New York Law Review

Tag: Shore Leave

  • Cruz v. American Export Lines, Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 832 (1986): Shipowner’s Duty Regarding Shore Leave Injuries

    Cruz v. American Export Lines, Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 832 (1986)

    A shipowner’s duty to provide a safe place to work for a seaman generally does not extend to areas beyond the pier-end of the gangway unless the shipowner has control over the area or the pier owner acts as the shipowner’s agent.

    Summary

    A seaman, Cruz, employed by American Export Lines, was injured during shore leave in Bremerhaven, West Germany, when he slipped and fell while climbing between railroad boxcars to access the ship. He sued under the Jones Act, alleging the shipowner was negligent for failing to correct or warn of the hazardous condition on the pier. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to grant summary judgment for the defendant, holding that Cruz failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate the shipowner’s control over the pier area or negligence on the part of the shipowner. The court emphasized deference to federal maritime law in Jones Act cases.

    Facts

    On May 23, 1978, Plaintiff Cruz, a seaman for American Export Lines, went on shore leave in Bremerhaven, West Germany. Upon returning to the ship, Cruz found railroad boxcars blocking access to the gangway. He determined the pathway between the boxcars and the pier’s edge was too dangerous. He attempted to climb between two boxcars over a wet platform or coupling, slipped, and fractured his leg.

    Procedural History

    Cruz sued American Export Lines under the Jones Act in a New York state court. The defendant moved for summary judgment after discovery. Special Term denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment and dismissing the complaint. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a shipowner’s duty to provide a safe place to work extends to areas beyond the pier-end of the gangway when a seaman is on shore leave.
    2. Whether the shipowner had a duty to warn of conditions on the pier or to repair hazardous conditions in areas through which the seaman had to pass to reach the ship.

    Holding

    1. No, because the plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence that the defendant had control over the area in question by virtue of its relationship with the pier owner.
    2. No, because on the facts presented, neither contention has been shown to be an obligation imposed by general maritime law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that injuries occurring during the course of employment under the Jones Act could extend to situations not on the ship itself or even while on shore leave, citing Braen v Pfeifer Transp. Co., 361 U.S. 129 (1959), and Aguilar v Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943). However, the court emphasized that the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue regarding negligence on the part of the shipowner. The court stated that even if a shipowner’s duty extends beyond the pier-end when the shipowner has an ownership interest or the pier owner acts as the shipowner’s agent, the plaintiff failed to provide evidence to support the assertion that the defendant had control over the pier area. The court cited Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557 (1980), regarding summary judgment standards. Regarding the duty to warn or repair, the court stated, “On the facts presented, neither contention has been shown to be an obligation imposed by general maritime law.” The court emphasized deference to federal maritime law as stated in Alvez v American Export Lines, 46 N.Y.2d 634 (1979), affirming 446 U.S. 274 (1980), “cognizant that it is the general maritime law that governs the rights and liabilities of the parties”.

  • Braen v. Pfeifer Transportation Co., 361 U.S. 129 (1959): Scope of Employment Under the Jones Act Extends Beyond the Vessel

    Braen v. Pfeifer Transportation Co., 361 U.S. 129 (1959)

    A seaman injured while going to or from their vessel on shore leave is considered to be acting within the scope of their employment for the purposes of the Jones Act, even if the injury occurs off the vessel.

    Summary

    Braen, a seaman, sued his employer, Pfeifer Transportation Co., under the Jones Act for injuries sustained when he fell into a pit on a boat yard while leaving his tugboat for the weekend. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ dismissal of Braen’s Jones Act claim, holding that the trial court erred in determining that Braen was not acting in the course of his employment when the accident occurred. The Supreme Court emphasized that a seaman is considered in the service of the ship when going to and from the vessel, thereby making the employer potentially liable for negligence even off the vessel itself. This case clarifies the scope of “course of employment” under the Jones Act, extending it beyond the physical confines of the ship.

    Facts

    Braen was employed as an engineer on the Tugboat Dalzellable. The tug was moored alongside a barge at a dock leased by Dalzell Maintenance Co., Inc. Weekends were typically off-duty for the crew. Braen left the docked tug, crossed the barge, and walked through the boat yard, a customary route for crew members. He was injured when he fell into an unlit ramp or pit in the boat yard. The area was supposed to be lit by a watchman employed by Dalzell Towing Co.

    Procedural History

    Braen sued Dalzell Towing Co. and Dalzell Maintenance Co., Inc., alleging negligence and a Jones Act violation. The trial court initially dismissed both causes of action. The Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial. At the second trial, the common-law negligence claim was submitted to the jury, which found for the defendants, while the Jones Act claim was dismissed. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the Jones Act claim. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, leading to this appeal before the U.S. Supreme Court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the Jones Act cause of action, specifically whether Braen was injured “in the course of his employment” under the Jones Act when he was injured in the boatyard while leaving his vessel on shore leave.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Supreme Court had previously established that a seaman is considered in the service of the ship when going to and from the vessel on shore leave. This means the Jones Act applies to injuries sustained while the seaman is leaving the ship, even if the injury occurs on land.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on precedent establishing that the scope of employment under the Jones Act is equivalent to the “service of the ship” formula used in maintenance and cure cases. The court cited Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., which held that a seaman is in the service of his ship when going to and from the ship on shore leave. The court quoted Braen v. Pfeifer Transp. Co. (361 U. S. 129, 132-133): “We held that a seaman who was injured on the dock while departing from the ship on shore leave was in the service of the vessel and was entitled to recover for maintenance and cure in Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U. S. 724. It was there recognized that a seaman is as much in the service of his ship when hoarding it on first reporting for duty, quitting it on being discharged, or going to and from the ship while on shore leave, as he is while on hoard at high sea. Id., at 736-737.” Therefore, the injury sustained by Braen while leaving the vessel fell within the scope of his employment. The court distinguished other cases cited by the respondents, such as Dangovich v. Isthmian Lines, by noting that those cases turned on the issue of negligence, not the scope of employment. The court determined the employer’s control over the location of the accident (the boat yard) was a question of fact for the jury, particularly given the watchman employed by Towing. The court remanded for a new trial, emphasizing that the negligence of the watchman, if any, could give rise to recovery against Towing under the Jones Act. The court also noted that while Maintenance was not Braen’s employer, the plaintiff should have the opportunity to prove in a new trial whether Towing and Maintenance are the same entity, and that if he is successful in this regard, he would then have a cause of action against Maintenance under the Jones Act.