New York Law Review

Tag: Same-Sex Relationship

  • H.M. v. E.T., 14 N.Y.3d 521 (2010): Limits on Family Court Jurisdiction to Order Child Support

    H.M. v. E.T., 14 N.Y.3d 521 (2010)

    Family Court’s jurisdiction is limited by statute; it cannot compel child support from an individual lacking a biological or legal parental connection to the child based solely on equitable principles where no statutory basis exists for such an order.

    Summary

    H.M. petitioned for child support from her former same-sex partner, E.T., under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). The child was conceived during their relationship but E.T. ended the relationship when the child was three months old. The New York Court of Appeals held that Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order E.T. to pay child support because E.T. had no biological or legal relationship to the child. Family Court’s jurisdiction is limited and it cannot grant equitable relief to create a support obligation where none exists under the Family Court Act.

    Facts

    H.M. and E.T. were formerly same-sex partners. H.M. gave birth to a child conceived during their relationship. E.T. ended the relationship with H.M. when the child was three months old. H.M. then filed a petition seeking to compel E.T. to pay child support for the child.

    Procedural History

    H.M. filed a support petition in Family Court under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). The Family Court granted the petition and ordered E.T. to pay child support. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Family Court lacked jurisdiction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, but on reargument, adhered to its original determination and reversed the Family Court’s order, dismissing the petition.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction to order a person to pay child support when that person has no biological or legal parental connection to the child.

    Holding

    No, because Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and lacks the equitable power to create a parental obligation for child support purposes where no such obligation exists under the law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, possessing only the powers granted to it by statute or the State Constitution. The Court emphasized that Family Court has no general equity jurisdiction and cannot grant equitable relief. The Court analyzed Family Court Act § 413 (1) (a), which states that “the parents of a child…are chargeable with the support of such child.” The Court noted that “parent” typically denotes more than responsibility for conception and birth, encompassing natural, adoptive, or legally recognized guardians. The Court found that E.T. had no such legal connection to the child, as she was not a biological parent, adoptive parent, or legal guardian. Allowing the Family Court to compel child support in this situation would be an unauthorized exercise of equitable power. The dissent argued that the majority’s reading of Article 4 was too broad and inconsistent with the Family Court’s limited subject matter jurisdiction.

  • Matter of Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d 233 (1984): Adoption Cannot Formalize a Non-Filial Same-Sex Relationship

    Matter of Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d 233 (1984)

    Adoption statutes are intended to create a parent-child relationship and cannot be used to formalize a non-marital relationship, whether heterosexual or homosexual, between adults.

    Summary

    A 57-year-old man petitioned to adopt his 50-year-old male partner, with whom he had a long-term homosexual relationship, for social, financial, and emotional reasons. The Family Court denied the petition, stating the adoption was an attempt to use the law to achieve the benefits of marriage, wills, and contracts. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that adoption laws are designed to create parent-child relationships, not to provide legal status to non-marital relationships. The court reasoned that allowing such adoptions would be a distortion of the law.

    Facts

    Two adult men, ages 57 and 50, had lived together in a homosexual relationship for over 25 years. They sought to formalize their relationship through adoption, citing concerns about housing, finances, inheritance, and mutual care in case of emergencies. They stated they considered themselves a family and sought legal recognition of their bond.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner filed for adoption in Family Court. The Family Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the adoption statute permits the adoption of an adult by another adult where the parties are in a homosexual relationship and seek to formalize their relationship for social, financial, and emotional reasons, but lack any parent-child relationship.

    Holding

    No, because adoption laws are intended to create a parent-child relationship and not to provide legal status to non-marital relationships, regardless of sexual orientation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that adoption, as defined in Section 110 of the Domestic Relations Law, creates a parent-child relationship. The court stated, “[i]t is plainly not a quasi-matrimonial vehicle to provide nonmarried partners with a legal imprimatur for their sexual relationship, be it heterosexual or homosexual.” The court highlighted that sexual intimacy is incompatible with the parent-child relationship. While adult adoptions are permitted, the underlying purpose of formalizing a parent-child relationship remains. The court noted that adoption is a statutory creation, unknown at common law, and therefore, its legislative purposes must be strictly observed. The court acknowledged that there are valid reasons for adult adoption, such as perpetuating a family name or formalizing a pre-existing filial relationship. However, in this case, the relationship was inconsistent with a parent-child dynamic. The court concluded that any change to permit such adoptions should come from the legislature, not the courts. The court explicitly rejected interpreting the statute in a way that would lead to an unreasonable result: “[s]uch would be the result if the Domestic Relations Law were interpreted to permit one lover, homosexual or heterosexual, to adopt the other and enjoy the sanction of the law on their feigned union as parent and child.”