New York Law Review

Tag: Search and Seizure

  • People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181 (1992): Police Encounters and the Scope of Permissible Inquiry

    People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181 (1992)

    Under New York law, police encounters with private citizens are governed by a four-tiered framework, where the permissible degree of intrusion is related to the escalating level of suspicion held by law enforcement.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the legality of a police search conducted after an encounter with a suspect on a train platform. The court upheld the lower court’s decision to admit the evidence, finding that the police inquiry was supported by a factual predicate and that the defendant voluntarily consented to the search. The case clarifies the boundaries of permissible police conduct during encounters with private citizens, emphasizing the importance of a graduated response based on the level of suspicion.

    Facts

    Police received a confirmed tip from a reliable informant that Hollman would travel to New York City to buy drugs and return to Poughkeepsie by train. Police saw Hollman on the train, seated next to an orange bag labeled “Nike.” An investigator asked Hollman for identification, which Hollman provided. When asked about the bag, Hollman disclaimed ownership. The investigator asked Hollman to exit the train with them, and Hollman complied, picking up the bag. On the platform, Hollman continued to deny ownership. When asked if the investigator could look in the bag, Hollman handed it over, saying, “Go ahead.” The officer found a gift-wrapped package, which Hollman claimed he was carrying for someone else and did not know its contents. The officer opened the box and found cocaine.

    Procedural History

    Hollman was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree (Penal Law § 220.18) after a guilty plea. He sought to suppress the evidence found in the bag. The suppression court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, and Hollman appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the search of Hollman’s bag was lawful, considering (1) if the police inquiry was supported by an adequate factual predicate, (2) if Hollman was in custody at the time of the search, and (3) if Hollman voluntarily consented to the search.

    Holding

    Yes, because the court found evidence in the record to support the lower court’s findings that the police inquiry was supported by an adequate factual predicate, that Hollman was not in custody at the time of the search, and that Hollman voluntarily consented to the search.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals deferred to the factual findings of the suppression court and the Appellate Division, which had affirmed those findings. Given its limited power to review mixed questions of law and fact, the court found no basis to overturn the lower court’s decision. The court emphasized that the initial police inquiry was justified by the confirmed tip from a reliable informant. The court also noted that Hollman’s disclaimer of ownership of the bag and his subsequent consent to the search were key factors in determining the search’s legality. The Court highlighted that Hollman was not in custody when he consented, further supporting the finding of voluntariness. The court stated: “There is evidence in the record to support that court’s undisturbed findings that the police inquiry was supported by an adequate factual predicate, and that defendant was not in custody at the time of the search. Moreover, assuming without deciding that defendant had standing to object to the search of the bag, there is evidence to support the lower court’s finding that defendant voluntarily consented to the search.” By handing over the bag and saying, “Go ahead,” Hollman relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy he might have had. This case illustrates the importance of the factual context surrounding police-citizen encounters and the need for clear and voluntary consent to a search to overcome Fourth Amendment protections.

  • People v. Holmes, 81 N.Y.2d 1056 (1993): Objective Credible Reason for Police Inquiry

    People v. Holmes, 81 N.Y.2d 1056 (1993)

    A police officer’s request for information is permissible when based on an objective, credible reason, and a suspect’s abandonment of contraband in response to such a request is not necessarily the product of an unlawful seizure.

    Summary

    This case addresses the level of police intrusion permissible during an encounter with a suspect. The Court of Appeals held that police officers acted permissibly when they approached the defendant for information based on observing him in a drug-prone area, clutching his jacket, and briskly walking away from a group of men. The court further found that the defendant’s act of dropping a brick of cocaine was not a direct result of police coercion, therefore the evidence was admissible. The court emphasized the need to balance individual rights against public safety concerns in assessing police conduct.

    Facts

    Two uniformed police officers in a marked van patrolled a drug-prone area. They saw the defendant clutching the inside of his jacket beneath his armpit, putting both hands in his pockets, and quickly walking away from a group of men. As the officers approached, one officer yelled, “Hey, stop, excuse me” or similar words. When the defendant stopped and turned, a kilogram brick of cocaine fell from his armpit. After arresting the defendant, a search revealed another kilogram of cocaine hidden in his jacket and $280.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, but the motion was denied after a hearing. He then pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the suppression motion. The dissenting justices at the Appellate Division level prompted the appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the police officers’ actions constituted an unlawful seizure of the defendant, requiring suppression of the evidence.
    2. Whether the defendant’s relinquishment of the cocaine was a direct result of police coercion, thus rendering the evidence inadmissible.

    Holding

    1. No, because the police action constituted a permissible request for information based on an objective, credible reason.
    2. No, because the Appellate Division’s determination that defendant’s relinquishment of the first kilogram brick of cocaine was not based upon submission to police authority is a mixed question of law and fact that is supported by the record.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s decision, finding the police officers’ actions justified under the four-tiered framework established in People v. De Bour and People v. Hollman. The court reasoned that the defendant’s behavior (clutching his jacket in a drug-prone area while walking away from a group of men) provided an objective, credible reason for the officers to approach him and request information. This initial encounter was a minimal intrusion and did not constitute a seizure. The court cited People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181, 191 and People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223. The court also emphasized that the defendant’s act of dropping the cocaine was not a direct result of police coercion. Since the initial encounter was lawful and the cocaine was abandoned voluntarily, the evidence was admissible. The court declined to further review the Appellate Division’s determination, stating, “In addition, the Appellate Division’s determination that defendant’s relinquishment of the first kilogram brick of cocaine was not based upon submission to police authority is a mixed question of law and fact that is supported by the record, and, thus, is not subject to our further review.”

  • People v. Morales, 82 N.Y.2d 420 (1993): Justification for Police Handling of Dropped Object

    People v. Morales, 82 N.Y.2d 420 (1993)

    When police respond to a crime scene and a suspect drops an object accompanied by a metallic sound, the totality of the circumstances may provide reasonable suspicion for the police to handle the object.

    Summary

    In People v. Morales, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the Appellate Division’s order, finding the police had reasonable suspicion to handle the defendant’s jacket. The police responded to a report of a shooting in an apartment and found blood in the hallway. Upon entering the apartment, the defendant appeared startled and dropped his jacket, producing a metallic sound. The court reasoned that the circumstances, including the shooting report, the blood, and the metallic sound when the defendant dropped the jacket, collectively provided reasonable suspicion for the police to handle the jacket. The discovery of a gun in the jacket was therefore admissible.

    Facts

    Responding to a radio transmission about a shooting in a Brooklyn apartment, police officers found blood in the hallway near the elevator on the floor where the apartment was located. They heard arguing and loud music coming from the apartment. The defendant was inside the apartment and appeared startled upon seeing the officers. The defendant immediately dropped his jacket to the floor, and the officer heard a metallic “thunk.”

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the gun found in the jacket. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, upholding the finding that the police had reasonable suspicion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion to handle the defendant’s jacket, which the defendant dropped right next to him.

    Holding

    Yes, because the totality of the circumstances, including the report of a shooting, the presence of blood, and the metallic sound upon the jacket hitting the floor, provided reasonable suspicion for the police to handle the jacket.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the Appellate Division’s finding of reasonable suspicion was supported by the evidence in the record. The court emphasized that whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion involves a mixed question of law and fact. The court cited precedent that its review is limited when the record supports a determination of reasonable suspicion. The court highlighted the following facts as supporting the finding of reasonable suspicion: the police were responding to a report of a shooting; they discovered blood in the hallway; the defendant appeared startled upon seeing the officers; and a metallic “thunk” was heard when the jacket was dropped. The court effectively applied the totality of the circumstances test to assess the reasonableness of the officer’s actions. The court implicitly balanced the individual’s right to privacy against the legitimate concerns for officer safety and crime prevention, concluding that the specific facts justified the limited intrusion of handling the jacket. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions.

  • In re Marrhonda G., 81 N.Y.2d 942 (1993): Warrantless Searches and the Plain Touch Doctrine

    In re Marrhonda G., 81 N.Y.2d 942 (1993)

    The ‘plain touch’ exception to the warrant requirement is not recognized in New York; therefore, feeling the shape of a weapon inside a bag, without more, does not justify a warrantless search of the bag.

    Summary

    A juvenile, Marrhonda G., was observed by a Port Authority police officer in the bus terminal. Based on her behavior and responses to questioning, the officer suspected she was a runaway and took her to the Youth Services Unit office. After she placed her bag on the floor, another officer picked it up to move it and felt what he believed to be a gun. The officers opened the bag and found weapons. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the initial detention was justified, the search of the bag was not, because New York does not recognize the ‘plain touch’ exception to the warrant requirement. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted the motion to suppress the evidence.

    Facts

    On April 5, 1990, a Port Authority Police Officer observed Marrhonda G. standing alone in the Port Authority Bus Terminal with a large knapsack-type bag. After several hours, the officer approached and questioned her. The officer concluded she might be a runaway because she was traveling alone, initially lied about her age, had no identification, appeared nervous, could not contact her mother, and could not provide a local address or telephone number for the relative she claimed to be waiting for.

    Procedural History

    Family Court denied Marrhonda’s motion to suppress the weapons, holding the detention proper and the search justified under a ‘plain-touch’ exception. The court determined she committed acts that would constitute criminal possession of a weapon if committed by an adult. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the detention proper and the search permissible because the discovery of the weapons was inadvertent. The New York Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless search of the respondent’s bag was justified under a ‘plain-touch’ exception to the warrant requirement, given that an officer felt what he believed to be a gun inside the bag.

    Holding

    No, because New York does not recognize a ‘plain-touch’ exception to the warrant requirement. Therefore, the warrantless search of the bag was unjustified.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court agreed with the lower courts that the detention of the juvenile was proper under Family Court Act § 718, which allows police to detain a juvenile who “in the reasonable opinion of the officer, appears to have run away from home without just cause.” The Court found the circumstances provided probable cause to believe the juvenile was a runaway.

    However, the Court disagreed with the lower courts’ conclusion that the warrantless search was justified under a ‘plain-touch’ exception. The Court had rejected that exception in People v. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106, decided the same day. The Court stated that “[i]n the absence of some other applicable exception to the warrant requirement, the warrantless search of respondent’s bag was unjustified.”

    The Court noted several other possible exceptions that could have applied. These include searching the bag if it had been within the juvenile’s “grabbable area,” if the juvenile had consented to the search, or if the juvenile had been placed under arrest and the bag then searched incident to that arrest. The Court also suggested that the police could have detained the bag while obtaining a warrant or simply asked the juvenile about the bag’s contents. The court referenced Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 766, regarding detaining the bag while a warrant is obtained. The key takeaway is the rejection of the plain touch doctrine; absent another exception, a warrant is required.

  • People v. King, 75 N.Y.2d 924 (1990): Establishing Standing to Challenge a Search

    People v. King, 75 N.Y.2d 924 (1990)

    A defendant seeking to suppress evidence obtained through a search must demonstrate a legitimate personal expectation of privacy in the area or item searched, considering factors beyond mere possession, such as precautions taken to maintain privacy and the right to exclude others.

    Summary

    King was charged with drug possession offenses after a bag containing narcotics was discovered by police. King and his companion initially denied ownership of the bag. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s suppression of the evidence, holding that King failed to establish standing to challenge the search. While the attorney’s affirmation claimed King had a possessory interest, and a police officer saw King holding the bag earlier, the Court emphasized that possessing an item alone is insufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy; King needed to demonstrate he took steps to maintain privacy and had the right to exclude others.

    Facts

    Port Authority police officers observed King and a companion who “appeared relatively young.” King and his companion separated, heading for different buses. An officer approached the companion, who dropped a black bag and denied ownership. King was brought back, and he also denied owning the bag. A pat-down of the companion revealed a bullet, leading the officers to search the bag, where they found narcotics.

    Procedural History

    The hearing court granted King’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from the bag, finding that the search was unlawful and that King had standing to challenge it. The Appellate Division affirmed. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant established a legitimate expectation of privacy in the bag such that he had standing to challenge the search that revealed the narcotics.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant did not demonstrate a sufficient expectation of privacy in the bag beyond simply showing prior possession.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the lower courts erred in finding that King had standing to seek suppression of the evidence. The Court reiterated that a defendant has the burden of establishing standing by demonstrating a personal, legitimate expectation of privacy. While the defendant can use evidence from the People’s case to meet this burden, the record here was insufficient. The Court emphasized that showing a possessory interest alone is not determinative. Instead, courts must consider factors such as whether the defendant took precautions to maintain privacy and whether the defendant had the right to exclude others from access. The court cited People v. Rodriguez, 69 N.Y.2d 159, 163, stating that “‘[a] showing of a possessory or proprietary interest in the item seized by itself…is not the determinative factor on the issue of standing’”. Even if the defendant once possessed the bag, his denial of ownership suggested a lack of intent to maintain privacy. The court found that the burden was on the defendant to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy under the circumstances and that he failed to do so. Therefore, the motion to suppress should have been denied.

  • People v. Carvey, 74 N.Y.2d 907 (1989): Justifying a Search Incident to a Lawful Stop for Officer Safety

    People v. Carvey, 74 N.Y.2d 907 (1989)

    During a lawful traffic stop, a police officer may conduct a limited search of items within the immediate reach of a vehicle’s occupant if it is reasonably necessary to ensure the officer’s safety.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a police officer’s action of shining a flashlight into a plastic bag at a suspect’s feet during a lawful traffic stop was justified for officer safety. The court reasoned that because the bag was within the suspect’s immediate reach while he was still in the vehicle, a cursory examination was permissible to ensure it did not contain a weapon or other dangerous instrumentality. This case distinguishes itself from cases where the suspect is removed from the vehicle before the search.

    Facts

    Police Officer Sherlock received a report of an abduction involving men in a grey Volvo. He spotted a matching vehicle and pulled it over. Sergeant Rivera, arriving on the scene, noticed a plastic bag at defendant Carvey’s feet, who was a passenger. Without opening the bag, Sergeant Rivera shined his flashlight through it, suspected it contained marihuana, and ordered Carvey out. A subsequent search revealed a loaded revolver on Carvey’s person.

    Procedural History

    Carvey was indicted for criminal possession of a weapon. He moved to suppress the evidence seized during the arrest, arguing the search was unlawful. The Supreme Court, New York County, denied the motion after a Mapp hearing. Carvey pleaded guilty, and the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, during a lawful traffic stop, Sergeant Rivera exceeded the permissible scope of the stop by reaching into the car and shining his flashlight through the plastic bag at defendant’s feet?

    Holding

    No, because the sergeant’s actions were reasonably necessary to ensure that the bag, which was well within defendant’s immediate reach, did not contain a weapon or some other instrumentality that posed a threat to the officers’ safety.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the search was justified under the circumstances to protect the officers. The court distinguished this case from People v. Torres, where a search of a bag after the suspect had been removed from the vehicle was deemed unlawful. In Torres, the court found that isolating the suspect negated the need to protect officer safety via an immediate search of the bag. Here, because Carvey was still in the car and the bag was within his reach, the police were justified in conducting the limited examination. The court emphasized the importance of officer safety during traffic stops, stating that the “cursory examination of the bag occurred while defendant was still sitting in the car. Since, at that point, the bag was still within defendant’s reach, the police were justified in examining it.” The court applied the principle that searches incident to a lawful stop must be “reasonably related to the need to protect the officers’ safety”. The court cited Terry v. Ohio in support of the principle that police officers can take reasonable steps to ensure their safety during an encounter with a suspect.

  • People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434 (1991): State Constitution Affords Greater Protection Against Payton Violations

    77 N.Y.2d 434 (1991)

    Under the New York State Constitution, statements obtained following a Payton violation (warrantless arrest in a home) are inadmissible unless the taint from the illegal arrest is attenuated, offering greater protection than the Fourth Amendment.

    Summary

    Following a remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals considered whether the station house statement obtained after an illegal warrantless arrest in the defendant’s home was admissible under the New York State Constitution. The Court held that the statement was inadmissible because the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the statement was not sufficiently attenuated. New York’s strong right to counsel rule provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment, thus requiring suppression of statements obtained after a Payton violation unless attenuated.

    Facts

    Police had probable cause to arrest Harris for murdering his girlfriend. However, instead of obtaining a warrant, they arrested him in his apartment, violating Payton v. New York. After his arrest, Harris made three statements: one in his apartment, one at the police station an hour later, and a third on videotape. The first and third statements were suppressed. The admissibility of the second statement, made at the station house, was at issue.

    Procedural History

    The trial court suppressed the first and third statements but admitted the second. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals initially reversed, suppressing the station house statement on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the statement admissible under the Fourth Amendment. The case was remanded to the New York Court of Appeals to consider the state constitutional claim.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the New York State Constitution requires suppression of a statement obtained at a police station following a warrantless arrest in the defendant’s home, in violation of Payton v. New York, even if the statement is admissible under the Fourth Amendment?

    Holding

    Yes, because the New York State Constitution provides greater protection regarding the right to counsel than the Fourth Amendment, and statements obtained following a Payton violation are inadmissible unless the taint of the illegal arrest is attenuated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court recognized that while the Fourth Amendment and the New York State Constitution’s search and seizure clause contain similar language, the State Constitution can provide greater protection. The court employed a noninterpretive analysis, focusing on matters peculiar to New York, including the history and traditions of the state in protecting individual rights. The court emphasized New York’s unique and strong right to counsel rule, noting it is “far more expansive than the Federal counterpart.” The Court stated: “Manifestly, protection of the right to counsel has become a matter of singular concern in New York and it is appropriate that we consider the effect of Payton violations upon it.” Because New York’s criminal procedure law requires an accusatory instrument be filed before an arrest warrant can be issued, the right to counsel attaches upon issuance of the warrant. Thus, police have an incentive to violate Payton to circumvent the accused’s indelible right to counsel. The Court concluded that the connection between the illegal arrest and the station house statement was not sufficiently attenuated, considering the temporal proximity, absence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct. Therefore, the statement was suppressed under the New York Constitution. The Court stated, “We adhere to our earlier decision, therefore, and hold that statements obtained from an accused following an arrest made in violation of Payton are not admissible under the State Constitution if they are a product of the illegality.”

  • People v. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d 406 (1991): Warrantless Canine Sniff of Apartment Requires Reasonable Suspicion Under NY Constitution

    People v. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d 406 (1991)

    Under the New York State Constitution, a warrantless canine sniff of the area outside a private residence to detect narcotics constitutes a search and requires reasonable suspicion that the residence contains contraband.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a canine sniff outside an apartment door to detect narcotics constitutes an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 12 of the New York State Constitution. The New York Court of Appeals held that while such a sniff does not violate the Fourth Amendment, the New York State Constitution requires police to have at least a reasonable suspicion that a residence contains contraband before conducting a canine sniff. The court reasoned that the state constitution provides greater protection against unreasonable government intrusions.

    Facts

    Police received information that defendant Dunn was keeping controlled substances in his apartment. They arranged for a trained narcotics detection dog to sniff the hallway outside Dunn’s apartment. The dog alerted, indicating the presence of drugs inside. Based on the dog’s reaction and prior information, police obtained a warrant to search the apartment, which led to the seizure of cocaine, marihuana, drug paraphernalia, and handguns. A second warrant was obtained to search another apartment of Dunn’s, which also resulted in the seizure of drugs and paraphernalia.

    Procedural History

    Dunn was indicted on multiple drug-related offenses. He moved to suppress the evidence seized during both searches, arguing the warrants were improperly issued based on the unlawful canine sniff. The trial court denied the motion, and Dunn was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with a divided court on the legality of the canine sniff. Dunn appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a canine sniff outside a private residence to detect narcotics constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

    2. Whether a canine sniff outside a private residence to detect narcotics constitutes a search under Article I, § 12 of the New York State Constitution, and if so, what level of suspicion is required.

    Holding

    1. No, because the canine sniff only reveals the presence or absence of narcotics, it does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.

    2. Yes, because it obtains information regarding the contents of a private place, a canine sniff is a search under the New York State Constitution; however, such a search requires only reasonable suspicion, not probable cause or a warrant, because it is minimally intrusive.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court first addressed the Fourth Amendment issue, relying on United States v. Place, which held that a canine sniff of luggage in an airport is not a search because it is minimally intrusive and only reveals the presence or absence of contraband. The court rejected the Second Circuit’s attempt to distinguish Place for residential sniffs, finding that the heightened expectation of privacy in a residence does not alter the fact that a canine sniff only reveals evidence of criminality.

    Turning to the New York State Constitution, the court emphasized its right to interpret the state constitution independently of the federal constitution, especially when federal analysis threatens to undercut citizens’ rights against unreasonable government intrusions. The court distinguished its prior holding in People v. Price, noting that the Price decision focused on the reduced expectation of privacy with luggage in the hands of a common carrier, rather than the nature of the investigative tool itself.

    The court reasoned that the fact that an investigative procedure can only reveal evidence of criminality should not be determinative of whether it constitutes a search. The focus should be on whether there has been an intrusion into an area where an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. “Thus, our analysis should more appropriately focus on whether there has been an intrusion into an area where an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.”

    The court found that using a trained canine outside Dunn’s apartment constituted a search because it obtained information about the contents of a place with a heightened expectation of privacy. The court analogized the odors emanating from the apartment to the sound waves harnessed in Katz v. United States. The court feared the implications of allowing indiscriminate canine sniffs in public housing projects, calling it an “Orwellian notion” repugnant to the State Constitution.

    However, the court also acknowledged the uniquely discriminate and nonintrusive nature of a canine sniff. Therefore, it held that a warrant or probable cause is not required, only a reasonable suspicion that the residence contains contraband. Because the police had reasonable suspicion in this case, Dunn’s rights under the New York State Constitution were not violated.

  • People v. Natal, 75 N.Y.2d 379 (1990): Warrantless Seizure of Jail Property

    People v. Natal, 75 N.Y.2d 379 (1990)

    Personal items lawfully exposed to police view and held by a jail for safekeeping may be transferred to the District Attorney without a warrant for use as trial evidence, provided there is no post-arrest investigation or “fishing expedition” involved.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a District Attorney could obtain a defendant’s clothing and personal effects, held at the jail during pretrial confinement, via a subpoena returnable to himself. The court held that the defendant suffered no constitutional deprivation, even though the District Attorney misused court process, because the items were already lawfully exposed to view and the action did not constitute a post-arrest investigatory “fishing expedition.” The conviction was affirmed, but the court cautioned against replicating the District Attorney’s subpoena practice.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested for breaking into a house. As part of police routine, his clothing and personal effects were inventoried and stored at the Westchester County jail while he awaited trial. Nine months later, a week before trial, the District Attorney served a subpoena on the jail’s “Booking Officer,” demanding specific items of clothing worn by the defendant at the time of the alleged incident, returnable “forthwith” to the District Attorney. The subpoena form lacked a court part or judge’s name. The jail complied, handing over the requested items.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress a red bandana, blue bag, and letter opener, arguing the District Attorney’s actions constituted an unlawful seizure and abuse of the subpoena process. The trial court denied the motion. The defendant was convicted of burglary, grand larceny, and criminal mischief. The disputed items were admitted as evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding no illegal search or seizure, and deemed any error harmless given eyewitness testimony and in-court identification. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether personal items exposed to police view under unobjectionable circumstances and then lawfully held by the jail for safekeeping may be transferred to the District Attorney, without a warrant, for use as trial evidence.

    Whether the District Attorney’s use of a subpoena, returnable directly to his office, to obtain said items, constitutes an abuse of process requiring suppression of the evidence.

    Holding

    Yes, because the items were already lawfully exposed to view, the defendant retained no reasonable expectation of privacy in them, and the transfer did not constitute a post-arrest investigatory “fishing expedition.”
    Even though the District Attorney misused court process, reversal was not warranted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the defendant retained a property interest in his belongings, he lacked a constitutionally protected privacy interest. Citing People v. Reynolds, the court emphasized that a property interest does not automatically equate to a privacy interest protectable by search and seizure guarantees. The court noted the items were known personal articles, already fully exposed to view and identified, relevant to the defendant’s identification at trial, and not sought for further searching or experimentation. Reference was made to People v Perel, 34 NY2d 462 where the court held that no reasonable expectation of privacy was invaded when the police simply looked again at what they had already lawfully seen.

    Regarding the subpoena, the court stated that subpoenas are court processes, not tools for parties. While the District Attorney issues subpoenas, they are mandates of the court for the court. “CPL 610.25 (1) makes clear that where the District Attorney seeks trial evidence the subpoena should be made returnable to the court, which has ‘the right to possession of the subpoenaed evidence.’” The court found the District Attorney circumvented protections against subpoena abuse by making it returnable to himself.

    However, the Court ultimately concluded that preclusion of the evidence and reversal of the conviction were not required because the eyewitness identification of the defendant was unequivocal, and the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Despite affirming the conviction, the court strongly cautioned against replicating the District Attorney’s subpoena practice.

  • People v. Carvey, 74 N.Y.2d 707 (1989): Authority to Order Passengers Out of Lawfully Stopped Vehicles

    74 N.Y.2d 707 (1989)

    During a lawful traffic stop, police officers may order both the driver and passengers to exit the vehicle without any particularized suspicion of danger, as such action is a reasonable safety precaution.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that police officers, during a lawful traffic stop, may order a passenger to exit the vehicle as a precautionary measure. In this case, the vehicle was lawfully stopped for a traffic violation. An officer directed the passenger, Carvey, to step out. With the door open, a gun was visible, leading to Carvey’s arrest. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, stating the Fourth Amendment permits such precautionary measures for passenger safety, regardless of specific suspicion, because the risks to officers during a traffic stop are the same whether the occupant is a driver or passenger.

    Facts

    Two police officers observed a car make an unsignaled right turn from the left lane across the flow of traffic, cutting off another vehicle. The officers initiated a traffic stop. One officer approached the driver’s side, while the other approached the passenger side, where Carvey was seated. The officer directed Carvey to step out of the car. With the passenger door open, the butt of a loaded handgun was plainly visible, protruding from under the seat. The gun was seized, and Carvey was arrested. A subsequent search revealed additional ammunition in Carvey’s pocket.

    Procedural History

    After his arrest, Carvey moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer’s order to exit the vehicle was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The suppression motion was denied, and Carvey was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Carvey appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Fourth Amendment is violated when a police officer orders a passenger out of a lawfully stopped vehicle without any particularized suspicion of danger.

    Holding

    No, because the inherent danger to police officers during a lawful traffic stop justifies the precautionary measure of ordering a passenger to exit the vehicle, regardless of any particularized suspicion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Pennsylvania v. Mimms and New York v. Class, which established that officers may order a driver out of a vehicle during a traffic stop, even without a specific reason to believe the driver is armed. The court extended this principle to passengers, reasoning that the risks to officers are the same whether the occupant is a driver or a passenger. The court reasoned that brief, uniform precautionary procedures are not per se unreasonable or unconstitutional. The court stated, “police may order persons out of an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation.” The court also emphasized that the evidence at the suppression hearing supported the determination that requiring the defendant to step from the car was reasonable under the particular facts and pertinent federal guideposts. The court declined to address any potential violations of the New York State Constitution because the issue was not properly preserved for appeal.