New York Law Review

Tag: Serial Murder

  • People v. Shulman, 6 N.Y.3d 1 (2005): Scope of ‘Similar Fashion’ in Serial Murder Statute

    6 N.Y.3d 1 (2005)

    The element of ‘similar fashion’ in New York’s first-degree murder statute (Penal Law § 125.27 [1] [a] [xi]) applies to the entirety of separate criminal transactions, including pre- and post-mortem conduct, not solely to the killing acts themselves.

    Summary

    Robert Shulman was convicted of first-degree murder for killing three women in separate, but similar, criminal transactions. He confessed to picking up the women, taking them to his residence, and killing them with blunt objects. He then dismembered the bodies to hinder identification and disposed of the remains in various locations. On appeal, Shulman challenged the ‘similar fashion’ element of the statute, arguing it only applied to the acts of killing, not the dismemberment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that ‘similar fashion’ encompasses the entirety of the criminal transactions, including post-mortem conduct. The court vacated the death sentence based on prior precedent.

    Facts

    The case involved the deaths of three women: Jane Doe Medford, Lisa Ann Warner, and Kelly Sue Bunting (aka Melani). Their dismembered bodies were discovered in separate locations between 1994 and 1996. Shulman confessed to killing all three women in his Hicksville residence after smoking crack cocaine with them. He detailed how he beat them to death with different blunt objects, then dismembered their bodies using tools from his screened-in porch. He discarded their body parts in various dumpsters to prevent identification. The victims’ bodies were discovered dismembered, with similar trace evidence found in Shulman’s room and at his workplace.

    Procedural History

    Shulman was convicted in County Court of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Because a notice of intent to seek the death penalty was filed, the appeal went directly to the New York Court of Appeals. Shulman appealed the conviction, arguing insufficient probable cause for his arrest, errors in jury selection, improper jury instructions, and the unconstitutionality of the death penalty. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions but vacated the death sentence, remitting the case for resentencing. The Court vacated the death sentence based on prior precedent establishing an unconstitutional two-tiered penalty level for death penalty cases.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the police had probable cause to arrest Shulman.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in rejecting for-cause challenges to certain prospective jurors.

    3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a request to question seated jurors about a prejudicial newspaper headline.

    4. Whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the meaning of “similar fashion” in the first-degree murder statute.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the police had information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that Shulman committed the offenses.

    2. No, because the trial court acted within its discretion in assessing the jurors’ fitness and impartiality.

    3. No, because the headline was “somewhat neutral” and the trial court reasonably feared that inquiry would highlight the article and foster speculation.

    4. No, because “similar fashion” encompasses the entirety of the separate criminal transactions, not solely the killing acts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Probable Cause: The Court found that the totality of the circumstances provided sufficient probable cause for arrest. This included Shulman being the last person seen with one victim, the similar manner of death and disposal of the victims’ bodies, the presence of trace evidence linking Shulman to the victims, and his work schedule coinciding with the murders. The court stated, “[t]he legal conclusion [as to whether probable cause existed] is to be made after considering all of the facts and circumstances together.”

    Jury Selection: The Court held that the trial court acted within its discretion during jury selection. The court emphasized that the trial judge is best positioned to assess a prospective juror’s demeanor and fitness. Addressing a juror who expressed sarcasm about life without parole, the court noted, “it was for the [trial] court to say, from the whole examination of the juror, including his appearance and demeanor, whether he was fit and competent to perform fairly and impartially”.

    Midtrial Publicity: The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not questioning the jurors about the newspaper headline. Because the headline was ambiguous and the trial court feared that inquiry would emphasize the article, the judge acted reasonably. The court noted that it has afforded trial courts wide flexibility in these matters. The court cited People v Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 388, 394 (1979), noting that in every case “the facts must be examined to determine the nature of the material placed before the jury and the likelihood that prejudice would be engendered”.

    “Similar Fashion” Instruction: The Court held that the trial court’s instruction on “similar fashion” was proper. The court reasoned that the statute’s language and legislative history indicate that “committed in a similar fashion” relates to the “separate criminal transactions” as a whole, not just the killing acts. The court referenced the Assembly Codes Committee Bill Memorandum which “explains that subparagraph (xi) of Penal Law § 125.27 (1) (a), the death penalty statute’s serial murder provision, “makes an intentional killing first degree murder when the defendant has committed two or more additional intentional killings within a 24 month period in separate criminal transactions that were committed in a similar fashion or pursuant to a common scheme or plan”. The Court emphasized that post-mortem conduct could be relevant to establishing “similar fashion”.

  • People v. Mateo, 93 N.Y.2d 327 (1999): Defining “Similar Fashion” in Serial Murder Statute

    People v. Mateo, 93 N.Y.2d 327 (1999)

    The phrase “committed in a similar fashion” within a serial murder statute requires more than just the use of firearms; the murders must exhibit a notable resemblance in motive, method, and surrounding circumstances to be considered sufficiently similar.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the interpretation of Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(xi), concerning intentional murder of multiple persons in separate incidents within a 24-month period, committed in a “similar fashion.” The defendant was charged with first-degree murder for four killings. The trial court dismissed these counts, and the Appellate Division affirmed, finding the evidence insufficient to establish the murders were committed in a similar fashion. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the murders lacked sufficient similarity in motive, method, and surrounding circumstances to meet the statutory requirement, even though firearms were used in each.

    Facts

    Defendant was indicted on 22 counts, including four intentional murders. The first two victims, Toro and Diaz, were shot at a phone booth. The third victim, Holley, was shot with a sawed-off shotgun after being identified as a thief. The fourth victim, Matos, was kidnapped, interrogated, and executed in defendant’s basement. All murders occurred within a 24-month period.

    Procedural History

    The County Court dismissed counts 11 and 12 of the indictment, charging defendant with first-degree murder under Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(xi), finding insufficient evidence that the murders were committed in a “similar fashion.” The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented to the Grand Jury was sufficient to establish that the killings were “committed in a similar fashion” pursuant to Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(xi), based on the fact that firearms were used in each murder.

    Holding

    No, because the murders did not adequately resemble each other with respect to motive, method, and surrounding circumstances; therefore, they were not “committed in a similar fashion.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the phrase “committed in a similar fashion” has a well-settled legal meaning derived from People v. Molineux, which concerns the admissibility of uncharged crimes to prove identity. The Court emphasized that the Legislature intended the phrase to apply to serial killings, but it declined to create a rigid set of criteria for defining “similarity.” The Court reasoned that the application of the “similarity” element is inherently contextual. Examining the facts, the Court noted the victims were of different backgrounds and ages, the weapons varied (handguns and a shotgun), the motives differed (revenge, eliminating a snitch), and the locations varied (public sidewalk, street, basement). The Court concluded that the common denominator – the use of firearms – was insufficient to establish the murders were committed in a “similar fashion.” The Court stated, “By any standard, the evidence before the Grand Jury was legally insufficient to establish the ‘committed in a similar fashion’ element of the statute.”