New York Law Review

Tag: Search Warrant

  • People v. Heller, 29 N.Y.2d 319 (1971): Search Warrant Must Specifically Describe Obscene Material

    People v. Heller, 29 N.Y.2d 319 (1971)

    A search warrant authorizing the seizure of “obscene” materials must particularly describe the items to be seized and cannot delegate to police officers the discretion to determine obscenity, as that determination is reserved for the courts.

    Summary

    Heller was convicted of possessing obscene motion picture films with intent to sell, based on evidence seized under a search warrant. The warrant authorized the search and seizure of “obscene, indecent and hard core pornographic” pictures, photographs, and motion picture films. Heller moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant was unconstitutionally broad. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding the warrant was invalid because it failed to particularly describe the items to be seized and improperly delegated the determination of obscenity to the police, a function reserved for the courts.

    Facts

    A police officer obtained a warrant to search Heller’s premises based on information from an FBI agent and a State Police investigation suggesting Heller was producing pornographic films and possessed master reels for copying. The warrant authorized the search and seizure of “obscene, indecent and hard core pornographic” pictures, photographs, and motion picture films. Police executed the warrant and seized reels of film from Heller’s home.

    Procedural History

    Heller was convicted in the trial court. He moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, but the motion was denied. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. Justice Shapiro dissented. Heller appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a search warrant authorizing the seizure of “obscene, indecent and hard core pornographic” materials is unconstitutionally general and vague, improperly delegating the determination of obscenity to the executing officers.

    Holding

    Yes, because the warrant’s language did not particularly describe the items to be seized and improperly delegated the determination of obscenity to the police, violating the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that warrants particularly describe the things to be seized.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found the search warrant invalid because it was too general and delegated the determination of obscenity to the police. The court relied on the Fourth Amendment, which requires that warrants particularly describe the persons or things to be seized. The court reasoned that the term “obscene, indecent and hard core pornographic” was not sufficiently specific and left it to the police officer executing the warrant to determine whether the material was obscene. The court emphasized that determining what constitutes obscenity is a matter of constitutional law reserved for the courts, not law enforcement officers. Citing Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 722, the court stated that “the power and duty of making that determination is conferred upon the courts rather than upon the police.” The court distinguished the case from People v. Richmond County News, 9 N.Y.2d 578, noting that even specifying “hard core pornography” was insufficient to define specifically in a search warrant what the police are to look for and seize. Because the motion to suppress was incorrectly denied, the judgment of conviction was reversed and a new trial ordered.

  • People v. Montague, 17 N.Y.2d 120 (1966): Establishing Probable Cause for a Search Warrant Based on Informant Testimony

    People v. Montague, 17 N.Y.2d 120 (1966)

    A search warrant may be issued based on information from a confidential informant if the affidavit supporting the warrant application provides sufficient detail for a neutral magistrate to independently determine probable cause, including verifying the informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge.

    Summary

    Montague was convicted of possessing cannabis after a search pursuant to a warrant revealed the contraband. The warrant was based on an affidavit from Detective-Sergeant Taubenkraut relying on information from a confidential informant. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the affidavit provided sufficient information for the issuing magistrate to determine the informant’s credibility and the reliability of his information. The court emphasized that the informant’s detailed account, verified actions, and delivery of purchased contraband provided a substantial basis for the magistrate’s probable cause determination, ensuring he was not merely a “rubber stamp” for the police.

    Facts

    Detective-Sergeant Taubenkraut investigated marihuana sales in Ossining and received information from a confidential informant. The informant claimed he could purchase marihuana from Montague and Joseph Fisher. Over 19 days, the informant contacted the suspects and, following a pre-arranged plan, purchased four marihuana cigarettes from them. The informant then turned these cigarettes over to another police officer. The informant also detailed plans for another purchase the following night and mentioned purchasing a medicinal compound at a drugstore, signing his name in the register.

    Procedural History

    Based on Detective-Sergeant Taubenkraut’s affidavit and the four marihuana cigarettes, a Police Justice issued a search warrant for Montague. Montague was arrested and searched, and additional contraband was found. He was convicted after his motion to suppress the evidence was denied. Montague appealed, arguing the affidavit was insufficient to establish the informant’s reliability. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affidavit presented to the Police Justice provided sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, specifically regarding the reliability of the confidential informant.

    Holding

    Yes, because the affidavit contained sufficient details, verified actions, and corroborating evidence to allow a neutral magistrate to independently determine that probable cause existed for the warrant to issue.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the affidavit established probable cause because it provided sufficient underlying circumstances to assess the informant’s credibility and the reliability of his information. The court noted that while prior reliable tips leading to convictions can establish credibility, it is not the only way. Here, the informant’s credibility was shown by providing a detailed account of his planned activities, which the police could have easily verified. Moreover, the informant’s delivery of the purchased marihuana cigarettes, implicating himself in criminal activity, further supported his truthfulness. The reliability of the informant’s information was further substantiated because he was reporting his own direct participation in illegal activities, not merely relaying suspicious occurrences. As the court stated, the informant “was not merely reporting ‘suspicious’ occurrences, but rather was attesting to his own actual participation with the suspects in their illegal activities, and he had the marihuana to show for it.” Unlike cases where neither the affiant nor informant had personal knowledge, here the informant had firsthand knowledge of the criminal activity. The court emphasized that the detective waited until he had verified the informant’s reliability before applying for the warrant, demonstrating commendable restraint and ensuring the magistrate had a “substantial basis” to conclude that contraband would likely be found on Montague’s person, referencing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271. The court explicitly distinguished this case from Aguilar v. Texas, where the affidavit lacked sufficient detail to allow a magistrate to make an independent assessment of probable cause.

  • People v. Solimine, 18 N.Y.2d 477 (1966): Hearing Not Required When Attacking Informant’s Veracity, Not Affiant’s

    People v. Solimine, 18 N.Y.2d 477 (1966)

    A defendant is not entitled to a hearing to challenge a search warrant affidavit where the challenge is to the veracity of the informant providing information to the affiant, rather than the truthfulness of the affiant’s statements themselves.

    Summary

    Solimine pleaded guilty to criminally buying and receiving stolen property. He sought to suppress evidence obtained via a search warrant, arguing the warrant’s affidavit was based on hearsay from a confessed thief. The trial court denied a hearing, but the Appellate Division reversed, citing People v. Alfinito. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Solimine’s challenge attacked the informant’s credibility, not the detective’s truthfulness. The Court reasoned that to warrant a hearing, the defendant must cast doubt on the affiant’s allegations, which Solimine failed to do, rendering a hearing unnecessary.

    Facts

    A detective obtained a search warrant based on an affidavit stating a named informant, incarcerated near the courthouse, confessed to burglarizing business premises with Solimine. The informant claimed Solimine possessed a calculating machine, a barometer, and a pistol at his home, car, or business, providing detailed descriptions verified by the detective.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Bronx County, convicted Solimine after he pleaded guilty. Solimine’s motion to suppress evidence was denied without a hearing. The Appellate Division reversed, finding Solimine was entitled to a hearing under People v. Alfinito. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant is entitled to a hearing to challenge a search warrant affidavit when the defendant’s challenge is directed at the veracity of the informant providing information to the affiant, rather than the truthfulness of the affiant’s statements.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s challenge must put into issue the truthfulness of the affiant’s statements to warrant a hearing. Here, the defendant only challenged the credibility of the informant, not the truthfulness of the detective’s affidavit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished this case from People v. Alfinito, emphasizing that Alfinito allows inquiry into whether the affidavit’s statements were perjurious, with the burden of proof on the attacker. The Court found Solimine’s affidavit did not attack the detective’s veracity but the credibility of the informant. The Court emphasized the importance of directing the challenge to the affiant’s truthfulness: “A challenge directed at the veracity of the informer does not put into issue the truthfulness of the affiant’s statements.” When reasons are given for crediting the source of information and the items and location are particularly detailed, a hearing will not be granted unless the moving papers imply perjury. The Court considered the detective’s specific details, such as the location of the items and verification of the informant’s information, did not imply falsity. The court found that the addition of details like color, model, and serial number of the calculating machine, likely from the victim, did not give the affidavit an air of falsity. Therefore, since Solimine’s challenge did not impugn the detective’s truthfulness, the Appellate Division erred in ordering a hearing. The key takeaway is that a defendant must directly challenge the affiant’s veracity, not merely question the informant’s credibility, to warrant a hearing on a search warrant affidavit.

  • People v. Schnitzler, 18 N.Y.2d 457 (1966): Probable Cause Based on Informant Testimony

    People v. Schnitzler, 18 N.Y.2d 457 (1966)

    A search warrant may be based on hearsay information from a confidential informant if the affidavit supporting the warrant details the underlying circumstances, gives reason for crediting the source, and a magistrate finds probable cause.

    Summary

    This case addresses the issue of probable cause for a search warrant based on information provided by a confidential informant. The Court of Appeals held that the warrant was valid because the affidavit presented to the issuing judge detailed the circumstances of the alleged crime, provided a basis for believing the informant’s information, and the judge found probable cause based on the affidavit and the officer’s sworn testimony. The court emphasized that a commonsense, rather than hyper-technical, approach should be used when reviewing warrants and that doubtful cases should be resolved with a preference for upholding the warrant.

    Facts

    A police detective obtained a search warrant for Alfred Schnitzler’s apartment. The detective’s affidavit stated that a confidential informant had told him Schnitzler was selling large quantities of marijuana. The informant claimed to have been present when over 50 pounds of marijuana were delivered to Schnitzler’s apartment. The affidavit included Schnitzler’s name, physical description, and address.

    Procedural History

    A Criminal Court Judge issued the search warrant. Schnitzler was subsequently convicted based on evidence seized during the search. The defendant appealed, arguing that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. A habeas corpus hearing was held, where the officer testified the judge asked about the informant’s reliability. The Court of Appeals reviewed the case to determine the validity of the search warrant.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affidavit, coupled with the officer’s sworn testimony before the issuing judge, provided probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.

    Holding

    Yes, because the affidavit detailed the underlying circumstances of the alleged crime, provided a basis for believing the informant’s information, and the issuing judge made a determination of probable cause after questioning the officer under oath.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on United States v. Ventresca, which held that probable cause cannot be based solely on an affiant’s or informer’s belief without detailing the underlying circumstances. However, Ventresca also stated that when circumstances are detailed, reason for crediting the source is given, and a magistrate finds probable cause, courts should not invalidate the warrant with hyper-technical interpretations. The court also cited Brinegar v. United States, stating that probable cause deals with probabilities and practical considerations of everyday life. The court noted that hearsay evidence is admissible on the issue of probable cause. The affidavit stated that Schnitzler was selling marijuana in large quantities and that deliveries had been made to his apartment. The court acknowledged that the affidavit lacked a statement of the informer’s reliability, but this information was provided to the judge by the officer’s sworn testimony before the warrant was issued. “The Supreme Court in United States v. Ventresca… said that probable cause cannot be made out by merely stating the belief of an affiant or an informer that probable cause exists without detailing the underlying circumstances upon which that belief is based. But the court went on… to say this: ‘However, where these circumstances are detailed, where reason for crediting the source of the information is given, and when a magistrate has found probable cause, the courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hyper technical, rather than a commonsense, manner.’” The court emphasized that the judge fulfilled his duty under Section 794 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by examining the officer under oath and supplementing the affidavit with additional information about the informant’s reliability. While the court noted it is best practice to record this additional information, its absence does not invalidate the warrant in this case.

  • People v. De Lago, 16 N.Y.2d 287 (1965): The ‘No-Knock’ Exception to Warrant Requirements

    People v. De Lago, 16 N.Y.2d 287 (1965)

    A ‘no-knock’ search warrant is permissible under the Fourth Amendment when there is reasonable cause to believe that evidence sought will be quickly destroyed if notice is given.

    Summary

    This case addresses the constitutionality of a ‘no-knock’ search warrant, specifically, whether police officers must announce their presence and purpose before forcibly entering a residence. The New York Court of Appeals held that a ‘no-knock’ warrant is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if the issuing judge finds, based on sworn proof, that the property sought (here, gambling paraphernalia) is easily destroyed or disposed of if advance notice is given. The court emphasized that the validity of a warrant is assessed at the time of its issuance, and the judge can infer the likelihood of destruction based on the nature of the contraband.

    Facts

    Police obtained a warrant to search the apartment of Anthony De Lago, located in a four-apartment building. The warrant authorized a search of “the structure” at a specified address, believed to be occupied by De Lago, but the caption clarified it was for “The first floor apartment at 2 Abendroth Place.” Based on an affidavit, the warrant included a provision dispensing with the need for the officers to announce their authority and purpose before entering. Police executed the warrant, found policy slips and other gambling paraphernalia in De Lago’s apartment, and arrested him.

    Procedural History

    De Lago was convicted based on the evidence seized during the search. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search warrant was invalid because it was overly broad and unconstitutionally authorized a ‘no-knock’ entry. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. De Lago appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, challenging the validity of the search warrant.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the search warrant, which authorized a search of “the structure” but was clarified in the caption to specify De Lago’s apartment, was sufficiently particular to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that warrants “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched.”

    2. Whether Section 799 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allowed a judge to authorize a ‘no-knock’ entry if there was proof that the property sought could be easily destroyed, violated the Fourth Amendment.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the caption of the warrant clarified that the search was limited to De Lago’s apartment, thus curing any ambiguity in the broader language of the warrant’s body.

    2. No, because the Fourth Amendment permits a ‘no-knock’ entry where there is reasonable cause to believe that giving notice would lead to the destruction of the evidence sought.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the warrant’s specificity, the court held that the caption clarified the scope of the search to De Lago’s apartment, curing any potential overbreadth in the initial description. The court cited People v. Martell and Squadrito v. Griebsch to support using the caption for clarification.

    On the ‘no-knock’ provision, the court acknowledged the general Fourth Amendment requirement of announcement, citing Boyd v. United States. However, it also recognized an exception when police have a reasonable basis to believe that evidence will be destroyed if notice is given, citing Ker v. California. The court noted that even Ker, which reaffirmed the announcement requirement, upheld a search where officers entered quietly to prevent the destruction of contraband.

    The court reasoned that the validity of the warrant is determined at the time of its issuance. The judge issuing the warrant could reasonably infer, based on the affidavit presented and judicial notice, that gambling materials are easily secreted or destroyed if the occupants are alerted to an impending search. The court stated, “Even though there is nothing in the affidavit to show specifically how or where these gambling materials would be likely to be destroyed or removed, the likelihood that they would be was an inference of fact which the Judge signing the warrant might draw.” The court concluded that Section 799 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as applied here, complied with the Fourth Amendment.

  • People v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181 (1965): Challenging the Veracity of a Search Warrant Affidavit

    People v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181 (1965)

    A defendant may challenge the veracity of factual statements made in an affidavit supporting a search warrant, but bears the burden of proving that the statements were perjurious; any fair doubt should be resolved in favor of the warrant.

    Summary

    Alfinito was charged with policy gambling violations. He moved to suppress evidence, arguing it was obtained through an unlawful search because the supporting affidavit for the search warrant contained false statements. The Criminal Court granted the motion, finding a conflict in testimony. The Appellate Term reversed, ordering a new hearing for factual findings. The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant can challenge the truthfulness of statements in a search warrant affidavit, but bears the burden of proof, and doubts are resolved in favor of the warrant.

    Facts

    A police officer obtained a search warrant based on an affidavit stating that a confidential informant (with a history of reliability) reported placing bets with Alfinito in a specific apartment. The officer also claimed to have personally observed several individuals engaging in transactions with Alfinito at that location, including handing over slips of paper and money. Police records indicated Alfinito had prior arrests and a conviction for policy violations.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court granted Alfinito’s motion to suppress evidence, citing a conflict in testimony that created a doubt in favor of the defendant. The People appealed to the Appellate Term, which reversed and ordered a new hearing, noting the lack of specific findings of fact by the Criminal Court. Both the People and Alfinito appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can challenge the truthfulness of factual statements made in the affidavit supporting a search warrant.

    Holding

    Yes, because Section 813-c of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits an inquiry into whether the affidavit’s statements were perjurious, but the burden of proof is on the defendant, and any fair doubt should be resolved in favor of the warrant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court recognized the importance of protecting citizens’ rights against unlawful searches and seizures, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Mapp v. Ohio. However, it also acknowledged the need to avoid creating overly strict rules that would invalidate warrants based on conflicting testimony. The court balanced these concerns by holding that a defendant can challenge the truthfulness of statements in a search warrant affidavit, but the burden of proof rests on the defendant to show that the statements were perjurious. The court reasoned that because a judicial officer already examined the allegations when issuing the warrant, any fair doubt about their veracity should be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant. The court stated, “Our duty is to fashion a rule which will prevent such a violation of the citizen’s rights and at the same time avoid creating a situation where overstrict rules would invalidate numerous warrants simply because witnesses can later be found to swear to the opposite of what the officer swore when he procured the warrant.”

  • People v. Dalinonte, 16 N.Y.2d 156 (1965): Probable Cause Requires More Than Observing Known Gamblers Entering a Private Residence

    People v. Dalinonte, 16 N.Y.2d 156 (1965)

    To establish probable cause for a search warrant related to bookmaking activities in a private residence, the affidavit must present more than mere observations of known gamblers entering the premises, especially when combined only with the presence of unlisted telephones.

    Summary

    Defendants were convicted of bookmaking based on evidence seized during a search. They argued the search warrant was issued without probable cause. The affidavit supporting the warrant detailed observations of known gamblers entering a private residence with unlisted phones. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that these observations, without additional evidence suggesting illegal activity like placed bets or confidential tips, were insufficient to establish probable cause for the warrant’s issuance, thus rendering the seized evidence inadmissible.

    Facts

    Police officers observed James Faliero, a known gambler, entering the premises at 556 Lakeview Avenue on multiple occasions. Later, Anthony Nasca and Anthony Fino, both known bookmakers, were observed entering the same premises on several days, often carrying large envelopes. The residence was listed to Aldo Dalimonte and had two unlisted telephone numbers. These observations occurred during normal bookmaking hours.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of bookmaking based on evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. Prior to trial, the defendants moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search warrant lacked probable cause. The trial court denied the motion. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case, focusing on whether the affidavit supporting the search warrant established probable cause.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant provided sufficient probable cause to believe that the crime of bookmaking was being committed at the premises located at 556 Lakeview Avenue.

    Holding

    No, because the affidavit presented only observations of known gamblers entering a private dwelling with unlisted phones, which is insufficient to establish probable cause without additional evidence linking the premises to illegal gambling activity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that probable cause requires a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by facts strong enough to warrant a cautious person’s belief that the law is being violated. The court stated that the determination of probable cause is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law, requiring an independent appraisal of the facts. The court reviewed precedents involving similar facts, noting that observation of known bookmakers entering a private dwelling with telephones is insufficient to establish probable cause without additional evidence, such as a placed bet, reliable confidential information, or frequent telephone contact with other known gamblers. The court distinguished the present case from those where probable cause was established due to such additional evidence. The court concluded that the affidavit in this case only established a bare suspicion, insufficient for probable cause. The search warrant was therefore invalid, and the evidence seized was inadmissible. As the court stated, probable cause exists when “there is reasonable ground of suspicion supported by facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the law is being violated on the premises to be searched”. Because the warrant was issued without probable cause, the evidence obtained was illegally obtained and inadmissible.

  • People v. Rainey, 14 N.Y.2d 35 (1964): Search Warrant Must Particularly Describe Premises

    14 N.Y.2d 35 (1964)

    A search warrant that authorizes the search of an entire building containing multiple separate residential units, based on probable cause to search only one unit, violates the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement and is invalid.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a search warrant authorizing the search of an entire building containing two separate apartments, based on probable cause relating only to one apartment, was unconstitutionally overbroad. The warrant failed to particularly describe the place to be searched, violating both the New York and U.S. Constitutions. Evidence seized from both apartments was deemed inadmissible, even though the occupant of the second apartment did not complain about the search. The Court reversed the lower court’s judgment and dismissed the indictment against the defendant.

    Facts

    A police officer obtained a search warrant for the premises at 529 Monroe Street, Buffalo, based on an affidavit stating probable cause to believe that the defendant, Rainey, was committing larceny and forgery at that address. The affidavit did not disclose that the building contained two separate apartments: one occupied by Rainey, and the other by Mildred Allison and her child. The warrant authorized a search of the “entire premises” at 529 Monroe Street.

    Procedural History

    The police searched both apartments. In Allison’s apartment, they found nothing. In a shed accessible from Allison’s apartment, they found a check writer and stolen checks. In Rainey’s apartment, they found a typewriter and checks. Rainey moved to vacate the search warrant and suppress the evidence, but the motion was denied. The evidence was admitted at trial over Rainey’s objection. Rainey was convicted. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a search warrant authorizing the search of an entire building containing multiple residential units, based on probable cause relating to only one unit, violates the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that the warrant particularly describe the place to be searched.

    Holding

    Yes, because the warrant’s failure to specify which part of the building was subject to the probable cause showing rendered it a general warrant, violating constitutional protections against unreasonable searches.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that searching multiple residential apartments in the same building is analogous to searching multiple separate houses; probable cause must be established for each unit. Because the affidavit supporting the warrant only established probable cause to search Rainey’s apartment, the warrant was invalid insofar as it authorized the search of Allison’s apartment. The Court emphasized that the officer knew Allison was an innocent party but failed to inform the court of the building’s layout when seeking the warrant. The Court stated, “It is to avoid ‘a blanket search’ with its obvious interference with the innocent that the State and Federal Constitutions provide that ‘No warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, * * * and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized’.” The Court cited federal cases holding that a search warrant commanding the search of an entire residential building is void if probable cause exists for the search of only a single residential space. The Court distinguished cases upholding warrants for single apartments within a multi-unit building when the warrant sufficiently identifies the target apartment. The Court rejected the argument that Allison’s lack of complaint validated the search, stating, “The warrant being void in its inception is void for all purposes, which in this instance includes the execution of its command against this defendant.” The Court emphasized that the focus is on the validity of the warrant at the time of issuance, not on subsequent events. The Court concluded that the warrant’s overbreadth rendered the seized evidence inadmissible.