Tag: settlement proceeds

  • Teichman v. Community Hospital of Western Suffolk, 87 N.Y.2d 514 (1996): Insurer’s Right to Reimbursement from Settlement Proceeds

    Teichman v. Community Hospital of Western Suffolk, 87 N.Y.2d 514 (1996)

    An insurer does not have an automatic lien on settlement proceeds received by its insured, but it may intervene in a lawsuit to establish a contractual right to reimbursement for medical expenses included in the settlement.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether an insurer, MetLife, had a right to recoup medical expenses it paid on behalf of an infant plaintiff, Michelle Teichman, from a medical malpractice settlement. The New York Court of Appeals held that while MetLife did not have a lien on the settlement funds, it was properly allowed to intervene in the lawsuit to prove its contractual right to reimbursement if the settlement included compensation for medical expenses. This prevents double recovery by the plaintiffs and ensures the responsible tortfeasors ultimately bear the medical expenses.

    Facts

    Michelle Teichman suffered severe injuries during birth, leading to cerebral palsy. Her mother, Camille Teichman, had health insurance coverage through the Empire Plan, administered by MetLife. MetLife paid for Michelle’s medical expenses, totaling $169,302.27 by January 1992. Camille Teichman sued the hospital and doctors for medical malpractice. The malpractice case settled for $4,500,000, with the settlement stipulation stating it was inclusive of all liens and claims of insurance carriers, including MetLife. MetLife was not a party to the settlement negotiations but had notified Camille Teichman of a reimbursement provision in the Plan.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs moved to vacate MetLife’s claims for reimbursement. MetLife cross-moved for permission to intervene and a declaration that it was entitled to reimbursement. The trial court granted MetLife intervention, finding a lien existed. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that MetLife had no lien or contractual subrogation right and had forfeited any refund right by delaying intervention. MetLife appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether MetLife had a valid lien on the settlement proceeds based on the insurance policy.
    2. Whether the trial court properly allowed MetLife to intervene in the lawsuit to assert its right to reimbursement.

    Holding

    1. No, because the insurance policy’s refund provision did not explicitly create a lien on specific property.
    2. Yes, because MetLife’s claim for a refund could be adversely affected if intervention were not allowed, there were common questions of law and fact, and no prejudice was shown in allowing intervention.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the insurance policy’s language only established a “right to a refund” if the insured was repaid for medical expenses, but it did not create a lien on any specific property. The Court emphasized that an equitable lien requires an agreement, express or implied, that there shall be a lien on specific property. The policy lacked the specificity required to create such a lien. The court also noted that while MetLife was entitled to subrogation, this right to seek recovery did not automatically create a lien. Regarding intervention, the Court found that it was proper because MetLife’s claim could be affected by the settlement. The Court rejected the argument that CPLR 4545 (the collateral source rule) mandated the exclusion of medical expenses from the settlement, as the statute applies to trials and judgments, not settlements. The Court pointed out that the settlement hearing suggested medical expenses were considered. The Court reasoned that allowing intervention prevents double recovery and ensures tortfeasors, not ratepayers, bear the expense. The court quoted the policy language, noting that it allows MetLife “the right to a refund from You” if “You were repaid for all or some of those expenses by another source”.

  • Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83 (1994): Attorney Liability for Disregarding Assignment of Settlement Proceeds

    84 N.Y.2d 83 (1994)

    An attorney with notice of a valid assignment of a client’s future settlement proceeds may be liable to the assignee for disbursing the proceeds to the client in disregard of the assignment.

    Summary

    Gina and Xavier Leon, along with Maria Macia, sued Wilfredo Martinez and his attorneys, Ira Futterman and Pearlman, Apat & Futterman, seeking to enforce their claim to a portion of Martinez’s personal injury settlement. The plaintiffs asserted that Martinez assigned them a percentage of his recovery in exchange for their care after his accident. Futterman, aware of the assignment, disbursed the entire settlement to Martinez. The New York Court of Appeals held that the complaint stated a valid cause of action against the attorneys, as they had notice of the assignment and may be liable for disregarding it. The Court also suggested the possibility of an attorney-client relationship between the plaintiffs and Futterman’s firm.

    Facts

    Following an accident, Wilfredo Martinez received care from Gina and Xavier Leon, and Maria Macia. In consideration for their care, Martinez agreed to assign them a portion of any recovery he received from his lawsuit against Hertz. At the request of both Martinez and the plaintiffs, attorney Ira Futterman drafted an agreement where Martinez assigned 5% of his net recovery to Gina Leon, 5% to Xavier Leon, and 15% to Maria Macia. Futterman subsequently settled Martinez’s case against Hertz but disbursed all the net proceeds to Martinez, allegedly in violation of the agreement.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs sued Martinez and Futterman, alleging a breach of the assignment agreement and professional misconduct. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint against Futterman and his firm, finding that drafting the agreement did not create liability. The Appellate Division reversed, holding attorneys could be liable for disregarding a known assignment. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, certifying the question of whether the Appellate Division’s decision was correct.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an attorney who has notice of an assignment of a portion of their client’s recovery can be held liable to the assignees for paying out that recovery in disregard of the assignment.

    Holding

    Yes, because the complaint and supporting affidavit adequately alleged that the instrument prepared by Futterman was intended by all parties to effectuate a present assignment to plaintiffs of interests in the future settlement, and Futterman had notice of this agreement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that on a motion to dismiss, the pleading should be liberally construed, and the facts alleged in the complaint should be accepted as true. The court emphasized that no particular words are required to effect an assignment, so long as there is a perfected transaction intended to vest in the assignee a present right in the thing assigned. The Court cited Speelman v. Pascal, noting that the words “I give” are sufficient to indicate a present assignment. The Court noted that because Futterman drafted the agreement, he unquestionably had notice of it. The Court reasoned that if an enforceable assignment is proven, Futterman’s payment of the funds entirely to Martinez, in disregard of the agreement, is sufficient to state a cause of action. The Court also rejected the argument that compliance with the assignment would violate ethical duties to Martinez, stating that DR 9-102 only mandates payment to the client of funds “which the client…is entitled to receive.” To the extent the client assigned those funds, he is no longer entitled to them. Furthermore, DR 9-102 creates ethical duties to third parties as to funds to which those third parties are entitled. The Court concluded that the complaint and affidavit were sufficient to support an inference of an attorney-client relationship between plaintiffs and the law firm, thus raising the possibility of legal malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty.