New York Law Review

Tag: RPAPL 753(4)

  • Nestor v. Diamond, 79 N.Y.2d 490 (1992): RPAPL 753(4) Cure Applies in Supreme Court Ejectment Actions

    Nestor v. Diamond, 79 N.Y.2d 490 (1992)

    RPAPL 753(4), which allows a tenant to cure a lease violation within ten days to avoid eviction, applies to ejectment actions commenced in the Supreme Court, not just summary proceedings in Civil Court.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a tenant can utilize RPAPL 753(4) to cure a lease breach in an ejectment action brought in Supreme Court, or if that remedy is limited to summary proceedings in Civil Court. The plaintiff, a cooperative apartment owner, sought to eject the defendant tenants for installing a washing machine without permission. The Court of Appeals held that RPAPL 753(4) applies to ejectment actions in Supreme Court, reasoning that the statute is remedial and should be liberally construed to allow tenants to cure breaches and remain in possession. The Court also denied the plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees, as she did not prevail on the central issue of possession.

    Facts

    The defendant, Helene Diamond, resided in a rent-stabilized apartment since 1965. The plaintiff, Marianne Nestor, purchased the apartment in 1982 subject to the defendant’s tenancy. In 1983, the plaintiff served notices to cure on the defendants for installing a washing machine and associated plumbing without the landlord’s consent. In 1985, the plaintiff initiated an ejectment action in Supreme Court, alleging breach of the lease.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court found a technical breach of the lease but granted the defendant time to cure the violation. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that RPAPL 753(4) was available in an ejectment action in Supreme Court. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether RPAPL 753(4), which allows a tenant to cure a lease violation to avoid eviction, applies to ejectment actions commenced in the Supreme Court.

    Holding

    Yes, because RPAPL 753(4) is a remedial statute that should be liberally construed to permit tenants to cure lease violations and remain in possession, regardless of whether the action is brought in Civil Court as a summary proceeding or in Supreme Court as an ejectment action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that RPAPL 753(4) is procedural and remedial and should be liberally construed to spread its beneficial effects as widely as possible. The statute aims to allow tenants to remain in possession by curing violations after adjudication and obviates the need for tenants to seek a Yellowstone injunction. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the reference to “warrant” in the statute limits its applicability to Civil Court summary proceedings, stating that such a construction would frustrate the statute’s purpose. The Court quoted Killington Investors v. Leino, 148 AD2d 334, 336, stating that a residential tenant who forebears from commencing a declaratory judgment, believing that he [or she] can obtain complete relief in the Civil Court, would be deprived of the benefit of the statute if the landlord unexpectedly commences an action for ejectment in Supreme Court instead of a summary holdover proceeding in the Civil Court, if we were to hold that RPAPL 753 (4) [does] not apply. The result would clearly frustrate the very purpose underlying the statute. The Court also noted the Supreme Court’s broad constitutional jurisdiction, which includes “‘all cases of every description in law and equity, from the most important and complicated to the most simple and insignificant’.” The Court concluded that the Legislature’s creation of new remedies tracked to a particular court does not divest the Supreme Court of its general power. Finally, the Court denied the plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees, as she did not prevail on the central issue of obtaining a possessory judgment, stating that Ordinarily, only a prevailing party is entitled to attorney’s fees.

  • Post v. 120 East End Avenue Corp., 62 N.Y.2d 19 (1984): Impact of RPAPL 753(4) on Yellowstone Injunctions

    62 N.Y.2d 19 (1984)

    RPAPL 753(4) grants residential tenants a statutory right to cure lease violations within ten days after a court determination in a summary proceeding, potentially limiting the need for a Yellowstone injunction.

    Summary

    This case addresses the interplay between Yellowstone injunctions and RPAPL 753(4), which provides residential tenants in New York City a ten-day stay to cure lease violations after an adverse judgment in a summary proceeding. The plaintiff, a psychiatrist, sought a Yellowstone injunction to prevent the termination of his lease based on alleged violations of residential use covenants. The court considered whether the newly enacted RPAPL 753(4) negated the need for a Yellowstone injunction. The Court of Appeals held that RPAPL 753(4) effectively allows Civil Court to impose a permanent injunction barring forfeiture of the lease if the tenant cures within the statutory period, but remitted the case to determine if the tenant could obtain complete relief in Civil Court.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, a psychiatrist, used his residential apartment to see patients after vacating his private office.
    The defendant landlord sent notices to the plaintiff asserting that this use violated the lease’s residential use clause. The landlord subsequently issued a notice of termination of the lease if the violation wasn’t cured by a specific date. Before the cure period expired, the plaintiff initiated a Supreme Court action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the lease termination.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order in Supreme Court.
    The defendant cross-moved to dismiss the complaint.
    The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion and granted the plaintiff a Yellowstone preliminary injunction.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, considering RPAPL 753(4), but differed on whether the violation could be cured within the statute’s ten-day period.
    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether RPAPL 753(4) eliminates the need for a Yellowstone injunction by providing sufficient protection to tenants facing lease termination for alleged violations?

    Holding

    No, not necessarily. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the matter. While RPAPL 753(4) provides a mechanism for tenants to cure lease violations after a determination in Civil Court, the statute’s applicability depends on whether the tenant can obtain complete relief in Civil Court. If the tenant cannot obtain complete relief in Civil Court, the jurisdiction of Supreme Court is still available because “the tenant is unable to make the necessary showing to invoke the equitable powers of Supreme Court.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that RPAPL 753(4) was intended to provide tenants with an opportunity to cure lease violations even after a court determination, effectively granting them what a Yellowstone injunction would provide. The Court of Appeals interpreted RPAPL 753(4) as “impressing its terms on residential leases and, in effect, authorizing Civil Court at the conclusion of summary proceedings to impose a permanent injunction in favor of the tenant barring forfeiture of the lease for the violation in dispute if the tenant cures within 10 days.” The court acknowledged that this interpretation limits the holding in First Nat. Stores v Yellowstone Shopping Center, where failure to obtain a stay resulted in lease termination. The court emphasized the policy benefits of resolving landlord-tenant disputes in Civil Court, and avoiding the delays associated with Supreme Court actions and pretrial proceedings. However, the court clarified that Supreme Court jurisdiction remains available if the tenant cannot obtain complete relief in Civil Court. Because the facts regarding the curability of the violation within ten days were not fully developed, the court remitted the case to Supreme Court for further proceedings. The court also cited the general rule that “a court applies the law as it exists at the time of appeal, not as it existed at the time of the original determination.”