New York Law Review

Tag: Routine Maintenance

  • Soto v. J. Crew Inc., 21 N.Y.3d 562 (2013): Defines Cleaning Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    21 N.Y.3d 562 (2013)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1), which imposes liability on building owners and contractors for failing to provide safety devices to workers exposed to elevation-related risks, does not extend to routine maintenance tasks such as dusting a shelf in a retail store.

    Summary

    Jose Soto, a commercial cleaner, was injured when he fell from a ladder while dusting a shelf in a J. Crew store. He sued under Labor Law § 240(1). The New York Court of Appeals held that dusting a shelf was routine maintenance, not “cleaning” under the statute. The Court established a four-factor test to determine whether an activity qualifies as cleaning under § 240(1), focusing on the routine nature of the task, the need for specialized equipment, the elevation risks involved, and the connection to construction-related activities. Because Soto’s activity did not meet these criteria, his claim was dismissed.

    Facts

    Jose Soto, an employee of Whelan Cleaning Services, was assigned to clean a J. Crew retail store. His duties included daily maintenance such as vacuuming, mopping, and dusting. On the day of the incident, a J. Crew employee asked Soto to dust a six-foot-high display shelf. Soto, using a four-foot ladder, fell while dusting the shelf, sustaining injuries. The ladder was in proper working order.

    Procedural History

    Soto sued J. Crew and the building owner under Labor Law § 240(1). Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the § 240(1) claim. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the dusting constituted routine maintenance and wasn’t protected by the statute. Soto appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the dusting of a display shelf in a retail store constitutes “cleaning” within the meaning of New York Labor Law § 240(1), thereby entitling the injured worker to the protections of the statute.

    Holding

    No, because the dusting of a display shelf is considered routine maintenance and does not involve the type of heightened elevation-related risks that Labor Law § 240(1) is designed to protect against.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that not all cleaning activities fall under the protection of Labor Law § 240(1). While commercial window washing is covered, routine maintenance is not. The Court established a four-factor test to determine whether an activity qualifies as “cleaning” under the statute. These factors are: (1) whether the task is routine and recurring; (2) whether it requires specialized equipment or expertise; (3) whether it involves insignificant elevation risks; and (4) whether it is related to any ongoing construction or renovation project. The Court stated, “Outside the sphere of commercial window washing (which we have already determined to be covered), an activity cannot be characterized as “cleaning” under the statute, if the task: (1) is routine… (2) requires neither specialized equipment or expertise… (3) generally involves insignificant elevation risks… and (4)…is unrelated to any ongoing construction…project.” Applying these factors, the Court found that Soto’s dusting activity was routine, required no special skills or equipment, involved minimal elevation risks, and was unrelated to any construction project. Therefore, Soto was not engaged in “cleaning” as defined by Labor Law § 240(1). The court referenced the example in Dahar v Holland Ladder & Mfg. Co., stating this case presented a scenario analogous to the bookstore employee who climbs a ladder to dust off a bookshelf, which the legislature never intended to cover.

  • Abbatiello v. Lancaster Studio Associates, 3 N.Y.3d 46 (2004): Labor Law § 240(1) and Owner Liability to Unauthorized Workers

    3 N.Y.3d 46 (2004)

    A building owner is not strictly liable under Labor Law § 240(1) for injuries sustained by a cable technician performing work on its property without the owner’s knowledge or consent, especially when the work constitutes routine maintenance.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a building owner can be held strictly liable under Labor Law § 240(1) for injuries to a cable technician who was working on the property without the owner’s awareness or permission. Anthony Abbatiello, a cable technician, was injured when a ladder he was using to access a cable junction box on Lancaster Studio Associates’ building bent, causing him to fall. Lancaster had no prior notice that Abbatiello would be on the premises. The Court of Appeals held that Lancaster was not liable under Labor Law § 240(1). The Court reasoned that Abbatiello was not an “employee” for purposes of the statute because there was no nexus between the owner and the worker, and the work being performed constituted routine maintenance.

    Facts

    Anthony Abbatiello, a cable technician for Paragon Cable Manhattan, was dispatched to Lancaster Studio Associates’ building in response to a tenant’s complaint about cable service. Lancaster had no prior notice that Abbatiello would be on the property. Abbatiello, unable to reach the tenant, located the junction box (15-20 feet above ground). While Abbatiello was inspecting the box from a ladder, the ladder bent, causing him to fall and sustain injuries.

    Procedural History

    Abbatiello sued Lancaster, alleging negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241. Lancaster brought a third-party action against Paragon, who counterclaimed. Supreme Court granted Lancaster’s and Paragon’s motions for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding no Labor Law § 240(1) liability because the owner did not authorize the work and the work was routine maintenance. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s ruling.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a building owner can be held strictly liable under Labor Law § 240(1) for injuries sustained by a cable technician performing work on its property without the owner’s knowledge or consent.
    2. Whether the work performed by the cable technician constitutes “repairing, altering” or other activities covered by Labor Law § 240(1), or whether it constitutes routine maintenance.

    Holding

    1. No, because the injured plaintiff was on the owner’s premises not by reason of any action of the owner but by reason of provisions of the Public Service Law, and thus, the plaintiff was not an employee for the purposes of Labor Law § 240(1).
    2. No, because the work involved the routine maintenance of a malfunctioning cable box.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that to be covered under Labor Law § 240(1), a plaintiff must demonstrate that they were “permitted or suffered to work on a building or structure and that he was hired by someone, be it [the] owner, contractor or their agent” (Whelen v Warwick Val. Civic & Social Club, 47 NY2d 970, 971 [1979]). The court distinguished this case from precedents like Celestine v City of New York, 86 AD2d 592 [2d Dept 1982], where liability was imposed on owners, because those cases involved some nexus between the owner and the worker (e.g., a lease agreement). Here, the technician’s presence was mandated by Public Service Law § 228, which requires landlords to allow cable installation. The court stated:

    “Lancaster cannot be charged with the duty of providing the safe working conditions contemplated by Labor Law § 240 (1) for cable television repair people of whom it is wholly unaware…Any permission to work on the premises was granted upon compulsion and no relationship existed between Lancaster and Paragon or the plaintiff.”

    Furthermore, the court agreed with the Appellate Division that the work being performed was routine maintenance, similar to Esposito v New York City Indus. Dev. Agency, 1 NY3d 526 (2003). The court stated that the technician was addressing “a common problem caused by rainwater accumulating in junction boxes affixed to building exteriors.” Therefore, the work did not constitute “repairing” as contemplated by Labor Law § 240(1). The court emphasized that imposing liability on the owner in this situation would create a new liability not envisioned by the Legislature.

  • Esposito v. New York City Indus. Dev. Agency, 1 N.Y.3d 526 (2003): Distinguishing Repairing from Routine Maintenance Under Labor Law § 240(1)

    Esposito v. New York City Indus. Dev. Agency, 1 N.Y.3d 526 (2003)

    Labor Law § 240(1), which imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors for elevation-related risks, does not extend to injuries sustained during routine maintenance, as distinguished from repairing, altering, or other enumerated activities.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, a maintenance worker, was injured when he fell from a ladder while attempting to remove a cover from an air conditioning unit during a routine monthly maintenance check. He sued under Labor Law § 240(1) and § 241(6). The Court of Appeals held that § 240(1) did not apply because the work constituted routine maintenance, not repairing. The court also found § 241(6) inapplicable outside of construction, demolition, or excavation contexts. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision dismissing the claims.

    Facts

    Plaintiff was a member of Local 94 Operating Engineers Union, which performed maintenance for a commercial building. He was conducting a monthly maintenance check of air conditioning units. He discovered a low amperage reading and heavy vibrations in a unit, indicating worn components. He returned with tools and parts to address the issue. While climbing a ladder to remove the unit’s cover, the ladder “kicked out,” causing him to fall and sustain injuries.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially held that the plaintiff could not sustain a claim under Labor Law § 240(1). The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiff’s activities at the time of the accident constituted “repairing” under Labor Law § 240(1), or merely routine maintenance.

    2. Whether Labor Law § 241(6) applies to maintenance work performed outside the context of construction, demolition, or excavation.

    Holding

    1. No, because replacing components that require replacement in the course of normal wear and tear constitutes routine maintenance, not “repairing” within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1).

    2. No, because Labor Law § 241(6) is inapplicable outside the construction, demolition, or excavation contexts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished “repairing” from “routine maintenance” under Labor Law § 240(1), citing Smith v. Shell Oil Co., 85 N.Y.2d 1000, 1002 (1995). The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s work involved replacing components that require replacement in the course of normal wear and tear. Therefore, it was routine maintenance, not “repairing” or any other enumerated activity covered by the statute. As for Labor Law § 241(6), the court relied on Nagel v. D & R Realty Corp., 99 N.Y.2d 98 (2002), to reaffirm its holding that § 241(6) is inapplicable outside the construction, demolition, or excavation contexts. The court emphasized a strict interpretation of the statute, focusing on the nature of the work being performed at the time of the injury. The decision underscores the importance of distinguishing between routine upkeep and more extensive repair or alteration work when evaluating claims under New York Labor Law. This case reinforces the principle that Labor Law § 240(1) is not a catch-all for any injury occurring at an elevated height but applies to specific activities with a higher degree of inherent risk related to construction and alteration. The court did not provide specific dissenting or concurring opinions.

  • Nagel v. D & R Realty Corp., 99 N.Y.2d 98 (2002): Labor Law § 241(6) Applies Only to Construction, Demolition, or Excavation

    Nagel v. D & R Realty Corp., 99 N.Y.2d 98 (2002)

    Labor Law § 241(6) imposes a nondelegable duty on owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate safety to workers only when the work being performed falls within the context of construction, demolition, or excavation, not routine maintenance.

    Summary

    Bruce Nagel, a laborer, was injured while performing a routine two-year safety inspection on an elevator. He sued D & R Realty Corp., the building owner, alleging violations of Labor Law § 241(6). The New York Court of Appeals held that Nagel could not recover under this section because his work constituted routine maintenance, not construction, demolition, or excavation. The Court emphasized that Labor Law § 241(6) is specifically designed to protect workers engaged in the inherently hazardous activities of construction, demolition, or excavation, as evidenced by the statute’s legislative history and associated regulations.

    Facts

    Bruce Nagel was performing a two-year safety inspection on top of an elevator. The purpose of the inspection was to ensure the elevator’s safety mechanisms, specifically the brakes, were functioning correctly. During the inspection, Nagel slipped on oil and fell, sustaining an injury to his right shoulder. The accident occurred approximately 1.5 hours into the two-hour inspection process. The Nagels then brought an action against D & R Realty Corp., alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1) and § 241 (6).

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted D & R Realty Corp.’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. The court reasoned that Nagel was performing routine maintenance work, which did not constitute construction, demolition, or excavation under Labor Law § 241(6). The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, clarifying that maintenance work only qualifies as construction if it involves significant structural work, not routine maintenance. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 241(6) applies to injuries sustained during routine maintenance work, specifically a two-year elevator safety inspection.

    Holding

    No, because Labor Law § 241(6) is intended to protect workers engaged in the inherently hazardous work of construction, excavation, or demolition, and routine maintenance does not fall within this scope.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the legislative history of Labor Law § 241(6) and the Industrial Code demonstrate a clear intent to protect workers from industrial accidents specifically connected with construction, demolition, or excavation. The Court highlighted that the statute’s title, “Construction, excavation and demolition work,” further supports this interpretation. The Court examined the Industrial Code’s definition of “construction work” (12 NYCRR 23-1.4[b][13]), which includes maintenance, but clarified that this definition must be construed consistently with the overall intent of Labor Law § 241(6). The Court reasoned that the regulation refers to protection in the construction, demolition, and excavation context. The Court distinguished this case from Mosher v. State of New York, where the plaintiff was injured while repaving a highway, an activity the court deemed to fall within the scope of Labor Law § 241(6) because it involved construction at a site. The court stated, “That the Legislature sought to protect workers from industrial accidents specifically in connection with construction, demolition or excavation work is, therefore, patent. In the present case, Nagel’s work of performing a two-year elevator test constituted maintenance work that was not connected to construction, demolition or excavation of a building or structure and is therefore not within the statute’s coverage.”

  • Smith v. Shell Oil Co., 85 N.Y.2d 1000 (1995): Applicability of NY Labor Law § 240(1) to Sign Maintenance

    Smith v. Shell Oil Co., 85 N.Y.2d 1000 (1995)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1), which imposes strict liability on owners and contractors for elevation-related risks, does not apply to routine maintenance activities such as changing a lightbulb, even when the task is performed on a structure covered by the statute.

    Summary

    The plaintiff, a maintenance mechanic, was injured when he fell from a ladder while attempting to change lightbulbs on a Shell Oil sign. He sued Shell Oil, alleging a violation of New York Labor Law § 240(1). The Court of Appeals held that while the sign qualified as a “structure” under the law, replacing a lightbulb constituted routine maintenance, not “repairing” or any other enumerated activity covered by the statute. Therefore, § 240(1) did not apply, and the defendants were not liable. This decision clarifies the distinction between repair and routine maintenance in the context of New York’s scaffolding law.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, employed by Island Pump and Tank Corp., was assigned to fix an illuminated Shell Oil sign at a Shell service station. He climbed an eight-foot A-frame ladder to inspect the sign. The ladder tipped, causing him to fall and sustain injuries. After the fall, he completed the task and determined that four lightbulbs needed replacement and replaced them.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued Shell Oil and Rye Shell, relying on Labor Law § 240(1). The defendants initiated an indemnification action against Island Pump and Tank Corp., the plaintiff’s employer. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the defendants and Island, dismissing the complaint, finding the sign was not a structure. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that changing a lightbulb was not “repairing” under the statute. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Shell sign constitutes a “structure” within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1)?

    2. Whether changing a lightbulb constitutes “repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure” under Labor Law § 240(1)?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Shell sign is a “production or piece of work artificially built up or composed of parts joined together in some definite manner”.

    2. No, because changing a lightbulb is considered routine maintenance, not “repairing” or any other enumerated activity under Labor Law § 240(1).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the Shell sign qualified as a “structure” based on its precedent in Lewis-Moors v. Contel of N.Y., where a telephone pole was deemed a structure. The court reasoned that the sign, like the telephone pole, was artificially built and composed of connected parts. However, the Court distinguished the act of changing a lightbulb from activities covered under Labor Law § 240(1). The Court stated, “An illuminated sign with a burnt-out lightbulb is not broken, and does not need repair. Rather it needs maintenance of a sort different from ‘painting, cleaning or pointing,’ the only types of maintenance provided for in the statute.” By framing the task as routine maintenance rather than repair, the Court limited the scope of § 240(1). The Court emphasized that the statute does not apply to all maintenance activities, only those specifically enumerated. This interpretation narrows the application of the strict liability imposed by § 240(1), preventing it from encompassing every task performed at an elevated height on a structure. The Court’s decision reflects a concern about broadening the scope of the statute beyond its intended purpose, which is to protect workers from the exceptional hazards of elevation-related tasks involving construction, demolition, and significant alterations or repairs. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions.