New York Law Review

Tag: Safe Workplace

  • Jock v. Fien, 80 N.Y.2d 965 (1992): Duty to Provide Safe Workplace Extends to Manufacturing Processes Under Labor Law § 200

    Jock v. Fien, 80 N.Y.2d 965 (1992)

    Labor Law § 200, which codifies the common-law duty to provide a safe workplace, applies to factories and is not limited to construction work, thus extending to employees engaged in normal manufacturing processes.

    Summary

    An employee of Van Petty Excavating, Inc., which manufactured septic tanks, fell from a steel mold while preparing it. He sued the building owner and his employer, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6). The Appellate Division dismissed the complaint, finding the employee was engaged in a normal manufacturing process outside the scope of these Labor Law sections. The Court of Appeals modified the order, reinstating the Labor Law § 200 cause of action, holding that this section applies to factories and is not limited to construction work.

    Facts

    The injured plaintiff was an employee of Van Petty Excavating, Inc. Defendant Fien owned a building leased to Van Petty, which used the building to manufacture septic tanks. The plaintiff was injured when he fell from an upright steel mold he was preparing as part of his customary work in fabricating a concrete septic tank. The accident occurred within the factory building.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff and his spouse sued, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6). The Supreme Court denied motions for summary judgment by both plaintiffs and defendants. The Appellate Division modified by granting the defendants’ motions and dismissing the complaints. The Court of Appeals granted the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Labor Law § 200 applies to a manufacturing process within a factory.
    2. Whether Labor Law § 240(1) applies to the plaintiff’s work of preparing a steel mold for septic tank fabrication.
    3. Whether Labor Law § 241(6) applies to the plaintiff’s work of preparing a steel mold for septic tank fabrication.

    Holding

    1. Yes, Labor Law § 200 applies to a manufacturing process within a factory because the section is not limited to construction work and covers all places to which the Labor Law applies, including factories.
    2. No, Labor Law § 240(1) does not apply because the plaintiff’s work was not related to “erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing” of a building or structure.
    3. No, Labor Law § 241(6) does not apply because the plaintiff was not engaged in construction, excavation, or demolition work at the time of the accident.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order by reinstating the Labor Law § 200 cause of action. The court reasoned that Section 200(1) codifies the common-law duty to provide employees with a safe place to work and applies to all places covered by the Labor Law, including factories. The statute requires that these places be “so constructed, equipped, arranged, operated and conducted as to provide reasonable and adequate protection to the lives, health and safety” of employees. The court emphasized that Section 200 is not limited to construction work and does not exclude employees engaged in normal manufacturing processes.

    Regarding Labor Law § 240(1), the court held that the injured plaintiff was not engaged in any activity protected under this section. The court noted that Section 240(1) applies to work involving “erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing.” The plaintiff’s work in fabricating molds did not fall under any of these categories.

    Similarly, the court found that Labor Law § 241(6) did not apply because the plaintiff was not engaged in construction, excavation, or demolition work. The court cited 12 NYCRR 23-1.4(b)(13) to further define these terms. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s work fabricating the molds during the normal manufacturing process did not constitute “construction” or “excavation” work as defined by the Labor Law.

    The court explicitly declined to address whether Labor Law § 2(9) renders Article 11, specifically section 316, as the exclusive remedy because they resolved the Labor Law § 240 (1) and § 241 (6) causes of action on narrower grounds.

  • Gasparrini v. Jackson Heights Shopping Center, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 105 (1965): Limits of Owner’s Duty to Provide Safe Workplace

    Gasparrini v. Jackson Heights Shopping Center, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 105 (1965)

    An owner or general contractor’s duty to provide a safe workplace for subcontractor’s employees does not extend to hazards created by the subcontractor’s own defective equipment or methods.

    Summary

    Gasparrini, an employee of a subcontractor, was injured when a plank provided by his employer broke while he was working on a shopping center under construction. The Court of Appeals reversed a judgment in favor of Gasparrini, holding that the owner of the shopping center was not liable because the defective plank and the uncovered floor below were not a “place of work” furnished by the owner. The court emphasized that the owner’s duty to provide a safe workplace does not extend to the subcontractor’s own equipment or methods, or to hazards created as a detail of the subcontractor’s work.

    Facts

    Jackson Heights Shopping Center, Inc. owned a shopping center building under construction. Keystone Fireproofing Corporation, Gasparrini’s employer, was a subcontractor hired to install fiber glass insulation between the iron beams and the roof. Gasparrini was injured when a plank he was standing on broke, causing him to fall. The plank was provided by Keystone. The building was a single story with a cellar. Some of the floor was uncovered due to excavation, increasing the distance to the basement in that area.

    Procedural History

    Gasparrini sued Jackson Heights Shopping Center, Inc., the owner, and obtained a judgment in his favor at trial. The owner appealed, arguing that it had not breached any duty of care owed to Gasparrini. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision and dismissed the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the owner of a building under construction is liable for injuries sustained by a subcontractor’s employee when a plank provided by the subcontractor breaks, and the employee falls in an area where the floor below is uncovered due to excavation.

    Holding

    No, because the defective plank furnished by the plaintiff’s employer and the uncovered floor were not a “place of work” furnished by the owner, and the owner’s duty to provide a safe workplace does not extend to the subcontractor’s own equipment or methods.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while an owner or general contractor has a common-law duty to provide a safe place to work for employees of subcontractors, this duty does not extend to hazards created by the subcontractor’s own negligence or defective equipment. The court distinguished this case from situations where the owner failed to maintain safe “ways and approaches” to the work site. The court cited several precedents, including Butler v. D. M. W. Contr. Co., where a scaffold erected by the plaintiff’s employer broke, and the court held that the scaffold was neither a place of work nor a way of approach furnished by the owner.

    The court emphasized that the safe place to work rule, whether under statute or common law, does not include the subcontractor’s own plant or the work the subcontractor is doing. The court quoted Wohlfron v. Brooklyn Edison Co., stating that the owner’s duty is “clearly distinguishable from that arising through negligent acts of a subcontractor occurring as a detail of the work.”

    The dissent argued that the issue was based on the alleged concurrent negligence of the owner in failing to cover the excavation into which the plaintiff fell, raising a proper issue of fact for the jury. However, the majority rejected this argument, focusing on the fact that the injury was directly caused by the subcontractor’s own defective plank. This case clarifies that an owner isn’t responsible for the day-to-day safety of a subcontractor’s tools and methods.

  • Persichilli v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, 16 N.Y.2d 136 (1965): Duty to Provide Safe Workplace and Subcontractor Negligence

    Persichilli v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, 16 N.Y.2d 136 (1965)

    An owner or general contractor’s duty to provide a safe workplace does not extend to protecting employees of a subcontractor from hazards arising from the subcontractor’s own methods or equipment when the work is not inherently dangerous.

    Summary

    Persichilli, an employee of Nassau-Mascali Construction Corp. (a subcontractor), died from asphyxiation while working in a “blow-off pot”. His widow sued Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority (the owner) and Lockwood, Kessler, Bartlett, Inc. (the engineer), alleging failure to provide a safe workplace. The court held that neither Triborough nor the City of New York were liable because the duty to provide safety equipment (gas detectors, blowers) rested with the subcontractor, Nassau-Mascali. The court reasoned that a property owner is not responsible for injuries to a contractor’s employees when the contractor fails to provide necessary tools for a non-inherently dangerous job. The general contractor, Nassau-Mascali, was responsible for ensuring its employees’ safety through proper equipment and procedures.

    Facts

    Triborough contracted with Nassau-Mascali for construction work on Conduit Boulevard. Lockwood was contracted to supervise the work. The Department of Water Supply requested construction of a “blow-off pot” connected to a water main. This was added to Nassau-Mascali’s contract via an extra work order. Cracks later developed in the pavement near the “blow-off pot”. A conference was held, and it was suggested that a water leak might be causing the settling. The decedent, Persichilli, entered the “blow-off pot” to investigate and died of asphyxiation. Plaintiff alleged negligence in failing to test for gas or provide ventilation before Persichilli entered the pot.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff won a judgment against Triborough. Triborough’s third-party claim against Nassau-Mascali was also successful. The Appellate Division ordered a new trial. This appeal followed, addressing the liability of Triborough and the viability of its third-party claim.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Triborough, as the owner/general contractor, had a duty to provide gas detection and ventilation equipment to Nassau-Mascali’s employee, Persichilli, working in the “blow-off pot”.

    2. Whether Triborough’s third-party complaint against Nassau-Mascali should be upheld if Triborough is not liable to the plaintiff.

    Holding

    1. No, because the duty to provide safety equipment for the job rested with the subcontractor, Nassau-Mascali, and the work was not inherently dangerous.

    2. No, because if Triborough is not liable to the plaintiff, the third-party complaint against Nassau-Mascali must also fail.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the principle that the duty to provide a safe place to work is not breached when the injury arises from a defect in the subcontractor’s own plant, tools, or methods. The court cited Hess v. Bernheimer & Schwartz Brewing Co., which held that an employer is not responsible for a contractor’s negligence in failing to furnish proper appliances. The court noted that the contract between Triborough and Nassau-Mascali required Nassau-Mascali to furnish all necessary equipment. The court reasoned that “a property owner who engages an independent contractor to do a task which is not inherently dangerous should not be held to account for injuries to the contractor’s employees because the contractor has omitted to bring along a tool vital to the job he was to perform.” Since Triborough was not required to supply gas measuring devices or air blowers, its failure to do so did not create liability. The court emphasized that the plaintiff’s claim was solely based on the failure to provide safety equipment, not on any other defect in the premises. The court stated, “It cannot be said, however, that the duty of the employer is by this provision of the statute extended to supervision of the method of doing the work by the contractor, or that the employer thereby becomes responsible for the negligence of the contractor in failing to furnish proper appliances therefor.”

  • Gasperino v. Larsen Ford, Inc., 307 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1970): Duty to Provide Safe Workplace and Foreseeable Use

    Gasparino v. Larsen Ford, Inc., 42 A.D.2d 1047, 348 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1973)

    An employer has a duty to provide a safe workplace, which extends to reasonably foreseeable uses of the premises, even if those uses are not explicitly directed by the employer.

    Summary

    Gasparino, a window washer, sustained injuries when he fell from a window while cleaning it at Larsen Ford. He sued Larsen Ford, alleging negligence in failing to provide a safe workplace. The key issue was whether Larsen Ford furnished the window seat as a place to work, even though it wasn’t explicitly directed. The jury found in favor of Gasperino, but the appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the appellate division, holding that the jury could reasonably find that Larsen Ford knew the windows were being cleaned in this manner and had not provided any alternative safe method, thus establishing a breach of duty. The dissent argued that the jury’s verdict should stand because Ford had a duty to provide a safe workplace, and the evidence supported the finding that the window seat was the only available place to perform the work, with Ford’s knowledge.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Gasperino, a window washer, was injured while cleaning windows at Larsen Ford. The injury occurred when he fell from a window. The evidence suggested that the window seat was the only available place to perform the cleaning work.
    There was evidence suggesting that Larsen Ford employees knew that the windows were being cleaned in this manner.
    Larsen Ford did not provide any alternative or safe method for cleaning the windows.

    Procedural History

    The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Gasperino. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s judgment. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, reinstating the trial court’s verdict in favor of Gasperino.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Larsen Ford breached its duty to provide a safe workplace by failing to provide a safe means for cleaning the windows, given that its employees knew how the cleaning was being performed.

    Holding

    Yes, because the jury could reasonably find that Larsen Ford knew the windows were being cleaned in the manner they were, and that Larsen Ford had not provided any alternative safe means, thus establishing a breach of duty.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that an employer has an affirmative duty to provide employees with a safe place to work. The jury was justified in finding that the seat on the ventilating window was the only place from which this work could be done. The court emphasized that the critical question was whether Ford “furnished” this location as the place to do the work. The jury’s positive answer was well-founded on the proof that responsible employees of Ford furnished no other place or way to do the work and knew that the windows were being washed in this manner. The court distinguished this case from Borshowsky v. Altman & Co., where the complaint was dismissed because the plaintiff had been told to keep off the glass marquee, there were other safe ways to clean, and the defendant never knew the marquee was being used for that purpose. The dissent argued that the evidence supported the jury’s finding that Ford provided no other safe method and was aware of the existing practice.