New York Law Review

Tag: seizure

  • People v. Ocasio, 85 N.Y.2d 508 (1995): Legality of a ‘Stop’ Command as a Seizure Under the New York Constitution

    People v. Ocasio, 85 N.Y.2d 508 (1995)

    Under the New York Constitution, a direction to “stop” by a uniformed police officer, considered in light of all surrounding circumstances, may constitute a seizure if it results in a significant interruption of an individual’s liberty of movement.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a police officer’s direction to a suspect to “stop” constitutes an unlawful seizure under the New York State Constitution. Police officers, responding to a radio report of a black male selling narcotics while wearing red and blue clothing, encountered the defendant, who matched the description. As the officer approached, the defendant began to walk away. The officer told him to “stop,” and the defendant then fled, discarding a bag containing cocaine. The New York Court of Appeals held that the officer’s direction to “stop” did not, as a matter of law, constitute a seizure under the specific facts presented.

    Facts

    Police received a radio report about a black male selling narcotics at a specific location, wearing red and blue clothing. Upon arriving at the location within a minute, they observed approximately ten people, including the defendant, who was the only one matching the description. As an officer approached, the defendant, after looking at the officer, began to walk away. The officer then directed the defendant to “stop.” The defendant then ran and discarded a bag containing vials of crack cocaine before being apprehended.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the drugs, arguing the “stop” command was an unlawful seizure. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The defendant pleaded guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding a sufficient basis for a common-law inquiry and reasonable suspicion to pursue the defendant after he fled.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a direction by a uniformed police officer to “stop,” made to a defendant as he began to walk away, constitutes a seizure as a matter of law under the New York State Constitution.

    Holding

    No, because under the totality of the circumstances, the officer’s single direction to stop was not a sufficient show of authority to constitute a seizure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between the Fourth Amendment standard under California v. Hodari D., which requires physical force or submission to authority for a seizure, and the New York Constitution, which focuses on whether there was a “significant interruption [of the] individual’s liberty of movement.” The court emphasized that while a verbal command alone might not be a seizure, it can be when coupled with other factors, such as drawn weapons or preventing movement. The Court distinguished this case from prior cases where a seizure was found, noting that here, there was only a single command to stop. The Court stated, “There are no bright lines separating various types of police activity. Determining whether a seizure occurs during the course of a street encounter between the police and a private citizen involves an analysis of the ‘most subtle aspects of our constitutional guarantees’.” The Court found that the facts did not indicate the officer’s conduct rose to the level of a seizure and deferred to the factual findings of the lower courts. The test is “whether a reasonable person would have believed, under the circumstances, that the officer’s conduct was a significant limitation on his or her freedom.”

  • People v. Cabey, 57 N.Y.2d 104 (1982): Reasonable Suspicion and Seizure of a Person

    People v. Cabey, 57 N.Y.2d 104 (1982)

    Ordering occupants to remain in a parked car constitutes a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and the mere fact that a vehicle is a dirty rental car does not provide such reasonable suspicion.

    Summary

    Police officers, while on patrol, observed a dirty rental car occupied by three black men. They followed the car until it parked, then approached the vehicle. The officers ordered the occupants to remain in the car while they investigated. A search of the vehicle revealed illegal weapons. The New York Court of Appeals held that ordering the occupants to remain in the car constituted an unlawful seizure because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that the occupants were involved in criminal activity. The court found that the dirty condition of the rental car, by itself, was insufficient to justify the seizure.

    Facts

    Two plainclothes police officers in an unmarked car observed a dirty 1978 Chrysler Cordoba rental car with three black male occupants. The officers followed the car for a few blocks until it parked near a bar. The officers parked behind the rental car and approached. One officer ordered one of the occupants, who was exiting the car, to get back inside, and also told another occupant to sit up. The officers then asked the driver for his license and registration.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were charged with unlawful possession of weapons. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the prosecutor appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the use of a dirty rental car in New York City establishes reasonable suspicion, as a matter of law, that the occupants are engaged in criminal activity.
    2. Whether police officers’ actions in approaching a parked car, asking the driver for his license and registration, and ordering the three occupants to remain in the vehicle constituted such a minor intrusion that the police may do so absent reasonable suspicion.

    Holding

    1. No, because the use of a dirty rental car alone does not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
    2. No, because ordering the occupants to remain in the car constitutes a seizure, which requires reasonable suspicion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the case concerned the seizure of a person, not a vehicle stop. Approaching a citizen for information requires only an articulable basis, but exercising restraint over an individual requires reasonable suspicion. “[B]efore the police can forcibly or constructively stop an individual as was done here by the order to remain in the car there must be some articulable facts, which initially or during the course of the encounter, establish reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in criminal acts or poses some danger to the officers.”

    The court distinguished Pennsylvania v. Mimms, noting that in Mimms, the driver had already been lawfully stopped for a traffic offense. The Cabey court emphasized that the incremental intrusion of ordering a driver out of a vehicle lawfully stopped for a traffic violation was minimal. However, in Cabey, there was no lawful stop preceding the order to remain in the car.

    The court deferred to the lower courts’ finding that the dirty rental car did not establish reasonable suspicion. The court noted that reasonable minds could differ as to whether the police action was justified. “Contrary to the dissenter’s view it is not common knowledge that ordinarily rental cars are relatively clean and well maintained… Thus if the defendants’ use of a dirty rental car in the City of New York could give rise to reasonable suspicion, that certainly was not the only inference that could be drawn.” Because the finding involved a mixed question of law and fact and was supported by evidence, the Court of Appeals could not overturn it.