New York Law Review

Tag: Sewer System

  • Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Board of Assessors, 2 N.Y.2d 500 (1957): Benefit Assessments and Proportionality in Sewer System Installation

    Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Board of Assessors, 2 N.Y.2d 500 (1957)

    A property owner challenging a sewer tax assessment must demonstrate that the financial burden of the sewer system installation is not apportioned among the benefited parcels in just proportion to the benefit conferred by the improvement.

    Summary

    Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. challenged the sewer tax assessments levied on its property, arguing that the benefit formula was flawed. Grumman claimed incongruities between the ratio of apportioned sewer charges to assessed valuation between commercial properties and its own undeveloped residential property demonstrated infirmity in the assessment. The court held that Grumman failed to meet its burden of proving the assessment was unfair because the benefits conferred by sewer installation are not necessarily related to assessed property valuation. Therefore, a disparity in ratios, without further evidence, is insufficient to prove a failure to apportion the tax in proportion to the benefit conferred.

    Facts

    Grumman owned property within a town that installed a sewer system. The town levied sewer tax assessments on properties deemed to benefit from the installation. Grumman challenged the assessments, arguing the benefit formula was flawed and resulted in disproportionate charges.

    Procedural History

    Grumman initially filed a petition challenging the sewer tax assessment. The Special Term dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division reversed the Special Term’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division and dismissed the original petition.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Grumman met its burden of demonstrating that the benefit formula for levying the sewer tax assessments was infirm, either facially or as applied, because the ratio of apportioned sewer charge to assessed valuation was incongruent between commercial properties and Grumman’s own undeveloped residential property.

    Holding

    No, because the benefits conferred by sewer installation may reasonably be unrelated to assessed valuation; thus, the disparity on which Grumman relies, without more, proves nothing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that Grumman’s argument was predicated on a comparison of sewer charge to assessed valuation ratios between commercial and residential properties. The court reasoned that assessed valuation is not necessarily related to the benefits conferred by sewer installation. The court stated, “The benefits conferred by sewer installation may reasonably be wholly unrelated to assessed valuation; thus, the disparity on which petitioner would rely, without more, proves nothing.”

    The court emphasized that the statutory mandate requires the financial burden of sewer system installation to be apportioned among the parcels benefited “in just proportion to the amount of benefit which the improvement shall confer upon the same” (Town Law, § 202, subd 2.). Grumman failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the town did not meet this mandate. The court placed the burden on the petitioner to demonstrate the infirmity in the assessment formula or its application. Because Grumman’s evidence only showed a disparity in ratios without any proof that the actual benefit received was disproportionate, the court concluded that Grumman failed to sustain its burden of proof.

  • Belle Harbor Realty Corp. v. Kerr, 35 N.Y.2d 507 (1974): Municipal Power to Revoke Building Permits Based on Public Health Concerns

    Belle Harbor Realty Corp. v. Kerr, 35 N.Y.2d 507 (1974)

    A municipality may revoke previously granted building permits based on a genuine and dire threat to public health and welfare, but not solely to appease community opposition or as a pretext for preventing development.

    Summary

    Belle Harbor Realty Corp. sought to build a nursing home in New York City. After initial approvals were granted, the city revoked them due to concerns about the inadequacy of the existing sewer system. Belle Harbor sued, arguing the city succumbed to community pressure and zoning changes. The Court of Appeals held that while a municipality can use its police power to prevent conditions dangerous to public health, it must demonstrate a dire necessity, a reasonable solution, and active steps to rectify the problem. The court remanded the case to determine if the revocation was genuinely based on public health concerns or merely a pretext.

    Facts

    Belle Harbor Realty Corp. applied for a permit to construct a four-story nursing home in New York City in 1972.

    The Department of Buildings, Department of Water Resources, and the State Board of Social Welfare issued the necessary approvals between July and September 1972.

    Prior to the issuance of the written permit, local citizens filed a lawsuit to enjoin the city from issuing the permit, citing inadequate sewerage facilities. The lawsuit was dismissed.

    Following complaints of sewer backups, the city investigated the sewerage facilities at the proposed site and discovered the sewers were grossly inadequate, dating back to 1889 with six-inch pipes and open joints.

    Based on this information, the city revoked the prior approvals, citing the deteriorated condition of the sewers.

    Procedural History

    Belle Harbor initiated an Article 78 proceeding to annul the city’s revocation of approvals and compel the city to reissue approvals and permits.

    Special Term dismissed the petition, finding the revocation a reasonable exercise of police power.

    The Appellate Division reversed, directing the city to issue the approvals and permits, relying on Westwood Forest Estates v. Village of South Nyack.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the city’s revocation of building approvals was a valid exercise of its police power to prevent conditions dangerous to public health and welfare, or whether the revocation was based solely on a pretext.

    Holding

    No, the court reversed and remanded because a municipality’s police power is limited by the necessity of the situation, and it cannot be invoked merely to appease community opposition without addressing the underlying problem.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from Westwood Forest Estates, noting that Westwood involved zoning power and a generalized pollution problem, while this case involves the general police power and an immediate, direct sanitation problem.

    The court recognized a municipality’s right, under its police powers, to prevent conditions dangerous to public health and welfare, citing cases such as Matter of Wulfsohn v. Burden and Shepard v. Village of Skaneateles.

    However, the court emphasized that such restrictions must be kept within the limits of necessity, quoting Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher: “within the limits of necessity”.

    The court stated that a municipality may not invoke its police powers solely as a pretext to assuage strident community opposition. To justify interference with property rights, the municipality must prove: (1) a dire necessity, (2) a reasonably calculated solution, and (3) active steps to rectify the problem.

    The court emphasized the emergency nature of the general police power under such circumstances: “When the general police power is invoked under such circumstances it must be considered an emergency measure and is circumscribed by the exigencies of that emergency.”

    The case was remanded to determine whether the revocation was truly necessary to prevent a public health crisis or based on a pretext.