New York Law Review

Tag: search incident to arrest

  • People v. Evans, 43 N.Y.2d 169 (1977): Warrantless Search Requires Contemporaneous Arrest

    People v. Evans, 43 N.Y.2d 169 (1977)

    A warrantless search of a person is unconstitutional if it is not contemporaneous with a lawful arrest, even if probable cause for arrest exists.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a warrantless search conducted based on probable cause, but without a contemporaneous arrest, violates the Fourth Amendment. An undercover officer bought heroin from the defendant, “George.” Later, a sergeant located someone matching George’s description, frisked him, and searched his pockets, finding cash but no drugs. The defendant was arrested a month later. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, finding the search unlawful because it was not incident to a contemporaneous arrest, despite the existence of probable cause. The court emphasized that an arrest and search must be nearly simultaneous to be considered a valid search incident to arrest.

    Facts

    An undercover officer, Scirri, purchased heroin from a man named “George” on a street corner. Scirri described George to Sergeant Guadagno. Guadagno found a man matching the description nearby. Guadagno stopped the man (Evans), frisked him for weapons, and then directed him to empty his pockets, revealing three ten-dollar bills. Guadagno then conducted a full search. No warrant check was outstanding and Evans was allowed to leave. Evans was arrested a month later and charged with the heroin sale to Scirri.

    Procedural History

    At trial, Evans objected to the introduction of the three ten-dollar bills as evidence, arguing that the search was illegal. The trial court overruled the objection, and the jury convicted Evans. The Appellate Division affirmed, reasoning that the search was justified by probable cause to search for narcotics. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a warrantless search of a person is justified solely by probable cause to arrest, when the arrest does not occur contemporaneously with the search?

    Holding

    No, because a warrantless search incident to arrest requires that the search be contemporaneous with a lawful arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while Sergeant Guadagno was justified in frisking Evans for safety, probable cause to arrest does not automatically justify a full search without an actual arrest. The right to personal security outweighs the state’s interest in an exploratory search absent an arrest. A search incident to arrest must be contemporaneous with the arrest; the arrest justifies the search because of the need to protect the officer and prevent the destruction of evidence. The court stated, “An arrest is an essential requisite to a search incident, otherwise once probable cause existed a potential arrestee would be fair game for any intrusions the police deem appropriate for however long they allow him to remain at large.” The court rejected the argument that preserving the undercover officer’s status justified the delayed arrest and search. The court emphasized the importance of “unity of time” in addition to “unity of place” for a valid search incident to arrest. The court further distinguished Cupp v. Murphy, noting that the search there was limited and the evidence (scrapings from fingernails) was in imminent danger of being destroyed. Here, the court determined the admission of the three $10 bills was not harmless error because it corroborated the undercover officer’s testimony. Thus, the conviction was reversed. The court clarified that while “the fact that the search precedes the formal arrest is irrelevant as long as the search and arrest are nearly simultaneous so as to constitute one event,” in this case, the month-long delay was too significant to satisfy the contemporaneous requirement.

  • People v. Lucas, 41 N.Y.2d 370 (1977): Establishing Probable Cause for Arrest Based on Informant Information

    People v. Lucas, 41 N.Y.2d 370 (1977)

    Information from a reliable informant that a suspect is involved in drug dealing and narcotics have been observed at a specific location can establish probable cause for the suspect’s arrest.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether police had probable cause to arrest the defendant, Lucas, based on information from a reliable informant. The New York Court of Appeals held that the informant’s tip, stating that Lucas and another individual were drug dealers and that narcotics were observed at their premises, was sufficient to establish probable cause. Consequently, the arrest and the incidental search of Lucas were deemed lawful. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for review of the facts.

    Facts

    Police had information from a reliable informant that Lucas and another individual were drug dealers. The informant also stated that narcotics had been observed at the premises associated with Lucas. Based on this information, Lucas was arrested.

    Procedural History

    The case initially involved a question of whether search warrants authorized a search of Lucas outside a specific apartment, which the Court of Appeals determined they did not. The People argued that the search was justified as incident to a lawful arrest based on probable cause, but this issue wasn’t raised at the original hearing. The case was remanded for a further hearing on the issue of probable cause. The trial court found probable cause existed. The Appellate Division’s order was appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for review of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    Whether information from a reliable informant that the defendant was a drug dealer and that narcotics had been observed at his premises was sufficient to establish probable cause for the defendant’s arrest.

    Holding

    Yes, because the police had information from a reliable informant that the defendant and another individual were drug dealers and narcotics had been observed at the premises. This information was sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a crime, making the arrest and incidental search lawful.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on whether the informant’s tip provided sufficient probable cause to justify the arrest. The court emphasized the reliability of the informant and the specificity of the information provided (drug dealing and observation of narcotics at the premises). The court reasoned that this level of detail and the informant’s reliability created a reasonable belief that the defendant had committed a crime, thus justifying the arrest. The court stated, “In our view this was sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a crime. Thus the arrest, and the incidental search were lawful.” The court relied on established precedent regarding the use of informant information to establish probable cause, balancing the need for effective law enforcement with the protection of individual rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.

  • People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447 (1980): Search Incident to Arrest Must Be Contemporaneous and Proximate

    People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447 (1980)

    A search incident to a lawful arrest must be contemporaneous with the arrest and confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrestee.

    Summary

    Defendant Belton was arrested just outside his apartment. Police, without a warrant, searched his apartment, ostensibly for a stolen television. The television was not found. However, they found an imitation pistol in plain view in a partially open dresser drawer in the bedroom. The New York Court of Appeals held that the search was illegal because it was not conducted pursuant to a warrant, was not incidental to the arrest (which occurred outside the apartment), and was not conducted with Belton’s consent. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order, vacated the guilty plea and conviction, and granted the motion to suppress the physical evidence.

    Facts

    Defendant was arrested and handcuffed either in the hallway adjoining his apartment door or immediately inside the doorway in the foyer.

    Without obtaining a warrant, police searched the defendant’s living room and bedroom, purportedly seeking a stolen television set.

    The stolen television was not found during the search.

    Police found an imitation pistol in plain view inside a partially open dresser drawer located in the bedroom.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted based on evidence found during a warrantless search of his apartment.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether physical evidence seized from an apartment during a warrantless search should be suppressed when the search was not conducted pursuant to a valid warrant, was not incidental to a lawful arrest, and was not conducted with the defendant’s consent.

    Holding

    Yes, because the search was not conducted pursuant to a valid warrant, was not incidental to the completed arrest outside the searched premises, and was not conducted with the defendant’s consent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the warrantless search violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The court emphasized the well-established exceptions to the warrant requirement, which include searches conducted pursuant to a valid warrant, searches incident to a lawful arrest, and searches conducted with consent. The court found that none of these exceptions applied in this case.

    The court cited Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33, for the proposition that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.

    The court also cited Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, which limited the scope of a search incident to arrest to the area within the immediate control of the arrestee.

    The court distinguished the present case from People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 373-374, without elaborating on the distinctions, but generally Loria involved consent, which was not present here.

    Because the arrest occurred outside the apartment and the search was not contemporaneous with the arrest, the search could not be justified as incident to a lawful arrest. Moreover, since there was no warrant and no consent, the search was illegal, and the evidence seized should have been suppressed.

  • People v. Troiano, 35 N.Y.2d 476 (1974): Search Incident to Arrest for Traffic Violation

    People v. Troiano, 35 N.Y.2d 476 (1974)

    A lawful arrest, even for a misdemeanor traffic violation, justifies a full search of the person incident to that arrest, as long as the person is being taken into custody.

    Summary

    Defendant Troiano was arrested on a warrant for driving with a suspended license. During the arrest, the officer frisked Troiano and discovered a loaded revolver. Troiano argued the search was unlawful because it stemmed from a traffic violation arrest. The New York Court of Appeals held that a full search is permissible incident to a lawful arrest, even for a misdemeanor traffic violation, provided the individual is being taken into custody. The court reasoned that the loss of privacy occurs upon the lawful taking into custody and that officers need to ensure their safety and the safety of others.

    Facts

    On January 8, 1969, Troiano was arrested pursuant to a warrant issued six days earlier for the misdemeanor of driving with a suspended or revoked license. The arresting officer showed Troiano the warrant and informed him he was under arrest. The officer then asked Troiano to place his hands on the police car and began a “search or frisk” of his person. During the frisk, the officer found a loaded revolver in Troiano’s waistband and confiscated it.

    Procedural History

    Troiano was indicted for possession of a loaded firearm. He moved to suppress the revolver, arguing the search was unlawful. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. Troiano was found guilty after a jury trial and sentenced to imprisonment. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction. Troiano then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a full search of the person is authorized as incident to a custodial detention for a misdemeanor traffic violation.

    Holding

    Yes, because so long as the person is being taken into custody, they have lost whatever interest in privacy they had before the arrest, and officers must ensure their safety and the safety of others during the arrest and detention process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that once a person is lawfully arrested and taken into custody, their expectation of privacy diminishes significantly. The act of taking someone into custody itself is a substantial intrusion on their privacy. The court emphasized the need for officers to protect themselves and others from potential harm during the arrest and detention process. The court stated, “So long as the person is being taken into custody, he has lost whatever interest in privacy he had before arrest, the taking into custody itself being the grossest intrusion upon his privacy.” The court acknowledged the existence of less intrusive alternatives, such as summonses, but emphasized that once an arrest is made, the potential danger to the officer and others necessitates a thorough search. The court also noted the impracticality of distinguishing between “hard” and “soft” objects, as many seemingly harmless items can be used as weapons. The court also cited the need for an inventory search upon arrival at the place of detention for the safety of the arrestee, custodians, and fellow prisoners. The court suggested that limiting the right to arrest or take into custody is the only way to restrict unnecessarily intrusive personal searches.

  • People v. Weintraub, 35 N.Y.2d 351 (1974): Warrantless Search Incident to Lawful Arrest Extends to Personal Effects

    People v. Weintraub, 35 N.Y.2d 351 (1974)

    A warrantless search incident to a lawful custodial arrest extends to personal effects of the arrestee that are “ready to hand,” regardless of a later judicial determination of the probability of finding weapons or evidence.

    Summary

    Weintraub was arrested for criminal trespass. A contemporaneous search of an attaché case he was carrying revealed stolen checks, airline tickets, and credit cards. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the warrantless search of the attaché case was constitutionally permissible as a search incident to a lawful arrest. The Court held that it was, reasoning that the authority to search incident to a lawful custodial arrest extends to items within the arrestee’s immediate control, regardless of the likelihood of finding specific evidence related to the crime of arrest. This case clarifies the scope of searches incident to arrest in New York, particularly distinguishing it from traffic offense cases and aligning it with federal standards.

    Facts

    Police officers found Weintraub in a closed, vandalized parking garage, sitting in a car belonging to Sal Cirella. Weintraub claimed he had Cirella’s permission, but Cirella denied this. Nothing was missing from the car. Because Weintraub could not explain his presence, officers arrested him for criminal trespass. Incident to the arrest, officers searched a closed attaché case Weintraub had been carrying and discovered checks, airline tickets, and credit cards made out to different people.

    Procedural History

    Weintraub was charged with criminally possessing stolen property. He moved to suppress the contents of the attaché case, but the motion was denied, and he pleaded guilty. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless search of the defendant’s attaché case, conducted incident to a lawful custodial arrest for criminal trespass, was a constitutionally permissible search.

    Holding

    Yes, because the authority to search incident to a lawful custodial arrest extends to personal effects within the arrestee’s immediate control, and this authority does not depend on a later determination of the probability of finding specific evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the search was justified as incident to a lawful custodial arrest. The court distinguished this case from prior New York cases, such as People v. Marsh and People v. Adams, which limited searches incident to arrest for traffic offenses. The Court emphasized that those cases were based on the unique nature of traffic offenses and did not apply to a custodial arrest for criminal trespass. Relying on United States v. Robinson, the court stated that the justification for a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest stems from the arrest itself, based on the need to disarm the suspect and to discover or preserve evidence. The Court stated, “The lawful custodial arrest being a constitutionally reasonable intrusion upon the defendant’s privacy, the search incident requires no additional justification. (United States v. Robinson, supra, at p. 235.)” The Court further noted that the search could include personal effects of the arrestee that are “ready to hand”. The Court acknowledged that a less intrusive action—seizing the attaché case without searching it—was possible. However, it found no constitutional requirement for officers to choose the least intrusive method when conducting a search incident to arrest. The Court concluded that the search of the attaché case was a permissible search incident to a lawful custodial arrest, and the evidence found therein was admissible. The court remitted the case to the Appellate Division for a determination of the facts.

  • People v. Brosnan, 32 N.Y.2d 254 (1973): Limits on Warrantless Vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest

    People v. Brosnan, 32 N.Y.2d 254 (1973)

    A warrantless search of an impounded vehicle’s trunk, conducted after the defendant is in custody and the vehicle is secured, is not justified as a search incident to arrest absent exigent circumstances.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the legality of a warrantless search of a vehicle’s trunk after the defendant’s arrest and the vehicle’s impoundment. The court held that the search was permissible because probable cause existed for the arrest and the subsequent vehicle search. The dissent argued that once the vehicle was impounded and the defendant was in custody, there were no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search of the trunk. The dissent emphasized that while probable cause existed, the police should have obtained a search warrant.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested. Subsequently, law enforcement impounded the defendant’s car and towed it to the Sheriff’s parking lot. While the defendant was in custody, officers conducted a search of the vehicle’s trunk without obtaining a warrant. Evidence discovered in the trunk was later admitted at trial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court admitted the evidence found in the trunk of the defendant’s car. The defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence should have been suppressed as the result of an illegal search. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the search was justified based on probable cause.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle’s trunk, conducted after the defendant is in custody, is permissible under the Fourth Amendment when there are no exigent circumstances?

    Holding

    No, according to the dissenting opinion. The dissent argued that absent exigent circumstances, a warrant should have been obtained prior to searching the trunk, even if probable cause existed. The majority affirmed without a written opinion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority affirmed the lower court’s decision without issuing a written opinion. The dissenting judge argued that the search of the trunk was not justified as a search incident to arrest because the vehicle was already impounded, and the defendant was in custody, negating any risk of the evidence being destroyed or moved. The dissent stated, “There was probable cause for the arrest and sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant. However, absent exigent circumstances, I cannot agree that this justified a warrantless search.” The dissent cited People v. Brosnan (32 Y 2d 254, 263), highlighting the importance of warrants in the absence of pressing circumstances. The dissent emphasized that obtaining a warrant would have been the proper course of action, given the lack of urgency and the defendant’s secure custody.

  • People v. Morales, 37 N.Y.2d 262 (1975): Applying Chimel’s Search Incident to Arrest Rule Retroactively

    People v. Morales, 37 N.Y.2d 262 (1975)

    The rule established in Chimel v. California regarding the permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest applies to searches conducted after June 23, 1969, the date of the Chimel decision, even if the trial occurred later.

    Summary

    This case addresses the retroactive application of the Supreme Court’s decision in Chimel v. California, which narrowed the permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Chimel rule applies to searches conducted after the Chimel decision date, regardless of when the trial took place. This decision aligns New York’s application of the rule with the Supreme Court’s stance to ensure consistency and avoid establishing a different timeline for the rule’s application within New York State.

    Facts

    The specific facts of Morales’ arrest and the search conducted are not detailed in this per curiam opinion, as the primary focus is on the broader legal question of Chimel‘s retroactive application. The core issue revolves around whether evidence seized during a search, potentially exceeding the scope permitted by Chimel, should be suppressed.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress evidence, likely arguing the search exceeded the permissible scope under Chimel. The Appellate Division ruled in favor of suppressing the evidence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, denying the motion to suppress, thereby upholding the admissibility of the evidence based on their interpretation of Chimel’s applicability.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the ruling in Chimel v. California, which limited the scope of searches incident to arrest, should be applied retroactively to searches conducted after the Chimel decision but before the defendant’s trial.

    Holding

    No, because the Chimel rule applies to searches occurring after June 23, 1969, the date of the Chimel decision, aligning with the Supreme Court’s determination and avoiding inconsistent application within New York State.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while applying Chimel to trials starting after the decision date might seem more aligned with judicial function, the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. United States dictated the approach. The court emphasized the importance of consistency between state and federal application of constitutional rules, stating, “We conclude that there is no sufficiently Compelling reason for us to establish for New York State a time of application different from that recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States.” The court also differentiated this case from People v. Lo Cicero, where both the search and trial were completed before Chimel. The court determined that the Chimel rule did not impact the “very integrity of the fact-finding process” to warrant retroactive application in cases still in the appellate process, referencing People v. Bush and People ex rel. Cadogan v. McMann. Ultimately, the decision prioritizes adherence to established federal precedent to ensure uniform application of constitutional rights.

  • People v. Adams, 32 N.Y.2d 451 (1973): Limits on Searches Incident to Arrest for Vehicle and Traffic Law Violations

    People v. Adams, 32 N.Y.2d 451 (1973)

    A full search of a person incident to arrest for a Vehicle and Traffic Law violation is not justified without reasonable grounds to believe the search will produce evidence related to the crime or is necessary for officer safety.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a full search of a defendant’s person incident to an arrest for driving a vehicle with an altered identification number (a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law) was unlawful because the officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe the search would reveal evidence related to the crime or that the defendant posed a threat. The court emphasized that the search must be justified by the nature of the offense and surrounding circumstances, and that the prosecution conceded the officer lacked probable cause independent of the traffic violation. The evidence seized (marijuana) was suppressed.

    Facts

    A police officer stopped the defendant for driving with high beam headlights. Upon checking the vehicle’s registration, the officer discovered the vehicle identification number did not match the number in the National Auto Check Book for that vehicle type. The officer arrested the defendant for having an altered identification number in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 422. The officer then conducted a full search of the defendant’s person, which revealed marijuana in his coat pocket. Subsequently, a search of the car revealed more marijuana, a scale, and manila envelopes.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with possession of marijuana and possession of a motor vehicle with an altered identification number. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized during the searches. The Criminal Court of the City of New York granted the motion to suppress. The Appellate Term reversed, upholding the search as incident to a lawful arrest. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a full search of a person is permissible incident to an arrest for a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 422 (possession of a motor vehicle with an altered identification number) without any additional justification.

    Holding

    No, because the search was not justified by the need to seize evidence related to the crime or to ensure the officer’s safety, and the prosecution conceded the officer lacked probable cause independent of the traffic violation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the Fourth Amendment requires searches to be reasonable. It noted that reasonableness is determined by examining the nature of the offense and the surrounding circumstances. The court distinguished this case from situations involving frisks for weapons or searches based on probable cause for a more serious crime. The court explicitly stated that “General or exploratory searches are condemned even when they are incident to a lawful arrest.” The court reasoned that after the defendant produced his license and registration, and without any indication he could not explain the discrepancy in the identification number, there was no justifiable belief that a search of his person was warranted. The court emphasized that the legitimate objectives of a search incident to arrest are: “(1) seizure of fruits, instrumentalities and other evidence of the crime for which the arrest is made in order to prevent its destruction or concealment; and (2) removal of any weapons that the arrestee might seek to use to resist arrest or affect his escape.” Neither of these objectives were present in this case. Judge Jasen dissented, arguing that operating a vehicle with an illegally changed serial number is a misdemeanor indicative of a more serious offense (potentially stolen vehicle), thus justifying the search for evidence of prior ownership. The dissent also highlighted officer safety as a justification for the search.

  • People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98 (1967): Limits on Vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest

    People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98 (1967)

    A warrantless search of a vehicle is not justified as incident to an arrest when the arrestee is secured away from the vehicle, and there is no reasonable belief that the vehicle contains fruits, instrumentalities, contraband, or evidence related to the crime for which the arrest was made.

    Summary

    Marsh was convicted of felony weapon possession after the denial of his motion to suppress a loaded revolver found in his car. An officer arrested Marsh based on an outstanding warrant for receiving stolen property. After securing Marsh inside a police station, the officer searched Marsh’s car, discovering the weapon. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the search was not a valid search incident to arrest because it was not contemporaneous with the arrest and there was no probable cause to believe the car contained evidence related to the crime for which Marsh was arrested. The Court emphasized that once Marsh was secured inside the station, there was no risk he could access any weapons in the car.

    Facts

    Patrolman Beedenbender, while directing traffic, recognized Marsh, a driver with Virginia license plates, from a prior narcotics arrest (later dismissed). The officer was aware of an outstanding warrant for Marsh’s arrest from February 1, 1965, related to a charge under Penal Law §1308. Beedenbender followed Marsh, requested him to park near the 30th precinct, and inspected Marsh’s license and registration, finding them in order. He then took Marsh inside to confirm the warrant’s validity. Upon confirmation, Marsh was arrested. Ten minutes after the arrest and while Marsh was inside the station, the officer searched Marsh’s vehicle, finding a loaded .45 caliber revolver under the driver’s seat. Marsh and his passengers were then arrested for weapon possession.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Marsh’s motion to suppress the weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient unity of time and place between the arrest and search. The District Attorney conceded error on appeal to the Court of Appeals, but the Court considered the merits. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, dismissing the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a warrantless search of a vehicle, conducted after the driver has been arrested, secured inside a police station, and where there is no reasonable belief that the vehicle contains evidence related to the crime for which the driver was arrested, is a valid search incident to arrest under the Fourth Amendment?

    Holding

    No, because the search was not contemporaneous with the arrest, and there was no reasonable belief that the vehicle contained evidence related to the crime for which the driver was arrested. The Court emphasized that “[o]nce an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied heavily on Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), which held that a search of a vehicle is not incident to arrest if it is remote in time or place from the arrest. The Court reasoned that the justifications for a search incident to arrest—officer safety and preventing the destruction of evidence—are absent when the arrestee is secured away from the vehicle. In this case, once Marsh was inside the station, there was no danger he could use a weapon from the car. The Court acknowledged the exceptions to the warrant requirement for vehicle searches, particularly where securing a warrant is impractical due to the vehicle’s mobility, as articulated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). However, the Court emphasized that even in such cases, a reasonable belief that the search will produce fruits, instrumentalities, contraband, or evidence is required. Here, the outstanding warrant for receiving stolen property, issued almost three years prior, did not provide a sufficient basis for a reasonable belief that a search of the vehicle would be productive. The Court distinguished this case from others where vehicle searches were upheld, noting that in those cases, the car itself was seized as an instrumentality or evidence of the crime. The Court stated, “Rather it is the lack of any justification to make the search after the 10 minutes had elapsed which brings about the result herein.”

  • People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98 (1967): Search Incident to Arrest for Traffic Violation

    People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98 (1967)

    A police officer is not authorized to conduct a search incident to an arrest for a traffic violation unless the officer has reason to fear an assault or probable cause to believe that the individual has committed a crime.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a search incident to an arrest for a traffic violation is unlawful unless the officer has a reasonable fear of assault or probable cause to believe that the individual committed a crime beyond the traffic infraction. The defendant was arrested on an outstanding warrant for a traffic violation (speeding). A search incident to that arrest revealed a policy slip, leading to a conviction for possession. The court reversed the conviction, reasoning that treating traffic violations as non-criminal offenses while simultaneously allowing searches incident to arrest would be incongruous and violate constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested pursuant to a warrant issued for a traffic violation (speeding) committed two years prior. Incident to the arrest, the police officer searched the defendant and found a sheet of paper in a matchbook cover that implicated him in playing policy (an illegal lottery). The defendant was charged and convicted for possession of a policy slip.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence found during the search, arguing it was an unlawful search and seizure. The motion was denied, and that denial was renewed and again denied at trial. The defendant appealed the conviction, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a police officer is authorized to conduct a search incident to an arrest when the defendant is taken into custody for a traffic violation based on an arrest warrant issued after the defendant failed to appear in court following the initial summons.

    Holding

    No, because the legislative policy treats traffic infractions differently from criminal offenses, and the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures does not permit a search incident to arrest for a traffic violation unless the officer reasonably fears an assault or has probable cause to believe that the person committed a crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Vehicle and Traffic Law explicitly states that a traffic infraction is not a crime, and the punishment should not be considered a penal or criminal punishment. This policy reflects a legislative intent to treat traffic offenses differently from criminal offenses. While an officer has the authority to arrest for a traffic violation, they also have the option to issue a summons. The court stated, “The authority of the police to search a traveler on the highway may not be made to turn on whether the officer, in the exercise of his discretion, forthwith arrests the traffic offender instead of merely summoning him to court.”

    The general rule allows a search incident to a lawful arrest for weapons or for fruits/implements used to commit the crime. However, the court found this rule inapplicable to traffic violations. It noted that traffic infractions rarely involve “fruits” or “implements,” and it would be incongruous to treat traffic offenders as non-criminals while simultaneously subjecting them to a search for weapons.

    The court emphasized that a search for weapons is a special exception that should not be extended beyond securing the officer’s safety and preventing escape. It stated that a speeding motorist does not inherently indicate a propensity for violence. The court found no legislative intent to authorize a search of a traffic offender unless the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect danger or probable cause to believe the offender committed a crime. The court stated that, “no search for a weapon is authorized as incident to an arrest for a traffic infraction, regardless of whether the arrest is made on the scene or pursuant to a warrant, unless the officer has reason to fear an assault or probable cause for believing that his prisoner has committed a crime.”

    The court also relied on the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, stating that a uniform rule permitting searches for all valid arrests, including minor traffic violations, would preclude consideration of the reasonableness of a search. The court cited People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 18, which observed that such a uniform rule “would take away the protection that the constitution is designed to provide.”

    Therefore, the court concluded that the search was unlawful, the evidence should have been suppressed, and the information dismissed.