New York Law Review

Tag: Sexual Abuse

  • People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40 (1988): Ex Post Facto Clause and Repeal of Corroboration Requirements

    People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40 (1988)

    The Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution does not prevent applying a statute repealing the requirement for corroboration of a victim’s testimony in sex crime prosecutions to crimes committed before the statute’s effective date.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that repealing a law requiring corroboration of a minor’s testimony in sex crime cases could be applied retroactively without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. Hudy was convicted of sexual abuse based largely on the testimony of underage victims for acts committed before the corroboration requirement was repealed. The court reasoned that repealing the corroboration rule was a procedural change, not a substantive one, and did not increase the punishment or alter the elements of the crime. However, the conviction was reversed due to trial errors: the admission of evidence of a prior uncharged crime and the restriction of the defendant’s ability to question investigating officers about suggestive interview techniques.

    Facts

    Defendant Hudy, a remedial math teacher, was accused of sexually abusing several elementary school students. Concerns arose after a student reported that Hudy was putting his hands down boys’ pants. An investigation revealed similar allegations from eight other boys, all students of Hudy. Hudy was indicted on multiple counts of sexual abuse and endangering the welfare of a child, involving incidents both before and after November 1, 1984.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Hudy’s motion to dismiss counts related to pre-November 1984 incidents, arguing that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibited applying the repealed corroboration rules. At trial, nine children testified against Hudy. The prosecution introduced testimony from Domenick M., alleging a prior, uncharged similar crime by Hudy. The defense was restricted from questioning the police investigators about suggestive interview tactics. The jury convicted Hudy on all charges. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the application of a statute repealing the corroboration requirement for sex offenses to crimes committed before the statute’s enactment violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior uncharged crime.
    3. Whether the trial court erred in restricting the defendant’s ability to cross-examine the investigating officers regarding potentially suggestive interview techniques.

    Holding

    1. No, because the repeal of the corroboration requirement is a procedural change, not a substantive one, and does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
    2. Yes, because the evidence of the prior uncharged crime was irrelevant and served only to demonstrate Hudy’s general criminal propensity.
    3. Yes, because the trial court’s restriction on questioning the investigating officers violated Hudy’s constitutional right to present a defense and confront his accusers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed the Ex Post Facto Clause, noting that such laws are unconstitutional if they are retrospective and detrimental to the accused. The court distinguished between procedural and substantive changes in the law, stating that procedural changes, even if disadvantageous to the defendant, are generally not ex post facto. The repeal of corroboration laws was deemed a procedural change affecting the rules of evidence rather than the definition of the crime or its punishment. The court reasoned that the Ex Post Facto Clause is intended to protect against arbitrary and oppressive legislation, not to limit legislative control over remedies and procedures that do not affect matters of substance.

    The court found that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Domenick M., regarding a prior uncharged sexual offense. The court stated that such evidence is only admissible if it is logically linked to a specific material issue in the case and does not merely demonstrate a general criminal propensity. In this case, the court found that the testimony only served to show that Hudy had a propensity to commit such crimes, and thus, it was inadmissible.

    The court also held that the trial court erred in restricting the defense’s ability to cross-examine the investigating officers regarding suggestive interview techniques. The court stated that a defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense and confront his accusers, and that extrinsic proof tending to establish a reason to fabricate is never collateral and may not be excluded on that ground. Here, the court found that the defense had a good-faith basis for the proposed line of questioning, and that the trial court’s restriction violated Hudy’s rights.

    “[T]he constitutional provision was intended to secure substantial personal rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislation * * * and not to limit the legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance” (Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171).

  • People v. Pepper, 59 N.Y.2d 353 (1983): Sufficiency of Corroborating Evidence in Child Sodomy Cases

    People v. Pepper, 59 N.Y.2d 353 (1983)

    In cases of sodomy and sexual abuse involving child victims, corroborating evidence, even if inconsistent with the victim’s testimony, is sufficient if it tends to establish that an attempt was made to engage the victim in the alleged acts and connects the defendant to the commission of the offense.

    Summary

    Following a reversal of his initial conviction, the defendant was retried and convicted of sodomy and sexual abuse. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that there was sufficient corroboration of the victim’s testimony as required by Penal Law § 130.16. The corroboration was found in the testimony of the victim’s mother, even though she denied that sexual contact took place. The court emphasized that the mother’s testimony about the encounters and arrangements was enough to connect the defendant to the crimes described by the victim. The court also addressed and dismissed the defendant’s claims regarding a change of venue and jury selection.

    Facts

    The complaining witness, an 11-year-old girl, testified that her mother arranged meetings between her and the defendant, during which she was expected “to do sexual things with him.” These encounters occurred in parking lots, where the defendant engaged in sexual contact with the witness. The witness’s mother received money from the defendant after each meeting.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was initially convicted based on a guilty plea, which was later overturned by the New York Court of Appeals due to a violation of the defendant’s rights. The case was remitted to the County Court for a new trial. At the second trial, the defendant was convicted of two counts of sodomy in the second degree and two counts of sexual abuse in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction, leading to this appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant was improperly denied a change of venue due to pretrial publicity, thus depriving him of a fair trial.
    2. Whether the trial court improperly denied the defendant the opportunity to make a challenge for cause out of the hearing of the jury.
    3. Whether there was sufficient corroboration of the victim’s testimony as required by section 130.16 of the Penal Law.
    4. Whether the indictment charged the alleged incidents with sufficient particularity.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant did not demonstrate that the pretrial publicity prejudiced the jury selection process or that the jurors chosen were anything but impartial.
    2. No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate any prejudice as a consequence of the error.
    3. Yes, because the testimony of the victim’s mother, though inconsistent with the victim’s testimony, sufficiently connected the defendant to the commission of the offenses described by the victim and tended to establish that an attempt was made to engage the victim in acts of sexual abuse and sodomy.
    4. No, because the defendant did not properly preserve this argument for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the defendant’s motion for a change of venue was properly denied, as he failed to demonstrate that the pretrial publicity prejudiced the jury selection process. The court emphasized that the trial court took precautions to ensure the impartiality of the jurors. Regarding the challenge for cause, the court acknowledged that CPL 270.15 (subd 2) was violated but concluded that the defendant failed to show any prejudice resulting from the error.

    The court addressed the corroboration requirement of Penal Law § 130.16, stating that the victim’s mother’s testimony provided sufficient corroboration, despite her denial of sexual contact between the defendant and her daughter. The court reasoned that the mother’s testimony regarding the encounters, arrangements, and details connected the defendant to the commission of the offenses. Specifically, the court pointed to the mother’s testimony regarding the defendant touching her daughter and asking her to kiss his penis, which “tends to establish that an attempt was made to engage the victim in acts of sexual abuse and sodomy.” The court explicitly stated, “The fact that the corroborating witness’s testimony is inconsistent with the victim’s does not, on this record, undermine the corroborative value of the evidence.”

    Finally, the court found that the defendant’s argument regarding the indictment’s lack of particularity was not preserved for review. The court noted that the defendant failed to raise this concern in his pretrial motions and only raised it orally just before jury selection, rendering the denial of his request proper.

  • People v. Ditta, 52 N.Y.2d 657 (1981): Defining “Sexual Contact” in First-Degree Sexual Abuse

    People v. Ditta, 52 N.Y.2d 657 (1981)

    The crime of first-degree sexual abuse, as defined in New York Penal Law § 130.65, occurs when a person compels another to touch the actor’s sexual or other intimate parts, as this constitutes “sexual contact”.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a defendant can be convicted of first-degree sexual abuse when they force another person to touch their sexual or intimate parts. The New York Court of Appeals held that such conduct does indeed constitute sexual abuse under Penal Law § 130.65. The Court reasoned that the statute’s language is broad enough to encompass situations where the defendant compels the victim to touch them, as this still involves the defendant “subjecting” another person to sexual contact. The Court rejected a narrow interpretation focusing solely on who initiates the physical touch.

    Facts

    The 16-year-old victim was walking to school when John Ditta, the defendant, accosted her on a motorcycle. Ditta flashed a badge, which the victim believed to be a police shield. He then blocked her path with the motorcycle and his body. Seeing a knife in Ditta’s pocket, the victim, fearing for her life, complied with his demands. Ditta placed his jacket on the ground, got down, and ordered the victim to get on top of him. He displayed the knife and threatened to kill her if she did not comply. Ditta instructed the victim to touch his crotch area, which she did for a few minutes. She stated the area felt hard, and Ditta’s pants were wet. The victim then lost consciousness. Police, alerted by a witness, apprehended Ditta nearby. He possessed a knife and a Department of Sanitation shield. An officer noticed a wet spot on Ditta’s pants in the crotch area.

    Procedural History

    Ditta was convicted after a non-jury trial of first-degree sexual abuse, second-degree unlawful imprisonment, fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon, endangering the welfare of a minor, and menacing. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without issuing an opinion. Ditta then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the act of compelling another person to touch the defendant’s sexual or intimate parts constitutes “sexual contact” within the meaning of New York Penal Law § 130.65, thereby supporting a conviction for first-degree sexual abuse.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statute prohibits a person from “subjecting another to sexual contact,” and this language is broad enough to include instances where the defendant compels the victim to touch them.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected a strict construction of the penal code, emphasizing that the Penal Law should be interpreted “according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law” (Penal Law, § 5.00). The court noted that § 130.65 does not specify who must perform the touching, stating: “Nowhere does the section prescribe which person must perform the actual touching. On its face, it is broad enough to encompass sexual touching of the victim by the defendant or touching of the defendant by the victim under compulsion by the defendant. In either instance, the defendant would be subjecting another person to sexual contact.”
    The Court found that the definition of “sexual contact” in § 130.00(3) as “any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person not married to the actor” was not intended to limit the scope of § 130.65. The Court reasoned that the definitional section primarily aimed to exclude sexual contact between married persons from the statute’s reach. To interpret “actor” as referring exclusively to the defendant would lead to an absurd result, making the applicability of the law contingent on which party is the more active participant. The Court emphasized the inclusive nature of section 130.65 and that the legislative intent was not to limit the crime only to instances where the defendant performs the actual touching. The court explicitly stated the defendant is made criminally liable, not if he touches another, but if he “subjects another person to sexual contact.”

  • People v. Shealy, 51 N.Y.2d 933 (1980): Sufficiency of Evidence for Intent to Commit Sexual Abuse

    People v. Shealy, 51 N.Y.2d 933 (1980)

    When a defendant is charged with entering or remaining in a place with the intent to commit sexual abuse, the prosecution must present sufficient evidence to allow a trier of fact to conclude that the defendant possessed the requisite intent.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish the defendant’s intent to commit sexual abuse. The evidence included the defendant’s position atop the victim, his forearm across her breast, his removal of bedclothes from her nude body, and his attempt to gag her. While some actions could be explained as attempts to silence the victim, others, like removing bedclothes and substituting gags, indicated an intent to commit sexual abuse. The court found that these actions, taken together, provided a sufficient basis for a jury to infer the defendant’s intent.

    Facts

    The defendant was found on top of the victim in her bed. His forearm was across her breast. The bedclothes were removed from her nude body. He gagged her with one item of clothing and then removed that gag and attempted to substitute another.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish the defendant’s intent to commit sexual abuse.

    Holding

    Yes, because the totality of the defendant’s actions, including being on top of the victim, touching her breast, removing bedclothes, and attempting to gag her, provided a sufficient basis for a jury to infer the defendant’s intent to commit sexual abuse.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the People were obligated to prove the defendant entered or remained with the intent to commit the crime of sexual abuse. The court acknowledged that some of the defendant’s actions could be attributed to an effort to silence the victim. However, the court emphasized that not all actions could be explained this way. Specifically, the removal of bedclothing and the substitution of the gag were not necessary for silencing the victim. These actions, combined with the other evidence, provided sufficient color to allow a jury to infer the defendant’s intent to commit sexual abuse. The court stated, “Some of those factors do not necessarily bespeak such an intent and could be attributable to an effort to silence the victim after she awoke and discovered his presence. But clearly not all can be so regarded (silencing neither necessitated removal of the bedclothing nor substitution of the gag) and they lend sufficient color to the others that it cannot be said that a prima facie case of intent to commit sexual abuse was not made out.”

  • People v. St. John, 47 N.Y.2d 117 (1979): Admissibility of Child Witness Testimony and Evidence of Uncharged Acts

    People v. St. John, 47 N.Y.2d 117 (1979)

    In cases of sexual abuse, a trial court has discretion to allow child witnesses to testify, even if unsworn, after adequately inquiring into their understanding and intelligence; evidence of similar uncharged acts is admissible to show the defendant’s disposition and the ongoing relationship between the parties.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for deviate sexual practices with his daughters. The court held that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in allowing child witnesses, some unsworn, to testify after assessing their understanding. It further ruled that testimony from neighbor children about similar uncharged acts committed by the defendant upon his daughters was admissible to show the defendant’s disposition and the ongoing relationship between the parties within the home, where the charged acts occurred.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with deviate sexual acts involving his daughters. The prosecution presented testimony from multiple child witnesses, ranging in age from 6 to 12 and a half years old. The trial judge administered oaths to all but the 6 and 7-year-old witnesses. The prosecution also presented testimony from neighbor children who observed similar uncharged deviate acts by the defendant against his daughters. These acts occurred within the defendant’s home.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in allowing child witnesses under 12 years of age to testify, some without being sworn.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing neighbor children to testify about their observations of similar uncharged deviate acts committed by the defendant upon his daughters.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial judge adequately inquired into the understanding and intelligence of each of the witnesses under 12 years old, and the decision to swear them or take their statements unsworn was within the judge’s discretion and not abused. The conviction did not rest solely on the interrogation of the unsworn witnesses.

    2. No, because such evidence involving the ongoing relationship and conduct between the parties is relevant and permissible where the charged acts occurred within the home, open to question concerning defendant’s disposition.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on CPL 60.20, which allows children under 12 to be questioned even if they don’t understand the oath. The court emphasized the trial judge’s role in assessing each child’s understanding and intelligence. The court found no abuse of discretion in allowing the children to testify, sworn or unsworn, as the judge properly assessed their capacity. The Court further relied on *People v. Henson, 33 Y 2d 63, 72; Richardson, Evidence [10th ed.], § 182* to allow evidence of similar uncharged acts committed by the defendant. The court reasoned that because the acts occurred within the home, the acts were “open to question concerning defendant’s disposition,” and evidence of the ongoing relationship and conduct between and among the parties involved, is relevant and permissible.

    The court stated, “Such evidence, involving the ongoing relationship and conduct between and among the parties involved, is relevant and permissible where the acts charged occur within the home and are open to question concerning defendant’s disposition.” The court’s decision emphasizes the importance of the trial judge’s role in assessing the competency of child witnesses and the admissibility of evidence showing the defendant’s propensity for the charged acts within the specific context of familial sexual abuse.