People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Service, 28 N.Y.2d 185 (1971)

A natural parent’s right to the care and custody of their child is superior to that of all others unless that right has been abandoned or the parent is proven unfit, and a surrender to an authorized adoption agency does not automatically constitute abandonment.

Summary

This case addresses whether a natural mother can regain custody of her child after surrendering the child to an authorized adoption agency. Olga Scarpetta, an unmarried woman, surrendered her child to Spence-Chapin shortly after birth but sought to regain custody days later. The New York Court of Appeals held that the mother could regain custody because the surrender was improvident, and the child’s best interests would be served by returning to her, emphasizing the primacy of parental rights unless unfitness is proven. The court also held that prospective adoptive parents do not have an automatic right to intervene in such proceedings.

Facts

Olga Scarpetta, a 32-year-old unmarried woman from Colombia, came to New York to give birth to her child. Four days after the child’s birth on May 18, 1970, she placed the infant with Spence-Chapin Adoption Service. Ten days later, she executed a surrender document. Five days after the baby was placed with a family for adoption, Scarpetta requested the child’s return, influenced by her family’s support for her raising the child herself.

Procedural History

Scarpetta commenced a habeas corpus proceeding after unsuccessful attempts to regain her child. Special Term ruled that the child should be returned to the mother. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a mother who has surrendered her child to an authorized adoption agency may regain custody of the child.
2. Whether the prospective adoptive parents were entitled to intervene in this proceeding as a matter of law.
3. Whether the failure to allow the prospective adoptive parents to intervene deprived them of due process.

Holding

1. Yes, because the surrender was improvident and the child’s best interests would be promoted by returning to the natural mother.
2. No, because the public policy of New York is against disclosing the identities of natural and prospective adoptive parents to each other.
3. No, because the prospective adoptive parents did not have legal custody of the child and thus were not deprived of a protected interest.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that while New York law sanctions surrenders to authorized adoption agencies (Social Services Law § 384), it does not render them irrevocable. Judicial supervision is inherent to surrenders, recognizing they are unilateral and often executed under circumstances casting doubt on voluntariness. However, courts should not undo surrenders except for the weightiest reasons. Citing People ex rel. Grament v. Free Synagogue Child Adoption Committee, 194 Misc. 332, 336, the court emphasized the legislature’s careful circumscription of parental rights in adoption. The court should exercise its power to direct a change of custody only when the child’s interest will be promoted and the parent is fit, competent, and able to care for the child (Social Services Law, § 383, subd. 1). The court reaffirmed the principle that a parent has a superior right to custody unless they have abandoned that right or are proven unfit, quoting People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 468. The court found the mother was motivated by concern for the child, had stabilized her relationships, and was financially secure. Regarding intervention by prospective adoptive parents, the court held that allowing intervention would violate the state’s public policy against disclosure of identities, as reflected in Social Services Law §§ 383 and 384. Finally, the court determined that the prospective adoptive parents lacked legal custody and therefore were not deprived of due process by being denied intervention.