New York Law Review

Tag: school liability

  • Brandy B. v. Eden Central School District, 15 N.Y.3d 297 (2010): School’s Duty to Supervise and Foreseeability of Harm

    15 N.Y.3d 297 (2010)

    A school district is not liable for the unanticipated intentional tort of a student against another student absent sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of prior similar conduct that would make the injury reasonably foreseeable.

    Summary

    This case concerns a negligence claim against a school district and a child services agency following a sexual assault by an 11-year-old student on a 5-year-old student on a school bus. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the school district had sufficient notice of the dangerous conduct and whether the child services agency had a duty to warn of the need for supervision. The Court held that the school district did not have sufficient notice, as the student’s prior history did not include sexually aggressive behavior, and the agency had no duty to warn in this specific situation. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants.

    Facts

    Robert F., born in 1991, had a history of behavioral issues, including aggression and hospitalization for psychiatric issues. He resided in various foster care placements and community residences. While living in a community residence, Robert was enrolled at the Stanley G. Falk School, where he was noted to be adapting well and displaying appropriate social skills. In 2002, he began living with foster parents and transferred to Eden Central School District. In September 2002, Brenna B., a kindergartner, started attending the same school and rode the same bus as Robert. Brenna’s mother, Brandy B., requested the bus driver separate the children. Thereafter, Brenna alleged Robert sexually assaulted her on the bus in March 2003.

    Procedural History

    Brandy B., Brenna’s mother, sued Eden Central School District for negligent supervision and Child and Family Services of Erie County (CFS) for failure to warn. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the school district had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused injury so that the third-party act could have been reasonably anticipated.

    2. Whether CFS had a duty to warn the child offender’s foster parents and others of the need to closely supervise him.

    Holding

    1. No, because the school district did not have sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the injury-causing conduct to reasonably anticipate the sexual assault.

    2. No, because the plaintiff did not set forth a prima facie claim against CFS establishing a duty to warn under these circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the established principle that schools have a duty to adequately supervise students and can be liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision. However, the court emphasized that unanticipated third-party acts causing injury will not give rise to liability without actual or constructive notice of prior similar conduct. The court stated, “[I]t must be established that school authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused injury; that is, that the third-party acts could reasonably have been anticipated.” The Court reasoned that Robert’s past behavioral issues had not manifested for over two years, and more importantly, his history lacked any sexually aggressive behavior. Brandy’s statement to the bus driver about separating the children did not provide specific notice, nor did Robert’s past conduct without subsequent incidents require the school district to provide an aide or for CFS to issue a warning. The court concluded that the defendants demonstrated they had no specific knowledge or notice of similar conduct, and the plaintiff failed to present a triable issue of fact. The dissenting judge argued that the school had enough information to be on notice of a potential danger.

  • Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44 (1994): School’s Duty to Protect Students After Notice of Attack

    Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44 (1994)

    A school has a duty to protect students from foreseeable harm, and this duty extends to intervening in an ongoing assault if school employees have notice of the attack and a reasonable opportunity to prevent further injury.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of a school’s duty to protect its students from foreseeable harm. The Court of Appeals held that while the school couldn’t have anticipated the initial attack on the student, a triable issue of fact existed regarding whether the school received notice of the attack while it was in progress and whether the school’s intervention could have prevented the subsequent, more serious assault. The court emphasized that the presence of school employees during the initial assault, coupled with eyewitness testimony, raised a legitimate question of fact that warranted a trial.

    Facts

    The decedent was assaulted on school grounds by a group of approximately ten students, one wielding a baseball bat. An eyewitness claimed that several teachers and a safety officer were present during the assault, supervising student dismissal. The eyewitness stated that these school employees did nothing to intervene, even after the witness yelled at the safety officer to protect the victim and the victim screamed for help. Shortly after the initial attack on school grounds, the student suffered a second, more serious assault off school property.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff brought suit against the City of New York, alleging negligence in failing to protect the student. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the school could not have foreseen the attack. The plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. The Appellate Division initially ruled in favor of the defendant, finding that the school could not have anticipated the first attack. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order by denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and affirmed as modified, remanding the case for trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a school is liable for injuries sustained by a student in a second assault off school grounds, where school employees allegedly witnessed the initial assault on school grounds but failed to intervene.

    Holding

    Yes, because an eyewitness account raised a triable issue of fact as to whether school employees had notice of the initial assault and whether their intervention could have prevented the subsequent assault.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on whether the school had notice of the initial attack and a reasonable opportunity to intervene. The court reasoned that the eyewitness testimony, alleging the presence of teachers and a safety officer during the initial assault and their failure to intervene despite being alerted, raised a sufficient question of fact to warrant a trial. The court emphasized that if a jury found that the school employees heard the calls for help and did nothing to stop the initial assault, it could also find that their intervention might have averted the second, more serious assault. “In light of these allegations by an eyewitness, a jury may find that the safety officer or the teachers heard the call for help by the witness but stood by and did nothing to stop the first assault on decedent and that their intervention might have averted the second assault, which occurred off the school grounds a short time later.” The court implicitly acknowledges a school’s duty to act reasonably to protect students when they are aware of an immediate danger.

  • особисте життя Smithtown Central School Dist., 7 N.Y.3d 336 (2006): Adequacy of Expert Testimony in Negligent Supervision Claims

    Smith v. Smithtown Central School Dist., 7 N.Y.3d 336 (2006)

    In a negligent supervision claim against a school, an expert affidavit lacking a proper foundation or source for its standards lacks probative force and is insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.

    Summary

    This case concerns a negligence claim brought against a school district after a second-grade student was injured during a gym class activity. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ grant of summary judgment to the school district, holding that the plaintiffs’ expert affidavit failed to establish an adequate foundation for its conclusions regarding the school’s supervision. The court emphasized that expert opinions must be based on established standards and not mere speculation to overcome a motion for summary judgment. This case clarifies the evidentiary burden on plaintiffs alleging negligent supervision in school settings and the importance of well-supported expert testimony.

    Facts

    The infant plaintiff was injured while participating in a cargo net climbing exercise during her second-grade gym class at Smithtown Central School District. The physical education teacher had instructed the students on proper net climbing techniques and demonstrated these techniques before the incident. The teacher was approximately 10 to 12 steps away from the plaintiff when she fell and sustained injuries.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs sued Smithtown Central School District for negligent supervision. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The plaintiffs then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the expert affidavit submitted by the plaintiffs in response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the adequacy of the school district’s supervision of the infant plaintiff.

    Holding

    No, because the expert affidavit lacked a proper foundation or source for the standards underlying its conclusion that the defendant’s supervision was inadequate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower courts, finding that Smithtown Central School District had demonstrated its entitlement to summary judgment. The court reiterated that while schools are not insurers of safety, they must exercise the same level of care as a reasonably prudent parent under similar circumstances. The court noted the physical education teacher’s deposition testimony, which detailed the instructions given, the demonstration of techniques, and the teacher’s proximity to the student. The critical deficiency was in the plaintiffs’ expert affidavit. The court stated that the affidavit “lacked probative force and was insufficient as a matter of law” to overcome the school district’s motion for summary judgment, quoting Diaz v New York Downtown Hosp., 99 NY2d 542, 545 (2002). The court emphasized that the expert failed to provide the foundation or the source of the standards used to conclude that the school’s supervision was inadequate. The absence of such a foundation made the expert’s conclusions speculative and unreliable. The court implicitly applied the standard that expert testimony must be based on accepted practices and not personal opinion to be admissible and to create a triable issue of fact. The Court’s decision underscores the need for expert opinions to be firmly grounded in established standards to be legally sufficient in negligence cases.

  • Ernest v. Red Creek Cent. Sch. Dist., 93 N.Y.2d 664 (1999): School and County Liability for Student’s Off-Premises Injury

    Ernest v. Red Creek Cent. Sch. Dist., 93 N.Y.2d 664 (1999)

    A school district may be liable for injuries to a student released into a foreseeably hazardous setting partly of the school’s making, and a county can be liable for failing to address a known dangerous road condition affecting schoolchildren.

    Summary

    A nine-year-old student was severely injured after being struck by a truck while crossing a county road after school. The plaintiff sued the school district, county, and town, alleging negligence. The New York Court of Appeals held that the school district could be liable for releasing the student before buses departed, creating a hazardous condition. The Court also found the county could be liable for failing to act on repeated notices of a dangerous road condition for schoolchildren. The Town, however, was not liable because it did not own or control the road.

    Facts

    Christopher Knopp, a nine-year-old student, was dismissed from school and attempted to cross Westbury Road, a Wayne County highway. He was hit by a truck and severely injured. Students walking to the village west of the school had to walk along the road’s shoulder and cross the highway, as there was no sidewalk on the school side of the road. The school superintendent had previously requested the County extend the sidewalk for safety reasons. On the day of the accident, students were released before the buses departed, contrary to school policy. Christopher crossed behind a bus, and his view was obstructed when he was hit by a truck traveling in the opposite direction.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the driver, the Red Creek School District, Wayne County, and the Town of Wolcott. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the School District and the Town, but not the County. The Appellate Division modified, granting summary judgment to the County as well. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the School District was negligent in releasing walking students before the school buses departed, contrary to established policy, thereby creating a hazardous condition that led to the student’s injury.

    2. Whether Wayne County was negligent in failing to respond to repeated notices of the need for sidewalks or traffic control devices on Westbury Road to protect schoolchildren.

    3. Whether the Town of Wolcott had a duty to ensure the safety of pedestrians on Westbury Road.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a jury could find that the School District breached its duty of care by releasing Christopher before the buses left, creating a foreseeable risk of harm. 2. Yes, because the County had received repeated notices of the dangerous conditions for schoolchildren and failed to take action. 3. No, because the Town did not own or control the road and had not affirmatively undertaken a duty to maintain it.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the School District had a duty to continue exercising control and supervision if releasing a child posed a foreseeable risk of harm. Citing McDonald v Central School Dist. No. 3, the court emphasized that a school’s duty continues when a student is released into a potentially hazardous situation, especially if the hazard is partly of the school district’s own making. The school’s policy of releasing walkers after the buses showed it recognized the enhanced risk. The Court distinguished Pratt v Robinson because in that case, the child was released to a safe location. Here, the release was into a “foreseeably hazardous setting partly of the School District’s making.”

    Regarding the County’s liability, the Court cited Alexander v Eldred, stating that a municipality can be liable if its failure to install a traffic control device was negligent and a contributing cause of the accident, and there was no reasonable basis for the inaction. The Court found the superintendent’s letters were sufficient notice of the hazardous conditions. The Court distinguished Weiss v Fote, which provides qualified immunity for decisions made by a public planning body after considering the risk, because the County’s prior study did not address the risk to schoolchildren crossing the road. The Court also found a triable issue on proximate cause, stating that a jury could infer that extending the sidewalk would have led to additional safety measures, including a crosswalk, thus reducing the risk to students. The Court noted, “Proximate cause is a question of fact for the jury where varying inferences are possible.”

    Regarding the Town, the Court found that the town did not own or control Westbury Road and never assumed a duty to maintain it. Citing Silver v Cooper, the Court stated, “Although sections of the Vehicle and Traffic Law [and General Municipal Law] give towns certain rights with respect to all roads, including County roads, none of the statutes establish an affirmative duty of the Town to maintain any County road.”

  • Chainani v. Board of Education, 87 N.Y.2d 370 (1995): School Liability for Student Injuries at Bus Stops

    Chainani v. Board of Education, 87 N.Y.2d 370 (1995)

    A school district is generally not liable for injuries to students at bus stops when it contracts with an independent bus company, absent a specific statutory duty or direct control over the contractor’s safety procedures.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether public schools are liable for injuries to students occurring between their homes and bus stops when transportation is contracted to independent bus companies. The Court of Appeals held that schools are not directly or vicariously liable in these circumstances, unless a specific statutory duty is imposed on the school or the school retains direct control over the safety aspects of the bus company’s operations. The Court emphasized that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1174(b) places the duty on the bus driver, not the school, and that the act of transporting students is not inherently dangerous.

    Facts

    In Chainani, a student was injured after being run over by a bus after exiting at her stop. The bus driver was new to the route and unaware the student needed to cross the street. In Bruce, a student was hit by a car while crossing a highway to catch the bus at an undesignated stop after missing her designated stop. The school district had established designated stops to avoid students having to cross the highway. There was conflicting evidence as to whether the school district was aware students regularly crossed the highway to catch the bus.

    Procedural History

    In Chainani, the trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiffs against the Board of Education, Amboy Bus Company, and the bus driver. The Appellate Division affirmed as to Amboy and the driver but reversed as to the Board. In Bruce, the trial court granted summary judgment to the school district, which was affirmed by the Appellate Division. Both cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a school district is directly liable for injuries to students at bus stops when the school contracts with an independent bus company for transportation services.
    2. Whether a school district is vicariously liable for the negligence of an independent bus company contracted to provide transportation services.

    Holding

    1. No, because absent a specific statutory duty imposed on the school or direct control retained by the school over the safety aspects of the contractor’s operations, the school is not directly liable.
    2. No, because the task of transporting children by bus is not inherently dangerous, and Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1174 places the duty on the bus driver, not the school.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that schools are generally not liable for the actions of independent contractors unless a specific statutory duty is imposed or the school retains control over the contractor’s work. The Court found no specific statutory duty imposed on the schools by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1174(b), which explicitly places the obligation on the bus driver. The Court also rejected the argument that transporting schoolchildren is an inherently dangerous activity that would trigger vicarious liability. The Court stated, “Demanding though it may be, the activity of transporting children by bus to and from school—successfully accomplished countless times daily—does not involve that sort of inherent risk for the nonnegligent driver and is simply not an inherently dangerous activity so as to trigger vicarious liability.” The Court further noted that the school in Bruce did not have knowledge of the students’ practice of crossing the highway to undesignated stops. The Court distinguished situations where the employer has knowledge of a “peculiar unreasonable risk” but fails to take steps to minimize the risk, but found that this exception did not apply since the school had no knowledge of the unsafe practice. The Court emphasized that holding schools liable in these circumstances would be an unwarranted extension of liability, given the detailed regulations governing transportation contracts and the allocation of responsibility between schools and bus companies. The dissent is not explicitly mentioned, suggesting a unanimous decision on the core principles.

  • Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44 (1994): School’s Duty to Supervise Students and Foreseeable Harm

    84 N.Y.2d 44 (1994)

    Schools have a duty to adequately supervise students and are liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision, especially when the school has specific knowledge of potential danger to a student.

    Summary

    Two student sisters, Virna and Vivia Mirand, were attacked at their high school after Virna reported a threat from another student, Donna Webster, to a teacher and found the security office unattended. Vivia was stabbed trying to defend her sister. The New York Court of Appeals held that the school district could be liable for negligent supervision because it had notice of a specific threat against Virna but failed to take adequate steps to protect her, and because school security was absent from key locations at dismissal time, when the attack occurred. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the jury verdict in favor of the sisters.

    Facts

    Virna Mirand, a student at Harry S. Truman High School, had an altercation with fellow student Donna Webster, who threatened to kill her. Virna reported the threat to a teacher after finding the security office closed. Later, while waiting for her sister Vivia, Webster and her companions attacked Virna on the school veranda. Vivia was injured when she intervened to protect her sister; she was stabbed in the wrist by Webster’s brother. No security personnel were present during the attack.

    Procedural History

    The Mirand sisters sued the Board of Education for negligent supervision. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court set aside the verdict and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the jury verdict. The Board of Education appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Board of Education negligently failed to provide adequate supervision, leading to the plaintiffs’ injuries.

    Holding

    Yes, because the school had notice of a specific threat and failed to take reasonable steps to protect the student, and because the absence of security personnel at a critical time and location was a proximate cause of the injuries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that schools have a duty to adequately supervise students, acting in loco parentis. To establish a breach of this duty when injuries are caused by fellow students, it must be shown that school authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused the injury and that the injury was foreseeable. The Court highlighted the fact that the school, through a teacher, was made aware of Webster’s death threat to Virna. The Court also noted the absence of security personnel at dismissal time, despite the school’s own security plan requiring their presence. The court emphasized, “The violent acts which caused plaintiffs’ injuries were sparked by a prior altercation and death threat of which defendant, through one of its teachers, was expressly made aware; yet no action was taken to prevent escalation of the incident…” The Court found that the jury reasonably concluded that the Board was on notice of imminent danger and did not take reasonable steps to protect Virna. It further stated, “On the issue of proximate cause, we conclude that a rational jury could find that the complete absence of security or supervisory personnel at a time and place when vigilance was absolutely essential constituted the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries.” The court concluded that the jury’s verdict was supported by sufficient evidence and should be upheld.