New York Law Review

Tag: Second Violent Felony Offender

  • People v. Smith, 25 N.Y.3d 681 (2015): Determining the Date of Sentence for Prior Violent Felony Convictions for Second Violent Felony Offender Sentencing

    25 N.Y.3d 681 (2015)

    When a defendant’s probation from a prior violent felony conviction is revoked, the original sentencing date, not the resentencing date, determines whether the prior conviction falls within the 10-year look-back period for second violent felony offender sentencing.

    Summary

    In People v. Smith, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue of determining the relevant sentencing date for the purposes of the second violent felony offender statute (Penal Law § 70.04). The court held that when a defendant’s probation for a prior violent felony conviction is revoked, the original sentencing date, not the resentencing date, controls for calculating the 10-year look-back period under the statute. This decision clarified that revocation of probation does not equate to an annulment of the original sentence, and thus the initial sentencing date applies. The Court reversed the lower court’s decision, which had relied on the resentencing date, and vacated the defendant’s second violent felony offender adjudication, remanding for resentencing.

    Facts

    In 2010, the defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree. He had a prior violent felony conviction in 1994 for assault in the first degree, for which he was initially sentenced to probation. After violating his probation, he was resentenced in 1995 to a prison term. The issue arose whether the original 1994 sentencing date or the 1995 resentencing date should be used to determine if the prior conviction fell within the 10-year look-back period for sentencing as a second violent felony offender for the 2010 conviction. The prosecution sought to have the defendant sentenced as a second violent felony offender by using the 1995 resentencing date.

    Procedural History

    The trial court adjudicated the defendant as a second violent felony offender, based on the resentencing date of the prior conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, concluding that the resentencing date was controlling. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the date of the original sentence or the date of the resentence, following the revocation of probation, determines the applicability of the 10-year look-back period in the second violent felony offender statute.

    Holding

    Yes, the date of the original sentence controls because the revocation of probation does not equate to an annulment of the sentence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on interpreting Penal Law § 70.04, the second violent felony offender statute. The statute specifies that the sentence for the prior violent felony must have been imposed within 10 years of the present felony. The court reasoned that the revocation of probation and subsequent resentencing did not constitute a new sentence, but rather a modification of the original sentence. The Court referenced Penal Law § 60.01(2)(b), which states that a revocable sentence, such as a sentence of probation, is considered a final judgment, and it emphasized that when probation is revoked, the court must sentence the defendant to imprisonment, it does not vacate the original sentence. The Court further noted, that “the legislature’s reference to the revocation of the part of the sentence imposing probation suggests that the substitution of a different punishment — such as incarceration — for the probation a defendant has violated does not constitute a new sentence, but rather a replacement of the original, conditional penalty reflected in the sentence.” Because the original sentencing date was more than 10 years before the current offense, the defendant should not have been sentenced as a second violent felony offender.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the application of the second violent felony offender statute and its look-back period, in cases involving probation revocations. Attorneys must consider the original sentencing date, not the resentencing date following a probation violation, when determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as a predicate violent felony. This ruling affects how prosecutors and defense attorneys analyze prior convictions in sentencing calculations. This case is a reminder that the specific language of the statute must be carefully examined, and the revocation of probation does not change the original sentencing date for the purposes of the second violent felony offender statute. Later cases referencing this one will likely turn on whether there was an actual vacatur and resentencing.

  • People v. Walker, 90 N.Y.2d 87 (1997): Applying Second Violent Felony Offender Sentences to Persistent Violent Felons

    People v. Walker, 90 N.Y.2d 87 (1997)

    When a statute does not explicitly provide a minimum sentence for a specific class of persistent violent felony offenders, the minimum sentence applicable to second violent felony offenders in the same class should be applied to fulfill legislative intent.

    Summary

    Defendant Walker challenged his sentence as a persistent violent felony offender, arguing that the lack of a specific minimum sentence for Class E persistent violent felons created a statutory gap. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the minimum sentence for a Class E second violent felony offender should be applied to Class E persistent violent felony offenders. The court reasoned that any other construction would undermine the legislative intent to impose enhanced sentences on repeat violent offenders, particularly after the 1995 amendments increased minimum sentences for violent felonies.

    Facts

    Defendant was indicted for criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. He negotiated a plea agreement to plead guilty to attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, a Class E violent felony, and be sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender. The trial court sentenced him to a prison term of four years to life, utilizing the minimum sentence applicable to a Class E second violent felony offender. The defendant appealed, arguing that this sentence was illegal.

    Procedural History

    The trial court sentenced Walker as a persistent violent felony offender. The Appellate Division affirmed the sentence. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in the absence of a statutorily defined minimum sentence for a Class E persistent violent felony offender, the court should apply the minimum sentence applicable to a Class E second violent felony offender.

    Holding

    Yes, because applying the minimum sentence for Class E second violent felony offenders to Class E persistent violent felony offenders fulfills the legislative intent to enhance sentences for repeat violent offenders.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decision in People v. Green, 68 N.Y.2d 151, which addressed a similar issue before the 1995 amendments to the Penal Law. The Court in Green held that applying the statutory minimum sentence for Class E second violent felony offenders was an appropriate construction of the Penal Law to avoid impeding the legislative intent to permit enhanced sentencing for persistent offenders. The Court in Walker reasoned that the 1995 amendments, which increased the minimum sentences for persistent violent felons, reinforced this legislative intent. The court emphasized that the defendant was on notice that he faced a maximum term of life imprisonment as a persistent offender. The court also noted that allowing a shorter minimum sentence for persistent violent felons than for second violent felony offenders would undermine the legislative purpose. The Court stated: “Indeed, defendant’s position would result in making a class E persistent violent felony offender eligible for release after a shorter period of incarceration than a class E second violent felony offender. In Green we rejected the notion that the legislative purpose behind the sentencing laws can be so facilely turned on its head.” The court found that the fact that the defendant was ineligible for a good behavior allowance was “a distinction without a difference” as this was not part of the sentence itself.