New York Law Review

Tag: Scaffolding

  • Brown v. Bowery Savings Bank, 65 N.Y.2d 778 (1985): Enforceability of Indemnification Agreements in Labor Law Cases

    Brown v. Bowery Savings Bank, 65 N.Y.2d 778 (1985)

    A party is entitled to full contractual indemnification when the intention to indemnify is clear from the agreement’s language, purpose, and surrounding circumstances, even without explicit reference to the indemnitee’s negligence, unless prohibited by statute.

    Summary

    This case concerns an injured painter’s claim under Labor Law § 240(1) and the subsequent contractual indemnity claims among the contractors, architect, and owner involved in a renovation project. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff but modified the order regarding contractual indemnity. The court held that the owner (Bowery Savings Bank) and its agent (Swanke Hayden Connell & Partners) were entitled to full contractual indemnification from the scaffolding contractor (Atlantic Scaffold & Ladder Co.) and the painter’s employer (Rambusch Decorating Co.) because the indemnity agreements demonstrated a clear intent to indemnify, and such indemnification was not prohibited by the relevant statute at the time of the accident.

    Facts

    A painter, employed by Rambusch Decorating Co., was injured when he fell from scaffolding at the Bowery Savings Bank headquarters, which was undergoing a major renovation. Atlantic Scaffold & Ladder Co. was contracted to provide, erect, and maintain the scaffolding. The contracts between the bank, Atlantic, and Rambusch contained indemnity agreements requiring each contractor to indemnify the Bank and the Architects against claims arising from their work.

    Procedural History

    The injured painter sued, and a jury found Atlantic, Rambusch, Bowery Savings Bank, and Swanke Hayden Connell & Partners liable. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment in favor of the injured employee. However, the Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, granting Bowery Savings Bank and Swanke Hayden Connell & Partners judgment over against Atlantic Scaffold & Ladder Co. and Rambusch Decorating Co. on the basis of full contractual indemnity.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Bowery Savings Bank and Swanke Hayden Connell & Partners are entitled to full contractual indemnification from Atlantic Scaffold & Ladder Co. and Rambusch Decorating Co., or whether their recovery should be limited to contribution due to the absence of express language referring to the negligence of the indemnitee in the indemnity clause.

    Holding

    Yes, because the intention to indemnify can be clearly implied from the language and purposes of the entire agreement and the surrounding facts and circumstances, and full contractual indemnification was not prohibited by the statute in effect at the time of the accident.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on Labor Law § 240(1), which places a non-delegable duty on owners and contractors to provide safe scaffolding for workers. The court found that Atlantic, as the scaffolding contractor, was properly held liable to the plaintiff for his injuries under this statute. The court also upheld the finding that Swanke, due to its activities at the jobsite, was Bowery’s agent and thus liable under Labor Law § 240(1). Regarding the indemnity claims, the court stated that a party is entitled to full contractual indemnification provided that the “intention to indemnify can be clearly implied from the language and purposes of the entire agreement and the surrounding facts and circumstances” (Margolin v New York Life Ins. Co., 32 NY2d 149, 153). The court further noted that, at the time of the accident, General Obligations Law former § 5-322.1 (as amended by L 1981, ch 964) did not prohibit such full contractual indemnification. The court distinguished the case from situations where the indemnity clause explicitly excludes indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence. The court emphasized that the indemnity clauses in the contracts at issue demonstrated a clear intent for the contractors to bear the ultimate responsibility for claims arising from their work, even if the owner or architect were also found liable under Labor Law § 240(1). This case underscores the importance of carefully drafting and interpreting indemnity agreements in construction contracts, especially in the context of Labor Law claims. “Each Contractor [to] indemnify the Bank and the Architects against claims arising from his work, to the fullest extent permitted by law”.

  • Alberti v. Bouse, 29 N.Y.2d 437 (1972): Defining ‘Directing’ Under New York Labor Law §240

    Alberti v. Bouse, 29 N.Y.2d 437 (1972)

    For a general contractor to be liable under New York Labor Law §240 for injuries to a subcontractor’s employee, the contractor must have ‘directed’ the employee’s work, meaning there must be supervision of the manner and method of the work, not merely granting permission to use equipment.

    Summary

    Alberti, an employee of a painting subcontractor, was injured when he fell from scaffolding while working at a St. Lawrence University auditorium. He sued the general contractor, Bouse, claiming violations of Labor Law §240. Bouse had allowed the subcontractor to use scaffolding parts from its own supply. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that Bouse did not ‘direct’ Alberti’s work. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that merely granting permission to use equipment does not constitute ‘directing’ within the meaning of Labor Law §240, which requires supervision of the manner and method of the work.

    Facts

    Alberti was employed by Svendsen Decorators, Inc., a subcontractor for John W. Bouse Construction Corp., the general contractor.
    Alberti was injured in a fall from a scaffold while painting the ceiling of an auditorium.
    Svendsen’s own scaffolding was not high enough to reach the ceiling.
    Svendsen asked Bouse’s superintendent for permission to use some of Bouse’s tubular scaffolding parts.
    Bouse’s superintendent granted permission, stating Svendsen could use the scaffolding.
    There was no agreement for Bouse to supply the scaffolding nor any direction from Bouse on how to use it. It was simply permission.

    Procedural History

    Alberti sued Bouse, alleging common-law negligence and absolute liability under Labor Law §240.
    Alberti elected to proceed solely on the theory of absolute liability under Labor Law §240, dismissing the common-law negligence claim.
    The trial court dismissed the complaint, relying on Galbraith v. Pike & Son, finding no supervision, control, or contractual obligation by Bouse to provide scaffolding.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under Labor Law §240, a general contractor ‘directs’ the labor of a subcontractor’s employee when it grants permission to use its scaffolding, such that the general contractor can be held liable for injuries sustained by the employee due to defective scaffolding.

    Holding

    No, because ‘directing,’ as used in Labor Law §240, means supervision of the manner and method of the work to be performed, and the mere granting of permission to use scaffolding does not constitute such direction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s dismissal, emphasizing the strict and literal construction of the word ‘directing’ in Labor Law §240.
    The court distinguished between ‘permission’ and ‘direction,’ stating that a mere grant of permission or a favor done for the plaintiff’s convenience does not satisfy the affirmative ‘directing’ required by the statute. The Court stated, “‘Directing’…means just that; for one person to be “directed” by another, there must be supervision of the manner and method of the work to be performed. The words are to be construed strictly and literally.”
    The court cited Glass v. Gens-Jarboe, Inc. (306 N. Y. 786) as an analogous case where a painter, employed by a subcontractor, was injured by a defective plank he was permitted to use from the general contractor’s supply. The Court in Glass held that the case did not fall under §240 because there was only permission, not direction.
    The court also referenced Mendes v. Caristo Constr. Corp. (6 Y 2d 729) where a subcontractor was allowed to use the general contractor’s rope sling. The court held that such permissive language did not amount to direction under the Labor Law.
    The court also noted that even if Bouse had ‘directed’ Alberti, Alberti still needed to prove that the defect in the scaffolding was the proximate cause of his injuries. “Violation of the statute alone is not enough; plaintiff was obligated to show that the violation was a contributing cause of his fall and there was no proof of that essential element here.”

  • Sarnoff v. Charles Schad, Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 180 (1968): General Contractor’s Non-Delegable Duty to Provide Safe Scaffolding

    Sarnoff v. Charles Schad, Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 180 (1968)

    A general contractor who undertakes to furnish scaffolding for subcontractors’ employees has a non-delegable duty under Labor Law § 240 to ensure the scaffolding is safe, even if the contractor delegates the actual construction to a subcontractor; however, a subcontractor who merely furnishes the scaffolding, without directing the injured worker, is not liable under the statute and is not liable under common-law negligence for patent defects.

    Summary

    Sarnoff, an employee of a painting subcontractor, was injured when he fell from a scaffold lacking a safety rail. He sued the general contractor, Associated Church Arts, and the scaffolding subcontractor, Charles Schad, Inc. The New York Court of Appeals held that Associated, having undertaken to furnish the scaffolding, had a non-delegable duty to comply with Labor Law § 240, which requires safety rails on scaffolds over 20 feet. However, Schad was not liable under the statute because it did not employ or direct Sarnoff. Schad also was not liable under common-law negligence because the lack of a safety rail was a patent defect.

    Facts

    Associated Church Arts (Associated) was the general contractor for repairs at a church. Associated hired Hans Schmidt as a painting subcontractor, who employed Sarnoff. Associated also contracted with Charles Schad, Inc. (Schad) to furnish and erect scaffolding for the project. Sarnoff was injured when a plank tilted on a scaffold, approximately 21 feet high and lacking a safety rail, causing him to fall.

    Procedural History

    Sarnoff sued Associated and Schad based on common-law negligence and violation of Labor Law § 240. The trial court initially found both defendants liable. However, the court later reversed its decision as to Schad’s liability, holding a supplier is not liable for a patently dangerous appliance. The Appellate Division affirmed. Associated appealed, arguing it was denied a jury trial on the Labor Law claim and that it delegated its duty. Sarnoff appealed the dismissal of claims against Schad.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a general contractor who contracts to furnish scaffolding for the use of subcontractors’ employees can be held liable under Labor Law § 240 for injuries resulting from a lack of safety rails, even if the contractor delegates the actual construction to a subcontractor?

    2. Whether a subcontractor who merely furnishes the scaffolding, without employing or directing the injured worker, can be held liable under Labor Law § 240?

    3. Whether a supplier of a chattel owes a duty, extending to all foreseeable users, of reasonable care in furnishing safe chattels where the alleged defect is patent?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because when a general contractor undertakes to furnish scaffolding, it cannot avoid its statutory duty under Labor Law § 240 by delegating this obligation to another subcontractor.

    2. No, because Labor Law § 240 imposes a duty on those employing or directing another to perform labor, and Schad did neither.

    3. No, because liability should not rest upon a theory that a supplier of a chattel owes a duty extending to all foreseeable users where the alleged defect is patent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Associated, by contracting to have Schad build scaffolding for the subcontractors, undertook the responsibility of furnishing the scaffolds and implicitly required the workmen to use them. The uncontroverted facts that the scaffolding lacked a safety rail, was over 20 feet high, and the jury’s special verdict on causation mandated a finding of a violation of Labor Law § 240. The court emphasized that the statute was intended to protect workmen and should be liberally construed. The court quoted Labor Law § 240, which states that a “person employing or directing another to perform labor…shall furnish or erect…scaffolding…which shall be so constructed…as to give proper protection”.

    As to Schad’s liability, the court found no evidence that Schad employed or directed the plaintiff. The court distinguished this from situations involving latent faults or hidden dangers. The court stated: “Liability should not rest upon a theory that a supplier of a chattel owes a duty, extending to all foreseeable users, of reasonable care in furnishing safe chattels where the alleged defect is patent.” Referring to *MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.*, the court concluded that the doctrine of liability as enunciated therein would not extend to a situation involving patent defects.