The defendant was apprehended in the stairwell and presented to the victim on the ground floor landing, where the victim identified him. Neither a gun nor the stolen jewelry was recovered.

    Procedural History

    The trial court concluded, without holding a Wade hearing, that the victim’s identification was free of police suggestion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals modified the order, remitting the case to the Supreme Court for a Wade hearing. If the hearing determined police suggestiveness tainted the showup, the defendant would be entitled to a new trial; otherwise, the judgment of conviction and sentence should be amended to reflect the hearing’s result.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Wade hearing is required to determine if a showup identification procedure was unduly suggestive when, after a robbery, the victim identifies the defendant in a showup after police apprehended him in a building, even though the victim initially pointed out the defendant to the police.

    Holding

    Yes, because the showup identification procedure does not automatically fall into the category of confirmatory identifications, and a hearing is necessary to determine if police suggestiveness tainted the procedure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court erred in determining the identification was free from police suggestion without holding a Wade hearing. The court noted that even though the victim initiated the police chase, the subsequent showup did not automatically qualify as a confirmatory identification, which is a recognized exception to the Wade hearing requirement. The court emphasized the need to examine the circumstances surrounding the identification to determine if it was unduly suggestive. The court stated, “Absent a hearing, it is impossible to discern whether the police had any influence on the victim during the pursuit immediately following the robbery, or to evaluate the effect on the identification procedure of the time the victim spent waiting in the police car outside the building while the police were searching for the perpetrator inside, or to determine the circumstances of the showup itself.” The court further stated, “Therefore, the courts below had no basis to determine that the police-arranged showup was free of taint, and that the victim was impervious to police suggestion.” Because the circumstances surrounding the showup identification were unclear, the Court found that a Wade hearing was necessary to determine if the procedure resulted in an unduly suggestive identification. The court distinguished the case from situations involving confirmatory identifications, where the witness has prior familiarity with the defendant, making a Wade hearing unnecessary.

  • People v. Williams, 85 N.Y.2d 889 (1995): Admissibility of Spontaneous Showup Identifications

    People v. Williams, 85 N.Y.2d 889 (1995)

    A showup identification is admissible when it is unavoidable due to the spontaneous and fast-paced nature of the encounter, and not the product of unduly suggestive police conduct.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of a showup identification where the encounter between the victim and the defendant was unplanned and occurred due to a series of spontaneous events. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the showup was admissible because it was the product of a fast-paced, uncontrollable situation and not unduly suggestive police conduct. The court emphasized that the circumstances made the showup unavoidable.

    Facts

    The victim was raped and sodomized in the lobby of her apartment building. Twelve days later, items were stolen from her apartment. An individual contacted the victim claiming to have her passport and identification cards. A neighbor provided a description of the individual who was looking for the victim. Based on the neighbor’s description and the caller’s admission, the victim believed this person was her attacker. The victim, after consulting with the police, arranged to meet the individual outside a subway station to recover her property. Detectives transported her to the location. They saw an individual matching the victim’s description. The detectives followed the suspect into the subway, where a scuffle ensued. The detectives arrested him and found the victim’s stolen items. The victim then observed the detectives emerging from the station with the defendant and immediately identified him as her attacker. The victim confirmed this identification when a detective indicated that the defendant’s teeth were crooked, a feature she had repeatedly mentioned.

    Procedural History

    The trial court admitted the showup identification. The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the showup identification procedure was unduly suggestive and therefore inadmissible as evidence.

    Holding

    No, because the showup identification procedure was unavoidable given the erratic circumstances of the detectives’ encounter with the defendant, and was the product of a fast-paced, uncontrollable situation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the showup identification was admissible because it was the result of a spontaneous and rapidly evolving situation. The detectives’ encounter with the defendant was unplanned, and the identification occurred as a direct result of the arrest. The Court emphasized that the circumstances made the showup unavoidable, distinguishing it from cases where police orchestrate suggestive identification procedures. The court cited People v. Rivera, 22 NY2d 453, 455, noting the admissibility of identifications in fast-paced, uncontrollable situations. The court also referenced People v. Dixon, 85 NY2d 218. Furthermore, the court deferred to the undisturbed findings of the lower courts, which involved mixed questions of law and fact supported by the record evidence, citing People v. Oeller, 82 NY2d 774, 775. The Court noted that, “Given the erratic circumstances of the detectives’ encounter with defendant, the resulting ‘showup’ identification procedure was unavoidable, the product of a fast-paced, uncontrollable situation.”

  • People v. Johnson, 81 N.Y.2d 831 (1993): Limits on Admissibility of Showup Identifications

    People v. Johnson, 81 N.Y.2d 831 (1993)

    A showup identification is impermissible if conducted hours after the crime, with both the complainant and the defendant transported to the crime scene; in such circumstances, a properly conducted lineup is required.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction, holding that a showup identification conducted hours after the robbery, with both the complainant and the defendant being transported to the crime scene, was improper. The Court emphasized that while prompt showup identifications are permissible when suspects are captured at or near the crime scene, the identification in this case lacked the necessary immediacy. The Court determined that under these circumstances, a properly conducted lineup was required to ensure a fair identification process.

    Facts

    A postman was robbed of a gold chain and pendant in the lobby of an apartment building. The postman chased the perpetrator, who was carrying a knife, but eventually abandoned the pursuit. He reported the incident to a security guard and police. Later that day, police apprehended the defendant near his home, which was close to the crime scene. The police then transported the postman back to the apartment building, informing him that they had a suspect in custody and were taking him back for a positive identification. The postman, seated in a police vehicle, identified the defendant, who was in handcuffs and civilian clothing, as the robber.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the showup identification, arguing it was unduly suggestive. The hearing court denied the motion. The identification was introduced at trial, and the complainant also made an in-court identification. The defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and resisting arrest. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a showup identification, conducted hours after the crime and involving the transportation of both the complainant and the defendant to the crime scene, is an impermissible identification procedure.

    Holding

    Yes, because showup identifications are strongly disfavored and are only permissible under exigent circumstances or when suspects are captured at or near the crime scene and viewed immediately. A showup hours after the crime, with both parties transported to the scene, does not meet this standard.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that showup identifications are inherently suggestive and should only be employed when justified by exigent circumstances or the immediacy of the capture. Citing People v. Riley, 70 N.Y.2d 523, 529, the court reiterated that showups are permissible “if the suspects are captured at or near the crime scene and can be viewed by the witness immediately.” Here, the showup lacked the requisite immediacy, as it occurred hours after the crime and involved the transportation of both the complainant and the defendant. The Court emphasized that the focus should be on the promptness of the identification after the crime, not after the arrest. Given these circumstances, the Court concluded that an appropriately conducted lineup was necessary to ensure a fair identification process. The Court noted that while the limits of an appropriate time period between the alleged crime and a showup identification may vary from case to case, “the emphasis must be upon the prompt and immediate nature of an identification after the crime has been committed, not, as the People argue, after the defendant has been arrested.” The admission of the showup identification at trial was therefore deemed prejudicial, warranting a new trial.

  • People v. Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541 (1991): Admissibility of Showup Identifications Near Crime Scenes

    People v. Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541 (1991)

    Prompt, at-the-crime-scene showup identifications are not presumptively invalid and admissible, but must be scrutinized carefully for suggestiveness and unreliability, considering the specific circumstances of each case.

    Summary

    Duuvon was convicted of robbery. After robbing the same dry cleaning store twice, the store manager chased and caught him. Police arrested Duuvon, and the manager identified him. Subsequently, another employee identified Duuvon while he was in the back of a patrol car near the scene. The Court of Appeals held that the showup identification was admissible because it was near the crime scene and temporally proximate to the crime. The Court emphasized that while showups are generally disfavored and suggestive, the immediate nature of the identification, coupled with the ongoing apprehension, justified its admission, subject to careful scrutiny for undue suggestiveness.

    Facts

    Defendant robbed a dry cleaning store on April 21, 1987, and again on May 1, 1987. During the second robbery, the manager recognized Duuvon from the first incident. As Duuvon fled in a taxi, the manager alerted the police, who stopped the cab. Duuvon exited the cab and ran. The police apprehended him a short distance away, clutching money. The manager identified Duuvon at the arrest scene. Police then brought Duuvon, handcuffed in a patrol car, back to the dry cleaners, where an employee also identified him.

    Procedural History

    Duuvon was charged with both robberies. He moved to suppress the employee’s showup identification. The trial court denied the motion, finding the showup not unduly suggestive due to its proximity in time and location to the crime. He was convicted of robbery in the first degree and two counts of robbery in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding the showup not unduly suggestive and any error harmless due to other evidence. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a showup identification by an employee-victim-witness, made at the crime scene shortly after the defendant’s apprehension and after another witness had already identified the defendant, is impermissibly suggestive and warrants suppression.

    Holding

    No, because the showup occurred in close temporal and spatial proximity to the crime, forming an unbroken chain of events, and the lower courts found it was not so unnecessarily suggestive as to create a substantial likelihood of misidentification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while showup identifications are generally suspect, at-the-crime-scene showups are not presumptively infirm. The admissibility of such evidence depends on the specific circumstances and requires careful scrutiny for suggestiveness and unreliability. The Court distinguished this situation from police station showups, which are inherently suggestive and generally suppressed unless exigent circumstances exist. The Court emphasized the importance of temporal and spatial proximity to the crime, stating that the identification occurred within minutes of the robbery and near the arrest scene, forming an unbroken chain of events. The Court acknowledged the suggestive nature of the defendant being handcuffed in the patrol car but found that the exigent circumstances justified the procedure. The Court stated, “The judicial toleration of promptly conducted at-the-scene showups rests on our objective that the police have reasonable assurances that they have arrested or detained the right person.” The Court cautioned against creating per se or presumptive rules due to the variety of circumstances in street encounters. The Court deferred to the lower courts’ factual findings, emphasizing that the procedural safeguard against abuse lies in the lower courts’ rigorous review. The Court noted that the manager’s initial identification was spontaneous and not a police-arranged showup, further supporting the admissibility of the employee’s subsequent identification.

  • People v. Morales, 37 N.Y.2d 262 (1975): Admissibility of Prior Identification Testimony

    People v. Morales, 37 N.Y.2d 262 (1975)

    Prior identification of a defendant is admissible at trial when the identifying witness observed the defendant at the crime scene, previously identified the defendant, and is unable to make a present in-court identification.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of prior identification testimony under CPL 60.25 when the identifying witness could not make a present in-court identification. The Court held that the testimony of a police officer confirming the pretrial identification of the defendant by the witness was properly admitted because all three preconditions of CPL 60.25(2) were met. The Court also found that the showup identification procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive, as it was deemed accidental and spontaneous, thus upholding the lower court’s decision.

    Facts

    A witness, Grant, observed an individual at a crime scene. Later, at the police station, Grant saw and recognized the defendant, Morales, as the person he had observed at the scene. At trial, Grant was unable to state with present recollection whether Morales was the person he had seen. Officer Moroney was present when Grant identified Morales at the station house.

    Procedural History

    The suppression court found the showup was not unnecessarily suggestive and denied the motion to suppress the identification. The Appellate Division affirmed this finding, characterizing the showup as “accidental” and the identification as spontaneous. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the testimony of Officer Moroney confirming the pretrial identification of the appellant by the witness Grant was properly admissible at trial under CPL 60.25(2)?

    2. Whether the procedures followed by the police in connection with the showup at which Grant identified the appellant were unconstitutionally suggestive?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because all three preconditions to the application of CPL 60.25 (subd 2) were met.

    2. No, because the showup was found to be accidental and the identification spontaneous and untainted by any untoward police conduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that all three conditions of CPL 60.25(2) were satisfied, making the officer’s testimony admissible. First, the identifying witness observed the person claimed to be the defendant at the crime scene (CPL 60.25, subd 1, par [a], cl [i]). Second, the identifying witness, in the presence of Officer Moroney, observed a person whom he recognized as the subject of his on-the-scene observation (CPL 60.25, subd 1, par [a], cl [ii]). Third, the identifying witness was unable at trial to state, on the basis of present recollection, whether or not appellant was the person in question (CPL 60.25, subd 1, par [a], cl [iii]).

    Regarding the constitutionality of the showup, the Court deferred to the Appellate Division’s finding that the showup was “accidental” and the identification spontaneous. Citing People v. Gruttola, 43 NY2d 116, 122, the Court stated that such a determination, affirmed by the Appellate Division, is beyond their power of review. The court emphasized the absence of “untoward police conduct” that might have tainted the identification.

    The court implicitly reinforced the importance of spontaneous identifications made without undue influence from law enforcement, suggesting that such identifications are more reliable and less susceptible to constitutional challenges. The ruling emphasizes adherence to statutory requirements for the admissibility of prior identification testimony and deference to lower court findings on factual matters related to identification procedures.