New York Law Review

Tag: Sandoval Hearing

  • People v. Sharp, 2024 NY Slip Op 05132 (2024): Defendant’s Right to be Present at Sandoval Hearing

    People v. Sharp, 2024 NY Slip Op 05132 (2024)

    A defendant has a right to be present and meaningfully participate in a Sandoval hearing, and a violation of this right requires reversal and a new trial, even if a subsequent hearing occurs in the defendant’s presence if the defendant was denied the opportunity for meaningful participation.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction, holding that the trial court violated the defendant’s right to be present during a Sandoval hearing. The trial court held an off-the-record conference on the prosecution’s motion to cross-examine the defendant on his prior criminal conduct without the defendant’s presence. While the court later announced its decision in court with the defendant present, the Court of Appeals found that this did not cure the initial error. The court reasoned that the defendant’s meaningful participation was necessary to point out factual errors, controvert the prosecutor’s assertions, and provide details about the underlying facts of prior convictions. The Court found that the defendant was deprived of this opportunity when the initial conference occurred in his absence and the subsequent proceeding did not afford him the opportunity to participate.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a defaced firearm and a loaded firearm. The prosecution filed a Sandoval application to cross-examine the defendant about his prior convictions. The trial court held an in-camera, off-the-record conference on the Sandoval motion with the prosecution and defense counsel, but without the defendant. At a subsequent in-court appearance, the trial court announced its rulings on the Sandoval application. The defendant’s attorney indicated that he was standing by the discussion that occurred in chambers. The defendant was later found guilty at a bench trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed.

    Procedural History

    The trial court held an in-camera conference regarding the Sandoval motion, excluding the defendant. The trial court then announced its Sandoval rulings in open court, with the defendant present. The defendant was convicted in a bench trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with one justice dissenting. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court violated the defendant’s right to be present during a material stage of the prosecution when it held a conference concerning the Sandoval application without him.

    2. Whether the subsequent proceedings cured the error of excluding the defendant from the initial Sandoval conference.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the defendant has a right to be present during the Sandoval hearing.

    2. No, because the subsequent in-court appearance did not allow the defendant to meaningfully participate in determining the merits of the Sandoval motion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on Criminal Procedure Law § 260.20, which states that a defendant must be present during the trial of an indictment. The court cited People v. Dokes, which held that a defendant has the right to be present at proceedings where the defendant has something valuable to contribute, including the substantive portion of a Sandoval hearing. The court reasoned that the defendant’s presence is crucial for pointing out errors in the criminal record, controverting the prosecutor’s assertions, and providing details about the underlying facts. The court held that the in-chambers conference was a material stage of the Sandoval hearing, and the defendant’s absence violated his right to be present.

    The court also held that the subsequent proceedings did not cure the error. The court emphasized that the defendant’s presence is not enough; the proceedings must afford the defendant a meaningful opportunity to participate. The court distinguished prior cases by noting that, in this case, the trial court did not ask the defendant if he wished to be heard, the court’s recitation of its rulings did not allow the defendant to meaningfully participate, and the defense counsel’s presence and comments did not satisfy the statute because it is the defendant’s right to be present.

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces the importance of a defendant’s presence during Sandoval hearings, including any preliminary discussions about the application. Attorneys must ensure that their clients are present for all stages of these hearings and are given the opportunity to participate. Specifically, the defendant must be in a position to contribute to a discussion of their criminal history to ensure that the court’s determination is not based solely on the prosecutor’s view of the facts. Failure to do so could lead to the reversal of a conviction. This ruling has implications for how trial courts should handle Sandoval hearings, mandating the defendant’s presence at all stages where factual matters are discussed. It is incumbent on the trial judge to ensure that a defendant understands their rights, including the opportunity to be heard on the application, and to avoid simply reiterating rulings previously made in the defendant’s absence. Additionally, this case illustrates that mere notice of the application is not enough; actual participation is required. It is important to remember that even if defense counsel is present and active, the defendant’s individual presence is still crucial for the protection of their rights.

  • People v. Sharp, 2024 NY Slip Op 05132 (2024): Right to be Present at Sandoval Hearing

    People v. Sharp, 2024 NY Slip Op 05132 (2024)

    A defendant’s right to be present during a Sandoval hearing is violated when the court holds an in-chambers conference on the admissibility of prior criminal conduct without the defendant’s presence, and the subsequent in-court proceeding does not provide an opportunity for meaningful participation.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction, holding that the trial court violated his right to be present at a critical stage of the proceedings, specifically during a Sandoval hearing, by holding an in-chambers conference about the defendant’s prior criminal history without his presence. Even though a subsequent hearing was held with the defendant present, the Court found that this did not cure the initial error because the defendant was not given an opportunity for meaningful participation. The Court emphasized the defendant’s right to be present to address factual errors, controvert the prosecutor’s assertions, and provide details about the underlying facts of prior convictions.

    Facts

    Eric D. Sharp was charged with firearm offenses. Before trial, the prosecution filed a Sandoval application seeking to cross-examine Sharp about his prior convictions. The trial court held an in-chambers conference on the motion with the prosecution and defense counsel, but Sharp was not present. Subsequently, the court announced its Sandoval rulings in Sharp’s presence. Defense counsel stood by the prior discussion, and the court proceeded to rule on the admissibility of Sharp’s prior convictions. Sharp was ultimately convicted after a bench trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, but the dissenting justice granted Sharp leave to appeal.

    Procedural History

    Sharp was convicted in trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The dissenting justice granted Sharp leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court violated Sharp’s right to be present during a material stage of the prosecution by holding an in-chambers Sandoval hearing without his presence.

    2. Whether the subsequent in-court proceeding cured any violation of Sharp’s right to be present.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the in-chambers conference on the Sandoval application constituted a material stage of the proceedings at which Sharp had a right to be present.

    2. No, because the subsequent in-court proceeding did not provide Sharp with an opportunity for meaningful participation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Criminal Procedure Law § 260.20, which guarantees a defendant’s right to be present at trial, and case law, including People v. Dokes, holding that this right extends to the substantive portion of Sandoval hearings. The Court found that the in-chambers conference was a material stage because it concerned factual matters about which the defendant might have had unique knowledge, which could have been used to advance the defendant’s position. The Court distinguished the case from situations where a curative hearing provides an opportunity for meaningful participation. Here, the subsequent hearing did not cure the violation because the court did not ask the defendant if he wished to be heard, nor did the court meaningfully explain the nature of the proceeding to the defendant, nor did the court entertain any arguments on the merits. Instead, the court merely reiterated its rulings. The Court emphasized that the right to be present belonged to the defendant personally, not counsel, and required an affirmative waiver for a defendant’s exclusion.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the critical importance of a defendant’s presence during Sandoval proceedings. Attorneys must ensure that their clients are present during all substantive discussions about prior criminal conduct. The court’s ruling emphasizes that a defendant’s presence and opportunity to participate meaningfully are required. A defendant’s mere awareness of a Sandoval application or counsel’s presence is not sufficient to protect the right to be present. When a court holds a hearing in a defendant’s absence, the court must provide a subsequent opportunity for meaningful participation, which includes the ability to present arguments and address factual issues. Failure to do so can result in reversal of a conviction and the need for a new trial. Courts should be explicit in inviting defendants to participate and explaining the significance of the proceedings.

  • People v. Smith, 18 N.Y.3d 588 (2012): Limits on a Defendant’s Right to Substitute Counsel and Sandoval Rulings

    People v. Smith, 18 N.Y.3d 588 (2012)

    A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a defendant’s request for substitution of assigned counsel absent a showing of good cause, nor does it abuse its discretion in its Sandoval ruling when it permits the prosecutor to refer to the nature, date, and location of prior convictions, even if drug-related, provided the court offers a limiting instruction.

    Summary

    Smith was arrested for selling cocaine. Before trial, he requested a new attorney, claiming his current counsel was inadequate. The court denied this request after determining counsel was competent and prepared. At a Sandoval hearing, the court ruled that if Smith testified, the prosecution could mention his prior felony drug convictions by name, date, and location, but not the underlying facts. Smith was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Smith’s request for new counsel or in its Sandoval ruling. The Court reiterated that good cause must be shown to warrant substitution of counsel and found none here. The Court also found that the Sandoval ruling was within the trial court’s discretion because it properly balanced probative value and potential prejudice.

    Facts

    Detectives observed Smith in two apparent drug transactions. After arresting the buyers, who possessed crack cocaine, they arrested Smith, finding additional drugs on him. Smith was charged with multiple counts of criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance.

    Procedural History

    Prior to jury selection, Smith requested a new attorney, which was denied. At the Sandoval hearing, the court partially denied Smith’s request to preclude mention of prior drug convictions. Smith was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed, modifying only for resentencing. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s request for the substitution of assigned counsel.

    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by issuing a Sandoval ruling that permitted the prosecutor to refer to the defendant’s prior drug-related felony convictions by naming the specific crimes, should he choose to testify.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate good cause for the substitution of assigned counsel.

    2. No, because the trial court properly exercised its discretion in its Sandoval ruling by limiting the scope of permissible cross-examination and offering a limiting instruction to the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding substitution of counsel, the Court of Appeals stated that while defendants have a right to effective counsel, substitution is only warranted for “good cause,” such as a conflict of interest or irreconcilable conflict. The Court emphasized that “good cause determinations are necessarily case-specific and therefore fall within the discretion of the trial court”. Here, the trial court conducted an inquiry and determined counsel was competent and prepared. The disagreement was primarily over strategy, which is insufficient for substitution. As the Court noted, courts have upheld refusal to assign substitute counsel where “tensions between client and counsel on the eve of trial were the precipitate of differences over strategy”.

    Regarding the Sandoval ruling, the Court acknowledged the potential prejudice of admitting prior drug convictions in a drug trial, due to the belief that “persons previously convicted of narcotics offenses are likely to be habitual offenders.” However, the Court reiterated that the determination of what prior convictions can be used for impeachment remains within the discretion of the trial court, citing People v. Hayes. Here, the trial court limited the prosecutor’s inquiry to the name of the crime, county, and date of conviction and promised a limiting instruction. This balanced the probative value of the evidence against the potential prejudice to the defendant, thus no abuse of discretion.

  • People v. Fabricio, 3 N.Y.3d 402 (2004): Defendant’s Right to Be Present at Sandoval or Ventimiglia Hearings

    People v. Fabricio, 3 N.Y.3d 402 (2004)

    A defendant’s right to be present at a sidebar conference is not violated when the conference concerns a pure legal issue, such as the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement, rather than factual matters about which the defendant has peculiar knowledge.

    Summary

    Fabricio was convicted of murder and robbery. During his trial, a sidebar conference was held to discuss the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement he allegedly made. Fabricio was not present at the sidebar. The New York Court of Appeals held that Fabricio’s right to be present was not violated because the sidebar concerned a legal issue – whether his testimony opened the door to the use of his prior inconsistent statement and whether the prosecution had a good faith basis to inquire about it – and did not involve factual matters about which Fabricio had peculiar knowledge. This case clarifies the scope of a defendant’s right to be present during legal discussions at trial.

    Facts

    Fabricio was charged with murder and robbery in connection with the shooting death of Jose Perez. At trial, Fabricio testified that he traveled from Florida to New York the day before the crimes and that an accomplice, Pedro Aviles, paid for his airfare. During cross-examination, the prosecutor sought to question Fabricio about a statement he allegedly made to Aviles and a taxi driver that he obtained the money for the ticket by committing a robbery. A sidebar conference was requested by the prosecution to determine the admissibility of this statement.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court convicted Fabricio of murder and robbery. Fabricio appealed, arguing he was denied his right to be present at a material stage of the trial because he was excluded from the sidebar conference, which he characterized as a Sandoval/Ventimiglia hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the conference concerned a pure issue of law. The dissenting Justice granted permission for Fabricio to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a sidebar conference, held while the defendant was on the witness stand and the jury was seated, constituted a Sandoval or Ventimiglia hearing at which the defendant had a right to be present, when the conference concerned the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement.

    Holding

    No, because the sidebar conference focused on a pure question of law – whether the defendant’s testimony opened the door to the use of his prior inconsistent statement and whether the People had a good faith basis to inquire about it – and did not implicate the defendant’s peculiar factual knowledge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a defendant has a right to be present during a particular proceeding if there is a potential for the defendant to meaningfully participate in the discussions. An important consideration is whether the proceeding involved factual matters about which the defendant might have peculiar knowledge that would be useful in advancing the defendant’s position or countering the People’s position. The Court distinguished this case from Sandoval/Ventimiglia hearings, which involve balancing the probative value of proposed evidence against its prejudicial impact. Here, the sidebar conference focused on a pure question of law: whether the defendant’s testimony “opened the door” to the use of his prior inconsistent statement and whether the People had a good faith basis to inquire about it. The Court stated, “Defendant did not have a right to be present, as the subject legal discussion did not implicate his peculiar factual knowledge or otherwise present the potential for his meaningful participation.”
    Furthermore, the Court noted that defense counsel only objected on the grounds of lack of notice, and the conference centered on that objection, with no inquiry about the alleged uncharged robbery itself. The Court found any claim based on Fabricio’s absence from the conference unpreserved for review.

  • People v. Brown, 98 N.Y.2d 226 (2002): Impeachment Using Attorney’s Prior Statements

    98 N.Y.2d 226 (2002)

    An attorney’s statements made in court on the client’s behalf during a pretrial hearing can be used to impeach the client’s testimony at trial if the statements are inconsistent and the client was the source of the information, unless the statement is part of a withdrawn alibi notice.

    Summary

    These consolidated appeals address whether a defendant can be impeached at trial using prior inconsistent statements made by their attorney. In People v. Brown, the court held that the defendant could be impeached with representations his attorney made at a pretrial Sandoval hearing. In People v. Burgos-Santos, the court held that the defendant could not be impeached with a withdrawn alibi notice. The Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions, finding the impeachment proper in Brown and harmless error in Burgos-Santos. This case clarifies the limitations on using prior attorney statements for impeachment, especially regarding withdrawn alibi defenses.

    Facts

    In Brown, the defendant was convicted of selling a controlled substance. At trial, he claimed he was merely present at the scene for innocent purposes. The prosecution impeached him with statements from his former attorney during a pretrial Sandoval hearing, where the attorney stated Brown would testify he was there to purchase cocaine. Brown was present during the Sandoval hearing. In Burgos-Santos, the defendant was convicted of murder. At trial, he claimed the shooting was accidental during an assault. The prosecution impeached him with a withdrawn alibi notice stating he was home at the time of the shooting.

    Procedural History

    In Brown, the trial court allowed the impeachment, and the Appellate Division affirmed. In Burgos-Santos, the trial court also allowed the impeachment, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Both cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant can be impeached with prior inconsistent statements made by their attorney during a pretrial hearing when the defendant was the source of the information?

    2. Whether a defendant who presents a non-alibi defense can be impeached using a withdrawn alibi notice?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the attorney’s statements were made on the defendant’s behalf, based on information from the defendant, and inconsistent with the defendant’s trial testimony.

    2. No, because a withdrawn alibi notice should not be treated as an informal judicial admission for impeachment purposes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding Brown, the Court relied on People v. Rivera, which permitted impeachment using an attorney’s affidavit. The Court reasoned that Brown was the source of his attorney’s statements at the Sandoval hearing, the statements were made in court to obtain a ruling, and they were inconsistent with Brown’s trial testimony. The attorney-client privilege was waived when the statements were made in open court.

    Regarding Burgos-Santos, the Court distinguished Rivera, emphasizing that withdrawn alibi notices should not be used for impeachment. The Court noted the potential for such use to infringe on a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights and due process rights. The Court reasoned that allowing impeachment with withdrawn alibi notices could inhibit defendants from abandoning inaccurate defenses, undermining the truth-seeking function of the trial. Referencing Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 12.1(f), the Court adopted a common-law rule prohibiting the use of withdrawn alibi notices for impeachment. However, the Court deemed the error harmless, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the minimal probability of acquittal absent the error, citing People v. Crimmins. The Court emphasized that multiple eyewitnesses contradicted the defendant’s testimony and aligned against the defendant’s credibility, which was also diminished by his criminal history and alias usage.

  • People v. Miller, 91 N.Y.2d 372 (1998): Cross-Examination on Prior Guilty Pleas Before Sentencing

    People v. Miller, 91 N.Y.2d 372 (1998)

    A defendant who pleads guilty to a crime waives their Fifth Amendment rights regarding the facts admitted during the plea allocution, and may be cross-examined on those admissions in a subsequent trial, even if sentencing on the prior plea is pending, absent a credible claim that the plea is subject to vacatur.

    Summary

    Miller was convicted of robbery. Prior to trial, the court ruled that if Miller testified, the prosecution could cross-examine him regarding a prior robbery to which he had pleaded guilty but had not yet been sentenced. The cross-examination was limited to the facts Miller admitted during his guilty plea allocution. Miller appealed, arguing that because sentencing was pending on the prior robbery, cross-examination violated his right against self-incrimination. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Miller waived his Fifth Amendment rights regarding the admitted facts when he pleaded guilty, and had not demonstrated a risk of incriminating himself beyond those admitted facts.

    Facts

    Miller robbed three children at a McDonald’s restaurant on August 11, 1996. He pleaded guilty to attempted robbery on November 20, 1996, admitting under oath to taking $70 from a child. Before sentencing, Miller was arrested for another robbery. At the trial for the second robbery, the People sought to cross-examine Miller about the McDonald’s robbery, for which he was still awaiting sentencing. The trial court permitted the cross-examination, limited to Miller’s admissions during his guilty plea allocution for the McDonald’s robbery. Miller did not testify and was convicted.

    Procedural History

    After being convicted of robbery, Miller appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted Miller leave to appeal to that court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court errs in permitting the prosecution to cross-examine a defendant about a prior crime to which the defendant pleaded guilty, but for which the defendant has not yet been sentenced, when the cross-examination is limited to the defendant’s admissions during the guilty plea allocution?

    Holding

    No, because the defendant waived his Fifth Amendment rights regarding the facts admitted during the plea allocution and did not demonstrate a credible risk of incriminating himself beyond those admitted facts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Betts, 70 N.Y.2d 289 (1987), where the Court held that a defendant who testifies does not waive their self-incrimination rights with respect to “pending” unrelated criminal charges. Here, Miller had already pleaded guilty to the prior crime, waiving his Fifth Amendment rights in connection with the facts he admitted during the plea allocution. The Court emphasized that Miller never suggested that his guilty plea was vulnerable or that there was any ground upon which it could be vacated. The Court also distinguished Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999), where the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s guilty plea did not waive her right to remain silent during sentencing proceedings where further testimony was expected. In this case, there was no basis for Miller to fear or expect a sentencing hearing at which proof would be taken or that he would be called upon to incriminate himself beyond what he admitted at the plea allocution. The Court stated, “By meticulously limiting the inquiry as it did, the trial court foreclosed any incriminating inquiry as to the McDonald’s crime, save what defendant himself said when he relinquished his Fifth Amendment rights during the plea colloquy.” The court concluded that Miller’s arguments regarding self-incrimination were theoretical and unavailing because the trial court only allowed questioning related to what Miller already admitted to under oath. The Court noted that it was not deciding whether People v. Spitaleri, 9 N.Y.2d 168 (1961), which barred the use of withdrawn guilty pleas, should be extended to admissions made in another trial.

  • People v. Hayes, 97 N.Y.2d 203 (2002): Scope of Cross-Examination Regarding Prior Convictions

    People v. Hayes, 97 N.Y.2d 203 (2002)

    A trial court has discretion to permit cross-examination of a testifying defendant regarding the nature of prior convictions, even if those convictions are similar to the charged crime; there is no per se rule prohibiting such inquiry.

    Summary

    Hayes was convicted of rape, coercion, burglary, and unlawful imprisonment. Prior to trial, the court ruled that if Hayes testified, the prosecution could cross-examine him on the existence and nature of four prior convictions, including sexual abuse and aggravated sexual assault, but not the underlying facts. Hayes did not testify, and was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the cross-examination should have been limited to the mere existence of prior convictions. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion and that similarity of prior convictions does not automatically preclude inquiry into their nature.

    Facts

    Complainant was placed in a motel due to domestic violence. Hayes allegedly entered her room, raped her, and stole money. A physical exam revealed evidence consistent with nonconsensual intercourse. Hayes conceded intercourse but claimed it was consensual. The People sought to cross-examine Hayes on six prior convictions if he testified. Defense argued this would be unduly prejudicial, particularly because the case hinged on the credibility of the complainant versus Hayes.

    Procedural History

    The County Court permitted cross-examination on the existence and nature of four prior convictions, prohibiting inquiry into the underlying facts. Hayes did not testify and was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the County Court abused its discretion by permitting cross-examination regarding the nature of similar prior crimes. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court errs when it permits cross-examination of a testifying defendant regarding the nature of prior convictions that are similar to the crime for which the defendant is currently on trial, or whether the cross-examination must be limited to the mere existence of the prior convictions.

    Holding

    No, because a trial court has discretion to determine the scope of cross-examination regarding prior convictions, and there is no absolute prohibition on inquiry into the nature of prior similar crimes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a criminal defendant who testifies may be cross-examined on prior crimes and bad acts that bear on credibility. The Court cited People v. Sandoval, stating that prior crimes revealing a willingness to place self-interest ahead of principle are relevant to credibility. The Court emphasized the trial court’s discretion in making Sandoval rulings, noting that while there are risks of prejudice and deterrence, the trial court can minimize them by limiting the scope of cross-examination. The Court stated, “Measured against such precedents, which are plentiful, plainly the Appellate Division erred in requiring that cross-examination be limited to the mere existence of defendant’s prior convictions where prior crimes are similar to the pending charges.” It distinguished the present case from situations where a fixed rule would prohibit inquiry into similar crimes, concluding the trial court appropriately weighed concerns and limited the scope of permissible cross-examination. The court noted the possible unavailability of other witnesses increases the importance of the defendant’s credibility.

  • People v. Robles, 86 N.Y.2d 764 (1995): Requirement to Preserve Error When Defendant is Physically Present

    People v. Robles, 86 N.Y.2d 764 (1995)

    When a defendant is physically present with counsel at a Sandoval hearing, traditional trial court preservation rules apply, requiring the defendant to raise any objections, such as the need for an interpreter, to the trial court to preserve the issue for appeal.

    Summary

    Defendant Robles was convicted of criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance. He argued on appeal that his conviction should be overturned because he was constructively absent from his Sandoval hearing due to the lack of an interpreter, even though he was physically present with his lawyer and no interpreter was requested. The Court of Appeals held that because Robles was physically present with counsel and failed to request an interpreter or object to the hearing proceeding without one, he failed to preserve the issue for appeal. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to traditional preservation rules when the defendant is physically present and represented by counsel.

    Facts

    Robles was charged with criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. He attended the Sandoval hearing with his lawyer, but no interpreter was present. Defense counsel did not request an interpreter or object to the hearing proceeding without one. Robles was subsequently convicted after a jury trial.

    Procedural History

    At the Appellate Division, Robles argued for the first time that the lack of an interpreter at his Sandoval hearing rendered him constructively absent, entitling him to a new trial. The Appellate Division initially affirmed his conviction, holding that the argument was unpreserved. However, upon reargument, the Appellate Division reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, concluding that Robles did not have to preserve the claim. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant who is physically present with counsel at a Sandoval hearing, but who fails to request an interpreter or object to the hearing proceeding without one, must preserve the issue for appeal.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plain language of CPL 260.20 and its purpose support the conclusion that traditional trial court preservation rules apply when a defendant is physically present with their lawyer.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the key issue was whether trial court preservation was required for the interpreter claim at the Sandoval hearing. CPL 260.20 grants a defendant the right to be “personally present during the trial of an indictment.” While the Court had previously held that this right extends to the Sandoval stage and that defendants need not preserve violations of this right when actually absent (citing People v. Dokes, 79 NY2d 656), Robles conceded that he and his lawyer were physically present at the hearing. The Court distinguished this case from situations where the defendant was actually absent or otherwise unable to understand the proceedings. The Court reasoned that maintaining customary preservation rules in cases where the defendant is physically present and represented by counsel is a more practical way to satisfy the underlying purposes of the statute and its related policies. As the Court noted, “We conclude that maintaining customary preservation rules in a case such as this is prudent and a more definite, practical way to fairly satisfy the underlying purposes of the statute and attendant policies (compare, People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19).” The Court found that requiring preservation in these circumstances promotes fairness and efficiency in the judicial process.

  • People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656 (1992): Defendant’s Right to Be Present at Trial Proceedings

    People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656 (1992)

    A defendant has a right to be present during a trial when their presence has a reasonably substantial relation to the opportunity to defend against the charge; however, presence is not required when the proceeding involves only questions of law or procedure.

    Summary

    Dokes was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. At issue was whether Dokes’ presence was required at a side-bar conference, held outside his earshot, to determine if his direct testimony opened the door to cross-examination about a prior conviction. The Court of Appeals held that Dokes’ presence was not required because the side-bar conference involved a purely legal question regarding the admissibility of evidence. The court reasoned that the conference did not implicate Dokes’ peculiar factual knowledge, nor did it present the potential for his meaningful participation, distinguishing it from hearings where factual matters are discussed.

    Facts

    Dokes was arrested for selling two vials, one containing cocaine and one without, to an undercover officer. Prior to trial, the court ruled that the prosecution could question Dokes about his prior felony conviction for attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance but could not inquire into the underlying facts of that conviction. During his direct testimony, Dokes described himself as a hustler who sold fake drugs to avoid jail time, stating that he had a prior felony selling drugs and another felony would result in jail time. The prosecutor then requested a side-bar to ask about cross-examining Dokes about the underlying facts of the prior conviction, which also involved selling one fake and one real vial of cocaine.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the prosecution’s request. Dokes was convicted. The Appellate Division reduced Dokes’ sentence but otherwise affirmed the conviction, rejecting Dokes’ argument that he was denied his right to be present at a material stage of trial. Dokes appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s presence is required at a side-bar conference where the attorneys argue, and the court determines, the legal issue of whether the defendant’s testimony had opened the door to cross-examination about a prior crime.

    Holding

    No, because the side-bar conference involved a purely legal discussion and did not implicate the defendant’s peculiar factual knowledge, nor present the potential for his meaningful participation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that a defendant has a statutory right to be present during the trial, including jury impaneling, evidence introduction, summations, and jury instructions. Furthermore, due process requires a defendant’s presence at ancillary proceedings that have a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of the opportunity to defend against the charge. However, a defendant’s presence is not required when the proceeding at issue involves only questions of law or procedure. The court distinguished the side-bar from Ventimiglia and Sandoval hearings, noting that the side-bar did not implicate Dokes’ factual knowledge or potential for meaningful participation. Regarding Dokes’ contention that he did not open the door, the court stated that when a defendant testifies to facts conflicting with evidence precluded by a Sandoval ruling, the defendant opens the door and is subject to impeachment using the otherwise precluded evidence. The court stated, “Where, as here, a defendant testifies to facts that are in conflict with evidence precluded by a Sandoval ruling, he or she ‘opens the door’ on the issue in question, and ‘is properly subject to impeachment by the prosecution’s use of the otherwise precluded evidence’” (People v. Fardan, 82 N.Y.2d 638, 646). The court noted it gave proper limiting instructions, cautioning the jury that evidence of prior convictions could not provide a basis for evaluating defendant’s guilt.

  • People v. Gray, 84 N.Y.2d 709 (1995): Admissibility of Out-of-State Juvenile Convictions for Impeachment

    84 N.Y.2d 709 (1995)

    A trial court retains discretion to permit cross-examination of a testifying defendant regarding a prior criminal conviction from another state, even if the underlying conduct would only result in a juvenile delinquency adjudication in New York.

    Summary

    Ernest Gray was convicted of murder and robbery. Prior to trial, Gray sought to prevent the prosecution from using a prior Maryland felony conviction (cocaine trafficking at age 15) to impeach his credibility if he testified. Under New York law, this act would have been adjudicated in juvenile court. The trial court denied Gray’s motion, and he was convicted. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court’s Sandoval discretion extends to out-of-state convictions, even if the underlying act would have been treated differently in New York. The Court declined to create a per se rule excluding such convictions, emphasizing the trial court’s ability to consider the differing juvenile justice policies.

    Facts

    Harry Rhodes was found murdered in his truck. The truck’s rear door was open, the driver’s window was broken, and papers were strewn inside. Rhodes’ wallet and documents were found nearby.

    Ernest Gray and five others were arrested. Gray admitted in written and videotaped statements that he participated in the robbery of Rhodes.

    Procedural History

    Gray made a pretrial Sandoval motion to preclude the prosecution from using a 1990 New York misdemeanor conviction for criminal trespass and a 1989 Maryland felony conviction for cocaine trafficking (when Gray was 15) to impeach his credibility if he testified. The trial court denied the motion. Gray did not testify and was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s prior felony conviction in another state, for conduct that would only result in a juvenile delinquency adjudication in New York, is automatically inadmissible as cross-examination material under People v. Sandoval.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court’s broad discretion in Sandoval determinations extends to out-of-state convictions, and a per se rule automatically excluding such convictions is not required.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the well-established principle that a testifying defendant may be cross-examined about prior criminal, vicious, or immoral acts that bear on their credibility. The Court emphasized that Sandoval determinations are largely discretionary, and there are no per se rules requiring preclusion based on the age, nature, or number of prior crimes. The Court distinguished between juvenile delinquency adjudications in New York, which cannot be used for impeachment, and criminal convictions in foreign jurisdictions, which can be used if the underlying act constituted a crime in that jurisdiction.

    The Court acknowledged New York’s policy of protecting young persons from acquiring the stigma of criminal convictions but reasoned that New York’s interest in adjudicating criminal acts outside the state is less compelling and does not require automatically overriding another jurisdiction’s treatment of youth crime. The court also referenced People v. Kuey, where it held that New York courts may defer to other jurisdictions’ policies in sentencing matters.

    While the court declined to adopt a per se rule, it stated that the trial court should be sensitive to the differences between the juvenile justice policies of New York and the foreign state. The court found no abuse of discretion in this case.

    Judge Levine’s concurring opinion argued for a per se rule barring cross-examination on out-of-state convictions based on conduct that would only result in a juvenile delinquency adjudication in New York, to maintain consistency with New York’s policy of protecting youths from criminal status for nonviolent crimes. However, Judge Levine agreed that the Sandoval error was harmless here.