New York Law Review

Tag: Search and Seizure

  • People v. Abruzzi, 42 N.Y.2d 813 (1977): Plain View Exception After Initial Lawful Entry

    People v. Abruzzi, 42 N.Y.2d 813 (1977)

    Evidence in plain view may be seized following a lawful initial entry onto premises, even if the seizure occurs after a delay, provided the suspect has fled and relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy in the items seized.

    Summary

    This case addresses the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. A police officer, investigating a crime, entered the defendant’s premises and observed a potential rape victim. After she reported the rape, the officer returned to arrest the defendant but found he had fled. The officer observed a ripped sheet in plain view, potentially used in the rape. After a four-day surveillance, the police seized the sheet. The New York Court of Appeals held that the seizure was lawful because the initial entry was lawful, the defendant had fled relinquishing any privacy expectation, and the sheet was in plain view. Thus, the evidence was admissible.

    Facts

    1. A police officer entered the defendant’s premises during an investigation.
    2. The officer encountered a woman who claimed she had been raped by the defendant.
    3. The officer left to call for assistance and returned to arrest the defendant.
    4. The defendant had fled, leaving a bedroom window open.
    5. The officer observed a ripped sheet in plain view, believed to be connected to the rape.
    6. The police conducted a four-day surveillance of the premises.
    7. After the surveillance, the police seized the sheet.

    Procedural History

    1. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the sheet as evidence.
    2. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.
    3. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the seizure of a ripped sheet, observed in plain view after a suspect fled premises following a lawful initial entry, is an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

    Holding

    1. No, because the initial entry was lawful, the defendant relinquished any expectation of privacy by fleeing, and the evidence was in plain view.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the seizure was justified under the plain view doctrine. The initial entry by the police officer was lawful, and upon returning to arrest the suspect, they found he had fled. By fleeing, the defendant abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. The ripped sheet was in plain view, and its evidentiary value was immediately apparent. The court emphasized that the defendant had “no expectation of privacy in the premises from which he had fled.” The delay in seizing the sheet during the four-day surveillance did not negate the lawfulness of the seizure, as the key factors were the lawful initial entry, the abandonment of privacy, and the plain view nature of the evidence. The court concluded that “under the circumstances the removal of the sheet cannot be said to have been unreasonable and therefore the refusal to suppress was proper.” This case clarifies that the plain view exception can apply even after a time delay, focusing on the suspect’s expectation of privacy and the lawfulness of the initial entry. It highlights the importance of the suspect’s actions (fleeing) in determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. This case can be distinguished from cases where the initial entry was unlawful or where the suspect maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy.

  • People v. Kreel, 42 N.Y.2d 90 (1977): Admissibility of Evidence Seized After Consent

    People v. Kreel, 42 N.Y.2d 90 (1977)

    Evidence obtained as a result of a search and seizure is admissible if the defendant consented to the surrender of the property in question, and even if the seizure was illegal, its admission is harmless if there is other overwhelming evidence.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a forged instrument. The police, investigating forged checks passed in a blue Volkswagen, traced the car to the defendant’s wife. They found the car at their residence and informed the wife they would seize it. While preparing to impound the car, they found a matchbook from a Binghamton restaurant inside. The defendant and his attorney later consented to surrender the car. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant consented to the surrender of the vehicle, negating any claim regarding subsequent photographs of the vehicle. The court further held that even if the matchbook seizure was illegal, its admission was harmless given the other evidence linking the car to the crime scene.

    Facts

    On July 19, 1972, a man driving a blue Volkswagen convertible with a white top and a dent in the right rear panel attempted to pass forged checks at two banks in Binghamton. Tellers described the man and the car. A parking lot attendant recorded two license plate numbers from the car: one which was reported stolen and another registered to the defendant’s wife, who resided in Westchester County. On July 21, 1972, State Police arrived at the defendant’s residence and found the car in the garage. The defendant was not home. The police informed the defendant’s wife that they would seize the vehicle and, while removing the contents to impound the car, found a matchbook from a Binghamton restaurant. The defendant and his attorney subsequently told the police they could surrender the car on Monday morning. The police seized the car on Monday, arresting the defendant and taking photographs of the license plates and the dent.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the vehicle and the matchbook, but the motion was denied. He was convicted of two counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument (Penal Law, § 170.25) following a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence obtained from the vehicle should have been suppressed because the search and seizure were illegal.

    2. Whether the admission of the matchbook into evidence was reversible error, even if its seizure was illegal.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant consented to surrender the vehicle on Monday morning, negating any claim regarding subsequent photographs of the vehicle.

    2. No, because even assuming the seizure of the matchbook was illegal, its admission was harmless in view of the other evidence placing the vehicle at the scene of the crimes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the defendant’s consent to surrender the vehicle on Monday morning waived any objection to the photographs taken of the vehicle at that time. The court did not need to decide if the defendant had standing to challenge the initial search. Regarding the matchbook, the court acknowledged the defendant’s argument that its seizure may have been illegal. However, the court found that even if the seizure was unlawful, admitting the matchbook into evidence was harmless error. The court emphasized the existence of other substantial evidence linking the vehicle to the crimes, including the eyewitness testimony and the license plate information. The court determined that the matchbook was merely cumulative evidence and its admission did not prejudice the defendant, and would not warrant reversal of the conviction. The court stated, “Even assuming, as the defendant urges, that the seizure was illegal, admission of the matchbook would unquestionably be harmless in view of all the other evidence placing the vehicle at the scene of the crimes.”

  • People v. Bryant, 37 N.Y.2d 208 (1975): Probable Cause and Second Chances at Suppression Hearings

    People v. Bryant, 37 N.Y.2d 208 (1975)

    The mere presence of empty glassine envelopes and a folded bill in a car, even in a narcotics-prone area, without more, does not constitute probable cause for arrest, and the prosecution is not entitled to a second chance to establish probable cause at a suppression hearing after failing to do so initially.

    Summary

    Bryant and Jones were arrested after a patrolman observed empty glassine envelopes and a folded $10 bill in their parked car. At the suppression hearing, the officer testified about the items and the location’s reputation for narcotics activity. Defense counsel waived cross-examination. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, finding no probable cause. The Appellate Term remitted for a new hearing, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the initial finding of no probable cause should stand and the prosecution was not entitled to a second opportunity to present evidence. The Court emphasized deference to the original judicial determination and the insufficiency of the evidence to establish probable cause.

    Facts

    A patrolman observed Bryant and Jones sitting in a parked car. He approached the vehicle and requested the driver’s license and registration. The officer saw 43 empty glassine envelopes and a folded $10 bill on the dashboard. Based on these observations, the patrolman arrested both defendants and searched them. A glassine envelope containing a white residue was found on Jones; Bryant had nothing. The $10 bill contained a white substance later determined to be six grains of cocaine. The arresting officer testified he had previously made arrests for drugs being passed in folded dollar bills and that the arrest occurred in a “narcotics prone location”.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court of the City of New York granted the defendants’ motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search. The Appellate Term characterized the patrolman’s testimony as equivocal and remitted the case to the Criminal Court for a hearing de novo. A dissenting justice would have affirmed the lower court’s order. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s order and reinstated the Criminal Court’s order granting suppression.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the observation of empty glassine envelopes and a folded bill in a car parked in a narcotics-prone area, without more, constitutes probable cause for arrest.
    2. Whether the prosecution is entitled to a second opportunity to present evidence at a suppression hearing after failing to establish probable cause initially.

    Holding

    1. No, because the mere presence of such items, without additional suspicious behavior or circumstances, is insufficient to raise the level of inference from suspicion to probable cause.
    2. No, because the People have the initial burden to establish probable cause and are not entitled to a second chance to succeed where they have already tried and failed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals deferred to the hearing court’s finding of no probable cause, noting the intermediate appellate court did not disagree with that finding. The court cited People v. Oden, stating that “the mere passing of a glassine envelope in a neighborhood in which narcotics were known to have been present, unsupplemented by any additional relevant behavior or circumstances found to exist, was insufficient to raise the level of inference from suspicion to probable cause”. The court emphasized that the arresting officer saw only containers suitable for holding narcotics, without actually observing any narcotics being exchanged or used. The court found no warrant to disturb the lower court’s finding that there was no probable cause for the defendants’ arrest. Regarding the second hearing, the Court found it improper because the original hearing was completed, and the People had a full opportunity to present evidence. The defendants chose to rest on the People’s evidence. Citing People v. Malinsky, the Court reiterated that the People bear the burden of showing probable cause to justify a warrantless search incident to arrest, and there was no justification to give them a second chance to succeed where they had already failed. The Court stated that “The People, in order to prevail, are under the necessity of going forward in the first instance with evidence to show that probable cause existed…in sustaining the legality of a search made, without a warrant, as incident to an arrest.”

  • People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594 (1980): Probable Cause and Observation of Glassine Envelope Exchange

    People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594 (1980)

    The observation of a glassine envelope exchange in a high-crime area, while relevant, does not automatically establish probable cause for an arrest; additional circumstances are needed to elevate suspicion to probable cause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence, holding that the observation of a glassine envelope exchange in a high-crime area, without more, is insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest. A police officer, using a telescope, observed the defendant receive a glassine envelope from another individual in an area known for narcotics activity. The court emphasized that probable cause requires a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed, based on the totality of the circumstances. Since the lower court did not credit certain aspects of the officer’s testimony and found no additional suspicious behavior, the Court of Appeals deferred to the factual findings and upheld the suppression order.

    Facts

    On October 5, 1973, Officer Gervasi, part of a narcotics enforcement unit, was surveilling an area known for drug activity. Using a telescope, he saw the defendant and another person, Johnson, engage in a brief conversation. Johnson handed the defendant a glassine envelope. The officer could not ascertain the contents of the envelope. The officer testified that the defendant took a quick look at the envelope and then closed her hand in a fist.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was arrested, and evidence was seized. She moved to suppress the evidence, arguing a lack of probable cause. The Criminal Court granted the suppression motion after a hearing. The Appellate Term affirmed the Criminal Court’s order. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the observation of a glassine envelope exchange in a high-crime area, combined with the defendant’s actions after receiving the envelope, constitutes probable cause for an arrest.

    Holding

    No, because the mere passing of a glassine envelope in a high-crime area, without additional suspicious behavior or circumstances, is insufficient to establish probable cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that probable cause requires facts and circumstances known to the officer that would warrant a prudent person in believing that an offense has been committed. The court acknowledged that a high crime rate is a relevant circumstance to be considered. However, the court deferred to the Criminal Court’s factual findings, noting that the Criminal Court did not fully credit the officer’s testimony regarding the defendant’s actions and the appearance of the envelope. The court distinguished this case from *People v. Quinones*, where a narcotics expert observed multiple glassine envelopes being exchanged at close range after suspicious interactions. Here, the court found that the observation of a single glassine envelope exchange, without more, was insufficient to elevate suspicion to probable cause. The court stated that, “the mere passing of a glassine envelope in a neighborhood in which narcotics were known to have been present, unsupplemented by any additional relevant behavior or circumstances found to exist, was insufficient to raise the level of inference from suspicion to probable cause”. The court also cited *People v. Brown*, where a high crime area, a suspected narcotic addict, and a meeting were deemed insufficient for probable cause. The Court of Appeals reiterated its limited power to review questions of fact, emphasizing its role is to determine whether the facts, as found by the lower courts, constitute probable cause as a matter of law. The court’s decision highlights the necessity of specific, articulable facts beyond generalized suspicion to justify an arrest and search.

  • People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594 (1980): Probable Cause and Observations of Glassine Envelopes

    People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594 (1980)

    Observations of glassine envelopes, even in a high crime area, are not sufficient, without more, to establish probable cause for a search and arrest, if the observed actions are susceptible of innocent interpretation.

    Summary

    McRay was arrested after a police officer observed him holding a small purse, opening it, and then handing it to a woman. The officer testified he saw what appeared to be glassine envelopes inside, but admitted he could not distinguish them from candy wrappers. The court held that the officer lacked probable cause for the arrest and search, as the defendant’s actions were susceptible to innocent interpretation. The observation of glassine envelopes, without additional suspicious behavior, was insufficient to justify a warrantless search and arrest.

    Facts

    A Housing Department patrolman, Hackett, in a high-crime area, observed McRay holding a small, zippered purse. McRay opened the purse halfway and withdrew matches. Hackett, approaching closer, thought he saw glassine envelopes in the purse. He conceded he couldn’t distinguish them from candy wrappers. McRay then handed the purse to a woman who accepted it without comment. Both were arrested, and a search of the purse revealed heroin-filled glassine envelopes.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted McRay’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding a lack of probable cause. The Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Supreme Court’s suppression order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officer had probable cause to arrest and search McRay based on the observation of what appeared to be glassine envelopes in a purse, coupled with the act of handing the purse to another person, in a high-crime area.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s actions were susceptible to an innocent interpretation, and the officer’s observation of the glassine envelopes, without more, did not elevate suspicion to probable cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the observed acts were “susceptible of various innocent interpretations.” The court emphasized that more is required to establish probable cause than merely observing actions that could be innocent, even in a high-crime area or involving someone with a narcotics background. The court distinguished this case from situations where behavior is unequivocally suspicious. Here, McRay’s actions—holding a purse, taking out matches, and handing the purse to a woman—could easily be explained innocently. The officer’s testimony that he could not distinguish the glassine envelopes from a candy wrapper further weakened the basis for probable cause. The court stated, “Defendant’s actions are susceptible of innocent explanation, since he may have been handed the purse to find a match or take a piece of chocolate therefrom and then return the purse to the owner.” The court reinforced that an equivocal observation coupled with innocent actions does not create probable cause. The Court cited People v. Russell, 34 N.Y.2d 261, 264 (1974), emphasizing the need for “supplementation by any additional behavior raising the level of inference from suspicion to probable cause.”

  • People v. Gambino, 35 N.Y.2d 932 (1974): Parolee’s Consent to Search Limited to Areas Under His Control

    People v. Gambino, 35 N.Y.2d 932 (1974)

    A parolee’s consent to searches of premises under their control, as a condition of parole, does not extend to locations where the parolee lacks the power or authority to manage or control access.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction, holding that a parolee’s consent to searches of premises under his control did not justify the search of an apartment where the prosecution failed to prove the defendant exercised sufficient dominion. The search, conducted at an apartment not the defendant’s residence, yielded a revolver, leading to his conviction. The court found the evidence insufficient to establish the defendant’s control over the apartment, thus the consent to search was inapplicable, and the evidence should have been suppressed.

    Facts

    Thomas Gambino, a parolee, signed a certificate of release agreeing not to possess firearms and consenting to searches by parole officers of his person, residence, or any property under his control. Parole officers searched an apartment rented to one Warner, finding a revolver. Gambino did not live at that apartment; his residence was at a different address. The caretaker testified that Warner paid the rent and she had never seen Gambino at the premises. Gambino testified that he occasionally visited Warner’s apartment, left a jacket there, and lent Warner a record player. Warner had once given Gambino a key to the apartment which Gambino later returned.

    Procedural History

    Gambino was indicted based on the evidence found in the search. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search was unlawful. The trial court denied the motion. Gambino then pleaded guilty. He appealed, challenging the denial of his suppression motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal further.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a parolee’s consent to searches of premises under his control, as a condition of parole, extends to an apartment that is not his residence where the prosecution has not demonstrated the parolee’s actual control over the premises.

    Holding

    1. No, because the prosecution failed to establish that Gambino exercised sufficient control over Warner’s apartment to justify the search under the terms of his parole agreement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on whether Gambino had sufficient control over the apartment to justify the search based on his consent. The court stated, “The difficulty is that on this record the People have failed to establish the necessary control of the apartment by defendant as is required by the certificate.” The court emphasized the lack of evidence showing Gambino had the power or authority to manage the apartment or control access to it. “It was not demonstrated that defendant exercised such dominion over the apartment as to have the power or authority to manage the apartment or to limit or bar the ingress or egress of others. Neither regularity nor constancy of visits, ready access, permanent key possession or other indicia of control were shown in such measure as to establish that fact.” Since the prosecution failed to prove Gambino controlled the apartment, his consent to search premises under his control was not applicable, rendering the search unlawful. The court reversed the order and dismissed the indictment. The key takeaway is that a consent to search, even a blanket consent in a parole agreement, is limited by the factual scope of the control the individual actually exercises over the location searched. Mere access or infrequent visits are not enough to establish control for the purposes of a consent search.

  • People v. Walls, 35 N.Y.2d 419 (1974): Jurisdiction Despite Illegal Extradition

    People v. Walls, 35 N.Y.2d 419 (1974)

    A state court has jurisdiction over a defendant even if the defendant’s return to the state was not in compliance with the extradition laws of another state, provided the officers acted in good faith and had probable cause for the arrest.

    Summary

    New York City police officers, after observing the defendants commit crimes, apprehended them just over the state line in New Jersey. The defendants argued that because the officers failed to comply with New Jersey’s fresh pursuit statute regarding extradition, New York lacked jurisdiction and the evidence seized during the arrest should be suppressed. The New York Court of Appeals held that the illegal extradition did not deprive the New York courts of jurisdiction, especially where the officers acted in good faith and had probable cause for the arrest. The court also ruled that the search incident to the arrest was valid under the circumstances.

    Facts

    New York City police officers and a federal narcotics agent were conducting an undercover operation. The officers attempted to arrest the defendants for narcotics possession and attempted sale. As one defendant was apprehended, others in a nearby car shot at the officers and fled toward the Hudson River. The officers pursued the defendants into the Lincoln Tunnel, where they were arrested just over the New Jersey state line. A search of the vehicle revealed weapons and illegal drugs.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were tried and convicted in New York. They appealed, arguing that New York lacked jurisdiction over them because they were arrested in New Jersey and were not properly extradited under New Jersey law. They also sought to suppress the evidence found in the car. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether New York courts lack jurisdiction over a defendant when the defendant’s return to New York from another state violated that state’s extradition laws.

    2. Whether evidence seized incident to an arrest in another state should be suppressed when the arresting officers failed to comply with the other state’s extradition procedures.

    Holding

    1. No, because the illegal extradition does not deprive the New York courts of jurisdiction, especially when the officers acted in good faith.

    2. No, because the arrest and incidental search were valid since the officers had probable cause and reasonably, though mistakenly, believed their actions were authorized.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the principle that an illegal extradition does not necessarily strip a court of jurisdiction. While the state could decline to exercise jurisdiction if officers exploited unauthorized conduct, it was not warranted here, particularly since the trial court found the officers acted in good faith without knowingly disregarding the law. The court cited Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519, in support of this proposition.

    Regarding the evidence suppression argument, the court emphasized the absence of bad faith. The officers had probable cause for the arrest and reasonably believed they were authorized to act as they did. This distinguishes the case from situations where officers act without probable cause or willfully disregard required procedures. The court analogized the situation to Hill v. California, 401 U. S. 797, where a good-faith mistake did not invalidate an arrest. The Court stated that “when they arrested the defendants and returned them to New York they reasonably —- although mistakenly — believed they were authorized to act as-they did. Under these circumstances the arrest and incidental search were valid.”

  • People v. Brosnan, 32 N.Y.2d 254 (1973): Warrantless Vehicle Search Based on Plain View

    People v. Brosnan, 32 N.Y.2d 254 (1973)

    Evidence of a crime observed in plain view inside a vehicle, with the defendant’s consent, provides probable cause for a warrantless search and seizure of the vehicle incident to a lawful arrest.

    Summary

    Brosnan was convicted of larceny and assault after a brutal attack on a woman he met in a bar. Police, investigating the crime, found Brosnan and asked to see his truck. He voluntarily showed them the truck, and through the windows, they observed bloodstains, a woman’s shoe, and glasses. Brosnan was arrested and the truck was seized. A subsequent search revealed more evidence. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the initial observation of incriminating evidence in plain view justified the warrantless seizure and subsequent search of the vehicle incident to a lawful arrest. The court also addressed concerns about the prosecutor’s summation, ultimately deeming it not prejudicial enough to warrant a new trial given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

    Facts

    Margaret Sullivan met Brosnan at a bar and later left with him in his panel truck.
    Sullivan was found unconscious and severely injured the next morning near a gas station. Her injuries included a fractured skull, lacerations, and bite marks.
    Police learned of Brosnan’s association with Sullivan and went to his home.
    Brosnan voluntarily led the police to his panel truck in a public garage.
    Through the truck’s window, police saw bloodstains on the dashboard, a woman’s shoe, and a pair of glasses.

    Procedural History

    Brosnan was convicted of larceny and assault in a jury trial.
    The Appellate Division modified the conviction, upholding only the assault conviction.
    Two justices dissented, arguing that the prosecutor’s summation warranted a new trial.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless seizure and subsequent search of Brosnan’s panel truck violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
    Whether the prosecutor’s summation was so inflammatory as to require a new trial.

    Holding

    Yes, the warrantless search and seizure was permissible, because the police had observed incriminating evidence in plain view inside the truck with the defendant’s consent prior to the arrest, justifying the seizure as incident to a lawful arrest.
    No, the prosecutor’s summation, while improper, did not warrant a new trial because it was not sufficiently prejudicial given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the key factor was the police’s observation of incriminating evidence in plain view within the truck before any action was taken to seize it. Brosnan voluntarily showed the police the truck, and the bloodstains, shoe, and glasses were visible through the window. This established probable cause to believe the truck was the scene of the assault. The court emphasized, “Unlike the legion of automobile search and seizure cases which have occasioned interest and difficulty, in this case before the police took any action with respect to the panel truck, they had seen the incriminating evidence in the truck which identified it as the scene of the bloody assault and which linked the victim’s last-known companion, the defendant, to its perpetration.” The court distinguished this case from others where the search preceded the establishment of probable cause or where the evidence discovered was unrelated to the initial reason for the arrest. The seizure occurred when a police guard was placed on the truck, preventing its removal. The court cited Chambers v. Maroney, stating that there is no constitutional difference between seizing and holding a car before obtaining a warrant and conducting an immediate search without a warrant when probable cause exists. The court dismissed the claim that a delayed search was impermissible. It found that the later examination of the truck at the site was merely a further examination of an object of evidence already lawfully seized. Regarding the prosecutor’s summation, the court acknowledged it was improper, using inflammatory language and epithets. However, it held that the impropriety was not significant enough to influence the jury, given the overwhelming evidence. The court stated, “The rule is that an improper summation, at least when the objectionable parts consist largely of abusive and intemperate language as here, should be assessed for its prejudicial effect, and it requires greater impropriety to produce that effect in a stronger case.”

  • People v. Corrado, 22 N.Y.2d 308 (1968): Establishing Probable Cause from Equivocal Circumstances

    People v. Corrado, 22 N.Y.2d 308 (1968)

    Probable cause for an arrest requires more than mere suspicion; even seemingly suspicious behavior must be supplemented by additional circumstances to elevate the inference from suspicion to probable cause.

    Summary

    This case addresses the critical threshold of probable cause required for a lawful arrest. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s decision, finding that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant based solely on the defendant carrying a crowbar and a car battery with torn cables. The court emphasized that while the defendant’s actions were suspicious, they were equally susceptible to innocent interpretation and were not supplemented by any further evidence of criminal activity, such as evasive answers, flight, or reports of a nearby crime. The subsequent search incident to the unlawful arrest was deemed invalid, and the evidence obtained (narcotics paraphernalia) was suppressed.

    Facts

    A patrol officer was dispatched to a Brooklyn address. Upon exiting the building, the officer observed the defendant carrying a crowbar and an automobile battery with torn cables. The officer stopped the defendant and asked if he owned the battery and the crowbar, to which the defendant replied affirmatively. No reports of car break-ins were made, nor was it indicated as a high crime area.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court of the City of New York granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the heroin and narcotics paraphernalia. The Appellate Term reversed this decision, holding that the officer had probable cause for the arrest and that the search was legal. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Term’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant based on observing him carrying a crowbar and a car battery with torn cables.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s actions, while suspicious, were also susceptible to innocent interpretation and lacked sufficient additional circumstances to establish probable cause for an arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the standard for probable cause requires more than a “bare suspicion” of criminal activity. While the officer’s initial suspicion justified an investigatory stop, it did not rise to the level of probable cause necessary for an arrest. The court highlighted several factors that distinguished this case from those where probable cause was found: the defendant did not give evasive answers, he was not given much opportunity to explain the situation, he did not flee, and there were no reports of a recent car break-in in the vicinity. The court noted that the defendant’s behavior, while “not inconsistent with culpable possession of a burglar’s tool and stolen property, are also susceptible of many innocent interpretations.” The court cited People v. Corrado, stating the defendant’s behavior was, “at most equivocal and suspicious, was unsupplemented by any additional behavior or circumstances raising ‘the level of inference from suspicion to probable cause’.” Because the arrest was unlawful, the subsequent search incident to arrest was also unlawful, and the evidence seized during the search was inadmissible. The court directly quotes Brinegar v. United States, stating the officer’s observations were insufficient to raise his suspicion to the requisite standard of probable cause without which the arrest and incidental search must fail.

  • People v. Stokes, 32 N.Y.2d 204 (1973): Limits on Loitering Arrests and Searches

    People v. Stokes, 32 N.Y.2d 204 (1973)

    An arrest for loitering requires specific evidence that the suspect’s behavior suggests they are engaged in or about to engage in criminal activity, and a refusal to identify oneself, without more, is insufficient to justify such an arrest.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed a conviction based on evidence obtained during a search incident to an arrest for loitering. The Court held that the arrest was unlawful because there was no probable cause to believe the defendant was engaged in criminal activity beyond simply being in a building lobby and refusing to identify himself. The Court emphasized that a refusal to answer police questions, without other suspicious circumstances, cannot justify an arrest for loitering. Therefore, the search was illegal, and the evidence seized should have been suppressed.

    Facts

    Albert Stokes and a friend entered the unlocked lobby of an apartment building. After a brief conversation, two housing authority policemen, who had been observing them, approached Stokes and asked if he lived there. Stokes said he did not. When asked to identify himself and explain his presence, Stokes refused. The officers arrested him for loitering, searched him, and discovered hypodermic instruments and heroin.

    Procedural History

    Stokes was charged with possession of a dangerous drug, possession of a hypodermic instrument, and loitering. After a hearing, his motion to suppress the evidence was denied, and he was convicted of loitering. Subsequently, he pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a hypodermic instrument. The Appellate Term reversed the loitering conviction but affirmed the judgment, finding probable cause for the loitering arrest. Stokes appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether there was probable cause to arrest Stokes for loitering under Penal Law § 240.35(6).
    2. Whether the evidence seized during the search incident to the arrest should have been suppressed.

    Holding

    1. No, because the circumstances did not justify a suspicion that Stokes was engaged or about to engage in crime.
    2. Yes, because the arrest was unlawful, making the subsequent search and seizure also unlawful.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that an arrest for loitering under Penal Law § 240.35(6) requires evidence that the suspect is loitering “in or about a place without apparent reason,” that the circumstances justify suspicion that they may be engaged or about to engage in crime, and that they refuse to identify themselves or provide a credible explanation when questioned by a peace officer. The Court found that the police lacked any evidence suggesting Stokes was engaged in criminal activity. The complaint lacked any allegation that Stokes was suspected of being involved in a crime. The Court stated, “Absolutely lacking is evidence that the policeman had any information whatever…that would have rendered this otherwise innocent conduct suspicious within the sense of the statute.”

    The Court distinguished this case from People v. Gresham, where the defendant’s suspicious behavior (fleeing with an envelope in a deserted train station) provided probable cause. The Court emphasized that Stokes’s refusal to identify himself was insufficient to justify the arrest. Citing People v. Schanbarger, the Court noted that while it may have been preferable for Stokes to answer the officer’s questions, his failure to do so did not constitute a criminal act or a violation of the loitering statute. Since the arrest was unlawful, the search was also unlawful, and the evidence should have been suppressed. The Court found it unnecessary to address the constitutionality of the loitering statute.