New York Law Review

Tag: Safety Device

  • Runner v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 28 N.Y.3d 539 (2016): Clarifying the Scope of Labor Law § 240(1) and ‘Falling Objects’

    Runner v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 28 N.Y.3d 539 (2016)

    Labor Law § 240(1) applies to falling object injuries only when the object is being hoisted or secured, or requires securing for the purposes of the undertaking, and the injury is proximately caused by the absence or inadequacy of a safety device enumerated in the statute.

    Summary

    An electrician, Runner, was injured when a conduit pipe fell on his hand while relocating a pencil box. He sued under Labor Law § 240(1), claiming the compression coupling securing the conduit was inadequate. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s denial of summary judgment for the defendants (building owner and general contractor), holding that the compression coupling was not a safety device within the meaning of the statute. The Court clarified that § 240(1) liability for falling objects requires proof that the object was being hoisted or secured, or required securing for the task at hand, and that the injury resulted from the lack of, or inadequate, safety device listed in the statute. Here, the coupling’s purpose was support, not worker protection.

    Facts

    Runner, an electrician, was tasked with relocating a “pencil box” (access point for telecommunication wires) that was connected to conduit piping. The pencil box was affixed between two vertical sections of conduit. Runner cut the conduit above and below the pencil box, removed the box, and began drilling new holes to relocate the support. Approximately 15 minutes later, the top conduit section, which was connected to a horizontal conduit near the ceiling by a compression coupling, fell and injured Runner’s hand.

    Procedural History

    Runner sued the building owner (1095 Avenue of the Americas), the general contractor (J.T. Magen Construction), and the tenant (Dechert, LLP), among others, alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). Supreme Court granted Runner’s motion for partial summary judgment. The Appellate Division modified, denying Runner’s motion but otherwise affirming. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order regarding the building owner and general contractor, granting their motion for summary judgment, and answered the certified question in the negative.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the compression coupling connecting the conduit pipe constituted a safety device within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1), such that its alleged inadequacy could give rise to liability for a falling object injury.

    Holding

    No, because the compression coupling was not a safety device intended to protect against falling objects, but rather a standard component used to support the conduit/pencil box assembly.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability only where the failure to provide proper protection is a proximate cause of the worker’s injury. To prevail in a falling object case, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the object was being hoisted or secured, or required securing for the purposes of the undertaking, and that the injury was due to the absence or inadequacy of a safety device enumerated in the statute. The Court distinguished between devices meant to provide general support and those intended for worker protection from falling objects. Quoting Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., the court reiterated that a plaintiff must show that the object fell “because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute”. Here, the compression coupling’s function was to keep the conduit together, not to prevent it from falling and injuring workers. The court noted that the plaintiff’s argument would inappropriately extend the statute’s reach to any component that lends support to a structure. The Court also noted that the fact that plaintiff suggested a different type of coupling (set screw coupling) would have been better was of no moment, because both couplings serve the same purpose of support and neither is a safety device within the meaning of the statute.

  • Hagins v. General Foods Corp., 81 N.Y.2d 921 (1993): No Recalcitrant Worker Defense When No Safety Device Provided

    Hagins v. General Foods Corp., 81 N.Y.2d 921 (1993)

    The “recalcitrant worker” defense to Labor Law § 240(1) liability is unavailable when the owner or employer fails to provide adequate safety devices; an instruction to avoid unsafe equipment is not a substitute for a safety device.

    Summary

    Hagins sued General Foods for injuries sustained in a fall from a broken ladder, alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). General Foods impleaded Hagins’ employer, C.P. Ward, Inc. Hagins was instructed not to climb the ladder without assistance, but did so when his supervisor left. The Court of Appeals held that Hagins’ contributory negligence was not a defense and that the “recalcitrant worker” defense did not apply because no adequate safety devices were provided. The Court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment on the issue of General Foods’ liability.

    Facts

    Hagins was injured when he fell from a ladder at a General Foods plant. The ladder, owned by Hagins’ employer, C.P. Ward, Inc., was broken a week prior to the accident. Hagins was instructed not to climb the ladder unless someone secured it. Hagins climbed the ladder unassisted when his supervisor left the area.

    Procedural History

    Hagins sued General Foods, alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). General Foods impleaded C.P. Ward, Inc. The trial court granted Hagins’ motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of General Foods’ liability. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “recalcitrant worker” defense applies to a Labor Law § 240(1) claim when the employer provides no adequate safety devices, but instructs the worker not to use unsafe equipment?

    Holding

    No, because the “recalcitrant worker” defense requires a showing that the injured worker refused to use safety devices that were provided by the owner or employer. An instruction to avoid using unsafe equipment is not itself a “safety device.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that contributory negligence is not a defense to a Labor Law § 240(1) claim. The Court stated, “It is well settled that the injured’s contributory negligence is not a defense to a claim based on Labor Law § 240 (1) and that the injured’s culpability, if any, does not operate to reduce the owner/contractor’s liability for failing to provide adequate safety devices.”

    The Court also rejected the “recalcitrant worker” defense, stating that the defense “requires a showing that the injured worker refused to use the safety devices that were provided by the owner or employer.” Because no adequate safety devices were provided, the defense was inapplicable. The Court emphasized that an instruction to avoid using unsafe equipment does not constitute providing a “safety device”. The court cited Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, stating that this defense is inapplicable where no adequate safety devices are provided. In effect, the Court clarified that an employer cannot avoid liability under Labor Law § 240(1) by simply telling an employee to avoid unsafe conditions; the employer must affirmatively provide adequate safety devices.