New York Law Review

Tag: seized property

  • DeBellis v. Property Clerk, 79 N.Y.2d 49 (1992): Demand for Return of Seized Property & Due Process

    DeBellis v. Property Clerk, 79 N.Y.2d 49 (1992)

    When the government seizes property during a criminal proceeding, due process requires the property be returned upon demand after the proceedings end, unless the government establishes a new basis for its detention, such as forfeiture.

    Summary

    DeBellis and Lopes sought the return of property seized during their arrest. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether their demand was timely and sufficient under the expedited procedure established in McClendon v. Rosetti. Although the petitioners did not strictly comply with McClendon‘s procedural requirements, the Court held that their demand should have been honored. The Court emphasized that the McClendon order aimed to facilitate property retrieval, not create obstacles. The core principle is that once criminal proceedings end, the government must return seized property upon demand unless it can justify continued detention.

    Facts

    Police arrested DeBellis and Lopes in July 1985 for possessing stolen property and seized items from their business under a warrant, including jewelry and currency. Two walkie-talkies were seized earlier. The items were vouchered and placed in the Property Clerk’s custody. Their attorney made unsuccessful requests for the return of business documents and non-stolen items. On August 17, 1987, Lopes pleaded guilty to criminal possession of stolen property (walkie-talkies), followed by DeBellis on September 14, 1987. On October 20, 1987, their attorney demanded the property’s return, noting a prior refusal due to a federal tax levy. After satisfying the levy on September 1, 1988, DeBellis’s renewed demand was denied as untimely and lacking a District Attorney’s release.

    Procedural History

    Petitioners commenced a proceeding seeking a court order directing the property clerk to return the property. The Supreme Court granted the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the initial demand timely and a District Attorney’s release unnecessary based on Moreno v. City of New York. The Property Clerk appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the petitioners’ demand for the return of seized property was timely under the McClendon procedure, considering it was made more than 90 days after the termination of criminal proceedings and without a District Attorney’s release?

    2. Whether the absence of a District Attorney’s release justified the Property Clerk’s refusal to return the property, even though all criminal proceedings related to the property had terminated?

    Holding

    1. No, because the strict procedural requirements of the McClendon order should not be rigidly applied to impede a claimant’s due process right to the return of their property when the purpose of those requirements is not compromised.

    2. No, because once all criminal proceedings related to the property have terminated, the government’s presumptive right to detain the property no longer exists, and requiring a District Attorney’s release would allow the District Attorney to arbitrarily block the return of property.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that the criminal proceedings terminated at sentencing, making the initial demands premature and the later demand untimely under a strict reading of McClendon. However, the Court emphasized that the McClendon order was intended to ease, not impede, the retrieval of property. The Court stated, “While the McClendon order sets forth a useful, more lenient alternative to the unconstitutionally burdensome procedure imposed by the Administrative Code, it is not the last word on the subject.” The Court found that the Property Clerk was notified of the claim, and the delay caused by the tax levy did not prejudice the Property Clerk’s ability to return the property. Requiring a District Attorney’s release after the criminal proceedings have ended allows the DA to arbitrarily prevent the return of the property, undermining the due process concerns addressed in McClendon. The court stated: “If the District Attorney can effectively block return of the property on such grounds, then McClendon accomplished little more than transferring that arbitrary power from the property clerk to the District Attorney.” The Court held that the petitioners’ demand for a release from the District Attorney was sufficient in the absence of a timely forfeiture proceeding or a valid reason for continued retention of the property. The Court dismissed the argument that petitioners waived their rights by agreeing to provide proof of ownership, finding the evidence ambiguous and non-binding on DeBellis. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the 90-day limit was to relieve the property clerk of indefinite custody, which was not compromised in this case. The Court emphasized that the procedural requirements ought to be justified by some countervailing State interest and strictly applied only where that interest is implicated.

  • Moreno v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 435 (1987): Replevin Action After Criminal Charges Dismissed

    Moreno v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 435 (1987)

    A property owner’s common-law right to demand the return of seized property, or its value in a replevin action, is not extinguished by a city administrative code provision that allows the property clerk to transfer unclaimed money to another fund after a statutory period.

    Summary

    Mayra Moreno was arrested, and money was seized by New York City police. After the criminal charges were dismissed, she assigned her rights to her attorney, who then demanded the money’s return more than 90 days after the dismissal. The City refused, claiming the demand was untimely under the Administrative Code and the *McClendon v. Rosetti* ruling, asserting the funds were abandoned. Moreno then commenced a replevin action. The New York Court of Appeals held that the City’s administrative code provision merely fixed the point at which the property clerk could transfer funds, not extinguish the owner’s common-law right to demand the property’s return via a replevin action.

    Facts

    On December 15, 1982, Mayra Moreno was arrested in New York City on gambling charges, and $156,150 was seized by the police.
    The seized money was delivered to the New York City Police Department property clerk.
    On March 8, 1983, Moreno served a notice of claim on the City while criminal charges were pending.
    The criminal charges against Moreno were dismissed on September 19, 1983.
    Six months later, Moreno assigned her rights to the seized funds to her attorney, Paul Lieber.
    On March 19, 1984, Lieber demanded the Police Department return the money.
    On March 27, 1984, the Police Department informed Lieber that his demand was untimely based on the Administrative Code and *McClendon v. Rosetti*, claiming the funds were deemed abandoned and paid over to the City.

    Procedural History

    Moreno commenced a common-law replevin action to recover the funds and served a second notice of claim.
    The City moved to dismiss, arguing the demand was untimely.
    The trial court granted the City’s motion, dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
    The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted Moreno’s motion for leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a replevin action to recover property seized by the City of New York in connection with a criminal prosecution may be maintained when the owner has not demanded return of the property within 90 days of the dismissal of the criminal charges, given the City’s administrative code provision regarding unclaimed property.

    Holding

    No, because the Administrative Code provision cited by the City merely fixes the point at which the property clerk may transfer the money to another fund, but it does not impose an obligation on the owner to demand the money within 90 days nor does it impair the owner’s common-law right to demand return of the property seized or its value in a replevin action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals considered the interplay between the City’s Administrative Code § 435-4.0(e) (now § 14-140(e)), which addresses the handling of unclaimed property by the police property clerk, and the common-law right to replevin.
    The Court acknowledged that the Administrative Code allows the property clerk to transfer unclaimed money to the Police Pension Fund after three months.
    However, the Court emphasized that the code provision does not impose an affirmative duty on the owner to demand the money within 90 days of the dismissal of criminal charges, nor does it impose a penalty for failing to do so. The court stated: “It does not, in short, impair the owner’s common-law right to demand return of the property seized or its value in a replevin action.”
    The court distinguished the City’s reliance on *McClendon v. Rosetti*, noting that while *McClendon* established a procedure for demanding property within 90 days to avoid having to commence a court action, it did not eliminate the owner’s right to pursue other remedies, such as replevin or an Article 78 proceeding.
    The Court rejected the City’s argument that failing to claim the funds within three months resulted in the loss of any right of possession. The court clarified that the code provision simply relieves the property clerk of the responsibility of retaining the moneys in custody after the statutory period.
    The Court also noted that the claimant bears the burden of proving title and lawful use of the money, but this burden does not negate the right to bring a replevin action.

  • Boyle v. Kelley, 42 N.Y.2d 88 (1977): Notice of Claim Required in Replevin Action Against County

    Boyle v. Kelley, 42 N.Y.2d 88 (1977)

    A replevin action against a county to recover property seized pursuant to a warrant is subject to the notice of claim requirements of the County Law, even if the underlying criminal charges are dismissed.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a plaintiff must file a notice of claim before bringing a replevin action against a county to recover money seized during a criminal investigation, after the charges were dismissed. The Court of Appeals held that the notice of claim requirement applies. The court reasoned that the County Law’s broad language encompasses claims for the invasion of property rights, regardless of whether the action is framed as legal or equitable. Failure to file a notice of claim mandates dismissal of the complaint. This decision reinforces the importance of adhering to statutory prerequisites when suing governmental entities.

    Facts

    Donald J. Boyle was arrested and charged with gambling offenses after police seized $14,960.35 from his apartment pursuant to a warrant. The search was invalidated as to Donald, and the evidence suppressed. Donald J. Boyle died, and the charges against him were dismissed. The administrator of Boyle’s estate then sought to recover the seized money from the Suffolk County Police Commissioner. The administrator filed a summons and complaint seeking return of the funds plus interest but did not file a notice of claim.

    Procedural History

    The administrator of Boyle’s estate moved for the return of the money, which was initially withdrawn pending appointment of an administrator. After being appointed, the administrator commenced an action against the Police Commissioner without filing a notice of claim. Special Term granted the administrator’s motion for summary judgment, finding wrongful detention. The Appellate Division affirmed, relying on equitable grounds. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the notice of claim requirement applied and that the failure to comply required dismissal of the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a replevin action against a county for the return of money seized pursuant to a warrant, following the dismissal of criminal charges, requires the plaintiff to file a notice of claim under Section 52 of the County Law.

    Holding

    Yes, because Section 52 of the County Law requires a notice of claim for any claim against a county for the invasion of property rights, regardless of whether the action is characterized as legal or equitable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the Appellate Division’s reliance on equitable principles to circumvent the notice of claim requirement. The court stated that an equitable action is inappropriate where an adequate remedy at law exists, such as replevin or an Article 78 proceeding. More importantly, the court emphasized the broad language of Section 52(1) of the County Law, which mandates a notice of claim for “any claim…for invasion of personal or property rights…and any other claim for damages arising at law or in equity.” The court found that this language encompasses the administrator’s claim for the return of the seized money. The Court stated: “Any claim or notice of claim against a county for damage, injury or death, or for invasion of personal or property rights, of every name and nature, and whether casual or continuing trespass or nuisance and any other claim for damages arising at law or in equity, alleged to have been caused or sustained in whole or in part by or because of any misfeasance, omission of duty, negligence or wrongful act on the part of the county, its officers, agents, servants or employees, must be made and served in compliance with section fifty-e of the general municipal law.” The failure to file a notice of claim as required by statute was deemed fatal to the plaintiff’s case, warranting reversal and dismissal.