New York Law Review

Tag: self-defense

  • People v. Stevenson, 31 N.Y.2d 108 (1972): Self-Defense and Resisting Arrest

    People v. Stevenson, 31 N.Y.2d 108 (1972)

    A defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense when charged with resisting arrest if the defendant’s own testimony establishes the intent to resist arrest before any alleged excessive force by the police occurred.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of resisting arrest and harassment. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that self-defense could be a defense to the charges of second-degree assault and resisting arrest. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant’s own testimony established his intent to resist arrest prior to any alleged excessive force by the police. Therefore, a self-defense instruction was not warranted because the initial act of resisting was not justified. The court emphasized that while a citizen may use reasonable force to defend against excessive force by police, the defendant’s actions demonstrated resistance before any such force was applied.

    Facts

    Police Officer Davis observed the defendant’s illegally parked car creating a traffic jam. The car’s registration had expired. When Davis reached into the car to remove the keys, the defendant pushed him. The defendant questioned the officer’s actions, stating, “What the God damn hell are you doing in that car? You have no damn business going in my car.” Officer Davis informed the defendant he was under arrest for harassment. The defendant resisted, swinging his fists at the officer. The defendant testified that the officer pushed him first when he tried to hand food to his passengers and that he was afraid of being beaten by approaching officers, so he grabbed Officer Davis to use him as a shield.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with possession of a weapon as a felony, second-degree assault, resisting arrest, and inciting to riot. He was convicted of resisting arrest and harassment in a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that self-defense is a defense to the crimes of second-degree assault and resisting arrest when the defendant claims he used force to defend himself against excessive force by the arresting officer.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s own testimony established that he demonstrated the requisite intent to resist arrest before any alleged excessive force by the police occurred, negating the justification for a self-defense instruction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that a citizen may use reasonable force in self-defense against excessive force used by police during an arrest. However, the court found that the defendant’s testimony revealed that he had already resisted arrest before any alleged excessive force was used against him. The court quoted the defendant’s own words: “ [Officer Davis] said, ‘You are under arrest.’ I said, ‘No, for what?’ And all the time he was telling, no, I was under arrest and I was asking for what, you know. * * * And he just kept on saying, ‘No, you are under arrest,’ and was grabbing for me.”

    The court reasoned that resisting arrest does not require the use of force; any conduct demonstrating an intent to prevent the officer from effecting an authorized arrest is sufficient. The court cited prior cases such as People v. Simms, 36 A.D.2d 23 and People v. Lattanzio, 35 A.D.2d 313 to support this conclusion. The court emphasized, “It is enough that he engage in some conduct with the intent of preventing the officer from effecting an authorized arrest of himself or another person”. Because the defendant resisted before any alleged excessive force, the court held that the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury on self-defense.

    The court distinguished this case from situations involving an “unprovoked police assault or of the use of excessive physical force” at the outset of an arrest, which might justify a self-defense claim. Because no such situation was apparent from the defendant’s own testimony regarding his initial resistance, there was no basis for a self-defense charge.

  • People v. Steele, 26 N.Y.2d 526 (1970): Justification Defense & Inconsistent Defenses

    People v. Steele, 26 N.Y.2d 526 (1970)

    A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on justification if the prosecution’s evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, supports such a defense, even if the defendant presents an alibi defense.

    Summary

    Ida Steele was convicted of shooting Hassell Thompson. At trial, Steele presented an alibi defense, claiming she was not present at the scene. However, prosecution witnesses testified that Thompson had a knife and initiated the aggression. Steele requested a jury instruction on justification, arguing she acted in defense of her brother. The trial court denied the request. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a justification charge was warranted because the prosecution’s evidence suggested Thompson was the initial aggressor. The Court further reasoned that an alibi defense does not preclude a justification defense when the prosecution’s case itself raises the possibility of justification. The People have the burden of disproving justification beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Facts

    Hassell Thompson had an encounter with Ida Steele and her brother. Later, Thompson returned to the area and became involved in an altercation with Steele’s brother. Prosecution witnesses provided conflicting accounts: some claimed Thompson had a knife and was the initial aggressor, while others said Steele’s brother stabbed Thompson before Steele shot him. Thompson himself claimed Steele shot him and her brother stabbed him. Steele testified she was not present at the scene of the shooting.

    Procedural History

    Steele was convicted at trial. During summation, the defense’s attempt to argue justification was blocked by a sustained objection. Steele requested a jury charge on justification, which the court denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Steele appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of justification, based on the evidence presented by the prosecution, despite the defendant’s alibi defense.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecution’s own evidence, viewed most favorably to the defendant, suggested that Thompson was the initial aggressor, thus potentially justifying Steele’s actions in defense of her brother; and the alibi defense does not preclude a justification defense under such circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that justification is a defense, and the prosecution bears the burden of disproving it beyond a reasonable doubt, as per revised Penal Law § 25.00. The court highlighted that the prosecution’s witnesses testified Thompson possessed a knife, and the prosecutor conceded Thompson was the initial aggressor. Given this, “a jury could find that defendant reasonably believed that Thompson was ‘using or about to use unlawful deadly physical force’ (revised Penal Law, § 35.15, subd. 1, par. [a]) at the time she shot him.” The Court applied the principle that a defendant is entitled to the “most favorable view of the record” when determining jury instructions.

    The Court addressed the prosecution’s argument that the alibi defense precluded a justification charge. It cited People v. Asan, stating that “the jury may believe portions of both the defense and prosecution evidence.” The Court reasoned that the jury could disbelieve the alibi but still find, based on the prosecution’s evidence, that Steele acted justifiably. Therefore, the inconsistent defenses were not a bar to the requested charge. The Court concluded that Steele was entitled to an acquittal if the jury found a failure of proof of no justification, regardless of whether they believed her alibi. The Court stated that “the prosecution’s witnesses created the opportunity for the defense.”

    The Court explicitly stated the practical implication for legal reasoning: “Defendant in addition—and without regard— to acceptance of her alibi, would be entitled to an acquittal if a jury found a failure of proof of no justification. Under the circumstances, the defendant should not be prevented from arguing that the People failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

  • People v. Asan, 22 N.Y.2d 526 (1968): Duty to Charge Lesser Included Offenses

    People v. Asan, 22 N.Y.2d 526 (1968)

    A trial court must submit lesser included offenses to the jury if any reasonable view of the evidence would permit the jury to find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense and not guilty of the greater offense.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that trial courts erred in failing to submit lesser included offenses to the jury in two separate cases. In People v. Asan, the defendant, charged with first-degree murder, argued self-defense. The court found the trial court should have submitted second-degree manslaughter to the jury. In People v. Freeman, the defendant, charged with first-degree robbery, claimed the alleged victim gave him money for a sexual act. The court found that the trial court should have submitted lesser robbery and assault charges to the jury. The court reiterated that a jury may selectively credit portions of both the prosecution and defense evidence, requiring submission of lesser offenses when supported by any view of the evidence.

    Facts

    In People v. Asan, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder for fatally stabbing Neziri Osmani. The prosecution argued that Asan deliberately stabbed Osmani six times due to Osmani’s involvement with Asan’s wife and daughter. Asan claimed self-defense, testifying that Osmani attacked him with a hunting knife during an argument, and the stabbing occurred during the ensuing struggle.

    In People v. Freeman, the defendant was charged with first-degree robbery for allegedly robbing a pastry deliveryman at knifepoint of two dollars. The prosecution’s evidence indicated Freeman slashed at the deliveryman with a knife before stealing the money. Freeman testified that the deliveryman gave him the money as partial payment for oral sodomy and denied using a knife.

    Procedural History

    In People v. Asan, the defendant was convicted of first-degree manslaughter, and the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    In People v. Freeman, the defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery and unlawful possession of a dangerous weapon, and the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. In People v. Asan, whether the trial court erred in refusing to submit the lesser included offense of second-degree manslaughter to the jury.

    2. In People v. Freeman, whether the trial court erred in refusing to submit the lesser included offenses of second and third-degree robbery and third-degree assault to the jury.

    Holding

    1. In People v. Asan, yes, because the jury could have concluded that Asan was culpably negligent in his use of the knife, thus supporting a conviction for second-degree manslaughter.

    2. In People v. Freeman, yes, because the jury might have believed that Freeman robbed the complainant without a dangerous weapon (second or third-degree robbery) or assaulted the complainant without a weapon and with no intention to rob him (third-degree assault).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that a trial court must submit a lesser-included offense to the jury if “upon any view of the facts, a defendant could properly be found guilty of a lesser degree or an included crime.” The court emphasized that there must be a basis in the evidence for finding the accused innocent of the higher crime and guilty of the lower one. The jury is free to accept portions of the defense and prosecution evidence. In Asan, the court found that a jury could have concluded that Asan was culpably negligent in his use of the knife, thus warranting a charge on second-degree manslaughter. The court also noted that the jury instructions regarding self-defense were inadequate. In Freeman, the court reasoned the jury could have believed Freeman robbed the complainant but without a dangerous weapon, or that Freeman assaulted the complainant without a weapon. The court stated, “The court, in effect, held that the defense evidence must be either accepted or rejected in its entirety. This was error since a jury may properly find a lesser included offense from any portion of the defense and prosecution evidence, or from any part of the total proof.”

  • People v. Wenzel, 189 N.Y. 275 (1907): Admissibility of Evidence and Harmless Error in Criminal Trials

    People v. Wenzel, 189 N.Y. 275 (1907)

    Even if a trial contains some evidentiary errors, the conviction can be upheld if those errors are deemed harmless and do not affect the defendant’s substantial rights, especially when the defendant admits to critical facts.

    Summary

    John Wenzel was convicted of second-degree murder for fatally shooting George Spatz in his saloon. At trial, several evidentiary rulings were challenged as erroneous. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while some errors occurred, they were harmless because Wenzel himself admitted to the shooting and other critical facts surrounding the incident. The court reasoned that the errors did not affect Wenzel’s substantial rights, and the jury’s verdict was justified by the evidence.

    Facts

    Wenzel, a frequent customer of Spatz’s saloon, had a history of altercations with Spatz. Following a prior dispute where Wenzel was beaten and ejected from the saloon, he purchased a revolver. He then returned to Spatz’s saloon days later. Wenzel claimed he sought to confront individuals involved in the prior beating. On a Sunday morning, Wenzel returned to the saloon with an associate. Wenzel claimed Spatz reached for a weapon, leading Wenzel to shoot him. The prosecution presented evidence that Spatz was unarmed and did not reach for a weapon.

    Procedural History

    Wenzel was tried in Kings County Court and convicted of second-degree murder. He appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that several evidentiary rulings during the trial constituted reversible error. The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial record and affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the admission of testimony regarding Wenzel’s prior troublesome behavior was prejudicial error.

    2. Whether a leading question regarding Spatz’s intentions immediately before the shooting constituted reversible error.

    3. Whether the admission of testimony regarding a witness’s dislike for Wenzel and a hearsay statement that Wenzel “steals” constituted prejudicial error.

    4. Whether the admission of a police officer’s opinion on Wenzel’s guilt was reversible error.

    Holding

    1. No, because Wenzel’s own testimony revealed similar or worse conduct, rendering the initial testimony harmless.

    2. No, because the witness had already fully described what he observed, and the jury was unlikely to be misled.

    3. No, because Wenzel himself admitted to a prior burglary conviction, mitigating the prejudicial effect of the hearsay statement.

    4. No, because the officer’s testimony primarily related to Wenzel’s statements at the time of arrest, and the defendant opened the door to this line of questioning.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied Section 542 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows appellate courts to disregard errors that do not affect the substantial rights of the defendant. The court acknowledged that some evidentiary rulings were erroneous. However, the court emphasized that Wenzel admitted to the shooting itself and provided details about purchasing the revolver and returning to Spatz’s saloon. The court stated that the key factual issue was whether Spatz had attempted to draw a weapon, and the jury’s verdict finding that he did not was supported by the evidence. The court reasoned that even if Spatz had a weapon, Wenzel could have retreated. The court found that because Wenzel admitted the central facts and the errors did not prejudice his defense, the conviction should be affirmed. The court noted, “There was really but one question of fact left open for consideration upon the trial, and that was as to whether Spatz had a revolver upon his person and attempted to draw it upon the defendant at the time the defendant did the shooting.” The court determined that the errors, “under the circumstances of this case, do not affect the substantial rights of the defendant. (Code of Criminal Procedure, § 542.)”