New York Law Review

Tag: Rosario Rule

  • People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 854 (1987): Preservation of Rosario Claims and Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose

    People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 854 (1987)

    To preserve a Rosario claim for appellate review, the prosecutor must specify any objections to furnishing requested materials at trial; otherwise, the issue is not preserved, and the court will not reach the merits of the Rosario claim.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse of his 11-year-old daughter. At trial, the defense sought to confront the complainant with statements she made to a social worker from the Bureau of Child Welfare (BCW), arguing these were prior statements relevant to her testimony. The prosecutor objected, citing privilege and the Family Court Act, and stated he possessed nothing relevant from BCW. The trial court sustained the objection. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prosecutor failed to adequately preserve objections to the defense’s Rosario claim because he didn’t specify his objections at trial, preventing the trial court from considering the matter and the defense from creating a proper record.

    Facts

    Defendant was accused by his 11-year-old daughter of rape and sexual abuse over several years.

    Defendant argued the accusations were fabricated by the child’s mother (from whom he was separated) to gain custody of their children.

    Defense counsel sought to cross-examine the daughter with prior statements made to a BCW social worker.

    The prosecutor claimed the statements were privileged and protected by the Family Court Act and asserted he had no relevant BCW material.

    The trial court denied the defense’s request for the statements.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant of rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecutor adequately preserved objections to the defense’s request for the complainant’s prior statements to a social worker under the Rosario rule.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecutor failed to specify his objections to furnishing the requested materials at trial, he did not preserve these arguments for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the prosecutor’s obligation to turn over a witness’s prior statements relating to the subject matter of their testimony, as established in People v. Rosario.

    The Court found that the prosecutor’s general reference to privilege and the Family Court Act was insufficient to invoke CPLR 4508, which governs social worker-client privilege. The court cited Matter of Grattan v. People to support this point.

    The prosecutor’s claim of possessing nothing relevant from BCW was deemed insufficient to argue on appeal that Rosario material doesn’t include statements in BCW custody.

    The Court stressed that the prosecutor’s failure to raise specific objections at trial deprived the trial judge of the opportunity to consider the issues and prevented the defense from creating a proper record. This record could have clarified the relationship between the People and BCW, the prosecutor’s access to BCW records, and who could assert or waive privilege under CPLR 4508, citing People v. Nieves and People v. Tutt.

    Because the Court did not reach the merits of the Rosario claim, it explicitly stated that it was not ruling on the availability of any of the requested materials. This leaves open questions about when the Rosario rule applies to materials held by outside agencies.

    The Court emphasized the importance of proper objections to allow the trial court to make informed decisions and to create a clear record for appeal. This case acts as a reminder to prosecutors that all objections to Rosario requests must be clearly laid out at trial.

  • Matter of Rodney B., 69 N.Y.2d 687 (1986): Mandatory Disclosure of Rosario Material in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings

    Matter of Rodney B., 69 N.Y.2d 687 (1986)

    In juvenile delinquency proceedings, the prosecution must disclose Rosario material (prior statements of prosecution witnesses) to the defense, and a judge’s determination that the material is duplicative is not a substitute for defense counsel’s own assessment of its usefulness.

    Summary

    Rodney B. was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for acts constituting criminal tampering. At trial, defense counsel requested the Transit Authority officer’s memo book as Rosario material, which was denied because the judge determined the contents were in other documents already given to the defense. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that denying the memo book’s production was error, even with the officer’s testimony, because defense counsel is entitled to review Rosario material independently. The memo book contained a notation not included in other documents, which could have aided Rodney B.’s defense, making the error not harmless.

    Facts

    Respondent, Rodney B., was accused of tampering with safety gates between subway cars.
    At the Family Court hearing, Rodney B. raised an affirmative defense, claiming he did not act for a larcenous or unlawful purpose.
    Defense counsel requested the Transit Authority officer’s memo book for potential impeachment material (Rosario material).
    The officer testified that his memo book contained nothing not already in the field investigation worksheet (TP67) and probation intake referral report (PIRR), which had been provided to the defense.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court Judge denied defense counsel’s request for the officer’s memo book.
    Rodney B. was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent and placed with the New York State Division for Youth.
    Defense counsel only received the memo book after filing the Appellate Division brief.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s decision.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Family Court erred in denying defense counsel’s request for the Transit Authority officer’s memo book as Rosario material, based on the officer’s testimony that its contents were duplicative of other disclosed documents.

    Holding

    Yes, because a judge’s determination regarding the usefulness of a witness’s prior statement is not a substitute for defense counsel’s own assessment; therefore, the memo book should have been produced. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new hearing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on Family Court Act § 331.4 (1) (a), which is based on Criminal Procedure Law § 240.45 and the precedent set by People v. Rosario, to emphasize the importance of providing defense counsel with prior statements of prosecution witnesses.
    The Court quoted People v. Perez, stating that even “a judge’s impartial determination as to what portions [of a statement] may be useful to the defense, is no substitute for the single-minded devotion of counsel for the accused.”
    The Court found that the memo book was not simply duplicative because it contained a statement that Rodney B. had seen the officer watching him and another person board the train from between cars. This was consistent with the defendant’s testimony and could have been used to support his affirmative defense.
    The Court referenced People v. Consolazio, suggesting that the “better practice is to direct turnover of material sought once it is determined that it is in fact Rosario material”.
    Because the defense was denied the opportunity to use this information, the court found the error was not harmless. The Court emphasized the importance of the defense having access to all Rosario material for effective cross-examination and presentation of their case.

  • People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56 (1986): Obligations and Consequences of Failing to Produce Rosario Material

    People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56 (1986)

    The prosecution’s complete failure to provide Rosario material to the defense requires automatic reversal of the conviction and a new trial, regardless of prejudice, and neither good faith nor the defendant’s access to the material excuses this obligation.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope and consequences of the Rosario rule, which requires the prosecution to provide defense counsel with pretrial statements of prosecution witnesses. The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution’s complete failure to produce a police complaint report (in Ranghelle) and police officer memo books containing witness statements (in Buster) constituted per se error, requiring reversal and a new trial in both cases, irrespective of the prosecution’s good faith or the potential lack of prejudice to the defense. The court emphasized that the burden of producing these statements lies solely with the People.

    Facts

    In Ranghelle, a sanitation enforcement agent, Nazario, filed a complaint against Ranghelle after an altercation. The complaint report, filed at the 77th precinct, was not provided to the defense before Nazario’s cross-examination. In Buster, a robbery victim, Benitez, gave descriptions of the robbers to police officers, who recorded them in memo books. These memo books were not provided to the defense, but the officers testified about the contents on cross-examination. The defense argued misidentification in Buster.

    Procedural History

    In Ranghelle, the Appellate Term affirmed the conviction despite the failure to produce the Rosario material, finding no deliberate misconduct or prejudice. In Buster, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion, after the trial court denied a motion for mistrial and instructed the jury to disregard the memo book testimony.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a police complaint report containing a witness’s allegations constitutes Rosario material that the prosecution must disclose.

    2. Whether the prosecution’s good faith effort to locate Rosario material excuses a failure to produce it.

    3. Whether the Rosario rule applies when the defense has independent knowledge of or access to the witness’s prior statement.

    4. Whether oral testimony regarding the contents of memo books is sufficient production of Rosario material.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because it contains a statement of a prosecution witness that should be disclosed after the witness testifies.

    2. No, because the People’s good faith is irrelevant.

    3. No, because the burden to locate and produce prior statements of complaining witnesses remains solely with the People.

    4. No, because the books themselves must be delivered to defense counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Rosario rule entitles a defendant to inspect prior statements of prosecution witnesses for impeachment purposes, regardless of whether the statements appear consistent with the witness’s trial testimony. The court emphasized that even seemingly harmonious statements might be valuable for cross-examination. The Court reiterated its prior holdings that the character of the statement is not determined by how it’s recorded. The Court distinguished between a delay in producing Rosario material (where prejudice must be shown) and a complete failure to produce, which constitutes per se error. The Court stated that “[a]s long as the statement relates to the subject matter of the witness’ testimony and contains nothing that must be kept confidential, defense counsel should be allowed to determine for themselves the use to be made of it on cross-examination”. The court rejected the argument that the People’s good faith or the defense’s ability to subpoena the material excused the prosecution’s obligation. It stated that ” ‘the State has no interest in interposing any obstacle to the disclosure of the facts’ “. The court also clarified that oral testimony about the contents of memo books does not satisfy the Rosario requirement; the documents themselves must be provided. In Buster, the inconsistencies between the memo books and incident reports, though minor, meant that the memo books were not duplicative equivalents. Because of the inconsistencies, the People could not claim the descriptions in the memo books were the ‘duplicative equivalents’ of the descriptions in the incident reports.

  • People v. Kanefsky, 48 N.Y.2d 985 (1979): Duty to Disclose Evidence and Relevance to Conviction

    People v. Kanefsky, 48 N.Y.2d 985 (1979)

    A defendant’s conviction will not be reversed for failure to produce evidence if that evidence is irrelevant to the crime for which the defendant was convicted.

    Summary

    Bernard Kanefsky was convicted of receiving an unlawful gratuity. He moved to set aside the verdict because a pocket appointment book (diary) kept by Roberto, a cooperating individual, was not produced in response to a subpoena. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s reversal of the conviction, holding that the diary’s contents, created before the commission of the crime, were irrelevant to the conviction. Even if a new trial were granted, the diary’s production would not assist the defendant because it lacked bearing on the specific unlawful act. The court also noted the extensive amount of other material that was properly disclosed to the defense.

    Facts

    Peter Roberto, an “expediter,” cooperated with the New York City Department of Investigation after being caught paying a bribe. He acted as an undercover agent, interacting with city employees, including Kanefsky, a building inspector. Kanefsky was indicted on four counts related to bribes allegedly received from Roberto. Kanefsky was ultimately convicted of only one count: receiving an unlawful gratuity on January 23, 1974. Roberto testified that on that date, he met Kanefsky and gave him a $20 “Christmas present”. This testimony was supported by a tape recording and evidence that Roberto had less recorded money after the meeting.

    Procedural History

    Kanefsky was convicted at trial. After the verdict, he moved to set aside the verdict based on the non-production of Roberto’s pocket appointment book. The trial court denied the motion, finding the diary immaterial because it was turned over to authorities before the crime Kanefsky was convicted of committing occurred. The Appellate Division reversed, stating that failure to turn over potentially relevant Rosario material could not be excused. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the failure to produce Roberto’s pocket appointment book mandates reversal of Kanefsky’s conviction.

    Holding

    1. No, because the contents of the diary were irrelevant to the specific criminal transaction for which Kanefsky was convicted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the relevance of the diary to the crime of conviction, not merely whether it should have been disclosed. The court emphasized that the diary was turned over to law enforcement on January 10, 1974, before the unlawful gratuity was given on January 23, 1974. Thus, pre-January 10 notations could not bear on the later criminal conduct. A new trial would not be aided by the diary’s production because its contents are “wholly irrelevant to the subject matter of the new trial.” The Court also noted the substantial amount of other information that *was* produced, encompassing a wider scope than the diary. The court distinguished this case from situations where the withheld evidence directly relates to the crime of which the defendant was convicted. The dissent, referencing the Appellate Division opinion, argued that the failure to disclose potentially relevant Rosario material warrants reversal regardless of its perceived limited utility.

  • People v. Poole, 48 N.Y.2d 144 (1979): Limits on Defense Access to Prosecutor Files Under Rosario Rule

    People v. Poole, 48 N.Y.2d 144 (1979)

    A criminal defendant does not have an unqualified right to inspect the prosecutor’s entire file to determine what material, if any, is relevant for cross-examination under the Rosario rule; instead, the trial court should conduct an in camera inspection when the defendant articulates a factual basis for believing the prosecutor is improperly withholding prior statements of a witness.

    Summary

    Poole was convicted of second-degree murder after pleading guilty. Prior to the plea, a hearing was held regarding the admissibility of Poole’s statements to police. During the hearing, defense counsel requested to see every document completed by the investigating officer, arguing it was for the defense to determine relevance under the Rosario rule. The prosecutor asserted that all relevant Rosario material had been turned over. The court denied the defense’s request to inspect the entire file. The Court of Appeals held that a defendant does not have an unqualified right to inspect the prosecutor’s entire file. Instead, the court should conduct an in camera inspection when a factual basis exists to believe the prosecutor is improperly denying the existence of prior statements.

    Facts

    Detective Rynne arrested Poole and charged him with second-degree murder. After being informed of his rights, Poole made several incriminating statements to Detective Rynne and other law enforcement officials.

    Prior to trial, Poole moved to suppress these statements. At the suppression hearing, Detective Rynne testified about the circumstances and substance of Poole’s admissions.

    Defense counsel requested Rosario material before cross-examining Rynne. The prosecutor provided Rynne’s memo book, representing it was the only relevant Rosario material. Defense counsel then requested to see all documents the officer filled out to determine relevance himself.

    The prosecutor refused, stating that the defense was seeking the entire investigative file under the guise of Rosario. Counsel for a co-defendant suggested an in camera review by the court, with which the prosecutor agreed. Poole’s counsel, however, insisted on an unqualified right to inspect the file personally.

    As cross-examination continued, Detective Rynne used a police report to refresh his recollection, revealing that the report related to Poole’s admissions. The defense renewed its request to inspect the entire file. The prosecutor acknowledged the file contained many documents referring to Poole’s admissions and authored by Detective Rynne but maintained that all relevant pretrial statements had been turned over. The court again denied the request.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ruled that Poole’s statements were voluntary.

    Poole pleaded guilty to second-degree murder.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant in a criminal case has an unqualified right to inspect the prosecutor’s file after a witness has testified against him, in order to determine whether relevant pretrial statements of the prosecution witness are being improperly withheld.

    Holding

    No, because a defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses using prior statements is not unlimited and does not extend to unrestricted access to the prosecutor’s entire file. The trial court should conduct an in camera inspection when the defendant articulates a factual basis for believing the prosecutor is improperly denying the existence of prior statements.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the established rule that a defendant is entitled to examine a prosecution witness’s prior statements related to their testimony for impeachment purposes, citing People v. Rosario and Jencks v. United States. However, the court emphasized that this case concerned whether a defendant could inspect the prosecutor’s file to determine relevance in the first instance, not whether relevant statements were being withheld.

    The court rejected the defendant’s argument that defense counsel must determine relevance, stating that allowing such a practice would permit an unrestrained “tour of investigation seeking generally useful information,” which Rosario specifically cautioned against. The court emphasized that the purpose of the Rosario rule is to ensure a fair opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, limited to statements relevant to the witness’s testimony and not subject to confidentiality concerns, citing People v. Malinsky.

    The court noted prior refinements to the Rosario rule, such as the prohibition against the prosecution or the court withholding statements based on a subjective determination of their utility to the defense. However, it clarified that Rosario has never been interpreted to grant defense counsel unrestricted access to the prosecutor’s file.

    The court established a procedure for cases where a defendant articulates a factual basis for believing the prosecutor is improperly denying the existence of prior statements or where the prosecutor admits the existence of statements but contends they are irrelevant: “we believe the better rule would be to place upon the court the responsibility to determine whether or not any relevant statements of the witness exist.” In such situations, the trial court should conduct an in camera inspection of the questioned document or the entire file, if necessary. The court reasoned that this process balances the defendant’s right to a fair trial with the need to prevent unwarranted intrusions into the prosecutor’s work product.

    Because the prosecutor willingly offered the file for an in camera inspection, but the defendant insisted on personal inspection, the court held that the defendant could not claim to have been deprived of a fair hearing.

  • People v. Malizia, 62 A.D.2d 896 (1978): Right to Prior Statements of Witnesses (Rosario Rule)

    People v. Malizia, 62 A.D.2d 896 (1978)

    A defendant is entitled to copies of a prosecution witness’s prior statements for use in cross-examination, and examining the documents briefly during another witness’s testimony does not cure the error of failing to provide those copies.

    Summary

    Malizia was convicted, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to provide defense counsel with copies of police documents containing prior statements of prosecution witnesses. The Court reasoned that the defense was entitled to use these prior statements during cross-examination. Examining the documents during the investigating officer’s testimony did not overcome this error, as defense counsel could not realistically remember the salient details. The Court also noted the acrimonious exchanges between defense counsel and the trial court and directed that the case be assigned to a different judge on remand.

    Facts

    The prosecution presented witnesses at trial who had previously given statements to police officers at the scene. The police reports and arrest forms were based upon the information derived from these earlier statements. The defense requested copies of these documents to aid in cross-examination. The trial court refused to provide copies of the documents to defense counsel.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Family Court for a new fact-finding hearing before a different judge.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to provide defense counsel with copies of prior statements of prosecution witnesses for use in cross-examination, where those statements were contained in police documents and reports.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant was entitled to use the prior statements of prosecution witnesses to conduct a searching cross-examination, and a brief examination of the documents during another witness’s testimony does not substitute for having copies available during the relevant witness’s testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the Rosario rule, which requires the prosecution to provide the defense with prior statements of prosecution witnesses for use in cross-examination. The Court stated that the interview summaries were drawn directly from prior statements of prosecution witnesses. The police report and arrest forms were, in turn, based upon information derived from the earlier statements. The Court noted that “the defendant was entitled to the use of these prior statements during the cross-examination of these witnesses.” The Court emphasized that examining the documents during another witness’s testimony was insufficient, stating: “It is hardly realistic to expect that defense counsel would retain sufficient memory of the salient details to enable him to conduct a searching cross-examination.” The Court further clarified that the documents did not need to be formally marked for identification to trigger the prosecution’s duty to provide copies to the defense. The court also disapproved of the acrimonious exchanges during the trial and ordered that a different judge preside over the new hearing, demonstrating the court’s concern for ensuring a fair trial free from perceived bias.

  • People v. Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d 451 (1976): Duplicative Rosario Material Need Not Be Disclosed

    40 N.Y.2d 451 (1976)

    Under the Rosario rule, the prosecution must turn over prior statements of its witnesses, but this requirement does not extend to duplicative equivalents of statements already disclosed to the defense.

    Summary

    Consolazio, an attorney, was convicted on six counts of grand larceny. He appealed, arguing that the prosecution’s failure to disclose certain worksheets compiled during witness interviews violated the Rosario and Brady rules. The Court of Appeals held that while the worksheets constituted Rosario material, their non-disclosure was harmless error because the information they contained was duplicative of Grand Jury testimony already provided to the defense. The Court also addressed and rejected Consolazio’s challenge to the jury panel selection process.

    Facts

    Consolazio solicited investments from individuals, promising high returns, but failed to return the funds. He was indicted on multiple counts of grand larceny. Before trial, the prosecution interviewed potential witnesses and created worksheets summarizing their responses to questions. During the trial, the defense requested these worksheets, arguing they were Rosario and Brady material. The prosecution initially denied their existence and later refused to turn them over, claiming they were not statements of the witnesses and contained no exculpatory information.

    Procedural History

    The Nassau County Court convicted Consolazio on six counts. The People’s appeal of the dismissal of other counts was consolidated with Consolazio’s appeal. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions and reinstated most of the dismissed counts. Consolazio appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals considered both Consolazio’s appeal and the People’s appeal from the trial order of dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People’s appeal from the trial order dismissing certain counts was barred by double jeopardy principles.

    2. Whether the prosecution’s failure to turn over worksheets compiled during witness interviews violated the Rosario and Brady rules, warranting reversal of the convictions.

    3. Whether the defendant’s challenge to the jury panel was properly denied.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because under People v. Brown, such an appeal was barred by double jeopardy.

    2. No, because while the worksheets constituted Rosario material, their non-disclosure was harmless error, as they were duplicative equivalents of Grand Jury testimony already provided to the defense.

    3. No, because the challenge to the jury panel was not made in writing before jury selection commenced, as required by CPL 270.10(2), and was therefore waived.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court held that the People’s appeal was barred by double jeopardy. As to the worksheets, the Court determined that the trial court erred in not examining the worksheets itself to determine if they contained exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, but after reviewing them, the Court of Appeals agreed that they contained no exculpatory information, making the error harmless. The Court further held that the worksheets constituted prior statements of prosecution witnesses under People v. Rosario. However, because the information in the worksheets was identical to the witnesses’ Grand Jury testimony, which had been turned over to the defense, the failure to disclose the worksheets was harmless error. The Court emphasized that withholding Rosario material is typically not excused based on its limited use to the defense. However, this case presented a distinct issue: the worksheets were “duplicative equivalents” of previously disclosed statements. The court stated, “The worksheets in this instance were nothing more than duplicative equivalents of statements previously turned over to the defense—the only difference being as to the particular form in which such statements were recorded.” The Court also noted that a challenge to a jury panel must be made in writing before jury selection commences, as required by CPL 270.10(2). Since the written challenge was not made until after jury selection, the issue was waived.

  • People v. Gilligan, 39 N.Y.2d 769 (1976): Defendant’s Right to Inspect Police Notes for Cross-Examination

    People v. Gilligan, 39 N.Y.2d 769 (1976)

    A defendant is entitled to inspect police officers’ notes and reports for potential use in cross-examination, and a trial court cannot deny this right based on an in camera finding that the material contains nothing exculpatory.

    Summary

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s request to inspect police officers’ notes and reports for possible use in cross-examination. The court reiterated that the prosecution cannot withhold witness statements or notes from the defense, even if the trial court believes the material would not assist the defense. The Court emphasized the importance of allowing the defense to examine the materials themselves to determine their potential value for cross-examination.

    Facts

    During the trial, defense counsel requested to inspect the written notes and reports made by several police officers during their investigation. The trial court denied this request after conducting an in camera review of the materials. The trial court determined that the materials had “nothing in it exculpatory to the defendant.” Defense counsel argued that they were entitled to review the notes for possible use during cross-examination of the officers.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defense’s request to inspect the police reports. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s request to inspect the written notes and reports made by police officers during their investigation for possible use in cross-examination, based on the trial court’s in camera determination that the material contained nothing exculpatory to the defendant.

    Holding

    Yes, because a trial court “may not allow the People to keep from the defendants’ counsel statements or notes made by a witness upon the ground that nothing in them could assist the defense or that no prejudice would result from withholding them.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the trial court’s reliance on its in camera finding was inconsistent with established precedent, specifically citing People v. Malinsky. The court emphasized that the defense, not the trial court, should determine the potential value of the officers’ notes for cross-examination. The court stated that withholding such materials based on the belief that they contain nothing exculpatory is an improper restriction on the defendant’s right to confront witnesses. The court reasoned that CPL Article 240, concerning pre-trial discovery, was not applicable because the request was made during trial, relying on Pitler, New York Criminal Practice Under the CPL. The ruling underscores the importance of providing defendants with access to witness statements and notes for effective cross-examination, even if the court believes the material is not exculpatory. This ensures a fair trial and protects the defendant’s right to confront witnesses. The court explicitly stated, “may not allow the People to keep from the defendants’ counsel statements or notes made by a witness upon the ground that nothing in them could assist the defense or that no prejudice would result from withholding them”.

  • People v. Zabrocky, 26 N.Y.2d 530 (1970): Limits to Rosario Rule on Witness Statements

    People v. Zabrocky, 26 N.Y.2d 530 (1970)

    The Rosario rule, requiring disclosure of witness statements by the prosecution, does not extend to situations where the defendant was present at a prior trial, knew the testimony, and had the opportunity to obtain the minutes independently.

    Summary

    During Zabrocky’s trial, his counsel requested the District Attorney to provide minutes from an earlier trial for cross-examination purposes. The prosecutor refused, and the trial judge declined to order the minutes’ disclosure, citing the lack of demonstrated indigency and the defendant’s ability to obtain the minutes independently. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the Rosario rule does not apply when the defendant was present at the prior trial, knew the testimony, and could have purchased the minutes. Moreover, even if the denial was erroneous, the overwhelming evidence of guilt rendered it harmless error.

    Facts

    During Zabrocky’s criminal trial, his defense attorney requested the prosecutor to provide a copy of the minutes from a prior trial for use in cross-examining witnesses.

    The prosecutor possessed these minutes in the courtroom but refused to provide them.

    The trial judge supported the prosecutor’s refusal, stating that the defendant hadn’t demonstrated indigency and could have obtained the minutes independently.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defense’s request for the minutes.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision, noting that any error in denying the minutes was harmless due to the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Rosario rule requires the prosecution to provide a defendant with minutes from a prior trial when the defendant was present at the prior trial, knew the testimony, and had the opportunity to obtain the minutes independently.

    Holding

    No, because the Rosario rule does not apply when the defendant was present at the prior trial, knew the testimony, and could have purchased the minutes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this situation from People v. Rosario, which mandates the disclosure of witness statements not otherwise available to the defendant. The court emphasized that Zabrocky was present at the prior trial, knew the testimony given, and had the opportunity to purchase the minutes himself. Therefore, the rationale behind the Rosario rule – ensuring the defendant has access to witness statements for effective cross-examination – did not apply in this case.

    The court also noted that even if the denial of the minutes was deemed erroneous, it constituted harmless error. The court agreed with the Appellate Division that the proof of the defendant’s guilt was so overwhelming that the denial did not prejudice the defendant’s case. As stated by the court, “Even if defendant had been entitled to the minutes and the court’s refusal to direct they be furnished be deemed error, proof of the defendant’s guilt is so overwhelming that such an error, as the Appellate Division observed, would have been harmless.” This highlights the importance of considering the overall fairness of the trial and the impact of any potential errors on the outcome.

  • People v. Jaglom, 17 N.Y.2d 162 (1966): Defendant Must Pay Transcription Costs for Grand Jury Testimony Absent Indigency

    People v. Jaglom, 17 N.Y.2d 162 (1966)

    A non-indigent defendant seeking to examine grand jury minutes that have not yet been transcribed may be required to bear the cost of transcription as a reasonable condition of exercising that right.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the prosecution must provide a free transcript of grand jury testimony to a non-indigent defendant when the testimony is in stenographic form. The defendants, Gregory and Jaglom, requested access to grand jury minutes before their trials. The District Attorney made the minutes available but required the defendants to pay for transcription. The Court of Appeals held that requiring a non-indigent defendant to pay for the transcription of grand jury testimony is a reasonable condition and does not violate the defendant’s right to examine prior statements of witnesses.

    Facts

    Defendant Gregory was adjudged a youthful offender, and defendant Jaglom was found guilty of a misdemeanor. Both defendants requested to examine the grand jury minutes of witnesses before their trials. The minutes were in stenographic form. The District Attorney offered access but required the defendants to pay for transcription of the testimony.

    Procedural History

    The defendants refused to pay for the transcription, and the trial court denied their requests to instruct the District Attorney to purchase the minutes. The Appellate Term affirmed these denials. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People are required to have grand jury testimony transcribed for use by the defense free of charge in every case, including when the defendant is not indigent.

    Holding

    No, because imposing the reasonable condition that a non-indigent defendant pay for the transcription of grand jury minutes does not prevent the exercise of the right to examine those minutes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while defendants have a right to examine prior statements of the People’s witnesses, including grand jury testimony under the rule established in People v. Rosario, this right is not absolute. The court analogized the right to examine prior statements to the right to appeal or the right to counsel, where defendants bear the expense unless indigent. The court distinguished the case from Rosario and Jencks v. United States, where there was a direct and unqualified refusal by the prosecutor to provide the statements. Here, the minutes were made available, and only the cost of transcription was at issue. The court emphasized that non-indigent defendants routinely pay for various legal expenses, such as attorneys, investigators, and appeal costs. Section 952-t of the Code of Criminal Procedure obligates the Grand Jury stenographer to furnish transcripts only to the District Attorney “as [he] shall require.” When the People secure typewritten minutes for prosecution purposes, they must make those available to the defense. The court concluded that requiring a solvent defendant to pay for transcription when the minutes are not already transcribed is a reasonable condition. The dissenting judges argued that the prosecution has a duty to turn over grand jury testimony whenever requested for cross-examination and may not condition production upon payment by the defendant. They pointed out that the stenographer’s fees are a public charge.