New York Law Review

Tag: Search Warrant

  • People v. Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 182 (1975): Establishing Probable Cause for a Search Warrant Based on Informant Testimony

    People v. Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 182 (1975)

    Probable cause for a search warrant can be established when an informant’s tip is corroborated by independent police investigation, even if the independently observed conduct is, by itself, innocuous.

    Summary

    Hanlon was convicted of possessing gambling records after a search of his car, which was conducted with a warrant. The warrant was based on an affidavit from a police officer who stated a confidential informant told him they saw bets being accepted at a steel plant and passed to Hanlon. The officer also saw an unknown person leave the plant and drop a package near the fence, which Hanlon retrieved on multiple occasions. While the officer’s observations alone might not establish probable cause, they corroborated the informant’s information, thus establishing the informant’s reliability. The New York Court of Appeals held that the corroboration of the informant’s information elevated Hanlon’s conduct from innocuous to suspicious, justifying the issuance of the search warrant. The conviction was reinstated.

    Facts

    A confidential informant told a police officer that bets on horse races were being accepted inside a steel plant and then passed through the fence to Hanlon.

    The officer independently observed an unidentified person leaving the steel plant and dropping a package by the fence on numerous occasions.

    The officer observed Hanlon pick up these packages.

    Based on this information, the officer obtained a search warrant for Hanlon’s car.

    Procedural History

    The City Court denied Hanlon’s motion to suppress the evidence found during the search.

    Hanlon was convicted in City Court of possessing gambling records.

    The County Court reversed the conviction, holding that the motion to suppress should have been granted.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s order and reinstated the City Court’s conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affidavit supporting the search warrant established probable cause based on the information provided by a confidential informant and corroborated by independent police observation.

    Holding

    Yes, because the officer’s independent observations corroborated the informant’s information in significant detail, establishing the informant’s reliability, and elevated Hanlon’s observed conduct from innocuous to suspicious.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while Hanlon’s observed conduct alone might be considered innocuous, the independent observations of the officer corroborated the informant’s tip, establishing the reliability of the informant. The Court cited People v. Coffey, noting the importance of independent verification of an informant’s tale. The court stated, “Thus, there was such an independent verification and separate objective checking of the informer’s tale as was sufficient to establish the reliability of the informer in this instance.” The Court emphasized that the informant’s information, combined with the officer’s observations, transformed Hanlon’s conduct from unusual to highly suspicious. This combination provided the necessary probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. The Court also dismissed Hanlon’s argument that he was entitled to a transcript or summary of the informant’s testimony before the issuing judge, as the affidavit itself was sufficient to establish probable cause.

  • People v. Nieves, 36 N.Y.2d 496 (1975): Limits of ‘Premises’ Search Warrants

    People v. Nieves, 36 N.Y.2d 496 (1975)

    A warrant authorizing the search of a premises and any person found “therein” does not extend to the search of a person who is observed leaving the premises just prior to the warrant’s execution.

    Summary

    Police obtained warrants to search two apartments and any persons found “therein.” Detectives observed Nieves leaving one of the apartments, stopped him in the hallway, and searched him, finding heroin. The New York Court of Appeals held that the search was not authorized by the warrant because Nieves was not found “therein” (inside the apartment) when the search occurred. The court emphasized that a search warrant’s authority is strictly limited to the place described in the warrant, stopping at the threshold. The case was remitted to determine if probable cause existed for the arrest and search independent of the warrant.

    Facts

    Detectives obtained search warrants for two apartments based on surveillance and information from an informant who had previously provided reliable information.

    One warrant related to an apartment occupied by “Vino” at 72-74 East 119th Street, and another related to an apartment occupied by Betty Lucas at 36 West 138th Street.

    The warrants authorized the search of the apartments, the occupants, and any other person who may be found inside the apartments.

    Two days later, detectives went to the Lucas apartment to execute the warrant.

    As they proceeded along the third-floor hallway, they saw Nieves leaving the Lucas apartment.

    Detectives stopped and searched Nieves, finding a package of heroin.

    Nieves was arrested and charged with criminal possession of a dangerous drug.

    Procedural History

    Nieves moved to suppress the evidence seized from him, arguing the search was unlawful.

    The trial court denied the motion.

    Nieves pleaded guilty.

    The case was appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court’s decision.

    The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the “Vino” warrant, authorizing a search of the person of “Vino,” could be executed anywhere, justifying the search of Nieves?

    2. Whether the Lucas warrant, authorizing the search of the apartment and any person “found therein,” justified the search of Nieves after he exited the apartment but before detectives entered?

    3. Whether, if the search was beyond the scope of the warrants, it could be sustained as incident to a lawful arrest.

    Holding

    1. No, because the “Vino” warrant was tied to a specific location and did not authorize a search of “Vino” wherever he might be found.

    2. No, because “therein” means inside the apartment, and the authority to search stops at the threshold.

    3. The issue of whether the search was incident to a lawful arrest was not determined at trial; thus, the case was remitted for further proceedings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the “Vino” warrant, when read in conjunction with the underlying application, limited the search authority to the premises where the contraband was believed to be.

    The authority to search individuals, including the occupant, extended only to those who might reasonably be expected to conceal contraband on their persons while inside the premises.

    Regarding the Lucas warrant, the court emphasized that the authority to search is limited to the place described in the warrant. “To put it another way ‘therein’ means therein and the authority to search stops at the threshold.”

    The court rejected the argument that observing Nieves leaving the apartment justified a search at some remote location.

    The court acknowledged that the search could still be valid if it was incident to a lawful arrest, but this issue required a determination of probable cause independent of the warrants, which had not been addressed by the trial court. The court noted the importance of the prosecution presenting evidence to establish probable cause independent of the warrants:

    “[T]he People bear the initial burden of ‘going forward in the first instance with evidence to show that probable cause existed both in obtaining a search warrant and in sustaining the legality of a search made, without a warrant, as incident to an arrest.’”

  • People v. Bennett, 33 N.Y.2d 850 (1973): Specificity Requirements for Obscenity Search Warrants

    People v. Bennett, 33 N.Y.2d 850 (1973)

    A search warrant authorizing the seizure of obscene materials must describe the items to be seized with sufficient particularity to prevent the warrant from becoming a general warrant.

    Summary

    This case concerns the validity of a search warrant for obscene materials. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the warrant lacked sufficient specificity in describing the items to be seized. The warrant authorized the seizure of “8mm films cut and uncut, depicting males and females in various positions of sexual intercourse, sodomy and masturbation.” The Court found that this description was too broad and delegated to the police officer executing the warrant the function of determining whether the material was obscene, rendering the warrant invalid. The dissent argued that the warrant was sufficiently specific under the circumstances, especially given the nature of the materials and the evidence presented to the magistrate.

    Facts

    Police obtained a search warrant to search the defendants’ premises. The warrant authorized the seizure of “8mm films cut and uncut, depicting males and females in various positions of sexual intercourse, sodomy and masturbation.” The magistrate had viewed a sample of the films. Based on the search, the defendants were charged with obscenity-related offenses.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendants’ motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted the motion to suppress, holding that the search warrant was invalid.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a search warrant authorizing the seizure of “8mm films cut and uncut, depicting males and females in various positions of sexual intercourse, sodomy and masturbation” is sufficiently specific to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.

    Holding

    No, because the warrant delegated to the executing officer the determination of what constituted obscenity, which is a judicial function.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the warrant lacked sufficient specificity. The warrant’s language authorized the police to seize films based on their own determination of whether the films depicted “various positions of sexual intercourse, sodomy and masturbation.” The Court cited People v. Abronovitz, 31 N.Y.2d 160, 164, and People v. Rothenberg, 20 N.Y.2d 35, 38, emphasizing that a warrant phrased in language which delegates to a police officer the function of determining whether material is obscene is invalid. The Court found that the description in the warrant was too broad and did not adequately limit the discretion of the executing officer. The dissent argued that the language of the warrant was considerably more specific than the warrants in Rothenberg or Abronovitz, and that the magistrate had before him a film, a scrap of uncut film, and testimonial data which established probable cause for believing that the defendants’ premises housed a large supply of contraband. The dissent also cited United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263, 1268, suggesting that the description was sufficiently specific under the circumstances. The dissent maintained that the warrant told the police, within the limits of the circumstances, exactly what they were to seize. The majority, however, was not persuaded, and reversed the order affirming the denial of the motion to suppress.

  • People v. Sutton, 32 N.Y.2d 923 (1973): Establishes Standards for Informant Reliability in Search Warrant Applications

    32 N.Y.2d 923 (1973)

    A search warrant based on information from a confidential informant must demonstrate the informant’s reliability and the basis of the informant’s knowledge to establish probable cause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that a search warrant was invalid because the affidavit supporting it lacked sufficient information regarding the reliability and basis of knowledge of the confidential informant. The affidavit stated that the informant, who had previously provided reliable information leading to an arrest for drug sales, claimed that Sutton possessed 30 kilos of marijuana. The court found the affidavit deficient because it did not specify whether the informant’s knowledge was based on personal observation or other sources, thus failing to establish probable cause for the warrant.

    Facts

    A detective of the Town of Greenburgh Police Department obtained a search warrant for John Sutton’s apartment based on an affidavit. The affidavit stated that a reliable informant reported that Sutton possessed 30 kilos of marijuana in his apartment. The affidavit claimed the informant’s reliability was based on prior information that led to an arrest for criminal sale of a dangerous drug. The prior instance involved the informant contacting Stanley Coon about purchasing marijuana, leading to Coon’s arrest and indictment after a purchase was made.

    Procedural History

    The trial court upheld the search warrant and admitted the evidence seized. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the affidavit insufficient to establish probable cause due to a lack of detail regarding the basis of the informant’s knowledge. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an affidavit supporting a search warrant based on information from a confidential informant is sufficient to establish probable cause when it fails to adequately detail the source of the informant’s belief and basis of knowledge.

    Holding

    No, because the affidavit lacked any indication of the sources of the informant’s belief, whether on personal knowledge or otherwise, the warrant was improperly issued.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals adopted the dissenting opinion from the Appellate Division, which emphasized the affidavit’s failure to provide any details about how the informant obtained the information about Sutton’s possession of marijuana. The court stressed that the affidavit must show the informant’s reliability and the basis for their knowledge to allow the magistrate to independently evaluate whether probable cause exists. Without knowing whether the informant personally observed the marijuana or relied on hearsay, the magistrate could not make a reasoned judgment about the information’s credibility. The dissent in the Court of Appeals argued that the informant’s reliability had been demonstrated by prior actions, specifically leading to an indictment and arrest in a prior narcotics case. The dissent cited United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 573, stating that the inquiry should be whether the informant’s present information is truthful or reliable. However, the majority found that, regardless of the informant’s past reliability, the affidavit lacked sufficient detail regarding the source of the present information, rendering the warrant invalid. The court did not elaborate further on why United States v. Harris was not controlling, but its decision emphasizes the need for specificity concerning the basis of the informant’s knowledge, which aligns with Aguilar v. Texas (378 U. S. 108).

  • People v. Wheatman, 29 N.Y.2d 337 (1971): Establishing Probable Cause with Hearsay from Grand Jury Testimony

    People v. Wheatman, 29 N.Y.2d 337 (1971)

    An affidavit supporting a search warrant can be based on hearsay if it provides the magistrate with sufficient information to determine both the reliability of the informant and the reliability of the information provided.

    Summary

    This case addresses the requirements for establishing probable cause in a search warrant affidavit when the affidavit is based on hearsay. The District Attorney obtained search warrants based on an affidavit summarizing grand jury testimony alleging a bid-rigging conspiracy. The New York Court of Appeals held that the affidavit was sufficient because the grand jury witnesses testified under oath against their penal interests, and their testimonies corroborated each other. This established both the reliability of the informants and the reliability of the information, justifying the issuance of the search warrants. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, which had found the affidavit insufficient.

    Facts

    The District Attorney investigated a bid-rigging conspiracy involving painting contracts for New York City Housing Authority projects. The conspiracy allegedly involved painting contractors and a Housing Authority official, Wheatman, who provided inside information on bidding estimates. Assistant District Attorney Phillips applied for search warrants for the offices of the contractors, submitting an affidavit based on sworn testimony from witnesses before the Grand Jury. The affidavit stated that these witnesses admitted to being parties to an agreement to rig bids and identified the contracting firms as parties to the agreement. It further alleged that Jerry Jerome obtained Housing Authority estimates and shared them with other conspirators. Based on this information, Judge Fine issued warrants, and a search uncovered relevant documents.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, arguing the affidavit lacked probable cause. The trial court denied the motion. The defendants were convicted, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding the affidavit insufficient. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Appellate Division, on reargument, affirmed Wheatman’s conviction, finding he lacked standing to challenge the warrants. Wheatman also appealed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an affidavit based on hearsay testimony before a grand jury can establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant if the affidavit adequately demonstrates the reliability of the informants and the reliability of their information.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the affidavit summarized sworn grand jury testimony where witnesses admitted to being part of a bid-rigging agreement, thereby testifying against their penal interests and corroborating each other’s accounts, which sufficiently established both the reliability of the informants and the reliability of their information.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that for an affidavit based on hearsay to be sufficient, it must allow a magistrate to independently assess the reliability of both the informant and their information. The court noted that reliability can be established in various ways, including prior reliable information, corroboration, statements against penal interest, and sworn testimony. In this case, the informants’ reliability was demonstrated by their sworn testimony before the grand jury, where they admitted to being parties to the bid-rigging agreement, thereby testifying against their penal interests. The fact that multiple informants corroborated each other’s testimony further bolstered their reliability.

    Regarding the reliability of the information, the court found it significant that the witnesses had firsthand knowledge of the conspiracy. The affidavit indicated that the witnesses testified to being parties to the agreement and identified the roles of various individuals and companies. The court reasoned that because the bid estimate information was essential to the conspiracy, it was reasonable to infer that copies of the forms would be found in the offices of the conspirators. The court rejected the argument that the affidavit was defective for failing to provide a “substantial basis” for concluding that the material sought would be found in the contractor’s offices.

    The court also addressed the defendants’ request for the names of the grand jury witnesses, stating that revealing their identities would jeopardize the ongoing investigation and potentially expose the witnesses to interference or intimidation. Quoting the decision, the court noted the importance of protecting witnesses “from interference from those under investigation,” preventing “subornation of perjury and tampering with prospective [trial] witnesses” and assuring “prospective witnesses [before the Grand Jury] that their testimony will be kept secret.”

    In conclusion, the court found the affidavit sufficient to establish probable cause and reversed the Appellate Division’s order. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to consider other factual and legal contentions raised by the defendants.

  • People v. Heller, 29 N.Y.2d 319 (1971): Judicial Scrutiny Sufficient for Obscenity Warrant Without Prior Adversary Hearing

    People v. Heller, 29 N.Y.2d 319 (1971)

    A judge’s independent viewing of a film and determination of probable cause for obscenity is sufficient for issuing a seizure warrant without requiring a prior adversary hearing.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a prior adversary hearing is required before a warrant can be issued for the seizure of an allegedly obscene film. The New York Court of Appeals held that a judge’s independent viewing of the film, followed by a determination of probable cause, satisfies constitutional requirements. The Court emphasized that judicial scrutiny, not merely a police officer’s assertion, is necessary for issuing warrants related to obscenity. The court distinguished the case from situations involving broad seizures of publications and highlighted the practical difficulties of requiring adversary hearings for warrant applications based on visual media.

    Facts

    The defendant was prosecuted under Section 235.05 of the Penal Law for exhibiting the film “Blue Movie.” A judge attended a public theater showing the film. After viewing the film, the judge determined there was probable cause to believe the film was obscene. Based on this determination, the judge issued warrants for the seizure of the film and the defendant’s arrest.

    Procedural History

    The trial court found the defendant guilty. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, before issuing warrants for the seizure of a film and arrest based on obscenity, the defendant is entitled to an adversary hearing before the issuing judge to contest the film’s obscenity.

    Holding

    No, because independent judicial action of viewing the film and determining probable cause met constitutional requirements; an adversary hearing is not mandated by the Supreme Court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the procedure followed—the judge viewing the film and independently determining probable cause—satisfied the requirements established in Marcus v. Search Warrant, which mandates judicial supervision in obscenity cases to prevent seizures based solely on police judgment. The Court distinguished this case from Marcus, where warrants were issued based on a police officer’s conclusory assertions without judicial scrutiny. The Court noted that the Supreme Court in Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia suggested that a judge’s viewing of the film might be sufficient, without explicitly requiring an adversary hearing.

    The Court further argued that requiring adversary hearings before issuing warrants in obscenity cases presents practical difficulties. Unlike factual disputes where an adversary hearing helps a magistrate determine probable cause, in obscenity cases, the judge has already viewed the film. “But when a Magistrate sees a film, it is not much help to him, or indeed to the parties, in deciding probable cause to have counsel on one side tell him what he has just seen is obscene and on the other that it is not.” The court also distinguished the seizure of a single film as evidence from the wide-ranging seizure of publications that could amount to suppression of expression, as in Marcus. The court found that the New York statute met the standards set forth in Roth v. United States, as it pertained to prurient interest, patent offensiveness, and lack of redeeming social value.

    The court emphasized the need for objective judgment by judges and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, concluding that the film was obscene and prosecution was not barred by the First Amendment.

  • People v. Waitz, 31 A.D.2d 298 (N.Y. 1969): Establishing Probable Cause for Search Warrants

    People v. Waitz, 31 A.D.2d 298 (N.Y. 1969)

    A search warrant must be supported by an affidavit containing specific facts establishing unlawful activity on the premises to be searched; a conclusory statement that individuals frequenting the premises are “LSD users and sellers” is insufficient to establish probable cause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendants’ convictions for possession of dangerous drugs, holding that the search warrant used to seize the drugs was issued without sufficient probable cause. The affidavit supporting the warrant stated only that “LSD users and sellers” frequented the defendant Waitz’s cottage. The court found this statement to be a conclusory assertion lacking specific facts to establish unlawful activity on the premises. Furthermore, the court held that the warrant, which described the cottage but not the surrounding area, did not justify the search of the defendant’s car when it was driven onto the property while officers were present. Because the warrant lacked proper foundation and the car search exceeded its scope, the evidence obtained should have been suppressed.

    Facts

    Police obtained a search warrant for a cottage belonging to defendant Waitz. The affidavit supporting the warrant stated that “LSD users and sellers are frequenting” the cottage. When the police arrived to execute the warrant, the defendant’s automobile was driven onto the property. The police searched the car, as well as the cottage, and seized LSD, marijuana, and hypodermic needles.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of possession of dangerous drugs based on the evidence seized during the search. Justice McInerney granted a certificate of reasonable doubt, questioning whether the mere presence of alleged drug users and sellers at a house was sufficient for probable cause. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment of conviction, and the People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an affidavit stating that “LSD users and sellers are frequenting” a premises provides sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant for that premises.
    2. Whether a search warrant authorizing the search of a specific building extends to a vehicle that is driven onto the property while the search is being conducted.

    Holding

    1. No, because the affidavit contains a conclusory statement lacking specific facts to establish unlawful activity on the premises.
    2. No, because the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, and the automobile was not included in the warrant’s description of the premises.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the affidavit supporting the search warrant lacked the factual substance required to establish probable cause. The statement that “LSD users and sellers are frequenting” the cottage was deemed a conclusory characterization, without any specific facts to suggest that illegal activity was occurring within the premises. The court cited Spinelli v. United States and Aguilar v. Texas, emphasizing that a mere assertion of police suspicion or reputation is insufficient to justify a magistrate’s finding of probable cause. “But just as a simple assertion of police suspicion is not itself a sufficient basis for a magistrate’s finding of probable cause, we do not believe it may be used to give additional weight to allegations that would otherwise be insufficient.”

    The court also addressed the scope of the search warrant, noting that it authorized the search of the cottage but did not mention the automobile. Citing People v. Rainey, the court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment and the New York Constitution require that a search warrant “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched.” Since the warrant did not include the automobile, the search of the car was deemed unlawful. Probable cause must be shown in each instance, and a warrant to search a building cannot be extended to justify the search of a separate location, such as a vehicle that happened to be present at the time of the search. The court concluded that the evidence obtained from both the cottage and the car should have been suppressed, leading to the reversal of the defendants’ convictions.

  • People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 129 (1969): Establishing Probable Cause Based on Informant Testimony

    People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 129 (1969)

    An affidavit in support of a search warrant relying on information from a confidential informant must demonstrate both the informant’s reliability and the basis of the informant’s knowledge to establish probable cause.

    Summary

    This case addresses the requirements for establishing probable cause for a search warrant when relying on information from a confidential informant. The Court of Appeals held that an affidavit must demonstrate both the informant’s reliability and the basis of their knowledge. The affidavit in this case was deemed insufficient because it only established the informant’s past reliability but failed to provide any details about how the informant obtained the information about the defendant possessing a weapon and stolen property. Consequently, the evidence seized and the defendant’s subsequent admissions were suppressed.

    Facts

    Detective Mugan obtained a search warrant for John Hendricks and his residence based on an affidavit stating that a reliable informant told him Hendricks possessed an illegal revolver and stolen property. Upon executing the warrant, officers found a loaded gun and airline tickets in Hendricks’s briefcase and more weapons in his home. After being confronted with the evidence, Hendricks admitted ownership of the weapons.

    Procedural History

    Hendricks was indicted on weapons and forgery charges. The trial court suppressed the airline tickets but not the weapons. After a hearing, the court upheld the warrant’s validity. Hendricks pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor weapons charge. The Appellate Division affirmed. Hendricks appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the affidavit supporting the search warrant established probable cause based on the informant’s information.
    2. Whether the defendant’s admissions should be suppressed as fruits of an illegal search and seizure.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the affidavit only established the informant’s reliability but failed to show how the informant obtained the information about Hendricks’s possession of the weapon and stolen property.
    2. Yes, because the admissions were directly linked to the illegal search and seizure, and the taint of the illegality had not been attenuated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the two-pronged test from Aguilar v. Texas and Spinelli v. United States, requiring the affidavit to demonstrate both the informant’s reliability and the basis of the informant’s knowledge. While Detective Mugan’s affidavit established the informant’s reliability by citing past instances where the informant provided information leading to arrests and convictions, it failed to provide any details about how the informant obtained the information about Hendricks’s possession of the weapon and stolen property. The court stated, “There must be more than an ultimate conclusion of probable cause or the affiant’s mere assertion that the information received was reliable.”

    The court distinguished this case from situations where the informant provides detailed information, suggesting firsthand knowledge, or where police independently corroborate the information. Here, the informant’s assertion was a mere conclusion, similar to the insufficient affidavits in Aguilar and Spinelli.

    The court rejected the argument that it should presume the informant saw the weapon, stating it would be impermissible, as it was in Giordenello v. United States, to presume that the informant had firsthand knowledge. A remand for a further hearing to establish the basis of the informant’s knowledge was also rejected, because “it would be manifestly unfair to the defendant to now allow the People to offer proof that the informer told the officer he saw the defendant in possession of the gun.”

    The court further held that the defendant’s admissions made after being confronted with the illegally seized items should also be suppressed. The court explained that these admissions were “tainted by the primary illegality” of the search and seizure because the link between them was “straight but short and immediate” and the taint was not attenuated.

  • People v. McKie, 25 N.Y.2d 19 (1969): Admissibility of Statements Made During a Search Absent Miranda Warnings

    25 N.Y.2d 19 (1969)

    Statements made by a defendant during a search of their apartment, before being placed under arrest and without Miranda warnings, are admissible if the questioning is not a custodial interrogation designed to elicit incriminating statements.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed McKie’s conviction for narcotics possession, holding that his admission of ownership of the narcotics found in his apartment during a search was admissible. The court reasoned that McKie was not subjected to custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings because he was not under arrest or restraint, and the question posed by the detective was an informal inquiry to ascertain who among those present was involved, not a process designed to elicit incriminating statements. The court also held that the search warrant was valid and that the identity of the confidential informant did not need to be disclosed.

    Facts

    Police officers, with a search warrant, entered McKie’s apartment. McKie, his wife, and his brother-in-law were present. During the search, officers discovered narcotics taped to the bottom of a portable closet. An officer asked McKie if his wife knew about the narcotics. McKie admitted ownership and described the contents of the envelopes.

    Procedural History

    McKie was convicted of misdemeanor narcotics possession after his motion to suppress the narcotics was denied. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the conviction. McKie appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, challenging the search warrant, the refusal to disclose the informant’s identity, and the admissibility of his admission.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the search warrant was supported by probable cause.

    2. Whether the People’s refusal to disclose the identity of the confidential informant at the suppression hearing deprived the defendant of a fair trial.

    3. Whether McKie’s admission of ownership of the narcotics was obtained during custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings, making it inadmissible.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the affidavit supporting the warrant contained information from a reliable informant and independent observations by the police.

    2. No, because the informant’s information was not essential to establishing probable cause due to independent verification by police observations.

    3. No, because McKie was not subjected to custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings, as he was not under arrest or restraint and the question was an informal inquiry.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the search warrant was properly issued based on the informant’s tip, which was corroborated by the detective’s observations of known drug sellers entering the apartment building. The court emphasized that the magistrate had a “substantial basis” for concluding that narcotics were likely present in the apartment. The court also stated that the informant’s reliability was established by prior instances of providing information leading to convictions.

    Regarding the informant’s identity, the court balanced law enforcement’s need for confidentiality against the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Quoting People v. Malinsky, the court stated that the privilege of nondisclosure must yield when “its assertion would seriously prejudice the defense…by making a fair hearing impossible.” However, the court found this was not such a case because the informant’s information was independently verified.

    The court addressed the Miranda issue, explaining that Miranda warnings are required only during “custodial interrogation,” defined as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” The court found that McKie was not under arrest or restraint during the search and that his admission was made in response to an informal question to determine who possessed the drugs, not to elicit an incriminating statement. The court noted that McKie’s wife and brother-in-law were also present, and that his brother-in-law had been apprehended with a bag of narcotics, making him a likely suspect at the time. The court distinguished the situation from a “police-dominated atmosphere or inherently coercive setting.”

    The court concluded by noting that McKie waived his right to challenge the lack of a jury instruction on the voluntariness of his admissions because he failed to request such an instruction or object to the charge given.

  • People v. McKie, 25 N.Y.2d 19 (1969): Admissibility of Spontaneous Statements Made During Warrant Execution

    People v. McKie, 25 N.Y.2d 19 (1969)

    A voluntary statement made by a suspect, even after a search warrant is executed but before any interrogation begins, is admissible as evidence and is not barred by the Fifth Amendment.

    Summary

    McKie was convicted of possessing policy slips. Police officers executed a search warrant at his apartment. Before the officers initiated any questioning, McKie volunteered the location of the contraband. McKie argued his statement was inadmissible because he was in custody and had not received Miranda warnings. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that McKie’s statement was admissible because it was voluntary and not the product of custodial interrogation. The court emphasized the distinction between voluntary statements and those obtained through interrogation, asserting that Miranda protections are triggered by interrogation, not mere custody.

    Facts

    On May 26, 1966, Officer Marfisi arrived at McKie’s apartment with a warrant to search both McKie and the premises.

    The officer identified himself and displayed the warrant.

    Before Officer Marfisi could ask any questions, McKie stated, “The booklets are in the closet in the room, on top. You are going to find them anyway.”

    The officer then located paper bags containing mutuel horse race policy booklets in the designated closet.

    Procedural History

    McKie was convicted in the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County, for violating section 975 of the former Penal Law.

    The Appellate Term, First Department, unanimously affirmed the conviction.

    McKie appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, challenging the admissibility of his statement and the sufficiency of evidence.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether McKie’s statement to the police officer, made after a search warrant was exhibited but before any questioning, was admissible under Miranda v. Arizona.

    2. Whether the possession of unplayed boli-pol constitutes a violation of section 975 of the former Penal Law.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because McKie volunteered the information before any interrogation took place, making the statement admissible despite the absence of Miranda warnings. The court emphasized the distinction between voluntary statements and those obtained through interrogation.

    2. Yes, because the statute encompasses all paraphernalia commonly used for “policy,” and possession of such items, whether or not they record a placed bet, is presumptive evidence of a violation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the key issue was whether McKie was subjected to “custodial interrogation” when he made the statement. While acknowledging arguments that the execution of a search warrant could create a coercive environment, the court emphasized that McKie volunteered the information before any questions were asked. Referencing Miranda v. Arizona, the court reiterated that “[a]ny statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.” The court distinguished between statements obtained through interrogation and truly voluntary statements, holding that the Miranda rule only applies to the former.

    The court further supported its reasoning by citing post-Miranda cases where spontaneous statements made by suspects in custody were deemed admissible. It declined to extend Miranda to situations where statements are volunteered, even in the context of a search warrant execution.

    Regarding the possession of “unplayed” policy slips, the court found that the statute’s language was broad enough to encompass all paraphernalia used in the policy game, not just slips representing actual bets. The court stated the omnibus phrase of the statute, “or any paper, print, writing, policy slip, or article of any kind” used in policy, has a broader sweep. It embraces all the paraphernalia commonly used for “policy”; and possession of such items, whether or not they record the fact that a bet has been placed, is presumptive evidence of violation of the statute (see People v. Kravitz, 287 N. Y. 475, 477-478, revg. 262 App. Div. 911, 912 [violation of § 975 grounded on possession of unsold lottery slips]; Ann. Possession of Gambling Device as Crime, 162 ALR 1188, 1189-1191; cf. People v. Lalli, 5 Y 2d 536, 539; but see, contra, People v. Rodriguez, 49 Misc 2d 324).