People v. Dunn, 28 N.Y.2d 667 (1971)

The term “run at large” in relation to domestic animals requires evidence of generalized wandering or running, not merely isolated instances of an animal being on a neighbor’s property, to establish quasi-criminal responsibility.

Summary

Dunn was convicted of disorderly conduct for allowing her cats to “run at large” in violation of a village ordinance after her cat was found on a neighbor’s (who was also a policeman) lawn on two occasions. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Dunn was responsible for violating the ordinance. The court clarified that the term “run at large” implies a more generalized pattern of wandering, not isolated instances.

Facts

The key facts are:

Dunn owned a cat. A neighbor, who was also a policeman, observed Dunn’s cat on his lawn on two separate occasions. Dunn’s property was fenced in. The neighbor initiated a prosecution against Dunn, alleging she violated a village ordinance by allowing her cats to “run at large”.

Procedural History

The Village Court convicted Dunn of disorderly conduct. Dunn appealed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and dismissed the information against Dunn.

Issue(s)

Whether two isolated instances of a cat being on a neighbor’s lawn are sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the cat’s owner “allowed” the cat to “run at large” in violation of a village ordinance, thereby establishing quasi-criminal responsibility.

Holding

No, because the term “run at large” requires a more generalized pattern of wandering or running of animals than merely being present on a neighbor’s property on two isolated occasions.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that the prosecution failed to prove Dunn’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court emphasized that the information alleged Dunn “did allow two cats to run at large.” The court found that the mere ability of the cat to get over or through the fence on two occasions was insufficient to establish personal quasi-criminal responsibility. The court then addressed the meaning of “run at large,” stating: “Additionally, the term ‘run at large’ in relation to domestic animals does not normally mean that an animal is found on a neighbor’s property in an isolated instance. The term has had a consistent judicial construction to mean a more generalized wandering or running of animals”. The court cited precedent to support this interpretation. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions noted.