Cruz v. American Export Lines, Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 832 (1986)

A shipowner’s duty to provide a safe place to work for a seaman generally does not extend to areas beyond the pier-end of the gangway unless the shipowner has control over the area or the pier owner acts as the shipowner’s agent.

Summary

A seaman, Cruz, employed by American Export Lines, was injured during shore leave in Bremerhaven, West Germany, when he slipped and fell while climbing between railroad boxcars to access the ship. He sued under the Jones Act, alleging the shipowner was negligent for failing to correct or warn of the hazardous condition on the pier. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to grant summary judgment for the defendant, holding that Cruz failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate the shipowner’s control over the pier area or negligence on the part of the shipowner. The court emphasized deference to federal maritime law in Jones Act cases.

Facts

On May 23, 1978, Plaintiff Cruz, a seaman for American Export Lines, went on shore leave in Bremerhaven, West Germany. Upon returning to the ship, Cruz found railroad boxcars blocking access to the gangway. He determined the pathway between the boxcars and the pier’s edge was too dangerous. He attempted to climb between two boxcars over a wet platform or coupling, slipped, and fractured his leg.

Procedural History

Cruz sued American Export Lines under the Jones Act in a New York state court. The defendant moved for summary judgment after discovery. Special Term denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment and dismissing the complaint. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a shipowner’s duty to provide a safe place to work extends to areas beyond the pier-end of the gangway when a seaman is on shore leave.
2. Whether the shipowner had a duty to warn of conditions on the pier or to repair hazardous conditions in areas through which the seaman had to pass to reach the ship.

Holding

1. No, because the plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence that the defendant had control over the area in question by virtue of its relationship with the pier owner.
2. No, because on the facts presented, neither contention has been shown to be an obligation imposed by general maritime law.

Court’s Reasoning

The court acknowledged that injuries occurring during the course of employment under the Jones Act could extend to situations not on the ship itself or even while on shore leave, citing Braen v Pfeifer Transp. Co., 361 U.S. 129 (1959), and Aguilar v Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943). However, the court emphasized that the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue regarding negligence on the part of the shipowner. The court stated that even if a shipowner’s duty extends beyond the pier-end when the shipowner has an ownership interest or the pier owner acts as the shipowner’s agent, the plaintiff failed to provide evidence to support the assertion that the defendant had control over the pier area. The court cited Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557 (1980), regarding summary judgment standards. Regarding the duty to warn or repair, the court stated, “On the facts presented, neither contention has been shown to be an obligation imposed by general maritime law.” The court emphasized deference to federal maritime law as stated in Alvez v American Export Lines, 46 N.Y.2d 634 (1979), affirming 446 U.S. 274 (1980), “cognizant that it is the general maritime law that governs the rights and liabilities of the parties”.