New York Law Review

Tag: Sentencing In Absentia

  • People v. Colon, 76 N.Y.2d 903 (1990): Right to Counsel at Execution of Sentence After Sentencing In Absentia

    People v. Colon, 76 N.Y.2d 903 (1990)

    When a defendant is sentenced in absentia while represented by counsel, the subsequent execution of the sentence is not a critical stage of the criminal proceeding, and the defendant is not entitled to counsel at that time.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant sentenced in absentia while represented by counsel is not entitled to counsel at the subsequent execution of that sentence. Colon pleaded guilty to attempted burglary and was warned that failure to appear for sentencing could result in a harsher prison sentence imposed in his absence. After failing to appear twice, he was sentenced in absentia. Several months later, Colon was arrested and the sentence was summarily executed without his counsel present, and without providing him an opportunity to explain his absence. The court reasoned that the critical stage of sentencing concluded when the sentence was imposed in absentia, thus negating any right to counsel at the later execution of that sentence.

    Facts

    The defendant, Colon, pleaded guilty to attempted burglary in the second degree. This plea satisfied an indictment charging him with second-degree burglary and criminal mischief. At the plea allocution, while represented by counsel, Colon was promised a conditional probationary sentence. He was explicitly warned that if he failed to appear for sentencing, he could be sentenced in absentia to a prison term of 2 1/2 to 7 years. Colon failed to appear for the scheduled sentencing, which was then adjourned. He again failed to appear at the rescheduled sentencing. The sentencing court, after a hearing, determined that Colon’s absence was voluntary and sentenced him to 2 to 6 years in prison.

    Procedural History

    Several months after being sentenced in absentia, Colon was arrested on a bench warrant and returned to court. The sentence was summarily executed. Colon’s counsel was not present during the execution of the sentence. Colon was not given an opportunity to explain his absence at the original sentencing hearing, nor did he request one. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision. Colon then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant who was sentenced in absentia while represented by counsel is entitled to counsel at the subsequent execution of that sentence.

    Holding

    No, because where a defendant is sentenced in absentia while represented by counsel, the critical stage of the sentencing process terminates upon the imposition of sentence, and the subsequent execution of the sentence is not a critical stage entitling the defendant to counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding that implicates the right to counsel, citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 and People v. Perry, 36 N.Y.2d 114. However, the court distinguished the present case by emphasizing that Colon was sentenced in absentia while represented by counsel. According to the court, this fact was crucial, since “the critical stage of the sentencing process and, hence, the criminal proceeding itself for all nisi prius court purposes, terminates upon the imposition of sentence.” The court explicitly stated that “[s]ubsequent execution of the sentence is not a critical stage of the defendant’s criminal proceeding.” The court cited People v. Scott, 158 A.D.2d 725, 726, and People v. Villegas, 146 A.D.2d 228, 232, in support of this proposition. The court reasoned that because the critical stage had already passed, Colon was not entitled to counsel at the execution of his sentence. The court also stated that Colon’s remaining argument was not properly preserved for appellate review, thus declining to address it.

  • People v. Corley, 67 N.Y.2d 105 (1986): Consequences of Dismissed Appeals and Sentencing In Absentia

    People v. Corley, 67 N.Y.2d 105 (1986)

    Dismissal of an appeal for failure to prosecute acts as an adjudication on the merits of all claims that could have been litigated, and a defendant forfeits the right to be present at sentencing by willfully absconding to frustrate scheduled proceedings.

    Summary

    Defendant Corley was convicted of robbery, but the trial court set aside the verdict. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the conviction. Corley was informed of the reinstatement and ordered to appear for further proceedings. He appeared but left during a break and did not return. A bench warrant was issued, and he was later sentenced in absentia. He appealed, but his appeal was initially dismissed when he absconded. The Court of Appeals held that dismissal of the appeal for failure to prosecute acted as an adjudication on the merits. It further held that Corley forfeited his right to be present at sentencing by willfully absconding, justifying sentencing in absentia.

    Facts

    Dwight Corley was convicted of second-degree robbery. The trial court set aside the jury verdict, but the Appellate Division reversed this decision and reinstated the guilty verdict. Corley was notified to appear in court following the reinstatement of his conviction. He appeared with counsel but left during a recess and failed to return. He was a predicate felon with a prior bench warrant.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially set aside the jury verdict. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision and reinstated the guilty verdict. Corley was granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, but that appeal was dismissed when he absconded. The Court of Appeals later reinstated his appeal, but it was again dismissed for failure to prosecute. The Appellate Division affirmed the sentence, and Corley appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the dismissal of defendant’s prior appeal for failure to prosecute bars his subsequent appeal of the same issue.

    2. Whether defendant was properly sentenced in absentia where, after reinstatement of his conviction on appeal, he willfully absconded on the day scheduled for his appearance before the Trial Judge.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because dismissal of an appeal for failure to prosecute acts as an adjudication on the merits of all claims that could have been litigated had the appeal been timely argued or submitted.

    2. Yes, because a defendant forfeits any right to be present at sentencing by absconding to frustrate scheduled proceedings before the Trial Judge in connection with sentencing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that dismissing an appeal for failure to prosecute acts as an adjudication on the merits. The court stated, “Once having dismissed an appeal for failure to prosecute, we foster disrespect and indifference toward our rules and orders, encourage laxity and extend the already lengthy litigation process if we simply ignore our own order and proceed to a consideration of the issue tendered by the dismissed appeal.”

    Regarding the sentencing in absentia, the court distinguished this case from People v. Stroman, where the defendant was nearby but not brought back into the courtroom. Here, Corley was aware of the consequences of his actions. He was present initially and then deliberately absented himself to frustrate the sentencing process. The court noted the difference between waiver (knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision) and forfeiture (occurs by operation of law, based on objective facts). The court quoted People v. Sanchez, stating that a defendant can lose the right to be present as a matter of public policy when the evidence unambiguously indicates “a defiance of the processes of law sufficient to effect a forfeiture”.