New York Law Review

Tag: Severance

  • People v. Warren, 20 N.Y.3d 36 (2012): Addressing Prejudice in Joint Trials with Severed Co-Defendants

    People v. Warren, 20 N.Y.3d 36 (2012)

    When a co-defendant in a joint trial waives the right to a jury trial, creating a situation akin to a trial with dual juries, prejudice to the remaining defendant must be assessed, and the court must ensure that the jury does not hear evidence admissible only against the co-defendant.

    Summary

    Damien Warren was convicted of murder and weapon possession in a joint trial with two co-defendants, one of whom waived his right to a jury trial. The co-defendant who waived the jury then testified, implicating Warren. Warren argued that it was prejudicial for the jury to hear the co-defendant’s testimony after the prosecution rested its case against him. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the co-defendant’s testimony was highly prejudicial to Warren and would not have been admissible in a separate trial, the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear it. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal of Warren’s conviction.

    Facts

    Damien Warren and three co-defendants were jointly indicted for murder and weapon possession related to a drug-related shooting. One co-defendant, Eric Young, who had waived his right to a jury trial, was offered a plea deal in exchange for his testimony. Another co-defendant, Marvin Howard, also waived his right to a jury trial. A witness identified Warren as the shooter. Howard testified and implicated Warren. The jury convicted Warren, while the judge acquitted Howard.

    Procedural History

    Warren was convicted in County Court. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing Howard to testify before the jury. The Appellate Division reversed Warren’s conviction. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, reversing Warren’s conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear the testimony of a co-defendant who had waived his right to a jury trial, when that testimony was prejudicial to the remaining defendant and would not have been admissible in a separate trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the situation was analogous to a trial with dual juries, and the trial court failed to shield Warren’s jury from prejudicial evidence only relevant to the co-defendant’s bench trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that when Howard waived a jury trial, the situation became similar to a trial with dual juries, requiring a showing of prejudice to entitle Warren to relief. The Court emphasized that the People could not have forced Howard to testify against Warren and that the judge could have easily excused the jury during Howard’s defense. The Court noted that in cases involving multiple juries, trial judges must shield each jury from evidence admissible only before the other. The fact that the second fact-finder was the court (for Howard) and not a jury did not alter the analysis.

    The Court further noted that if Howard had not waived a jury trial, Warren could have made a strong case for severance because their defenses were irreconcilable. In that case, Warren’s jury would not have been permitted to hear the witnesses who testified on Howard’s behalf. The Court concluded that the judge’s failure to prevent the jury from hearing Howard’s defense was not harmless because the prosecutor adopted Howard’s narrative during summation, emphasizing that Howard corroborated the People’s case against Warren. The Court stated: “the prosecutor repeatedly referenced [Howard’s testimony] during his summation to the jury, emphasizing that, although he was not the People’s witness, he had corroborated the People’s proof’ against Warren.” (87 AD3d at 39). The Court thus determined that Howard’s vivid account may have unfairly influenced the jurors against Warren. The ruling reinforces the principle that modified severances require the same protections as full severances to prevent prejudice.

  • People v. Cardwell, 78 N.Y.2d 996 (1991): Establishing Prejudice in Joint Trials with Conflicting Defenses

    78 N.Y.2d 996 (1991)

    Severance of trials is required when the core defenses of codefendants are irreconcilably conflicting, and there’s a significant danger that the conflict alone would lead the jury to infer a defendant’s guilt.

    Summary

    George Cardwell, Herman Goss, and Johnnie McCoy were jointly tried for murder and robbery. Cardwell and Goss sought severance, arguing their defenses were irreconcilable with McCoy’s. McCoy was acquitted, while Cardwell and Goss were convicted. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the severance motion. The Court found that McCoy’s defense was in irreconcilable conflict with those of Cardwell and Goss, and the conduct of the trial created a significant danger that the conflict alone led the jury to infer Cardwell’s and Goss’s guilt.

    Facts

    George Cardwell, Herman Goss, and Johnnie McCoy were charged with murder, robbery, and weapons possession stemming from a fatal shooting during a robbery at a candy store.

    Prior to trial, Cardwell and Goss moved for severance, arguing that their defenses were antagonistic to McCoy’s.

    The trial court denied the motion, and the three defendants were tried jointly.

    During the joint trial, McCoy’s attorney took an aggressive, adversarial stance against Cardwell and Goss.

    Goss’ attorney attempted to impeach McCoy’s testimony with evidence of a recantation, which elicited an assertion from McCoy that Cardwell induced the recantation by threats.

    Procedural History

    Cardwell, Goss, and McCoy were tried jointly in Queens County.

    McCoy was acquitted, while Cardwell and Goss were convicted on several charges.

    Cardwell and Goss appealed, arguing the denial of their severance motion was reversible error.

    The Appellate Division affirmed their convictions.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial for Cardwell and Goss.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendants’ motion to sever their trials, given that their defenses were allegedly irreconcilable, and whether this prejudiced the defendants.

    Holding

    Yes, because the core defenses of Cardwell and Goss were in irreconcilable conflict with McCoy’s defense, and the circumstances of the joint trial created a significant danger that the conflict itself led the jury to infer Cardwell’s and Goss’s guilt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the two-part test from People v. Mahboubian, which requires severance when: (1) the core of each defense is in irreconcilable conflict with the other; and (2) there is a significant danger that the conflict alone would lead the jury to infer the defendant’s guilt. The District Attorney conceded the first prong was met.

    Regarding the second prong, the Court emphasized the fact-specific nature of the inquiry. While trial courts decide severance motions prospectively, appellate courts review the issue with the benefit of a full trial record.

    The Court noted several special factors that demonstrated prejudice. McCoy’s attorney essentially acted as a second prosecutor against Cardwell and Goss. When Goss’s attorney tried to impeach McCoy’s testimony, McCoy claimed Cardwell threatened him, introducing damaging evidence not presented by the prosecution.

    The Court quoted Mahboubian, stating that the situation “created the sort of compelling prejudice that could have been avoided by the grant of the requested severance.” The court found the trial court abused its discretion by denying the severance motion and reversed the convictions of Cardwell and Goss.

    The Court emphasized that the strong public policy favoring joint trials is overcome when the prejudice to the defendants is too great. This case serves as a reminder that joint trials must be carefully scrutinized to ensure a fair trial for each defendant, particularly when their defenses are antagonistic.

  • People v. Mahboubian, 74 N.Y.2d 174 (1989): Antagonistic Defenses Require Severance in Joint Trials

    74 N.Y.2d 174 (1989)

    Severance in a joint trial is required when the core of each defendant’s defense is irreconcilable with the other, creating a significant risk that the conflict itself will lead the jury to infer guilt.

    Summary

    Houshang Mahboubian and Nedjatollah Sakhai were convicted of conspiracy, attempted grand larceny, and burglary for staging a theft of Persian antiquities to collect insurance proceeds. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the defendants’ antagonistic defenses prejudiced their right to a fair trial, thus requiring severance. Mahboubian’s defense was denial of involvement, while Sakhai admitted involvement but claimed it was a publicity stunt. The court found that the jury could not have believed both defenses, leading to undue prejudice. The court also held that the defendants’ actions constituted attempted grand larceny and burglary.

    Facts

    Mahboubian insured his collection of Persian antiquities for $18.5 million. Suspicions arose regarding the authenticity of some pieces. Mahboubian rented a vault at Morgan Brothers Manhattan Storage in New York. Sakhai contacted individuals, including a police informant named Daniel Cardebat, to arrange the theft of the collection. Sakhai informed them the collection would be shipped from Switzerland to New York. Mahboubian marked the shipping crates with his initials. The crates were then shipped to Regency Worldwide Packing, where the burglary occurred. Cardebat and his accomplices broke into the warehouse, removed the crates, and were subsequently arrested. Sakhai was arrested while attempting to meet Cardebat. Mahboubian was later charged with participation in the crime.

    Procedural History

    Mahboubian and Sakhai were jointly tried and convicted of conspiracy, attempted grand larceny, and burglary in the Supreme Court, New York County. Both defendants moved for severance, arguing undue prejudice due to antagonistic defenses. The trial court denied the motions. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, ordering a new trial, holding that severance was improperly denied.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendants’ motions for severance based on antagonistic defenses.
    2. Whether the defendants’ actions constituted an attempt to commit grand larceny.
    3. Whether the defendants’ actions satisfied the intent element for burglary.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the core of each defendant’s defense was irreconcilable with the other, creating a significant risk that the conflict itself would lead the jury to infer guilt.
    2. Yes, because their conduct went beyond mere preparation and came dangerously close to completing the larceny.
    3. Yes, because they intended that the crime of criminal facilitation be committed within the warehouse.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendants’ defenses were mutually exclusive and irreconcilable. Mahboubian denied involvement, while Sakhai admitted involvement but claimed it was a publicity stunt. The jury could not have credited both defenses. The court established a standard that severance is compelled where the core of each defense is in irreconcilable conflict with the other and where there is a significant danger that the conflict alone would lead the jury to infer defendant’s guilt. The court found that Mahboubian was unduly prejudiced because, due to a Bruton problem concerning Sakhai, large portions of his statement to an Assistant District Attorney were redacted. Regarding the attempted grand larceny charge, the court found that the defendants’ actions had gone beyond mere preparation and constituted an attempt to commit grand larceny because they had hired professional burglars, provided them with tools, and caused them to break into a warehouse and steal property in the dead of night. The court also found that the defendants intended that the crimes of criminal facilitation and attempted grand larceny be committed on the warehouse premises, thus satisfying the intent element for burglary. The court noted that “[A] person is guilty of criminal facilitation when, ‘believing it probable that he is rendering aid * * * to a person who intends to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit a felony’” (Penal Law § 115.00).

  • People v. Mas, 68 N.Y.2d 683 (1986): Limits of Redaction and Right to Confrontation

    People v. Mas, 68 N.Y.2d 683 (1986)

    When a co-defendant’s confession implicating the defendant is introduced at a joint trial, redaction of the confession must effectively protect the defendant from prejudice; if the redaction is compromised by other evidence or judicial statements, a new trial is required to protect the defendant’s right to confrontation.

    Summary

    Mas was convicted of robbery. Prior to trial, he moved for severance from his co-defendant, Lopez, whose confession implicated him. The trial judge denied the motion, expecting redaction would suffice. However, a slip of the tongue by the judge and the introduction of evidence linking Mas to the co-defendant’s statement undermined the redaction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Mas’s conviction, holding that the compromised redaction violated his right to confrontation. The court reasoned that the errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given weaknesses in the other evidence against Mas.

    Facts

    Mas and Lopez were charged with robbery. Lopez confessed to the crime but implicated Mas. Mas moved for severance, arguing that the introduction of Lopez’s confession would prejudice him. The trial court denied severance, believing redaction of Lopez’s confession would protect Mas’s rights. During the trial, the judge mistakenly used Mas’s name when referring to Lopez’s taped statement. Further, the prosecution introduced evidence linking Mas to a nickname mentioned in Lopez’s statement. A witness identified Mas as one of the robbers, but only positively identified him 16 months after the incident. When arrested three days later, Mas was in a car with others, and the murder weapon was found at his feet.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Mas. Mas appealed, arguing that the compromised redaction of Lopez’s confession violated his right to confrontation. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Mas appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s failure to grant a severance or adequately protect Mas from prejudice through the redaction of his co-defendant’s confession, when that redaction was undermined by subsequent evidence and judicial statements, violated Mas’s right to confrontation.

    Holding

    Yes, because the redaction of the co-defendant’s confession was rendered ineffective by the judge’s comment and the introduction of additional evidence, thus violating Mas’s right to confrontation and warranting a new trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court held that the redaction’s effectiveness was negated by the trial judge’s slip of the tongue and the introduction of evidence linking Mas to a nickname mentioned in the co-defendant’s statement. This compromised the redaction to the point where it no longer adequately protected Mas’s right to confrontation. The court cited People v. Jackson, noting similarities in how redaction efforts were undermined by subsequent events at trial. The court also referenced Bruton v. United States, emphasizing that limiting instructions are not always a sufficient substitute for the right to cross-examination. The court stated, “[L]imiting instructions with respect to the codefendant’s confession were no ‘adequate substitute for [defendant’s] constitutional right of cross-examination.’” The court rejected the argument that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. While a witness identified Mas, the identification occurred 16 months after the crime and other individuals were present in the car with Mas when he was arrested with the murder weapon. Given these factors, the court could not conclude that the denial of Mas’s right to confront his co-defendant was harmless. The court emphasized that “[a] defendant is entitled to a new trial if events or evidence introduced during the trial materially reduce the probability that the redaction effectively afforded the protection it was intended to provide.”

  • People v. Lane, 56 N.Y.2d 1 (1982): Standard for Consolidating Indictments When Defendant Wishes to Testify on One But Not Another

    People v. Lane, 56 N.Y.2d 1 (1982)

    To defeat a motion to consolidate indictments when a defendant claims they wish to testify on one charge but not another, the defendant must convincingly show they have important testimony for one offense and a strong need to remain silent on the other.

    Summary

    Defendants Lane and Wells were charged with two robberies with similar facts. The prosecution moved to consolidate the indictments, arguing evidence of one robbery would be admissible in the trial for the other. The defendants opposed, stating they wished to testify about the first robbery (claiming it involved consensual sexual acts, not robbery) but not the second (relying on perceived weaknesses in the prosecution’s identification evidence). The trial court granted consolidation, and the defendants were convicted of at least one charge. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendants failed to demonstrate a sufficiently compelling reason to avoid testifying on the second charge. The Court adopted a standard requiring a “convincing showing” of both important testimony for one offense and a strong need to remain silent on the other to defeat consolidation.

    Facts

    Two men fitting the defendants’ descriptions were picked up hitchhiking on two separate occasions. In each incident, the driver was forced at knifepoint to drive to a location near Driving Park Bridge. The driver was then robbed, locked in the trunk, and the car was abandoned near the Genesee River Gorge.

    Procedural History

    The People moved to consolidate two indictments for robbery. The trial court granted the motion based on oral arguments. The defendants moved for reconsideration, submitting affidavits stating their desire to testify regarding the first robbery but remain silent on the second. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. Neither defendant testified at trial. The jury convicted both defendants of the first robbery. Wells was convicted of the second robbery, but Lane was acquitted. The Appellate Division affirmed all convictions, and the defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant must make a convincing showing of both important testimony concerning one offense and a strong need to refrain from testifying about another offense to defeat a motion by the People to consolidate two indictments, where consolidation is sought because proof of one offense would be material and admissible in the trial of the other.

    Holding

    Yes, because to defeat a consolidation motion under these circumstances, a defendant must make a “convincing showing” of both important testimony concerning one offense and a strong need to refrain from testifying about the other.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court’s decision to consolidate indictments is discretionary and reviewable only for abuse of discretion as a matter of law. The Court weighed the public interest in efficient trials against the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The Court adopted the standard from Baker v. United States, which requires a defendant to make “a convincing showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count and strong need to refrain from testifying on the other.” The Court found this standard applicable to consolidation motions because the same concerns of fairness and prejudice are present as in severance motions. The Court distinguished its prior holding in People v. Shapiro, noting that in Shapiro, the defendant had made a sufficient showing under the Baker test. In this case, the Court found the defendants’ stated desire to exploit a perceived weakness in the People’s identification evidence insufficient to demonstrate a “strong need” to refrain from testifying. The Court stated, “It was incumbent upon defendants to articulate in concrete terms why they would be unduly prejudiced by giving testimony on the December 2 count either supporting misidentification or simply denying the charge.” The Court noted that an in camera review could be used to protect a defendant from revealing privileged information to the prosecution. The court emphasized that “speculative fears of exposure to cross-examination regarding undocumented events and abstract claims of impeachment…should never be considered dispositive absent the most obviously egregious circumstances.”

  • People v. Shapiro, 50 N.Y.2d 747 (1980): Severance and Prosecutorial Misconduct

    People v. Shapiro, 50 N.Y.2d 747 (1980)

    A trial court abuses its discretion when it denies severance of indictments involving numerous counts of sex crimes from indictments involving promoting prostitution, especially when the prosecutor intimidates defense witnesses with perjury charges.

    Summary

    Elliot Shapiro was convicted of promoting prostitution, endangering the welfare of a minor, and multiple counts of sodomy. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by consolidating indictments, as the sheer number of sodomy counts prejudiced Shapiro’s defense against the prostitution charges. The court also found prosecutorial misconduct where the District Attorney repeatedly and unqualifiedly warned defense witnesses that they would be prosecuted for perjury if their testimony favored Shapiro, effectively depriving him of his right to compulsory process. Finally, the court ruled that the eavesdropping orders were invalid as they exceeded the bounds of the federal wiretapping statute.

    Facts

    Shapiro was charged with multiple counts of sodomy over 17 months with eight underage boys (Indictment No. 143). He was also charged with promoting prostitution and endangering the welfare of a minor based on a single incident on January 31, 1974, when police found him and another underage boy nude in his home, along with other adults and underage boys (Indictment Nos. 117 and 118). The police obtained evidence for the latter indictments through court-ordered wiretapping. Shapiro claimed he was merely a patron, not a promoter, of prostitution.

    Procedural History

    Shapiro was convicted in the County Court, Westchester County. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction but modified the sentence. Shapiro appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing improper joinder of indictments, prosecutorial misconduct, and invalid eavesdropping orders.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by consolidating Indictment No. 143 (multiple sodomy counts) with Indictment Nos. 117 and 118 (promoting prostitution and related charges).
    2. Whether the District Attorney’s warnings to defense witnesses regarding perjury violated Shapiro’s due process rights.
    3. Whether the eavesdropping orders exceeded the bounds of the federal wiretapping statute.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the multiplicity of sodomy counts in Indictment No. 143 carried an almost irresistible potential for prejudicing Shapiro’s defense against the charges arising out of the January 31, 1974, incident.
    2. Yes, because the District Attorney’s repeated and unequivocal warnings to the witnesses effectively deprived Shapiro of his right to compulsory process.
    3. Yes, because the state law, as applied to authorize wiretaps for crimes not involving force or danger to life or limb, contravened the requirements of section 2516 of the federal statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the joinder of the indictments was prejudicial because the numerous sodomy counts created an inference of indiscriminate propensity, unfairly impacting the defense against the promoting prostitution charges. The court highlighted the lack of physical evidence of sodomy with one of the boys found in Shapiro’s home during the police raid. Furthermore, the prosecutor’s intimidation of defense witnesses by threatening perjury charges violated Shapiro’s due process rights. The court emphasized that the witnesses sought assurance against prosecution for inconsistencies in prior testimony, not immunity for false statements at Shapiro’s trial. The court cited Webb v. Texas, stating that substantial interference by the State with a defense witness’ free and unhampered choice to testify violates due process. Finally, the court found that the eavesdropping orders were invalid because they exceeded the scope of permissible state regulation under the federal wiretapping statute (18 U.S.C. § 2516(2)). The court noted that the federal statute limits wiretapping authorization to major offenses involving harm or the substantial threat of harm to the person, and that New York’s statute was broader than federal law. The court emphasized that, while the state’s interest in criminalizing participation with minors in prostitution or sexual abuse is compelling, the wiretaps here were for crimes not involving the use of force or danger to life or limb, thus violating federal law. The Court stated, “The provisions of title 3 do more than codify bare constitutional requisites; they manifest a Congressional design to protect the privacy of wire and oral communications by confining State authorization for eavesdropping by wiretap to what in Congress’ view are appropriate and compelling circumstances”.

  • People v. Streiff, 41 A.D.2d 259 (1973): When a Joint Trial Unduly Prejudices a Defendant

    People v. Streiff, 41 A.D.2d 259 (1973)

    A defendant is entitled to a separate trial when a co-defendant’s statement, inadmissible against the defendant, is so incriminating that it substantially prejudices the defendant’s right to a fair trial, especially when the evidence against the defendant, standing alone, is weak.

    Summary

    Charles Streiff was convicted of felony murder along with co-defendants Davis and Payne. Streiff appealed, arguing he was prejudiced by the joint trial because Payne’s statement, which implicated all three men in an attempted rape that led to the victim’s death, was admitted into evidence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Streiff’s conviction, holding that the joint trial prejudiced Streiff because Payne’s statement filled critical gaps in the prosecution’s case against Streiff, and without it, a conviction for felony murder would have been unlikely. The court affirmed the convictions of Davis and Payne.

    Facts

    Martha Kirk went missing, and her car was found at Merrill’s restaurant. Her body was later discovered, and an autopsy revealed she had been strangled. Streiff, Davis, and Payne were identified as patrons of Merrill’s on the night Kirk disappeared. Initially, they denied involvement, but later signed statements admitting some degree of involvement and implicating each other. The statements generally agreed that they found Kirk drunk and unconscious in her car, moved her to their vehicle, and drove to a secluded area. However, their accounts of what happened in the secluded area differed significantly, particularly between Streiff and Payne. Payne’s statement included graphic details implying an attempted rape, which was the predicate felony for the felony murder charge.

    Procedural History

    Streiff moved for a severance and separate trial, which was denied. All three defendants were tried together and convicted of felony murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. Streiff appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the denial of his motion for a separate trial was prejudicial error.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Streiff’s motion for a separate trial, thereby prejudicing his right to a fair trial due to the admission of a co-defendant’s (Payne’s) statement that was highly incriminating but inadmissible against Streiff.

    Holding

    Yes, because without Payne’s statement, the possibility of Streiff’s conviction for felony murder was remote, and Payne’s statement so clearly and ineradicably charted the course to guilt. “In a case where, without the existence of a confession by one defendant, the evidence against another would be too weak to justify a conviction or even where a conviction would be doubtful, our review of the judgment would compel us to conclude that an abuse of discretion had been committed.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the decision to grant a separate trial is discretionary, appellate courts can review whether that discretion was abused and resulted in injustice. The court acknowledged that the introduction of a co-defendant’s confession implicating the defendant could violate the defendant’s right to confront witnesses, but this right was not violated here because the co-defendants testified. However, the court emphasized that the right to a separate trial is broader than the right to confrontation. The court recognized the risk that a jury might consider evidence against all defendants collectively, despite instructions to consider each defendant separately. While the possibility of prejudice is discounted when the defendant’s own statement is nearly identical to the co-defendant’s or when independent proof of guilt is substantial, neither condition was met in Streiff’s case.

    The court found that Streiff’s own statement, even if it established criminal conduct, did not definitively establish the attempted rape necessary for a felony murder conviction. Payne’s statement, however, filled this gap. The court stated, “From a purely legal standpoint, Payne’s admission that he lay next to the naked girl with his erect penis exposed, shows that he at least ‘carr[ied] the project forward within dangerous proximity to the criminal end to be attained.’” The court concluded that it could not confidently say the jury disregarded Payne’s statement when convicting Streiff, particularly because Payne implicated Streiff by claiming Streiff was present during the attempted rape. Therefore, the joint trial substantially prejudiced Streiff’s rights, necessitating a separate trial. As the court put it, “Cast out the [codefendant’s] confessions and the result would need to be the same” and this was not the case here.

  • People v. Owens, 22 N.Y.2d 95 (1968): Prejudice from Co-defendant’s Invocation of Fifth Amendment

    People v. Owens, 22 N.Y.2d 95 (1968)

    It is reversible error to permit a co-defendant to call another co-defendant as a witness, knowing that the witness will invoke their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, because of the inherent prejudice to the witness, even if the court provides a curative instruction.

    Summary

    Robert Owens and Charline Brown were convicted of grand larceny for taking money from Clarice Harriss through false pretenses. During the joint trial, Brown called Owens as a witness, knowing he would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court allowed this, providing a cautionary instruction to the jury. The Appellate Division reversed Owens’ conviction, finding this prejudicial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that compelling a defendant to invoke the Fifth Amendment in front of the jury is inherently prejudicial, and a curative instruction is unlikely to eliminate the harm. The court also discussed the importance of considering severance when a co-defendant’s testimony is needed.

    Facts

    Clarice Harriss was approached by Owens at a bank. Owens showed her an envelope, claiming it contained $15,000 and that she had left it in a phone booth. Brown then prompted Owens to open the envelope. Owens, Brown and Harriss then agreed to split the money, with Harriss paying $2,000 for the right to receive $5,000. Harriss withdrew $1,000 from her savings and gave it to Owens, along with the $318 she had withdrawn earlier. Owens and Brown then disappeared with the money.

    Procedural History

    Owens and Brown were jointly indicted for grand larceny in the first degree. Before trial, Brown moved for a mistrial and severance because she intended to call Owens as a witness, knowing he would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. The motion was denied. Brown renewed the motion at the close of the People’s case; it was denied. Brown then called Owens as a witness. Owens invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. The trial court denied Owens’ motion for a mistrial. The jury convicted both defendants. The Appellate Division reversed Owens’ conviction. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court committed reversible error by allowing co-defendant Brown to call co-defendant Owens to the witness stand, knowing that Owens would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination before the jury.

    Holding

    Yes, because compelling a defendant to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury is inherently prejudicial, and instructions are unlikely to cure that prejudice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the People’s concession that it was error to allow Brown to call Owens to the stand. The court stated, “[T]he privilege against self incrimination is violated whenever a criminal defendant is compelled to take the stand and claim his privilege, whether at the behest of the prosecution or a codefendant.” The court recognized the right of a defendant to call a co-defendant as a witness but noted that this right is qualified when a joint trial is involved and the witness invokes their Fifth Amendment right. The court reasoned that the stigmatizing effect of claiming the privilege before the jury is so powerful that curative instructions are unlikely to eliminate the prejudice. The court noted that the proof of guilt was not overwhelming, so the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court emphasized that trial courts must carefully consider whether to sever trials when a defendant intends to call a co-defendant as a witness, especially where there is a showing of a need for the co-defendant’s testimony. “But there must be a showing of intention to call the codefendant as a witness and a need to do so; the mere statement of intention is hardly sufficient unless the circumstances indicate sincerity of intention and reasonable need.” A defendant must make the severance motion “as early as it is reasonably feasible.”

  • People v. Burrelle, 21 N.Y.2d 265 (1967): Redaction Insufficient to Prevent Prejudice in Joint Trial

    People v. Burrelle, 21 N.Y.2d 265 (1967)

    In a joint trial, redaction of co-defendants’ confessions is insufficient to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial when testimony is later introduced that effectively identifies the defendant as the person referenced in the redacted confession.

    Summary

    Defendants Burrelle, Weston, and Grant were jointly tried for first-degree murder. Each defendant had given statements implicating the others. The trial court redacted these statements, replacing the names of co-defendants with “X.” However, during the trial, an assistant district attorney and police officers testified, identifying each defendant by their nicknames, effectively undoing the redaction and prejudicing the defendants. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the initial denial of severance, while potentially proper at the outset, resulted in an unfair trial due to the subsequent testimony and warranted separate trials for each defendant.

    Facts

    The three defendants were arrested and charged with first-degree murder. Following their arrests, Burrelle and Weston gave statements implicating each other and Grant in the shooting death. Grant denied the robbery and the shooting, but admitted an attempt by someone referred to as “X” to obtain money owed to him by the victim. The defendants had distinct physical characteristics, known by the nicknames “Fats”, “Slim”, and “Shorty.” Burrelle moved for a separate trial prior to the joint trial, but this motion was denied.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were jointly tried for first-degree murder. Defendant Burrelle’s pretrial motion for a separate trial was denied. During the trial, redacted statements were introduced. The assistant district attorney and police officers testified, identifying “Fats”, “Slim”, and “Shorty” as the individuals implicated in the crime, effectively identifying each defendant. The jury convicted all three defendants. Burrelle appealed, arguing that the denial of his motion for a separate trial was prejudicial. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Burrelle’s motion for a separate trial, given the introduction of testimony that effectively identified him in the redacted confessions of his co-defendants.
    2. Whether the admission of testimony identifying the defendants by their nicknames, thus linking them to the redacted confessions, prejudiced the defendants and deprived them of a fair trial.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the subsequent testimony undermined the redaction of the confessions, prejudicing Burrelle.
    2. Yes, because the testimony nullified the redactions and unfairly implicated each defendant in the crime, warranting separate trials for each.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on People v. La Belle, which allowed for retrospective review of a trial court’s decision to deny severance. While the initial denial of severance might have been appropriate, the subsequent testimony identifying the defendants by their nicknames undid the redaction. The court found that this resulted in prejudice, because the jury could easily connect each defendant to the redacted confessions. The court emphasized that the use of redacted confessions in joint trials is permissible, but only if the redactions are effective in protecting the rights of the defendants. Here, the testimony “sterilize[d] the effect of the redaction,” depriving the defendants of a fair trial.

    The court stated, “when testimony is later introduced to sterilize the effect of the redaction, the defendants are at that time deprived of a fair trial.” Because Burrelle had moved for a severance, he was clearly entitled to a new and separate trial. The court also found that the references to Grant as “Fats” were similarly prejudicial. Due to the unique circumstances of the joint trial, the court concluded that Weston also required a separate trial to satisfy standards of justice.

  • People v. Feolo, 282 N.Y. 276 (1940): Severance of Trials When Confessions Implicate Co-Defendants

    282 N.Y. 276 (1940)

    When a confession by one defendant in a joint trial powerfully implicates co-defendants, and independent evidence against those co-defendants is weak, the trial court abuses its discretion by denying a motion for severance.

    Summary

    Feolo, Mastrone, Brabson, and Summerfeld were convicted of first-degree murder. The key issue was whether the trial judge erred in denying separate trials to Feolo, Mastrone, and Brabson. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on the testimony of Funicello, an admitted criminal, and the confessions of Summerfeld, which implicated all four defendants. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the convictions of Feolo, Mastrone, and Brabson, finding that the denial of separate trials prejudiced them, as Summerfeld’s confession was highly incriminating and the independent evidence against them was weak. Summerfeld’s conviction was affirmed due to his own confessions. This case highlights the critical importance of severance when a co-defendant’s confession substantially prejudices others in a joint trial.

    Facts

    On September 14, 1931, three men robbed a speakeasy, during which Sergeant Timothy Murphy was fatally shot. Officer Khocke was also shot but survived. Six years later, Emillio Funicello, a repeat offender, provided information leading to the indictment of Feolo, Mastrone, Brabson, and Summerfeld. Funicello testified that Feolo and Brabson admitted to him that they shot a cop after Mastrone provided a “tip” about the speakeasy. Funicello also stated that Summerfeld confessed to him his involvement in the robbery and homicide, corroborating the roles of the four defendants.

    Procedural History

    The four defendants were jointly indicted for first-degree murder. Feolo, Mastrone, and Brabson moved for separate trials, which were denied. All four were convicted. Feolo, Mastrone, and Brabson appealed, arguing the denial of severance was prejudicial. The Court of Appeals reviewed the convictions.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motions for separate trials made by Feolo, Mastrone, and Brabson, given that the evidence against them, absent Summerfeld’s confession, was weak?

    Holding

    Yes, because without the confessions of Summerfeld, conviction of the other three defendants would have been far from a certainty. The Court of Appeals found that the denial of separate trials prejudiced Feolo, Mastrone, and Brabson.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the decision to grant separate trials is generally within the trial court’s discretion. However, the court emphasized that discretion ends and severance becomes a duty when a confession by one defendant powerfully implicates co-defendants and the independent evidence against them is weak. The court cited People v. Fisher, 249 N.Y. 419, stating, “One who makes no confession must be found guilty, if at all, only on proof independent of a confession by a codefendant.” The court found that Funicello’s testimony, standing alone, was not strong enough to ensure a conviction for Feolo, Mastrone and Brabson. The court also noted that the jury was improperly instructed to consider Summerfeld’s confession in evaluating whether Funicello was an accomplice, compounding the prejudice. The court concluded that, without Summerfeld’s confession, a conviction of the other three defendants was not a certainty, and therefore, the denial of separate trials constituted an abuse of discretion. Summerfeld’s conviction was upheld because of his own confessions: “The uniform consistency with which Funicello’s trial testimony tallies in its details with those confessions is cogent proof of its veracity and accuracy.”