New York Law Review

Tag: Search Warrant

  • People v. Imperial News Co., 45 N.Y.2d 511 (1978): Independent Probable Cause Determination by Magistrate Required

    People v. Imperial News Co., 45 N.Y.2d 511 (1978)

    A warrant is invalid if the issuing magistrate fails to conduct an independent inquiry into the facts supporting probable cause and instead relies on the conclusions of other judges without personally assessing the evidence.

    Summary

    Imperial News Co. was charged with obscenity after police, accompanied by a Village Justice, seized magazines and records from their premises pursuant to a warrant. The warrant was based on affidavits stating that other judges had found probable cause that the magazines were obscene. The issuing Justice relied on these statements without independently reviewing the magazines or evidence. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression of the seized materials, holding that the issuing magistrate failed to make the independent determination of probable cause required by the Fourth Amendment, improperly delegating this responsibility.

    Facts

    State Police applied to a Village Justice for a warrant to search Imperial News Co.’s premises for obscene materials. The application included affidavits from Rochester police officers describing the delivery of magazines and the purchase of three magazines. The affidavits stated that two Rochester City Court Judges and one Buffalo City Court Judge had independently found probable cause that the magazines were obscene. Copies of the magazines or certifications of the other judges’ findings were not provided. Based on these affidavits, the Village Justice issued a warrant and accompanied police to Imperial News Co., seizing materials listed in the warrant and additional items based on the Justice’s on-the-scene assessment.

    Procedural History

    Imperial News Co. moved to suppress the seized evidence. The trial court granted the motion, finding the warrant procedure and search invalid. The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the determination of probable cause for issuing a warrant can be delegated, in part, to someone other than the issuing magistrate.

    Holding

    No, because the Fourth Amendment requires a neutral and detached magistrate to make an independent determination of probable cause based on their own inquiry into the facts. Reliance on another judge’s conclusion without independent assessment is an improper delegation of authority.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the warrant requirement is intended to interpose a neutral magistrate between law enforcement and citizens. The magistrate must draw their own inferences from the evidence presented. Here, the issuing magistrate accepted the police officer’s statement that other judges had found probable cause without any further inquiry. He didn’t determine if the entire publication or just a portion was reviewed, how the other judges reached their conclusions, or even the identities of the judges. The court stated, “It follows from these principles that the fundamental requirement that a neutral and detached Magistrate make an independent determination of probable cause is not fulfilled unless the issuing Magistrate himself conducts a full and searching inquiry into the facts on which the warrant application is based. The obligation is one which may not be delegated, in part or in whole, regardless of the qualifications of the person on whom reliance is placed.” The Court explicitly referenced the historical context: “With its origins in the Colonials’ abhorrence of the general warrant and writ of assistance, the warrant requirement of the State and Federal Constitutions was designed to interpose ‘the detached and independent judgment of a neutral Magistrate’ between police officers and citizenry”. The court also noted an error in the warrant where one magazine was listed for seizure even though it had never been reviewed by any judge. The Court concluded that because the Justice failed to conduct the necessary inquiry, the warrant was invalid, and the evidence was properly suppressed.

  • People v. Sciacca, 45 N.Y.2d 122 (1978): Limits on Executing Vehicle Search Warrants on Private Property

    People v. Sciacca, 45 N.Y.2d 122 (1978)

    A warrant to search a vehicle does not automatically authorize entry onto private property, such as a locked garage, to access the vehicle, and such an entry, absent exigent circumstances or specific authorization in the warrant, violates the Fourth Amendment.

    Summary

    Sciacca was convicted of possessing and transporting untaxed cigarettes after tax investigators, acting on a warrant to search his van, entered a locked garage where it was parked and discovered contraband. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal of the conviction, holding that the warrant authorizing the search of the van did not authorize the warrantless entry into a private, locked garage. The court reasoned that the investigators exceeded the scope of the warrant and violated Sciacca’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The ‘inevitable discovery’ doctrine did not apply in this case where the constitutional violation was not merely technical.

    Facts

    The New York State Tax Enforcement Bureau received information that John Sciacca was smuggling untaxed cigarettes using a green Dodge van. Surveillance confirmed Sciacca’s activities, including transporting boxes resembling cigarette cartons. Based on this, investigators obtained a warrant to search the van. After Sciacca parked the van in a locked garage, investigators, without obtaining a warrant to enter the garage, moved a loose panel, entered, and found 3,060 cartons of untaxed cigarettes inside the van.

    Procedural History

    Sciacca was convicted at trial after his motion to suppress the evidence was denied. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding the entry into the garage an unreasonable search and seizure. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a warrant authorizing the search of a vehicle extends the authority of law enforcement to enter a private, locked garage to access that vehicle.

    Holding

    No, because the warrant authorized the search of a particular van and nothing else, and the garage had a structural and functional existence distinct from the van; therefore, the investigators’ entry into the garage was unlawful. The theory of inevitable discovery does not apply to excuse the unlawful entry.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that a warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, and authority to search a vehicle does not imply authority to enter private premises. The investigators’ entry into the locked garage constituted an unreasonable search because Sciacca had a reasonable expectation of privacy within the garage. The court distinguished cases where vehicles were searched in driveways or open carports, finding that a locked garage provides a greater expectation of privacy. The court emphasized that the investigators knew of Sciacca’s use of the garage and could have sought a warrant to enter it. The court rejected the argument that the entry was justified by the need to inspect regulated activity, stating that regulatory schemes cannot override constitutional safeguards. The court quoted Colonnade Corp. v. United States, noting that “our traditions are strongly opposed to using force without definite authority to break into a locked premises.” The court also dismissed the inevitable discovery argument, stating that the constitutional violation was not a mere technicality. “The theory of inevitable discovery is essentially a safety valve for the exclusionary rule to be used when the constitutional violation is of technical dimension and should not be used to countenance the breaking into a locked garage by administrative investigators.”

  • People v. Hanlon, 41 N.Y.2d 147 (1976): Establishing Probable Cause for a Search Warrant

    People v. Hanlon, 41 N.Y.2d 147 (1976)

    Probable cause to search must be established on the face of a warrant application; it cannot be supplemented by unsworn, unwritten, and unrecorded details presented to the issuing magistrate.

    Summary

    Hanlon was convicted of manslaughter after pleading guilty, following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the search warrant was improperly issued because the affidavit supporting it lacked probable cause and was supplemented with unsworn information. The court held that probable cause must be established within the four corners of the affidavit supporting the warrant application and cannot be based on unrecorded, unsworn testimony given to the issuing magistrate. The court also rejected the argument that the search was justified as incident to a lawful arrest.

    Facts

    A police detective obtained a search warrant for Hanlon’s premises. The affidavit supporting the warrant suggested evidence of a crime might be found there but provided minimal probative information in conclusory terms. The Town Justice who issued the warrant also received unsworn, unwritten, and unrecorded details of the investigation from the detective.

    Procedural History

    The defendant’s motion to suppress evidence was denied. Following presentation of some evidence at trial, Hanlon pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree. He appealed the judgment of conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the affidavit supporting the search warrant established probable cause.
    2. Whether unsworn, unwritten, and unrecorded details presented to the issuing magistrate can supplement a deficient affidavit to establish probable cause.
    3. Whether the search can be justified as incident to a lawful arrest, even if the search warrant was invalid.

    Holding

    1. No, because the affidavit only obliquely suggested that evidence of the crime may be found at defendant’s premises and set forth what little may be considered probative in the most conclusional terms.
    2. No, because CPL 690.40, subd 1 requires a showing of probable cause on the face of the affidavit and any supplementation must be sworn and recorded.
    3. No, because under these circumstances, a warrantless arrest was neither necessary nor permissible and the inadmissible evidence resulting from an invalid search warrant may not be resurrected by a belated claim that there was probable cause to arrest without a warrant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the affidavit supporting the search warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause because it lacked specific details and relied on conclusory statements. The court emphasized that probable cause must be demonstrated on the face of the affidavit. Supplementing the affidavit with unsworn, unwritten, and unrecorded details violated CPL 690.40(1) and undermined the integrity of the warrant application process. The court cited People v. Brown, 40 NY2d 183. The court stated, “For whatever reason, the Town Justice accepted this information without an oath and without making a record and facts were omitted which may have made sufficient the affidavit prepared at his direction. Thus, there is no adequate record of these facts.”

    The court further reasoned that the search could not be justified as incident to an arrest. While probable cause to arrest may exist independently of a search warrant (citing People v. Green, 33 NY2d 496), the court found that a warrantless arrest was not necessary or permissible in this case. Allowing a search based on a later claim of probable cause to arrest would circumvent the protections of the Fourth Amendment and the warrant requirement. The court cited People v. Perel, 34 NY2d 462, 468, noting that the arrest would not justify a full-blown warrantless search of the defendant’s home.

  • People v. Wirchansky, 41 N.Y.2d 130 (1976): Probable Cause and Informant Tips in Search Warrants

    People v. Wirchansky, 41 N.Y.2d 130 (1976)

    A search warrant based on an informant’s tip must disclose the underlying facts from which the informant concluded illegal activity was occurring; otherwise, police observations must independently establish probable cause, and a suspect’s reputation alone is insufficient to justify a search.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed an Appellate Division order, holding that a search warrant issued for Stephen Wirchansky lacked probable cause. The warrant was based on an affidavit from a police officer, which included information from a confidential informant and police surveillance. The court found that the affidavit failed to meet the requirements established in Aguilar v. Texas because it did not disclose the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded illegal gambling activities were taking place. Furthermore, police observations of Wirchansky’s actions were deemed consistent with innocent behavior and insufficient to independently establish probable cause, even when combined with his prior arrest record.

    Facts

    A police officer obtained a search warrant based on an affidavit that included information from a confidential informant stating that gambling paraphernalia was being left in the common hallway of a building and picked up by Stephen Wirchansky. The affidavit also stated that Wirchansky was a known policy runner and had been arrested for gambling activities 20 days prior. Police conducted surveillance and observed Wirchansky driving to the location, entering the hallway for a few minutes, and then leaving. This pattern was repeated over several days.

    Procedural History

    The County Court granted Wirchansky’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search. The Appellate Division reversed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the suppression of evidence.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affidavit supporting the search warrant provided sufficient probable cause, considering the informant’s tip, police surveillance, and Wirchansky’s prior record.

    Holding

    No, because the informant’s tip failed to disclose the underlying circumstances for their conclusion, and the police observations were consistent with innocent activity; thus, there was not enough information to justify the warrant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the two-pronged standard established in Aguilar v. Texas, which requires that the magistrate issuing the warrant be informed of (1) the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that illegal activities were taking place, and (2) the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant was credible or reliable. While the affidavit satisfied the informant reliability prong, it failed to disclose any underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that Wirchansky was engaged in gambling activities. The court emphasized that the purpose of the Aguilar requirement is to allow a “neutral and detached magistrate” to determine independently whether the informant was justified in their conclusion.

    The court distinguished the case from Spinelli v. United States, where similar observations of a suspect’s conduct were deemed insufficient to corroborate an informant’s tip. While the affidavit contained specific information about the location of the gambling paraphernalia (a mailbox in the hallway), it failed to explain how the informant obtained this knowledge. The court reasoned that the information could have been obtained from a casual remark and, therefore, did not amount to probable cause.

    The court acknowledged that seemingly innocent conduct could indicate illegal activity to a trained police officer, but emphasized that such instances are unusual, and the police officer’s expertise is generally not enough to justify a search of one engaged in seemingly innocent conduct. The court quoted People v. Brown, stating, “[T]he detected pattern, being only the superficial part of a sequence, does not provide probable cause for arrest if the same sketchy pattern occurs just as frequently or even more frequently in innocent transactions.”

    Finally, the court stated that while Wirchansky’s criminal reputation was relevant, it was not enough alone to save the warrant. Citing Spinelli, the court noted that a suspect’s reputation may not be used “to give additional weight to allegations that would otherwise be insufficient.” The court distinguished between instances where the underlying circumstances disclosed by the informant are merely lacking in detail (which can be bolstered by police observations) and instances where the informant’s tip does not disclose any circumstances of the criminal activity (in which case the police observations must independently establish probable cause).

    The Court held that the informant’s tip and the defendant’s reputation should not elevate activities susceptible to an interpretation of innocent activity to probable cause. The Court stressed that such a result would allow for probable cause for a search “every time the police receive an informant’s tip that a ‘known criminal’ is going to a particular location for criminal purposes.”

  • People v. Hickey, 40 N.Y.2d 761 (1976): Justice Court Authority and Search Warrant Jurisdiction

    People v. Hickey, 40 N.Y.2d 761 (1976)

    A Justice Court lacks the authority to issue a search warrant for premises located outside its territorial jurisdiction unless there’s a connection between the target of the search and an offense committed within that jurisdiction.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a town justice court had the authority to issue a search warrant for a residence located outside of the town’s boundaries. The warrant was issued by a Town Justice of Orchard Park to search the defendant’s apartment in Buffalo for narcotics. The court held that the Justice Court lacked jurisdiction because the affidavit supporting the warrant did not allege any offense occurred within the Town of Orchard Park. The Court emphasized the necessity of a nexus between the criminal activity and the Justice Court’s geographic jurisdiction for the warrant to be valid.

    Facts

    A State Police investigator obtained a search warrant from the Town Justice of Orchard Park to search Dennis Hickey’s apartment in Buffalo for narcotics. The supporting affidavit indicated probable cause to believe Hickey possessed narcotics at his residence. The search warrant was executed, and marijuana was found. Hickey was subsequently charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance.

    Procedural History

    Hickey pleaded not guilty and moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search. The Supreme Court granted the motion, finding the Justice Court lacked geographical jurisdiction. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision without opinion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Town Justice Court has the authority to issue a search warrant for premises located outside its territorial jurisdiction when there is no evidence connecting the target of the search to an offense committed within the town.

    Holding

    No, because a Justice Court’s authority to issue process, including search warrants, is confined to matters within its jurisdiction, requiring a geographic nexus between the criminal activity and the court’s jurisdiction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that Justice Courts, as local criminal courts, have trial jurisdiction over offenses other than felonies and preliminary jurisdiction over all offenses. However, this jurisdiction is not without limits and requires a connection between the criminal conduct and the geographical area the court oversees. CPL 690.05(2) establishes a search warrant is a court process. UJCA § 2005 limits a Justice Court’s power to send process to any matter within its jurisdiction. Quoting the court, “The test, quite simply, is whether the affidavits which form the basis for issuance of the search warrant allege that an offense was committed within ‘the jurisdictional purview of the issuing court.’” Since the affidavit provided no evidence that any offense occurred within Orchard Park, the Town Justice lacked the authority to issue the search warrant for Hickey’s apartment in Buffalo. The court noted that the application should have been made to a judge within the City of Buffalo, County Court, or to a Supreme Court Justice.

  • People v. Brown, 40 N.Y.2d 183 (1976): Warrant Based on Informant’s Reliability Established by In-Person Examination

    40 N.Y.2d 183 (1976)

    When an informant appears before a magistrate considering a search warrant application, the magistrate can assess the informant’s credibility in person, and the traditional requirement for the officer to vouch for the informant’s reliability is unnecessary.

    Summary

    This case concerns the validity of a search warrant based on information provided by a confidential informant who appeared before the issuing magistrate. A police officer applied for a search warrant based on information from an informant who claimed to have seen drugs and handguns in an apartment. The informant was brought before the judge, who spoke with him off the record and then issued the warrant. The subsequent search yielded narcotics, weapons, and cash. The defendant, arrested at the scene, argued the warrant was invalid because the officer didn’t establish the informant’s reliability in the warrant application. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the warrant’s validity, holding that the magistrate’s in-person assessment of the informant obviated the need for the officer to vouch for the informant’s credibility.

    Facts

    A police officer applied for a search warrant for an apartment based on information from a registered police informant.

    The informant told the officer he saw drugs being packaged and handguns at the apartment on two occasions: September 5, 1972, and again on September 20, 1972.

    The officer provided the informant’s registration number and presented the informant to the judge, who spoke with him off the record.

    The warrant was issued, and a search of the apartment yielded cocaine, heroin, revolvers, drug paraphernalia, and approximately $5,000 in cash.

    The defendant, Albert Brown, was arrested at the apartment.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, arguing the warrant was invalid.

    The motion to suppress was denied without a hearing.

    The defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the fourth degree, satisfying an indictment charging him with weapon and narcotics offenses.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a search warrant application is valid when based on hearsay information from a confidential informant who appears before the issuing magistrate, even if the police officer does not independently establish the informant’s reliability in the application.

    Holding

    Yes, because when the informant is presented to the court for examination, the court can determine credibility without the officer needing to vouch for the informant’s reliability. The court’s direct examination of the informant serves as an adequate substitute for the traditional requirement of establishing the informant’s credibility through the officer’s testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test for assessing hearsay information from an informant: (1) the informant’s basis of knowledge and (2) the informant’s credibility. The court noted that the first prong was satisfied because the informant claimed to have personally seen the drugs and weapons. Addressing the second prong, the court acknowledged that the officer’s testimony did not independently establish the informant’s reliability.

    However, the court reasoned that the traditional requirement to establish an informant’s reliability is a substitute approach used when the informant is not identified to the magistrate. When the informant appears before the court, the magistrate can assess credibility directly. The court emphasized that the judge noted on the record that the informant’s information “tallies” with that provided by the police officer and can be read “in a commonsense manner”.

    The court also addressed concerns about the informant’s statements not being under oath, stating that there were “adequate safeguards against the rendition of false information” because the informant could be prosecuted for falsely reporting an incident. The court also relied on the preference to be accorded warrants when the resolution of the case was “doubtful or marginal”.

    The dissenting judges argued that the constitutional requirement of “oath or affirmation” was not met for establishing the informant’s reliability because the informant’s statements to the judge were unsworn and unrecorded. They expressed concern that the decision could allow prosecutors to circumvent the requirement of proving an informant’s reliability by simply producing the informant in person before the magistrate without any sworn testimony.

  • People v. Hicks, 38 N.Y.2d 90 (1975): Probable Cause Based on Identified Citizen Informant Testimony

    People v. Hicks, 38 N.Y.2d 90 (1975)

    A search warrant may be issued based on the sworn statement of an identified citizen informant who provides firsthand information regarding criminal activity, without requiring independent corroboration of the informant’s reliability.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a search warrant was validly issued based on the sworn affidavit of a named citizen informant who detailed firsthand observations of the defendant’s criminal activity. The court distinguished this situation from cases involving confidential informants, where the informant’s reliability must be independently established. The court reasoned that citizen informants, who report crime out of civic duty, are inherently more reliable than underworld informants and their sworn statements can directly establish probable cause without requiring corroboration. This decision upholds the importance of citizen involvement in law enforcement and provides a practical framework for assessing probable cause based on identified informant testimony.

    Facts

    Kenneth Leone, an 18-year-old, provided a sworn affidavit to police detailing his observations at Douglas Hicks’ residence. Leone stated that he was in Hicks’ bedroom, where Hicks admitted to stealing a safe during a burglary. Hicks opened the safe, revealing marijuana and fireworks. Hicks also claimed that stereo equipment in the room and a new engine/bucket seats for his car were stolen. Leone’s affidavit included his name, address, and telephone number.

    Procedural History

    Based on Leone’s affidavit, a search warrant was issued for Hicks’ residence. Evidence found during the search led to Hicks being indicted for burglary and grand larceny. Hicks’ motion to controvert the search warrant was denied. He pleaded guilty to petit larceny charges, satisfying all indictment charges and a separate charge in District Court. The Appellate Term affirmed the convictions.

    Issue(s)

    Whether probable cause existed to support the issuance of the search warrant based solely on the sworn affidavit of an identified citizen informant, without independent corroboration of the informant’s reliability.

    Holding

    Yes, because the affidavit was a sworn statement of an identified member of the community attesting to facts directly and personally observed, which sufficiently supports the issuance of a search warrant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the traditional two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test (requiring a showing of the informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge) does not apply when the affidavit is based on the direct observations of a named citizen informant. The court distinguished this situation from cases involving confidential informants, where the police officer is repeating a story told to him by a “reliable” informant; instead, the information furnished the court came directly from the informer’s sworn statement. The court stated, “Unlike Aguilar and Spinelli, the affiant in this case is not a police officer repeating a story told to him by a ‘reliable’ informant; instead, the information furnished the court came directly from the informer’s sworn statement, without the benefit of filtering by the police.” The court emphasized that citizen informants are inherently more reliable than underworld informants because they act out of civic duty and without expectation of personal gain. The court also noted the safeguards against false information, including the risk of prosecution for false statements and civil liability for malicious prosecution. The court concluded that requiring independent corroboration of a citizen informant’s sworn statement would be absurd and would denigrate the character of public-spirited citizens. The court emphasized that such civic-mindedness should be encouraged and applauded.

  • People v. Slaughter, 37 N.Y.2d 596 (1975): Establishing Probable Cause for Search Warrants Based on Informant Testimony

    People v. Slaughter, 37 N.Y.2d 596 (1975)

    A search warrant may be issued based on hearsay information from a confidential informant if the affidavit establishes both the informant’s credibility and the reliability of the information provided, and independent police observations corroborate the informant’s statements.

    Summary

    Slaughter was convicted of drug possession and unlawful possession of an unregistered rifle after a search of his hotel room pursuant to a warrant. The warrant was based on an affidavit from a police officer relying on information from a confidential informant. Slaughter challenged the warrant, arguing the informant’s information was inaccurate. He also moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence from two officers who participated in the raid. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the warrant was properly issued because the affidavit established the informant’s credibility and the information’s reliability, and the “new” evidence was not compelling enough to warrant a new trial.

    Facts

    A police officer obtained a search warrant for Slaughter’s hotel room based on an affidavit stating that a confidential informant had provided information that Slaughter possessed and was selling narcotics and possessed a gun in specific rooms of the Ebony Hotel. The informant was described as reliable, having previously provided information leading to arrests and narcotics seizures. The officer also stated that he had personally observed known narcotics sellers entering the hotel lobby and proceeding to the rooms indicated by the informant. Slaughter presented hotel receipts showing he was out of town on dates the informant claimed to have witnessed the sales.

    Procedural History

    Slaughter was convicted in the trial court. He moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause. The trial court denied the motion after an in camera examination of the informant. After the jury found him guilty, Slaughter moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The trial court also denied this motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. Slaughter appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by leave of a judge of that court.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the affidavit provided probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant, considering the information provided by the confidential informant and the alleged inaccuracies in the dates of the reported observations.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Slaughter’s motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence from two police officers who participated in the raid.

    Holding

    1. No, because the affidavit established both the informant’s credibility and the reliability of the information, which was further corroborated by independent police observations.

    2. No, because the newly discovered evidence did not create a probability that a different verdict would have resulted had the evidence been presented at trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the two-pronged test from Aguilar v. Texas, requiring the affidavit to demonstrate both the informant’s veracity and the reliability of the information. The court found the informant’s credibility was established by the fact that the informant had previously supplied information leading to arrests and narcotics seizures. The reliability of the information was bolstered by the officer’s independent observation of known narcotics sellers entering the hotel and proceeding to the rooms identified by the informant. This provided a “substantial basis” for believing the informant.

    Regarding the discrepancy in dates, the court deferred to the trial judge’s finding after an in camera examination of the informant, concluding the inaccuracy did not undermine the informant’s credibility or the officer’s good faith reliance on the information. The court distinguished People v. Alfinito, clarifying that a defendant is only entitled to challenge the truthfulness of allegations in an affidavit when attacking the veracity of the police officer affiant, not merely the credibility of the informant.

    The court held that the newly discovered evidence, consisting of testimony from two additional police officers, did not warrant a new trial. The court pointed out that even if believed, the officer’s testimony merely provided an inconsistent version of events and did not directly contradict the evidence that Slaughter was found with contraband behind a locked door. The court quoted the trial judge who stated the defendant did not meet “the statutory requirement that the new evidence must ‘create a probability that had such evidence been received at the trial the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant.’”

  • People v. Wright, 37 N.Y.2d 88 (1975): Establishing Probable Cause for a Search Warrant Based on Informant Testimony

    People v. Wright, 37 N.Y.2d 88 (1975)

    An affidavit supporting a search warrant based on hearsay information from an informant must demonstrate both the informant’s veracity and the basis of the informant’s knowledge to establish probable cause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction for criminal possession of a weapon. The court held that the search warrant was improperly issued because the affidavit supporting it lacked probable cause. The affidavit relied on information from an informant, James, who claimed the defendant received a stolen pistol. However, the affidavit failed to establish how James knew this information. The single observed narcotics transaction involving the defendant was insufficient to establish a likelihood of narcotics being kept on the premises. Therefore, the evidence seized during the search and the defendant’s admission of ownership should have been suppressed.

    Facts

    Police obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s apartment for narcotics or weapons based on an affidavit by Patrolman Hantz. The affidavit stated that officers saw the defendant pass a glassine envelope to a police officer under investigation for robbery. A “reliable informant,” James, stated that the officer under investigation and another person had robbed narcotics dealers of narcotics and two pistols, with one pistol given to the defendant. The affidavit didn’t explain how James knew the defendant received the pistol, or when/where it occurred.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in a jury trial for criminal possession of a weapon. His motions to suppress the pistol and his admission of ownership were denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, vacated the conviction, suppressed the evidence, and dismissed the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affidavit provided probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant for either narcotics or weapons in the defendant’s apartment.

    Holding

    No, because the affidavit failed to establish a sufficient basis for the informant’s knowledge that the defendant possessed a stolen pistol, and the single narcotics transaction was insufficient to establish probable cause that narcotics were present in the defendant’s apartment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that when an affidavit relies on hearsay from an informant, it must satisfy two prongs: (1) the informant’s veracity and (2) the basis of the informant’s knowledge. While James’ statement against penal interest could establish his credibility, the affidavit failed to reveal the basis for his knowledge regarding the defendant’s possession of the pistol. The affidavit did not clarify whether James personally witnessed the transfer or learned about it through another source. The court cited People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 129 (1969) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), noting that the magistrate could not rely on James’ statement without knowing its foundation.

    The court also determined that the affidavit lacked probable cause to believe narcotics were present in the defendant’s apartment. The single narcotics transaction observed by Hantz was not linked to the defendant’s residence, and it didn’t demonstrate that the defendant was a large-scale dealer or user. As the court stated, “Wright’s giving Antomez one glassine envelope did not establish him as a large-scale dealer or user likely to have narcotics on his premises.”

    Because the warrant lacked probable cause, the pistol and the defendant’s admission of ownership obtained as a result of the illegal search should have been suppressed. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the indictment.

  • People v. Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 549 (1975): Establishing Probable Cause with Informant Testimony for Search Warrants

    People v. Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 549 (1975)

    An affidavit supporting a search warrant application based on information from an undisclosed informant must satisfy a two-pronged test: establishing the informant’s veracity and the basis of their knowledge, but warrants are favored and should be upheld in marginal cases.

    Summary

    This case consolidates appeals concerning the validity of search warrants based on information from confidential informants. The Court of Appeals addressed whether the affidavits supporting the warrants established probable cause, specifically focusing on the reliability of the informants and the basis of their knowledge. The court held that both warrants were valid because the affidavits provided sufficient details to establish the informants’ credibility and a basis for believing their information was accurate. The Court reiterated a preference for warrants, presuming police good faith when a warrant is secured.

    Facts

    In Hanlon, a detective obtained a search warrant based on an informant’s tip that marijuana and a weapon were located at Hanlon’s residence, along with the detective’s observation of known narcotics users entering and leaving the premises. The informant had previously provided information leading to arrests. In Rosen and Fredericks, a detective obtained warrants to search the defendants and a printing corporation based on an informant’s detailed description of an illegal football pool operation, which police surveillance corroborated. The informant had a history of providing accurate information.

    Procedural History

    In Hanlon, the County Court denied the motion to suppress the evidence. The Appellate Term affirmed on different grounds. In Rosen and Fredericks, the City Court granted the motion to suppress, finding the affidavit insufficient. The People appealed the disposition in Rosen and Fredericks.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the affidavit in Hanlon sufficiently established the timeliness of the informant’s information and the informant’s reliability.

    2. Whether the affidavits in both cases sufficiently established the basis of the informants’ knowledge.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a common-sense reading of the affidavit suggests the information was recent, and the informant had purchased narcotics from the defendant, provided accurate information previously, and the police corroborated the information.

    2. Yes, because in Hanlon, the detailed nature of the information suggested personal observation. In Rosen and Fredericks, the pattern of activity described by the informant, including specific details, was sufficiently accurate to lead to a reasonable belief that the conclusion was likewise accurate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the two-pronged test established in Aguilar v. Texas, requiring that an affidavit based on an informant’s tip must establish both the informant’s veracity and the basis of their knowledge. The court found the Hanlon affidavit satisfactory because it indicated that the informant had purchased drugs from the defendant, which is against the informant’s penal interest. The affidavit also stated that the informant had provided accurate information previously. Furthermore, the police corroborated aspects of the informant’s information. The court cited Spinelli v. United States to explain that detailed information can suggest personal observation.

    Regarding the Rosen and Fredericks case, the court acknowledged that the defendants conceded the reliability of the informant, but the defendants challenged the basis of knowledge. The court stated, “The pattern of activity related by the informant, even to the extent of relating the time, day, place and mechanics of the operation, was of such accuracy and detail as to lead to a reasonable belief that the conclusion was likewise accurate.” The court also stated, “As the pattern unfolded the informer’s statements were reinforced by what the defendants did and the defendants’ activity was colored by what the informant said.”

    The court emphasized a strong preference for search warrants, stating that when a warrant has been secured, the good faith of the police will be presumed and the subsequent search upheld in a marginal or doubtful case. The court cautioned against reading search warrant applications in a hypertechnical manner, stating that they must be considered in the clear light of everyday experience and accorded all reasonable inferences.

    “Where a search warrant has been secured, the bona fides of the police will be presumed and the subsequent search upheld in a marginal or doubtful case.”