New York Law Review

Tag: Search and Seizure

  • People v. Cefaro, 21 N.Y.2d 252 (1967): Standing to Challenge Search of Another’s Property

    People v. Cefaro, 21 N.Y.2d 252 (1967)

    A defendant does not have standing to challenge the search and seizure of evidence from another person’s property if the defendant’s own privacy rights were not violated during the search.

    Summary

    Defendants Cefaro, Josephs, and Russo were convicted of burglary and grand larceny. A key piece of evidence, a stolen camera, was found in the apartment of one Barth during a search for narcotics under a warrant. While the prosecution initially agreed to suppress the camera, they later successfully argued that the defendants lacked standing to challenge the search of Barth’s apartment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights were not violated since the search occurred on Barth’s property and not their own, and they were not present during the search. The Court also rejected the argument that Barth was an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration.

    Facts

    On February 29, 1964, a burglary occurred at the premises of William Mendolia, resulting in the theft of cash, jewelry, and a Polaroid camera. On the same evening, binoculars, two television sets, and liquor were stolen from Thomas Simonetti’s apartment at the same address.

    On March 2, 1964, police searched the apartment of Barth pursuant to a warrant for narcotics. During the search, the stolen Polaroid camera was found in a bureau drawer belonging to one of Barth’s children. Barth testified that the defendants brought the stolen items to his apartment and that Russo sold him the camera.

    Russo admitted that he was with the other defendants on the night of the burglary and that he and Cefaro entered a house and committed a burglary. Josephs admitted to being a lookout during the burglary. Cefaro denied participating in the burglary.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of burglary in the third degree (two counts), grand larceny in the first degree, and grand larceny in the second degree. Prior to trial, the assistant district attorney consented to the suppression of the camera, but later successfully moved to be relieved of this consent. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, holding that the defendants lacked standing to challenge the seizure of the camera from Barth’s apartment. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions without opinion. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge that Barth was an accomplice as a matter of law or, at least, that the jury could find Barth to have been an accomplice, requiring corroboration of his testimony?

    2. Whether it was improper to revoke the order suppressing the camera and whether revoking it during the trial was unfair and deprived the defendants of a fair trial?

    3. Whether the refusal to charge that the jury must find the confessions were voluntary deprived the defendants of their constitutional right to trial by jury?

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence indicated Barth was a receiver of stolen property, not an accomplice to the burglary and larceny.

    2. No, because the defendants lacked standing to challenge the search and seizure of evidence from Barth’s apartment.

    3. No, because there was no evidence presented that the confessions were involuntary, and no proper requests or exceptions were made regarding jury instructions on voluntariness (except for Josephs, whose request was declined).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Barth could not have been convicted of burglary or larceny based on the evidence presented. The court referenced People v. Foley, 307 N.Y. 490 and People v. Roman, 12 N.Y.2d 220, indicating that while possession of stolen goods can be evidence of larceny, the possession must be unexplained. In this case, Barth’s testimony and the statements of the defendants indicated that he was merely a receiver of stolen property, which is a mutually exclusive crime from larceny. The court cited People v. Kupperschmidt, 237 N.Y. 463, 465, stating, “The crimes of larceny and receiving are mutually exclusive.” Thus, Barth could not have been an accomplice.

    Regarding the camera, the Court held that the defendants lacked standing to challenge its seizure because it was found in Barth’s apartment, not their own. The Court distinguished the case from People v. McDonnell, 18 N.Y.2d 509, where a wiretap was installed in premises maintained for the defendant’s benefit. The Court clarified that the decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, did not overrule prior precedent established in Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261; and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471. These cases established that a defendant cannot assert that evidence seized unlawfully from another person’s property should be suppressed. The court emphasized that if the defendants had been present in Barth’s apartment and the camera had been taken from their possession, they might have had standing to challenge its use.

    The Court did not find any evidence presented demonstrating the involuntariness of the confessions and noted the appellants’ failure to properly request or except to the court’s failure to charge the jury concerning the voluntariness of these admissions.

  • People v. Horowitz, 21 N.Y.2d 53 (1967): Anonymous Tip and Probable Cause for Search

    People v. Horowitz, 21 N.Y.2d 53 (1967)

    An anonymous tip, even if it accurately describes a suspect and their location, is insufficient on its own to establish probable cause for a search and seizure without independent indicia of the informant’s reliability or independent verification of the tip’s substance beyond easily observable details.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether an anonymous tip provided sufficient probable cause for police to search and arrest the defendant, Horowitz. The police received an anonymous call detailing Horowitz’s location, physical description, and the fact that he possessed stolen bonds in a brown paper bag. Upon finding a man matching the description, the police searched him and found the bonds. The court held that the anonymous tip, even when corroborated by the defendant’s appearance and location, lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to establish probable cause. The case was remitted for a hearing to determine if the police had additional evidence to support probable cause beyond the tip itself. The court emphasized the need for evidence demonstrating the informer’s reliability, not just the accuracy of the description.

    Facts

    A police lieutenant received an anonymous phone call stating that a man named Bernie Horowitz, described as tall, heavy, bald, and carrying a brown paper bag with stolen U.S. savings bonds and pornographic material, would be at the New York Times Building mailroom. The lieutenant relayed this information to an arresting officer. The officer found Horowitz at the mailroom, matching the anonymous description and carrying a brown paper bag. The officer identified himself, asked Horowitz his name, and obtained the bag, which contained stolen bonds. Horowitz was then arrested.

    Procedural History

    Horowitz was arrested and charged with possession of stolen property. He moved to suppress the bonds as evidence, arguing they were obtained through an illegal search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion, and Horowitz pleaded guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision, with two justices dissenting. Horowitz appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an anonymous tip, corroborated only by the suspect’s physical appearance and location matching the description, provides sufficient probable cause for a search and seizure.

    Holding

    No, because the accuracy of the description alone does not establish the reliability of the informant or the truthfulness of the information regarding the stolen bonds.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the police verified the details of the anonymous tip regarding Horowitz’s appearance and location, this did not establish the reliability of the informant or the veracity of the claim that Horowitz possessed stolen bonds. The court distinguished this case from cases where the informant’s reliability was established through prior accurate tips or through independent police investigation corroborating the substance of the tip. The court emphasized that “[a]ll that this amounts to is that the anonymous informer described the defendant correctly and had the right man as the sequel proved when he was found to have the stolen bonds in his possession. That is not the kind of evidence necessary to prove the reliability of the informer.” The court cited People v. Coffey and other cases emphasizing the need for evidence of the informant’s past reliability. The court also distinguished this case from People v. Montague, where police officers had independent knowledge of facts constituting probable cause. The court, referencing People v. Malinsky, remitted the case for a hearing to determine if the police possessed any evidence, beyond the anonymous tip, to establish probable cause. The court acknowledged its previous adherence to People v. Defore, favoring admissibility of evidence even if illegally obtained, but recognized the current commitment to the exclusionary rule established in Mapp v. Ohio. The controlling principle is that the arresting officer does not need to know the reliability of the informer if acting on the direction of another officer with sufficient information to constitute probable cause.

  • People v. Schwartz, 24 N.Y.2d 518 (1969): Admissibility of Confession After Legal Seizure

    People v. Schwartz, 24 N.Y.2d 518 (1969)

    A confession made after being confronted with legally seized evidence is admissible, even if the defendant previously made statements after an illegal search, as the later confession is not considered fruit of the poisonous tree.

    Summary

    Schwartz was convicted of stealing cash and checks. Police found a stolen check in a hotel washroom (unrelated to an initial call), and later, after an illegal search of Schwartz’s car, found clerical garb. At trial, a confession Schwartz made after being shown the check was admitted, detailing that he, dressed as a minister, stole the items. The New York Court of Appeals held that the confession was admissible because it stemmed from the legally seized check, not the illegal search of the car. The court modified the judgment to direct a Huntley hearing on the confession’s voluntariness because the trial court charged the jury on that subject.

    Facts

    On September 20, 1963, cash and checks were stolen from Montauk Freightways.

    Police officers responded to a call at a hotel regarding an attempted robbery.

    An officer found a check stolen from Montauk Freightways on a washroom window sill in the hotel.

    Schwartz and another man were taken into custody.

    A search of Schwartz’s car (later deemed illegal) produced clerical garb and ministerial identification.

    Detective Greene testified that Schwartz confessed to being at Montauk Freightways dressed as a minister, soliciting money, and stealing a bag containing checks and cash when refused.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ruled the evidence from the car search inadmissible due to illegal seizure but allowed the check found in the washroom and related statements.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision without opinion.

    The Court of Appeals reviewed the case, focusing on the admissibility of the confession and the need for a Huntley hearing on voluntariness.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting Schwartz’s confession to Detective Greene, arguing it was a product of the illegal search and seizure of items in his car.

    2. Whether the Appellate Division erred in not remanding the case for a hearing on the voluntariness of Schwartz’s confession, as per People v. Huntley.

    Holding

    1. No, because the confession was triggered by a legally seized check, not the illegally seized items from the car; thus, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine did not apply.

    2. Yes, because under People v. Huntley, a hearing on the voluntariness of a confession is required if the trial court charged the jury on that subject, regardless of any objection during the trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the check found in the washroom was legally seized, as someone had discarded it there. Since the confession stemmed from confronting Schwartz with this legally obtained check, it was admissible. The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, which excludes evidence derived from illegal searches, did not apply here. The Court stated, “The fruit of the poisonous tree rule was designed to discipline law-enforcement officers rather than because of any bearing which it has on the guilt or innocence of a defendant.”

    The Court rejected the argument that any admission made after being confronted with illegally seized evidence is automatically protected. Effective law enforcement required the officer to ask about the check, and there was no legal basis to prevent prosecution to that extent. The fact that Schwartz previously stated he stole items from Montauk Freightways when confronted with the clerical garb did not preclude further questioning about the legally seized check.

    Regarding the voluntariness of the confession, the Court applied the rule from People v. Huntley, which mandates a hearing on voluntariness even if not objected to at trial, provided the trial court charged the jury on the issue. Since the trial court did so here, a Huntley hearing was required.

    The Court modified the judgment to direct a Huntley hearing on the confession’s voluntariness, affirming the judgment as modified.

  • People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335 (1967): Anonymous Tips and ‘Stop and Frisk’ Exception

    People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335 (1967)

    An anonymous tip, if sufficiently detailed and corroborated by observation, can provide reasonable suspicion to justify a “stop and frisk” for weapons, especially when public safety is at risk.

    Summary

    The case addresses the legality of a search and seizure based on an anonymous tip. Police received an anonymous call stating a youth at a specific location possessed a loaded gun. Upon arrival, the police found someone matching the description and immediately searched him, finding the gun. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the search under the “stop and frisk” doctrine, finding that while the anonymous tip alone might not establish probable cause for arrest, the corroborated details provided reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant and, given the potential danger, to immediately search him for the weapon, even among a group of children.

    Facts

    Detective Delaney received an anonymous phone call at the police station. The caller stated that a white male youth was at the corner of 135th and Jamaica Avenue with a loaded .32 caliber revolver in his left jacket pocket. The caller described the youth as eighteen years old, with blue eyes, blond hair, wearing white chino-type pants. Delaney went to the location and observed someone who matched the description perfectly. The youth (Taggart) was standing in a group of children who had just finished bowling. Delaney crossed the street, took Taggart by the arm, placed him against the wall, and retrieved the revolver from his left-hand jacket pocket. Delaney did not observe any bulge in Taggart’s pocket prior to the search.

    Procedural History

    Taggart was arrested and charged with possession of a pistol. He moved to suppress the evidence (the pistol). The Criminal Court, Queens County (Schreckinger, J.) denied the motion. Taggart pleaded guilty and was committed to Elmira Reception Center, and adjudged a youthful offender. The Appellate Term, Second Department, affirmed the conviction, with one Justice dissenting.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an anonymous tip, without more, provides reasonable grounds for a search and subsequent arrest.
    2. Whether, even if the anonymous tip did not provide reasonable grounds for an arrest, the search was valid under New York’s “Stop and Frisk” law (Code Crim. Pro., § 180-a).

    Holding

    1. No, because the information received from the anonymous caller was not substantiated by sufficient indicia of reliability beyond the defendant’s mere presence at the specified location.
    2. Yes, because the detective had a reasonably based suspicion that Taggart was committing a crime and that he possessed a dangerous weapon, justifying the stop and immediate search under the exigent circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while the anonymous tip alone might not constitute “reasonable grounds” for a search incident to an arrest under traditional standards (citing People v. Malinsky and People v. Coffey), the search was justified under the “Stop and Frisk” law. The Court relied on the fact that the detective corroborated the details of the tip: Taggart’s appearance matched the description. The court reasoned the detective had a reasonable suspicion that Taggart was committing a crime which justified the initial stop. Moreover, the court emphasized the potential danger: Taggart was suspected of possessing a loaded weapon among a group of children, creating exigent circumstances that justified an immediate search rather than a preliminary frisk. The court acknowledged the potential dangers of relying on anonymous tips but emphasized that the police action was related to a matter gravely affecting personal and public safety. The court distinguished this case from those involving sumptuary laws or offenses of limited public consequence. The court noted that the Constitution forbids “unreasonable” searches, and what is reasonable is determined by the circumstances. The majority stated, “To tolerate unconstitutional action as a matter of necessity… but then to reject use of the evidence obtained, is hardly a proper way to justify illegal conduct as necessary”.

  • People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 219 (1969): Motion to Suppress Evidence Must Be Made in Trial Court

    People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 219 (1969)

    A motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained via an illegal search and seizure must be made in the court where the indictment will be tried, not before a magistrate who issued the warrant.

    Summary

    Defendants were arrested for arson and related crimes after police found them emerging from a burning house believed to contain a stolen safe. After obtaining a search warrant (later conceded to be invalid), police seized the safe and other items. The defendants moved before the Justice of the Peace to suppress the evidence obtained via the warrant. The Justice of the Peace granted the motion. The County Court reversed, directing the Justice to determine if the motion was to “controvert” the warrant (in which case relief could be granted) or to “suppress” the evidence (which the Justice lacked jurisdiction to decide). The New York Court of Appeals held that the Justice of the Peace had the authority to vacate the warrant, but not to suppress the evidence. The Court reasoned that motions to suppress must be made in the court where the indictment is to be tried, allowing the People an opportunity to prove the search was incident to a lawful arrest.

    Facts

    Bob’s Super Market was burglarized, and a safe was stolen. Police investigation led them to a residence on Herr Road. Upon arriving, officers heard movement inside and, after a period of surveillance, observed the house on fire. The defendants emerged from the house and were arrested for arson. Police entered the house and found the stolen safe. Later, an officer obtained a search warrant and seized the safe and other property.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved before the Justice of the Peace for an order suppressing the search warrant and all evidence produced thereby. The Justice of the Peace granted the motion to suppress the evidence. The County Court reversed and remanded, directing the Justice to determine the nature of the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s order, remitting the case with directions to vacate the search warrant and deny the motion to suppress the evidence, holding that only the trial court could hear the suppression motion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Justice of the Peace has the authority to suppress evidence obtained via a search warrant he issued, when the warrant is later conceded to be invalid, or whether such a motion must be made in the court where the defendant will be tried.

    Holding

    No, because the Code of Criminal Procedure dictates that a motion to suppress evidence must be made in the court where the indictment will be tried, allowing the People an opportunity to show that the search and seizure were incident to a lawful arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the Justice of the Peace had the power to vacate the invalid search warrant, he did not have the authority to suppress the evidence obtained through it. The court relied on Sections 813-c through 813-e of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which specify that a motion to suppress evidence must be made in the court where the defendant is to be tried. Specifically, Section 813-e provides that if an indictment has been returned, the motion “shall be made in the court having trial jurisdiction of such indictment.” The court stated, “In the present case, it is manifest that the application could not have been properly decided by the justice of the peace.” The court emphasized that when the defendants make a motion to suppress in the trial court, “the People will have an opportunity to show (if they can) that the search and seizure which produced the evidence in question were incident to a lawful arrest.” The court cited People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86, 88-89, 91, in support of the principle that evidence obtained incident to a lawful arrest is admissible. The court also noted that vacating the warrant would not entitle the defendant to restoration of the property, since the seized items were allegedly stolen or used in the commission of the crime, citing Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710.

  • People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86 (1965): Informant’s Privilege and Probable Cause for Arrest

    People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86 (1965)

    When probable cause for an arrest depends solely on an informant’s tip, the prosecution must disclose the informant’s identity to allow the defendant a fair opportunity to challenge the basis for probable cause, unless the prosecution presents independent evidence corroborating the tip or the informant’s reliability.

    Summary

    Malinsky and others were convicted of concealing stolen goods. Prior to trial, they moved to suppress evidence seized during their arrest, arguing the search warrant was improperly executed. The trial court ruled the nighttime execution invalid but ordered a hearing to determine if the search was incident to a lawful arrest based on probable cause stemming from an informant’s tip. The defense was denied the ability to question the detective about the informant. The New York Court of Appeals held that while prior statements of a witness must be disclosed under People v. Rosario, the informant’s identity need only be disclosed if probable cause hinges solely on the informant’s tip without independent corroboration. The case was remanded for a new hearing to allow the prosecution to present additional evidence, if any, supporting the informant’s reliability or independent probable cause.

    Facts

    A trailer containing drugs and cosmetics was stolen from a terminal in Boston. Three days later, New York City police, acting on a search warrant, seized the stolen goods as the defendants removed them from a warehouse in Queens. Prior to obtaining the warrant, police had observed the defendants and received a tip from an unnamed informant, who had previously provided reliable information, stating that there was a stolen load of goods at the warehouse and that Malinsky and Lustigman were involved. The police saw the defendants loading cartons onto a truck before arresting them. Only after the arrest did the officers confirm that the goods were stolen from the Boston terminal. The cartons lacked identifiable markings, and the informant did not describe the goods or their packaging.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were indicted and moved to suppress the evidence seized, arguing the search warrant was improperly executed at night. The trial court agreed the nighttime execution was unauthorized but ordered a separate hearing to determine if the search was justified as incident to a lawful arrest. The suppression hearing court denied the motion to suppress, and the evidence was admitted at trial, resulting in the defendants’ convictions. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendants access to the notes made by Detective Sullivan regarding the arrest.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to compel disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because under People v. Rosario, defense counsel must be permitted to examine a witness’ prior statement that relates to the subject matter of the testimony.
    2. No, not necessarily, because disclosure of an informant’s identity is only required where probable cause depends solely on the arresting officer’s testimony about the informant’s communications and there is insufficient other evidence to establish probable cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the detective’s notes, the court cited People v. Rosario, emphasizing that defense counsel must be allowed to examine a witness’ prior statements related to their testimony, provided the statements don’t contain confidential information. The court held that the Rosario rule applies equally to hearings and trials.

    Regarding the informant, the court acknowledged the government’s privilege to protect the identity of informants to encourage citizens to report crimes, citing Roviaro v. United States. However, this privilege is limited by fairness requirements. Quoting Roviaro, the court stated, “the privilege must give way” where “the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, * * * is essential to a fair determination of a cause.”
    The court noted that when the legality of a search without a warrant relies on an informant’s communications to establish probable cause, the government must disclose the informant’s identity unless there is sufficient evidence apart from the confidential communication to sustain such a finding.”

    The court found that in this case, probable cause rested almost entirely on the informant’s tip, with limited corroborating evidence. The officers’ observations of the defendants loading cartons onto a truck did not, by themselves, establish probable cause without knowing the goods were stolen or that the defendants were not authorized to be there.

    The court remanded the case to allow the prosecution the opportunity to present further evidence to support the informant’s reliability or establish independent probable cause based on the police’s own investigation. The court concluded that “unless the prosecution is required to disclose the informer’s identity— so that he may be produced for possible questioning—the defendants will be denied the opportunity, to which they are entitled, of rebutting the detective’s crucial testimony.” If the prosecution fails to provide additional support, the court indicated that the informer’s identity must be disclosed or the evidence suppressed.

  • People v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65 (1964): Legality of “Frisk” Extended to Briefcase

    People v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65 (1964)

    A “frisk” for weapons, permissible during a lawful detention for inquiry, can extend to containers, such as a briefcase, carried by the suspect if there is reasonable concern for officer safety.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of Burton Pugach for unlawfully possessing a loaded firearm. Police officers, investigating Pugach for an unrelated matter, stopped him, and escorted him to a squad car. Inside the car, officers “frisked” Pugach and then searched the briefcase he was carrying, discovering an unlicensed, loaded pistol. The Court found that the search of the briefcase was a permissible extension of a lawful “frisk” and not an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, given the circumstances of the detention and the officers’ safety concerns. The court reasoned that a weapon concealed in a briefcase is the same as concealed on the person.

    Facts

    New York City police were investigating Burton Pugach concerning an unrelated matter. On October 30, 1959, three officers observed Pugach entering an office building carrying a briefcase. Two officers approached him and asked him to accompany them to a squad car for questioning about the other matter. Inside the car, officers began to “frisk” Pugach. Pugach placed the briefcase on the floor. After the frisk, an officer took the briefcase, unzipped it, and discovered a loaded pistol. Pugach admitted he did not have a permit for the weapon and stated he would explain his possession of the gun “at the right time and place.”

    Procedural History

    Pugach was convicted in the Bronx County Court for violating Section 1897 of the Penal Law (illegally carrying a concealed, loaded firearm without a license). The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to determine the legality of the search and seizure of the briefcase and its contents.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the search of the defendant’s briefcase during a “frisk” in a police car, leading to the discovery of an unlicensed loaded firearm, constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

    Holding

    No, because under the circumstances, the inclusion of the briefcase in the “frisk” was not so unreasonable as to be constitutionally illegal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment proscribes “unreasonable” searches and seizures, and that determining “unreasonableness depends on surrounding facts and circumstances and involves a balancing of interests.” Referencing *People v. Rivera*, the court stated that a “frisk” is a reasonable and constitutionally permissive precaution to minimize the danger to a policeman who is trying to determine whether a crime has been or is about to be committed. The right to “frisk” is justified as an incident to an inquiry upon grounds of safety and precaution which might not initially sustain a search. The court held that the fact that the loaded gun was found concealed in the briefcase, rather than in a pocket of defendant’s clothing, affords no ground for saying that this “frisk” was in reality a constitutionally protected search. In the language of the statute, “the loaded firearm concealed in the brief case carried in the hands of the defendant was concealed upon his person (Penal Law, § 1897).” The court deemed disclosure of the “other matter” unnecessary, given the ongoing surveillance of the defendant and the intent to bring him to the police station for questioning. Therefore, under all the circumstances the inclusion of the brief case in the “frisk” was not so unreasonable as to be constitutionally illegal.

  • People v. McCarthy, 14 N.Y.2d 203 (1964): Probable Cause Requirement for Misdemeanor Arrests

    People v. McCarthy, 14 N.Y.2d 203 (1964)

    An arrest for a misdemeanor requires probable cause to believe the suspect is guilty, and evidence obtained from a search incident to an unlawful arrest is inadmissible.

    Summary

    McCarthy and Kancza were arrested for carrying a suspicious package. Prior to the arrest, they made statements to police indicating it was found nearby. The package contained stolen radios and radio parts. The New York Court of Appeals held that the circumstances did not provide probable cause for the initial arrest of McCarthy and Kancza, making the subsequent search of the package illegal. Therefore, the evidence (stolen radios) should have been suppressed, because a search cannot be validated by its success if the initial arrest was unlawful. The court reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial.

    Facts

    A police officer observed McCarthy and Kancza carrying a closed package addressed to General Consolidated Ltd.

    McCarthy told the officer the box contained a doll for his sister and claimed he found the package nearby.

    McCarthy and Kancza were arrested on suspicion.

    After their arrest, McCarthy and Kancza stated that they received the package from Collins, who threw it over a fence.

    Collins later admitted to throwing the package over a fence.

    The package was opened at the police station and found to contain stolen radios and radio parts.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved to suppress the evidence (radios and radio parts), arguing it was obtained through an illegal search and seizure without a warrant, and as a result of an illegal arrest without probable cause.

    The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the defendants were convicted.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police had probable cause to arrest McCarthy and Kancza for a misdemeanor at the time of the arrest.

    Whether the evidence seized (the radios and radio parts) should have been suppressed as the product of an illegal search incident to an unlawful arrest.

    Holding

    No, because the circumstances did not provide the officer with probable or reasonable cause to believe that McCarthy and Kancza were guilty of a crime at the time of their arrest.

    Yes, because the evidence was obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure incidental to an unlawful arrest, the evidence should have been suppressed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the established rule that even for a misdemeanor arrest under New York Criminal Procedure Law, officers must have probable cause to believe the person is guilty. The court found the circumstances surrounding McCarthy and Kancza’s possession of the package, and their initial explanation, did not provide probable cause to believe they had committed a crime. The court emphasized that probable cause must exist *prior* to the arrest. The court cited *People v. O’Neill*, noting that “[a] search is good or bad when it starts and does not change character from its success.” The Court further cited *People v. Loria*, stating that the validity of a warrantless arrest depends on probable cause, and such cause cannot be based on evidence obtained from a search whose validity depends on the validity of the arrest. In other words, the discovery of the stolen goods could not retroactively justify an arrest that was initially unlawful. The dissent is not discussed.