Tag: Separate Offenses

  • People v. Prescott, 66 N.Y.2d 213 (1985): Defining Separate Offenses for Double Jeopardy Purposes

    People v. Prescott, 66 N.Y.2d 213 (1985)

    A prior prosecution under a town ordinance does not bar a subsequent prosecution under state law if the two laws differ materially in scope and purpose, even if arising from the same underlying conduct.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a prior prosecution for violating a town ordinance concerning local wetlands did not bar a subsequent prosecution for violating a state law concerning wetlands, even though both prosecutions arose from the same conduct. The Court reasoned that the two laws differed materially in scope and purpose. The town ordinance protected local interests, while the state law sought to implement a uniform state policy. The state prosecution also involved conduct (altering an area adjacent to a wetland without a state permit) not covered by the town ordinance, justifying separate prosecutions under CPL 40.20(2)(b).

    Facts

    The petitioner, Prescott, was initially prosecuted for violating a town ordinance related to wetlands. Subsequently, Prescott faced a separate state prosecution for violating a state law pertaining to wetlands (ECL 25-0202). The state charge included allegations of altering an area immediately adjacent to a wetland and acting without a state permit. This conduct, while subject to state law, would not constitute a violation of the town ordinance.

    Procedural History

    After the initial prosecution for violating the town ordinance, the state initiated a separate prosecution against Prescott for violating state wetlands law. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision allowing the state prosecution to proceed, and Prescott appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a prior prosecution for violating a town ordinance bars a subsequent prosecution for violating a state law when both prosecutions arise from the same conduct related to wetlands alteration.

    Holding

    No, because the town ordinance and state law differ materially in scope and purpose, and the state prosecution includes conduct not covered by the town ordinance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, agreeing with Justice Margett’s reasoning that the prior town ordinance prosecution did not bar the subsequent state law prosecution. The court emphasized the material differences in scope and purpose between the two laws. The town ordinance was limited to the town’s interest in local wetlands, whereas the state law aimed to implement a uniform state policy across all state wetlands areas. The court noted that the state prosecution included allegations of altering an area adjacent to a wetland, a violation not covered by the town ordinance. Furthermore, the state charge involved acting without a state permit, which also did not violate the town ordinance requiring a permit from the town board. The court explicitly referenced CPL 40.20(2)(b), which authorizes separate prosecutions for separate offenses. The court stated: “[T]he two laws differ materially in scope and purpose. The town ordinance is only concerned with the town’s interest in local wetlands, while the State law, which applies to a much broader area, seeks to carry out a uniform State policy consistent with the ecology of the State wetlands areas in their entirety.” This distinction justified the separate prosecutions.