New York Law Review

Tag: school search

  • In re Elvin G., 12 N.Y.3d 832 (2009): Establishing Factual Disputes for Suppression Hearings in School Searches

    In re Elvin G., 12 N.Y.3d 832 (2009)

    A suppression hearing is required in juvenile delinquency proceedings when the accused raises a factual dispute on a material point that must be resolved to determine if evidence was obtained constitutionally.

    Summary

    Elvin G. was subject to a school search. He moved to suppress a knife found during the search, alleging the dean ordered all students to empty their pockets. The presentment agency countered that Elvin voluntarily removed the knife. The New York Court of Appeals held that a suppression hearing was necessary because the conflicting factual accounts created a material dispute regarding the constitutionality of the search. The Court reasoned that the record was insufficiently developed to determine whether a search occurred and, if so, if it was reasonable under the circumstances. The dissent argued that the dean’s actions were justified due to a classroom disruption and were reasonably related in scope to finding the source of the disruption.

    Facts

    While in class, a cell phone or other electronic device disrupted the class.
    According to Elvin G., the school dean ordered all students to stand and empty their pockets to find the device.
    According to the presentment agency, the dean asked students to place their bags on their desks, and Elvin G. voluntarily removed a knife from his pocket.
    A knife was recovered from Elvin G.

    Procedural History

    Elvin G. moved to suppress the knife, arguing the search was unconstitutional.
    The Family Court denied the motion for a suppression hearing.
    The Appellate Division affirmed.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the matter to Family Court for a suppression hearing.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a suppression hearing is required when there is a factual dispute regarding the circumstances of a search in a school setting, specifically whether the student voluntarily revealed the weapon or whether it was discovered pursuant to an order to empty pockets.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was a factual dispute on a material point – whether the dean ordered students to empty their pockets (as alleged by Elvin G.) or whether Elvin G. voluntarily removed the knife (as claimed by the presentment agency) – that needed to be resolved to determine if the evidence was obtained constitutionally.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on CPL 710.60 and Family Court Act § 330.2 (1), stating that a suppression hearing is required if the accused raises a factual dispute on a material point that must be resolved before the court can decide the legality of obtaining the evidence.
    The court cited People v. Burton, 6 N.Y.3d 584, 587 (2006), emphasizing that a hearing is needed to resolve factual disputes relevant to constitutional permissibility.
    The Court applied the People v. Mendoza, 82 N.Y.2d 415 (1993) factors, noting the record was insufficiently developed to properly determine whether a search occurred and, if so, whether it was reasonable under the circumstances, referencing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); and Matter of Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d 588 (1993).
    The Court emphasized that if the dean recovered the knife because it was in “plain view,” the constitutional question would be academic, highlighting the importance of resolving the factual dispute.
    The dissent argued that the dean was justified in directing students to empty their pockets due to the classroom disruption and the search was reasonably related to finding the offending article, citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). The dissent also noted that Matter of Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d 588 (1993), supports the idea that a search may be reasonable without individualized suspicion when privacy interests are minimal and governmental interests are significant.

  • People v. Singletary, 37 N.Y.2d 311 (1975): Search of Student Based on Reliable Informant Information

    People v. Singletary, 37 N.Y.2d 311 (1975)

    A search of a student by a school official is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if based on concrete, articulable facts provided by a reliable informant, even if the informant’s identity is not disclosed.

    Summary

    Singletary was adjudicated a youthful offender after a search by a high school dean revealed heroin. The search was prompted by a student informant who had previously provided accurate information leading to drug-related arrests and convictions. Singletary argued the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights under the precedent of People v. Scott D. and that he should have been able to elicit the informant’s identity at the suppression hearing. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the adjudication, distinguishing Scott D. based on the reliability of the informant and emphasizing that an in camera examination of the informant adequately protects the defendant’s rights.

    Facts

    A high school dean responsible for security was approached by a student informant who stated Singletary possessed and was selling narcotics on school property.
    The informant had provided similar information on five prior occasions, each leading to the seizure of narcotics.
    The students named by the informant in those prior instances were subsequently arrested and convicted of drug-related charges.
    The dean searched Singletary and found 13 glassine envelopes containing heroin in his sock.

    Procedural History

    Singletary was adjudicated a youthful offender in the Criminal Court of the City of New York based on a guilty plea to attempted possession of a narcotic drug.
    Appellate Term affirmed the judgment.
    Singletary appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by leave of a judge.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the search of Singletary by the school dean violated his Fourth Amendment rights, considering the information was provided by a student informant.
    Whether Singletary was entitled to elicit the identity of the student informant at the suppression hearing.

    Holding

    No, because the dean acted on concrete, articulable facts supplied by an informant whose reliability had been proven by the accuracy of previous communications.
    No, because the defendant’s rights are adequately protected by an in camera examination of the informant by the hearing judge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from People v. Scott D., where the information was imprecise and the informant’s reliability was not established. In Singletary’s case, the informant had a proven track record of providing accurate information leading to arrests and convictions.

    The court relied on People v. Darden and People v. Goggins, which held that a defendant is not necessarily entitled to learn the identity of an informant at a probable cause hearing, especially when probable cause rests solely on the informant’s information. The court stated that when probable cause is the issue, as opposed to guilt, the defendant’s rights are amply protected by an in camera examination of the informant by the hearing Judge. The court noted that no in camera examination was requested in this case.

    “The rule enunciated by Chief Judge Breitel in Scott D. was designed to prevent teachers or other school officials from exercising ‘arbitrary power’ by engaging in ‘random causeless searches’ based upon unfounded ‘equivocal suspicion’.” The court found that the search in this case was not arbitrary but based on reasonable suspicion supported by a reliable informant.

  • People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360 (1967): School Official’s Authority to Consent to Locker Search

    People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360 (1967)

    School officials have the authority to consent to the search of a student’s locker based on their duty to maintain discipline and a student’s diminished expectation of privacy in school lockers.

    Summary

    This case addresses the question of whether a school official can consent to a search of a student’s locker. Police obtained a warrant to search two students and their lockers. The warrant was later invalidated. However, a search of Overton’s locker, authorized by the vice-principal, revealed marijuana. The court held that the vice-principal’s consent validated the search. The court reasoned that school officials have a duty to maintain discipline and investigate potential illegal activity, giving them the authority to consent to searches of lockers under their control. The court found the students have a reduced expectation of privacy in lockers, especially given school regulations and practices.

    Facts

    Three detectives obtained a search warrant for two students, including Overton, and their lockers at Mount Vernon High School.
    The detectives presented the warrant to the vice-principal, Dr. Panitz, who summoned the students.
    A search of Overton and the other student revealed nothing.
    A subsequent search of Overton’s locker, however, revealed four marijuana cigarettes.
    Overton’s locker combination was on file in the school office, accessible to school authorities.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to invalidate the portion of the search warrant pertaining to his locker, which was granted.
    The defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence was denied because the court found that the vice-principal had the authority to consent to the search.
    The Appellate Term reversed, dismissing the information, holding that the vice-principal’s consent could not justify an otherwise illegal search.
    The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a high school vice-principal can validly consent to a search of a student’s locker, thereby rendering the search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, when the initial search warrant is later invalidated.

    Holding

    Yes, because school officials have a duty to maintain discipline and investigate potential illegal activity, which, coupled with the non-exclusive nature of student lockers, empowers them to consent to a search when suspicion arises.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court grounded its decision in the unique relationship between school authorities and students. It emphasized the school’s duty to maintain discipline and provide a safe environment for students. The court stated: “It is in the high school years particularly that parents are justifiably concerned that their children not become accustomed to antisocial behavior, such as the use of illegal drugs.” This parental expectation necessitates an affirmative obligation for school authorities to investigate suspected narcotics use.

    The court distinguished the locker from a private depository, noting that students are aware that school authorities possess locker combinations and issue regulations regarding locker contents. The court observed, “the student does not have such exclusivity over the locker as against the school authorities.” Dr. Panitz testified that he would have inspected the locker regardless of the warrant, demonstrating his understanding of his duty and authority.

    The court cited United States v. Botsch, illustrating circumstances where a third party can consent to a search when they possess common authority over the premises. The court analogized the vice-principal’s role to the landlord in Botsch, given the school’s retained control over the lockers.

    Therefore, the court concluded that Dr. Panitz’s consent justified the search, and the evidence obtained was admissible. The order of the Appellate Term was reversed, and the case was remitted for consideration of other unresolved issues raised by the defendant.