New York Law Review

Tag: Scope of Employment

  • Braen v. Pfeifer Transportation Co., 361 U.S. 129 (1959): Scope of Employment Under the Jones Act Extends Beyond the Vessel

    Braen v. Pfeifer Transportation Co., 361 U.S. 129 (1959)

    A seaman injured while going to or from their vessel on shore leave is considered to be acting within the scope of their employment for the purposes of the Jones Act, even if the injury occurs off the vessel.

    Summary

    Braen, a seaman, sued his employer, Pfeifer Transportation Co., under the Jones Act for injuries sustained when he fell into a pit on a boat yard while leaving his tugboat for the weekend. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ dismissal of Braen’s Jones Act claim, holding that the trial court erred in determining that Braen was not acting in the course of his employment when the accident occurred. The Supreme Court emphasized that a seaman is considered in the service of the ship when going to and from the vessel, thereby making the employer potentially liable for negligence even off the vessel itself. This case clarifies the scope of “course of employment” under the Jones Act, extending it beyond the physical confines of the ship.

    Facts

    Braen was employed as an engineer on the Tugboat Dalzellable. The tug was moored alongside a barge at a dock leased by Dalzell Maintenance Co., Inc. Weekends were typically off-duty for the crew. Braen left the docked tug, crossed the barge, and walked through the boat yard, a customary route for crew members. He was injured when he fell into an unlit ramp or pit in the boat yard. The area was supposed to be lit by a watchman employed by Dalzell Towing Co.

    Procedural History

    Braen sued Dalzell Towing Co. and Dalzell Maintenance Co., Inc., alleging negligence and a Jones Act violation. The trial court initially dismissed both causes of action. The Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial. At the second trial, the common-law negligence claim was submitted to the jury, which found for the defendants, while the Jones Act claim was dismissed. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the Jones Act claim. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, leading to this appeal before the U.S. Supreme Court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the Jones Act cause of action, specifically whether Braen was injured “in the course of his employment” under the Jones Act when he was injured in the boatyard while leaving his vessel on shore leave.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Supreme Court had previously established that a seaman is considered in the service of the ship when going to and from the vessel on shore leave. This means the Jones Act applies to injuries sustained while the seaman is leaving the ship, even if the injury occurs on land.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on precedent establishing that the scope of employment under the Jones Act is equivalent to the “service of the ship” formula used in maintenance and cure cases. The court cited Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., which held that a seaman is in the service of his ship when going to and from the ship on shore leave. The court quoted Braen v. Pfeifer Transp. Co. (361 U. S. 129, 132-133): “We held that a seaman who was injured on the dock while departing from the ship on shore leave was in the service of the vessel and was entitled to recover for maintenance and cure in Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U. S. 724. It was there recognized that a seaman is as much in the service of his ship when hoarding it on first reporting for duty, quitting it on being discharged, or going to and from the ship while on shore leave, as he is while on hoard at high sea. Id., at 736-737.” Therefore, the injury sustained by Braen while leaving the vessel fell within the scope of his employment. The court distinguished other cases cited by the respondents, such as Dangovich v. Isthmian Lines, by noting that those cases turned on the issue of negligence, not the scope of employment. The court determined the employer’s control over the location of the accident (the boat yard) was a question of fact for the jury, particularly given the watchman employed by Towing. The court remanded for a new trial, emphasizing that the negligence of the watchman, if any, could give rise to recovery against Towing under the Jones Act. The court also noted that while Maintenance was not Braen’s employer, the plaintiff should have the opportunity to prove in a new trial whether Towing and Maintenance are the same entity, and that if he is successful in this regard, he would then have a cause of action against Maintenance under the Jones Act.

  • Lundberg v. State, 25 N.Y.2d 467 (1969): Scope of Employment and Commuting

    Lundberg v. State, 25 N.Y.2d 467 (1969)

    An employee driving to and from work is generally not acting within the scope of their employment for purposes of respondeat superior, even if the employer provides reimbursement for travel expenses, unless the employer exercises control over the employee’s activities during the commute.

    Summary

    Lundberg’s husband died when his car was struck by Sandilands, a state employee, who was driving from his home to a temporary work assignment. The Court of Appeals addressed whether the State could be held liable for Sandilands’ negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The Court held that the State was not liable because Sandilands was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The court reasoned that the commute was primarily for Sandilands’ personal convenience, and the State did not exert sufficient control over his travel to establish liability.

    Facts

    Sandilands, a Senior Engineering Technician for the New York State Department of Public Works, was permanently based in Buffalo but temporarily assigned to a project near Salamanca, about 80 miles away. He stayed in a hotel in Salamanca during the week and drove home to Buffalo on weekends. The State reimbursed him for living expenses and provided a mileage allowance for his travel. On a Monday morning, while driving back to the reservoir after a holiday weekend, Sandilands negligently caused a car accident that resulted in Lundberg’s husband’s death.

    Procedural History

    Lundberg sued Sandilands and the State for wrongful death. The claim against Sandilands was settled. The case against the State proceeded to trial, and the claimant received a judgment in her favor. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The State appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State of New York is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the negligence of its employee, Sandilands, who caused a fatal car accident while commuting to a temporary work assignment, where the State reimbursed his travel expenses.

    Holding

    No, because Sandilands was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, as the commute was primarily for his personal convenience, and the State did not exercise sufficient control over his travel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the doctrine of respondeat superior, which holds an employer liable for an employee’s negligence when the employee is acting within the scope of their employment. The court stated that an employee acts within the scope of employment when they are furthering their duties to the employer and the employer has, or could have, control over the employee’s activities. “An employee acts in the scope of his employment when he is doing something in furtherance of the duties he owes to his employer and where the employer is, or could be, exercising some control, directly or indirectly, over the employee’s activities”.

    The court noted the general rule that commuting to and from work is not considered within the scope of employment due to the lack of employer control. It distinguished this case from exceptions where an employee uses their car in furtherance of work, remaining under the employer’s control throughout the day. Here, Sandilands’ commute was primarily for his personal desire to return home. The court emphasized that the State lacked control over Sandilands’ activities during his commute. The court rejected the argument that the mileage allowance established control, deeming it unfair to impose liability based solely on expense reimbursement. “To hold that by simply paying his travel expenses to his home the State opened itself to liability for any tortious act he might commit while traveling between Buffalo and the work site would be patently unfair and beyond the scope of the doctrine of respondeat superior”.

    The court distinguished worker’s compensation cases, where the focus is on job-related activity regardless of fault, from respondeat superior cases, which require employer control. It cited Natell v. Taylor-Fichter Steel Constr. Co., a similar case where an employee’s travel between work sites was deemed outside the scope of employment despite expense reimbursement. The court determined that, as a matter of law, Sandilands was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.

  • Mansfield v. General Adjustment Bureau, 20 N.Y.2d 881 (1967): “Arising Out of Employment” After-Hours Activities

    20 N.Y.2d 881 (1967)

    An employee’s injury does not arise out of and in the course of employment when it occurs after the work-related function has concluded and the employee engages in substantial, purely personal activity that materially increases the risk of injury.

    Summary

    This case concerns a claim for workmen’s compensation benefits following an employee’s death in a car accident after attending a dinner with fellow employees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the award of benefits, holding that the employee’s attendance at the dinner was within the scope of employment. The dissent argued that the employee’s extended stay at a tavern after the dinner, until 4:00 AM, constituted a deviation from employment, making the subsequent accident a result of personal activity, not arising out of employment. The majority’s brief per curiam opinion references prior rulings without detailing its reasoning.

    Facts

    The employee, Mansfield, attended a dinner with fellow employees. After the dinner, Mansfield remained at a tavern until approximately 4:00 AM. Subsequently, Mansfield was involved in a fatal car accident.

    Procedural History

    The Workmen’s Compensation Board awarded benefits to Mansfield’s estate. The Appellate Division affirmed. This appeal followed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the employee’s fatal car accident arose out of and in the course of his employment, considering his attendance at a company dinner followed by several hours at a tavern.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Court of Appeals, in a brief per curiam opinion, affirmed the lower court’s decision, citing prior cases where attendance at a company-related event was deemed within the scope of employment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority affirmed the lower court’s decision with a brief citation to prior cases, including Matter of Graves v. Tide Water Oil Sales Co. and Matter of Lowery v. Riss & Co. These cases generally suggest that injuries sustained while attending employer-sponsored or work-related social events can be compensable under workmen’s compensation laws.

    The dissenting judge, Van Voorhis, argued that even if attending the dinner was initially within the scope of employment, Mansfield’s actions after the dinner constituted a significant deviation. The dissent emphasized the lengthy period between the dinner’s conclusion (11:00 PM) and the accident (4:00 AM), arguing that Mansfield’s personal activity during those hours materially increased the risk and severed the connection to his employment. As the dissent stated, “This personal activity on his part materially added to the risk and, in my judgment, constituted a deviation from the course of his employment if his attendance at the dinner could be regarded as having been work connected in the beginning.”

    The brevity of the majority opinion makes it difficult to fully discern their reasoning beyond reliance on precedent. The dissent highlights a critical point: the temporal and causal connection between the employment and the injury. The long intervening period of purely personal activity was, in the dissenter’s view, enough to break that connection.

  • Hacker v. City of New York, 26 N.Y.2d 755 (1970): Establishing Scope of Employment for Negligence with City-Mandated Equipment

    Hacker v. City of New York, 26 N.Y.2d 755 (1970)

    When a police officer is required by the city to carry a weapon at all times, there is a rebuttable presumption that the officer is acting within the scope of employment when the weapon discharges, placing the burden on the city to prove otherwise.

    Summary

    Anna Hacker sued the City of New York and her husband, a probationary patrolman, after being shot and crippled by her husband’s service revolver. She alleged the shooting resulted from her husband’s negligence due to inadequate training provided by the city. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff, but the Appellate Division reversed, citing a lack of explanation for the shooting and uncertainty regarding the officer’s scope of employment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the reversal. The dissent argued that because the city required the officer to carry the gun, a presumption arises that its discharge occurred within the scope of his employment, shifting the burden to the city to prove otherwise.

    Facts

    Anna Hacker was visiting her brother-in-law’s apartment. While in a bedroom separated from the living room by a kitchen, she was shot by a revolver owned by her husband, George Hacker, a probationary patrolman. The bullet severely injured her, causing permanent disability. George was required to carry his service revolver at all times as part of his employment as a probationary patrolman.

    Procedural History

    Anna Hacker sued the City of New York and her husband in the Supreme Court. The liability issue was tried separately without a jury, and the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s judgment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a probationary patrolman, required by the City of New York to carry a revolver at all times, is presumed to be acting within the scope of his employment when the revolver discharges, thereby placing the burden on the city to prove otherwise in a negligence action arising from the discharge?

    Holding

    No. The Court of Appeals upheld the Appellate Division’s reversal of the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The dissent argued that a presumption existed that the patrolman was acting within the scope of his employment, and the burden should have shifted to the city.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority’s reasoning is not explicitly stated in the provided dissent, as the excerpt focuses on the dissenting judge’s argument. However, the dissent critiqued the Appellate Division’s basis for reversal, which was the lack of a credible explanation for the accident. Judge Keating, in dissent, argued that requiring the patrolman to carry the gun as part of his employment created a presumption that any negligence in carrying or handling the gun occurred within the scope of his employment. The dissent referenced People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, noting the officer was duty-bound to act in his official capacity even when technically off-duty. The dissent also cited Collins v. City of New York, 11 Misc.2d 76, to support the view that the officer’s possession of the revolver could be deemed within the course of his employment.

    Keating argued: “For any negligence in carrying or handling the gun the city would be responsible. Somehow, while he was so carrying the weapon, it discharged. It seems to me only reasonable, under these circumstances, to presume the weapon was being used in the course of the patrolman’s employment, and the burden of establishing that it was not so used should be on the city which, for its own benefit, required that the weapon be carried at all times.”

    The dissent also invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, suggesting that the accident itself implies negligence on the patrolman’s part. The lack of complete training in handling the revolver further supported this inference. The dissenting judge concluded that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish the patrolman was acting within the scope of his employment, unless the city could provide substantial evidence to the contrary. The city only discredited the patrolman’s version of events, failing to prove he was using the weapon for personal gain at the time of the accident.

  • Matter of Siguin v. McCarthy, 295 N.Y. 443 (1946): Workplace Horseplay and Scope of Employment in Workers’ Compensation

    Matter of Siguin v. McCarthy, 295 N.Y. 443 (1946)

    Injuries sustained by an employee as a result of customary workplace horseplay, known to and tolerated by the employer, arise out of and in the course of employment, entitling the employee to workers’ compensation benefits.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether an injury resulting from horseplay in the workplace is compensable under workers’ compensation law. John Siguin, a minor, died from an accidental stabbing during a friendly exchange of blows with a co-worker, a custom known to the employer. The New York Court of Appeals held that Siguin’s death arose out of and in the course of his employment. The court reasoned that the horseplay was a customary and known part of the work environment, making the resulting injury a risk of the employment. However, the court reversed the award against the employer individually for payments to special funds, clarifying that such payments do not constitute “compensation and death benefits” under the relevant statute.

    Facts

    John Siguin, a 17-year-old waiter, was employed at a restaurant. It was customary among employees to playfully exchange taps or blows when passing each other, a practice known to the employer. On December 24, 1942, Siguin playfully “made a pass” at a co-worker, Demers. Demers, attempting to avoid the blow, accidentally struck Siguin with a knife he was holding, resulting in Siguin’s death. No work certificate had been filed for Siguin, a violation of labor law.

    Procedural History

    The Industrial Board (now the Workmen’s Compensation Board) ruled that Siguin’s death arose out of and in the course of his employment, awarding compensation. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed this decision. The employer and carrier appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Siguin’s injury and death arose “out of and in the course of the employment” within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Law.
    2. Whether the award against the employer individually for the benefit of special funds under the Workmen’s Compensation Law was proper.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the horseplay was a customary and known incident of the employment, making the resulting injury a risk of the employment.
    2. No, because payments to the special funds do not constitute “compensation and death benefits” within the meaning of Section 14-a of the Workmen’s Compensation Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the customary horseplay was an inherent part of the work environment and, thus, a risk of the employment. Quoting from Matter of Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N.Y. 470, 472-473, the court stated, “The claimant was injured, not merely while he was in a factory, but because he was in a factory, in touch with associations and conditions inseparable from factory life. The risks of such associations and conditions were risks of the employment.” The court distinguished this case from others where the injured employee initiated a fight or horseplay as a single, isolated incident. Here, the long-standing custom demonstrated that Siguin did not abandon his employment. The court further noted that the injuries did not result from the “wilful intention of the injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or another.” Regarding the award against the employer individually, the court determined that payments to the special funds are not considered “compensation” or “death benefits” as defined by the Workmen’s Compensation Law. The court cited Commissioner of Taxation v. Riger Bldg. Corp., 285 N.Y. 217, which held that such payments do not constitute compensation. The court emphasized that the “double compensation and death benefits” provision is not punitive but rather increased compensation. Therefore, only the $150 funeral expense could be considered “compensation” or “death benefits.”