New York Law Review

Tag: Rules of Judicial Conduct

  • People v. Garson, 6 N.Y.3d 604 (2006): Using Rules of Judicial Conduct to Establish Criminal Liability

    6 N.Y.3d 604 (2006)

    The Rules of Judicial Conduct can be used to prove the element of a judge’s “duty as a public servant” within the meaning of Penal Law § 200.25, when the judge accepts a benefit for violating an official duty.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether evidence presented to a grand jury, indicating a judge accepted a benefit for violating his duty as a public servant under the Rules of Judicial Conduct, was sufficient to support charges of receiving reward for official misconduct. The Court held that the People could rely on the Rules to establish a violation of official duties, as the Rules set forth a constitutionally mandated duty. The Court reinstated six counts of receiving reward for official misconduct, finding the evidence legally sufficient. A count charging defendant with official misconduct was properly dismissed.

    Facts

    Gerald Garson, a New York Supreme Court Justice, allegedly engaged in a course of conduct from October 2001 to March 2003 where he violated his duties as a public servant in exchange for cash and gratuities. Evidence showed a relationship with attorney Paul Siminovsky, who regularly appeared before Garson, where Siminovsky provided meals and gifts expecting and receiving preferential treatment. Garson allegedly conducted improper ex parte conversations with Siminovsky about the “Levi case,” receiving a box of cigars as a reward. Garson also allegedly accepted monies for referring clients to Siminovsky, with Siminovsky compensating Garson for these referrals.

    Procedural History

    The grand jury indicted Garson on multiple counts, including six counts of receiving reward for official misconduct. The Supreme Court dismissed these six counts, holding that the Rules of Judicial Conduct could not establish a violation of duty as a public servant. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence presented to a grand jury that a judge accepted a benefit for violation of his duty as a public servant, as defined by the Rules of Judicial Conduct, is legally sufficient to support six counts of receiving reward for official misconduct in the second degree (Penal Law § 200.25).

    Holding

    Yes, because the Rules of Judicial Conduct set forth a constitutionally mandated duty upon the judiciary, and when combined with the additional factor of receiving a reward, a violation of that duty may serve as a basis for prosecution under Penal Law § 200.25.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Penal Law § 200.25, which addresses bribery involving public servants, is intended to be comprehensive to prevent abuses of power. The statute specifically defines “public servant” and “benefit” broadly. The legislature did not define “duty” to allow for factual resolution based on the misconduct alleged. The Court rejected the argument that judges should be immune from criminal prosecution when they receive a benefit after violating a judicial rule. The Court stated that to hold otherwise would lead to the incongruous result of insulating judges from criminal liability because they have a formal body of rules governing their conduct while subjecting other public servants to criminal liability for similar conduct. The Court distinguished People v. La Carrubba, noting that the Rules of Judicial Conduct, unlike the Code of Judicial Conduct in La Carrubba, are rooted in the State Constitution and are mandatory. A key distinction is that the criminal prosecution rests not on a violation of the Rules alone but on the acceptance of a benefit for violating an official duty defined by the Rules. As the Court stated, “The law binds all men equally, the Judges no less than the judged” (Matter of Stern v Morgenthau, 62 NY2d 331, 339 [1984]). Judge G.B. Smith dissented in part, arguing that the Rules of Judicial Conduct were not intended as criminal statutes and that there was no legislative intent to make criminal judicial conduct based upon the Rules.

  • Matter of Robert, 89 N.Y.2d 745 (1997): Judicial Misconduct and Impropriety

    Matter of Robert, 89 N.Y.2d 745 (1997)

    A judge must avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, and removal from office is warranted when a judge presides over cases involving close friends and confronts critics in an unprofessional manner, even after being cautioned about such behavior.

    Summary

    This case concerns a Justice of the Chester Town Court who was charged with judicial misconduct for presiding over cases involving his friends and for confronting a woman who had criticized him in a newspaper letter. The Commission on Judicial Conduct found him guilty of misconduct, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that his actions warranted removal from office because they demonstrated a lack of understanding of the serious nature of his conduct and a disregard for the rules of judicial conduct, even after being cautioned by the Commission.

    Facts

    The petitioner, a Justice of the Chester Town Court, was charged with violating the Rules of Judicial Conduct. The charges included presiding over cases involving his friends, despite prior cautions from the Commission on Judicial Conduct against such behavior. He was also charged with confronting a woman in the presence of her employer after she wrote a letter to the editor critical of him.

    Procedural History

    The Commission on Judicial Conduct designated a Referee who held a hearing. The Referee found the factual allegations of the charges were sustained. The Commission confirmed the Referee’s findings and determined the petitioner engaged in misconduct warranting removal from office. Three members of the Commission dissented with respect to the sanction, voting for censure instead. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the actions of the Justice of the Chester Town Court, specifically presiding over cases involving friends and confronting a critic, constitute judicial misconduct warranting removal from office.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Justice’s conduct demonstrated a failure to comprehend the serious nature of his actions and a disregard for the rules of judicial conduct, even after being cautioned by the Commission, thus making him unfit for judicial office.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that each of the charges against the Justice was established. The court cited Matter of Murphy, 82 NY2d 491, 495 and Matter of Fabrizio, 65 NY2d 275 to support the impropriety of presiding over cases involving close friends. The court emphasized that the Justice failed to understand the seriousness of his conduct. He even testified that he intended to continue presiding over matters involving his friends. The Court noted, “The fact that the misconduct continued even after petitioner was on notice that the Commission considered his actions improper demonstrates that he is not fit for judicial office (see, Rules of Judicial Conduct [22 NYCRR] § 100.2 [a]; Matter of Hamel, 88 NY2d 317, 320) and that the sanction of removal is appropriate (Matter of Sims, 61 NY2d 349, 356).” This continuation of misconduct, even after being cautioned, was a key factor in the Court’s decision to uphold the sanction of removal.