New York Law Review

Tag: Rosario Rule

  • People v. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638 (1991): Prejudice Requirement for Rosario Violations in Collateral Review

    People v. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638 (1991)

    A defendant seeking to vacate a conviction via a CPL 440.10 motion based on a Rosario violation (failure to disclose a witness’s prior statement) after exhausting direct appeals must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the failure to disclose the Rosario material contributed to the verdict.

    Summary

    Erick Jackson was convicted of felony murder and arson. After his direct appeal failed, he moved to vacate his conviction under CPL 440.10, alleging a Rosario violation. The prosecution had failed to disclose a memorandum containing a synopsis of an interview with a prosecution witness. The Court of Appeals addressed whether the per se error rule for Rosario violations, typically applied on direct appeal, extends to collateral review via CPL 440.10 motions. The Court held that it does not; a defendant must demonstrate prejudice resulting from the Rosario violation when seeking relief under CPL 440.10 after exhausting direct appeals, requiring a showing that the non-disclosure reasonably could have contributed to the verdict.

    Facts

    Erick Jackson was convicted of felony murder and arson in connection with a fire at a supermarket that killed six firefighters.

    After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, Jackson filed a CPL 440.10 motion to vacate his conviction.

    The motion alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and a Brady violation. The trial court also considered a Rosario claim.

    The People conceded that a memorandum summarizing an interview with a fire marshal, who later testified, was not provided to the defense, and that it was not a duplicative equivalent of other disclosed materials.

    Procedural History

    Jackson was convicted of felony murder and arson; his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.

    Jackson then filed a CPL 440.10 motion to vacate his conviction, which was granted by the trial court based on a Rosario violation, applying the per se error rule.

    The Appellate Division affirmed, also applying the per se error rule.

    The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the per se error rule applicable to Rosario violations on direct appeal extends to motions to vacate a conviction under CPL 440.10 after direct appeal has been exhausted, or whether the defendant must demonstrate prejudice.

    Holding

    No, because a defendant who has exhausted direct appeal and seeks to raise a Rosario claim via a CPL 440.10 motion must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the failure to disclose the Rosario material contributed to the verdict.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished between direct appeals and collateral attacks via CPL 440.10 motions.

    CPL 440.10(1)(f), relating to “improper and prejudicial conduct,” is the appropriate avenue for Rosario claims raised in a CPL 440.10 motion.

    CPL 440.10(1)(f) requires a showing of prejudice; the improper conduct must have affected the trial and prejudiced the defendant. “To prevail under CPL 440.10 (1) (f), however, a defendant must do more than demonstrate that the conduct at issue was improper. The statute by its very terms affords a remedy only if the defendant’s trial was affected by conduct that was both improper and prejudicial.”

    The per se error rule developed in Rosario cases on direct appeal was a policy decision, balancing defendant’s rights against society’s. However, CPL 440.10 requires a showing of prejudice, reflecting society’s interest in the finality of judgments.

    The Court adopted a “reasonable possibility” standard for prejudice, requiring the defendant to show that the failure to disclose the Rosario material “contributed to the verdict.” This aligns with the standard in Rosario itself and with Brady claims where a specific request was made.

    The Court emphasized that the per se error rule continues to apply to Rosario claims on direct appeal and when a Rosario claim is raised concurrently on direct appeal and in a CPL 440.10 motion (per People v. Novoa).

    The Court rejected the dissent’s view that the procedural distinction was arbitrary, emphasizing that it was an effort to balance the rights of the defendant against the interests of society, particularly the interest in the finality of judgments, given the lack of a time limit on CPL 440.10 motions.

  • People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56 (1986): Preserving Rosario Violations for Appellate Review

    People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56 (1986)

    To preserve a Rosario violation for appellate review, the defendant must object at a time when the trial court can provide a remedy.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order and remitted the case because the defendant failed to preserve the Rosario violation claim for appellate review. The defendant argued that the prosecution failed to produce Rosario material related to a witness’s videotaped testimony. However, the defense counsel did not raise the Rosario issue before the trial court or a hearing court in a timely manner when a remedy could have been implemented, such as excluding the videotaped testimony. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the issue was not properly preserved for appellate review.

    Facts

    The prosecution presented videotaped testimony of a witness who was later deported.

    Defense counsel alleged the People failed to produce certain Rosario material pertinent to the videotaped testimony.

    At a Wade hearing, defense counsel brought the omission to the judge’s attention, but the judge stated that their jurisdiction was limited to the Wade hearing and the objection should be made before the trial court.

    Defense counsel acknowledged the court’s limited role and stated she only wanted to record when she received the material.

    At a CPL 670.20 hearing and at trial, defense counsel made several motions, some directly relating to the videotaped testimony, but did not raise the Rosario issue.

    Procedural History

    The case was heard in a Wade hearing, then a CPL 670.20 hearing, and then at trial.

    The Appellate Division issued an order, which was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for a determination of the facts and consideration of issues not previously reached.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant preserved the Rosario violation claim for appellate review when the defense counsel failed to object at a time when the trial court could have provided a remedy.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s failure to object at a time when the Rosario violation could have been redressed constituted a failure to preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendant’s claim regarding the failure to produce Rosario material was not preserved for review because the defense counsel did not raise the issue before the trial court or hearing court at a time when a remedy could have been implemented. By failing to object when the trial court could have taken action, such as excluding the videotaped testimony, the defendant lost the opportunity to have the Rosario violation addressed. The Court emphasized the importance of raising objections at the trial level to allow the court to correct any errors. The court stated, “Defendant’s failure to object at a time when any Rosario violation could have been redressed — as, for example, by excluding the videotaped testimony — constituted a failure to preserve the issue for appellate review.”

  • People v. Wallace, 76 N.Y.2d 953 (1990): Duty to Preserve Rosario Material and Sanctions for Failure

    People v. Wallace, 76 N.Y.2d 953 (1990)

    When the prosecution fails to exercise due care in preserving Rosario material and the defendant is prejudiced, the trial court must impose an appropriate sanction.

    Summary

    Wallace was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. Undercover and arresting officers discarded notes containing the defendant’s description after the arrest. The Court of Appeals held that discarding these notes, which constituted Rosario material, prejudiced the defendant because they would have been helpful for cross-examining the officers on the identification issue. The court emphasized that while the specific sanction is discretionary, the failure to impose any sanction when the defendant is prejudiced is an abuse of discretion.

    Facts

    An undercover officer purchased drugs from the defendant and broadcasted a description over the police radio, which the arresting officer recorded. The undercover officer performed a post-arrest “drive-by” identification. The undercover officer made two subsequent drug purchases. Both officers discarded their written descriptions of the defendant after the arrest, but the undercover officer claimed to have incorporated the description into a “buy” report created later that evening.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. The Court of Appeals reviewed the case after the lower courts affirmed the conviction, focusing on the issue of whether the discarding of the notes prejudiced the defendant.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in failing to impose any sanction for the officers’ discarding of notes containing a description of the defendant, when those notes constituted Rosario material and the defendant was prejudiced by their absence.

    Holding

    Yes, because the written descriptions would have been helpful to the defendant in cross-examining the officers on the critical issue of identification, and the People failed to exercise due care in preserving the Rosario material. The court must impose a sanction when prejudice occurs.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the discarded notes constituted Rosario material, and the People did not dispute this point or contend that the officers exercised due care in preserving them. The court limited its review to whether the defendant was prejudiced. The court reasoned that the written descriptions would have been helpful to the defendant in cross-examining the officers, especially given the importance of the identification issue. The undercover officer’s claim that he incorporated the description into his “buy” report did not alleviate the prejudice because there was no way to verify if the description in the report matched the lost notes, especially since the report was prepared after a confirmatory “drive-by” identification. The court cited People v. Martinez, 71 NY2d 937, 940, stating that “the [trial] court must impose an appropriate sanction” where the People fail to exercise due care in preserving Rosario material, and the defendant is prejudiced. While the specific sanction is discretionary (People v. Kelly, 62 NY2d 516, 521), it was an abuse of discretion to decline to impose any sanction. The court reversed the order and ordered a new trial.

  • People v. Adger, 75 N.Y.2d 723 (1989): Duty to Examine Rosario Material

    People v. Adger, 75 N.Y.2d 723 (1989)

    When a defendant requests specific documents under People v. Rosario, the trial court must examine the requested material to determine if it contains prior statements of prosecution witnesses and is thus subject to disclosure, unless an exception such as work product or duplicative nature applies.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court erred by failing to require the prosecution to turn over specific documents requested by the defense under People v. Rosario. In People v. Adger, the trial court summarily concluded the defense was not entitled to the Grand Jury synopsis sheet and the Early Case Assessment Bureau data sheet without examining the documents. In People v. Austin, the trial court examined the documents but overlooked that the data analysis form contained statements from a prosecution witness. The Court of Appeals remitted both cases for further proceedings, emphasizing the trial court’s duty to examine requested material to determine if it constitutes Rosario material and whether any exceptions apply.

    Facts

    In People v. Adger: The defendant was charged with robbery. The prosecution provided some Rosario material but refused to provide the Grand Jury synopsis sheet and the Early Case Assessment Bureau data sheet, claiming they were work product.

    In People v. Austin: The defendant was charged with robbery. The prosecution provided some Rosario material but refused to provide the Grand Jury synopsis sheet and the data analysis form, arguing it was work product and not witness statements. The defense argued the data analysis form contained statements from the arresting officer, a testifying witness.

    Procedural History

    In both cases, the trial courts denied the defendants’ requests for the specified documents. The Appellate Division’s orders were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in People v. Adger by failing to examine the requested documents to determine if they constituted Rosario material.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in People v. Austin by overlooking that the data analysis form contained statements of a prosecution witness when determining if it constituted Rosario material.

    Holding

    1. No, in People v. Adger because the trial court failed to conduct any examination to determine if the material requested by the defense was Rosario material, requiring remittance for proper examination.

    2. Yes, in People v. Austin, because the trial court improperly glossed over the fact that the data analysis form contained statements of a prosecution witness, necessitating remittance for focused determination on potential exemptions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reiterated the importance of trial courts examining requested documents to determine if they contain prior statements of prosecution witnesses (Rosario material). Citing People v. Poole, 48 NY2d 144, 149-150 and People v. Consolazio, 40 NY2d 446, 453, the court emphasized that this examination is crucial before deciding whether the documents should be disclosed. The Court found the trial court in Adger failed to conduct any examination. In Austin, while the trial court did examine the documents, it erred by not recognizing that the data analysis form contained statements from the arresting officer. The Court highlighted that if the documents are determined to be Rosario material, the focus shifts to whether an exception, such as work product or duplication, applies. If the documents should have been disclosed, a new trial is required; otherwise, the judgments should be amended. The court emphasized that the purpose of Rosario is to ensure the defense has access to information that could be used for cross-examination and impeachment of prosecution witnesses, stating that failing to examine the material thwarts this purpose.

  • People v. Goins, 73 N.Y.2d 983 (1989): Duty to Disclose Rosario Material at a Useful Time

    People v. Goins, 73 N.Y.2d 983 (1989)

    A prosecutor’s duty to provide Rosario material (prior statements of prosecution witnesses) includes providing it at a time when it can be effectively used by the defense; an offer to provide the material after the defense has rested is not a sufficient remedy for a prior Rosario violation.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of a crime, and the conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division. However, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prosecution failed to provide the defense with a police officer’s daily activity report (DAR) in a timely manner, violating the Rosario rule. The court found that offering the report only after the defense had rested its case was insufficient to remedy the violation because the defense had already structured its case based on a perceived discrepancy that the DAR could have clarified. The court reasoned that late disclosure would only bolster the prosecution’s case while undermining the defense.

    Facts

    The key facts are centered around the prosecution’s failure to timely disclose a police officer’s Daily Activity Report (DAR). The defense believed a discrepancy existed concerning the undercover officer’s activities on the day of the sale. Defense counsel structured their defense, rested their case, and prepared their summation based on the perceived discrepancy. The prosecution offered the DAR only after both sides had rested.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution’s offer to provide the defendant with Rosario material (specifically, a police officer’s Daily Activity Report) after both sides had rested constituted a sufficient remedy for the prosecution’s failure to provide the material in a timely manner.

    Holding

    No, because a witness’s prior statement must be furnished to the defendant at a time when it can be useful to the defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the prosecution had a clear obligation to furnish the defense with a copy of the police officer’s daily activity report (DAR) under People v. Rosario and People v. Ranghelle well before both sides rested their cases. The Court found that the trial court’s offer to reopen the case for cross-examination with the DAR, after the defense had already rested, was insufficient to cure the Rosario violation. The Court stated, “A witness’s prior statement must be furnished to the defendant at a time when it can be useful to the defense.” Because the defense had already been structured around a perceived discrepancy, introducing the DAR at that late stage would only serve to bolster the prosecution’s case while undermining the defense’s strategy. The Court rejected the Appellate Division’s interpretation that the defense counsel’s refusal to accept the late disclosure constituted a waiver. The Court reasoned that the right to timely disclosure had already been violated, and the defense’s rejection of the inadequate remedy did not constitute abandonment of that right. The court emphasized the importance of timely disclosure for effective cross-examination and trial strategy, quoting People v. Perez, noting the prior statement must be useful to the defense. Allowing the prosecution to rectify the error so late in the trial would prejudice the defendant, and “destroy the defense while bolstering the case for the prosecution”.

  • People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547 (1987): Consequences of Failing to Provide Rosario Material

    People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547 (1987)

    A complete failure to provide Rosario material to the defense requires a new trial, and the People cannot remedy this failure by later claiming the undisclosed material was a duplicate equivalent of disclosed material if it was not included in the trial record.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted after an altercation. At trial, the defense requested the police officer’s memo book and arrest report related to the co-defendant’s arrest, pursuant to People v. Rosario. The prosecution stated it would provide these items, but the record only showed that the officer returned with *other* materials. The Court of Appeals held that the complete failure to provide the requested Rosario material warranted a new trial. The Court further stated that the People could not argue on appeal that the unproduced items were the equivalent of disclosed materials, as these items were not made part of the record.

    Facts

    The defendant, Jones, and Scott Horne were arrested following an altercation at a jewelry exchange.

    During the trial, defense counsel requested, based on People v. Rosario, access to the police officer’s memo book and the arrest report pertaining to Horne’s arrest.

    The People stated that the officer would return with these materials.

    The officer returned to the courthouse but only provided *other* materials, not the memo book or arrest report.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial.

    The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding a Rosario violation.

    The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s failure to provide Rosario material (police officer’s memo book and arrest report) requires a new trial.

    Whether the People can argue on appeal that the undisclosed materials were the duplicate equivalent of disclosed materials, when those undisclosed materials are not part of the trial court record.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was a complete failure to comply with the Rosario rule. The Appellate Division correctly held that a new trial was required.

    No, because the People should have included these items in the trial court record so the issue could be resolved on appeal in the normal course.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the record demonstrated a complete failure to provide the requested Rosario material, not merely a delay.

    Referencing People v. Ranghelle, the Court reiterated the importance of providing Rosario material and the consequences of failing to do so.

    The Court refused to remit the case for a hearing to determine if the undisclosed items were duplicate equivalents because the People failed to include the items in the trial court record.

    The Court stated: “If the People intended to raise this issue to justify the nondisclosure, they should have included these items in the trial court record so that the point could be resolved on appeal in the normal course.”

    The Court cited People v. Consolazio and People v. Ranghelle to support this proposition.

    The Court’s decision underscores the prosecution’s burden to properly preserve the record for appellate review when attempting to justify the non-disclosure of Rosario material.

  • People v. Tissois, 72 N.Y.2d 78 (1988): Social Worker Privilege and Rosario Material

    People v. Tissois, 72 N.Y.2d 78 (1988)

    Statements made to a registered social worker are confidential communications protected from disclosure by statute (CPLR 4508), and a defendant’s claim for such statements under People v. Rosario is insufficient to overcome this privilege unless specific exceptions apply.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of rape and sexual abuse. Prior to trial, the child victims were interviewed by a social worker. The defendant sought access to the social worker’s notes under People v. Rosario, arguing they were necessary for cross-examination. The Brooklyn Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (BSPCC) asserted the social worker privilege under CPLR 4508. The trial court denied the defendant’s request after an in-camera inspection. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statutory privilege protected the notes from disclosure and the defendant failed to demonstrate entitlement to the material despite the privilege.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of rape and sexual abuse by three young children who temporarily lived with him and their parents. The defendant claimed the children were coerced into making false accusations by their father. To support his defense, the defendant subpoenaed the notes of a social worker from the BSPCC who had interviewed and counseled the children before the trial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s request for the social worker’s notes after an in-camera inspection, finding no exculpatory or inconsistent information. The defendant was subsequently convicted. He appealed, arguing that the denial violated the Rosario rule. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s claim to statements made by prosecution witnesses to a social worker, under the rule of People v. Rosario, is sufficient to overcome the statutory privilege protecting those communications from disclosure under CPLR 4508?

    Holding

    No, because the social worker’s notes are protected by statutory privilege (CPLR 4508), and the defendant failed to demonstrate entitlement to the material despite the privilege.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that CPLR 4508 prohibits a registered social worker from disclosing communications made by a client during professional employment. The court distinguished this case from People v. De Jesus, where the prosecutor failed to assert the statutory privilege, thus depriving the defendant of the opportunity to make a record regarding the privilege. In this case, the BSPCC expressly invoked the CPLR 4508 privilege when producing the documents for in-camera review. Therefore, it became the defendant’s responsibility to demonstrate why he was entitled to the material despite the privilege. The defendant failed to assert any applicable exceptions to the prohibition of disclosure under CPLR 4508(a) or raise any additional basis for entitlement. The court noted that the social worker’s notes were not in the possession or control of the People, further weakening the Rosario claim. Because the statutory privilege was properly invoked, and the defendant failed to overcome it, the trial court’s decision was upheld. As the court stated, “[I]t was incumbent upon defendant to demonstrate entitlement to the material despite the statutory privilege.”

  • People v. Novoa, 70 N.Y.2d 870 (1987): Prosecution’s Duty to Provide Witness Plea Minutes

    People v. Novoa, 70 N.Y.2d 870 (1987)

    The prosecution has a duty to provide the defense with prior statements of a witness, including plea minutes of an accomplice who testifies against the defendant, to ensure a fair trial, even if the minutes are untranscribed but ordered.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of the Rosario rule and CPL 240.45(1)(a), specifically whether the prosecution must provide the defense with untranscribed plea minutes of a potential prosecution witness. The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution did not violate the rule because they lacked control over the untranscribed minutes. However, the dissent argued that the statute and principles of fairness necessitate providing such materials to the defense to reduce surprise and ensure effective cross-examination, especially when the prosecution is actively involved in the plea agreement.

    Facts

    Defendant was tried for attempted murder. One of the defendant’s accomplices, Fernando Castro, pleaded guilty to conspiracy in exchange for testifying against the defendant. The prosecution informed the defendant of this fact on the day before trial, indicating Castro “might” testify. During the opening statement, the prosecutor stated Castro would testify. Defense counsel requested a copy of Castro’s plea minutes for cross-examination. The prosecution stated the minutes were untranscribed.

    Procedural History

    The trial court concluded that the prosecution had no obligation to provide the defendant with the untranscribed plea minutes under People v. Rosario. The defendant was convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a memorandum decision, with one judge dissenting.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution is required under CPL 240.45(1)(a) and the Rosario rule to provide the defense with untranscribed plea minutes of a potential prosecution witness when the minutes have been ordered but not yet received by the prosecution.

    Holding

    No, because the plea minutes were not in the control of the People.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority’s memorandum decision affirmed the lower court ruling without extensive reasoning. The dissent argued that CPL 240.45(1)(a) explicitly requires the prosecution to provide any written or recorded statement of a witness they intend to call at trial. The dissent emphasized that the statute aims to reduce surprise and broaden discovery in criminal trials. The dissent argued that the People’s active participation in the accomplice’s plea, coupled with their delay in informing the defendant and placing the burden on the defendant to obtain the minutes, resulted in unfairness. Quoting the Bill Jacket, the dissent noted that the statute aimed to make trials “fairer as the element of surprise is reduced”. The dissent contrasted the situation with cases where a defendant seeks a victim’s personal account of the crime, noting the prosecution’s direct involvement in the plea bargain. They highlighted that the key factor should be whether the statement might have been of use to the defense, referencing People v. Ranghelle, 69 NY2d 56, 64. The dissent concluded that the prosecution’s conduct effectively “sandbagged” the defendant and that the prosecution had a duty to provide a transcribed copy of the plea.

  • People v. Haupt, 71 N.Y.2d 929 (1988): Consequences of Lost Rosario Material

    71 N.Y.2d 929 (1988)

    When the prosecution loses or destroys Rosario material (prior statements of a witness), the trial court must impose an appropriate sanction, focusing primarily on eliminating prejudice to the defendant.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery. A key issue was the loss of police notes containing a description of the robber provided by a witness. The defense sought to preclude the witness’s testimony, arguing a Rosario violation. The trial court denied preclusion but instructed the jury that they could draw an adverse inference against the prosecution. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that an adverse inference charge was an appropriate sanction, given the circumstances, for the loss of the Rosario material and that it sufficiently mitigated any potential prejudice to the defendant. The court emphasized that the focus should be on eliminating prejudice to the defendant when Rosario material is lost or destroyed.

    Facts

    Efraim Gonzalez, a cashier, was threatened during an armed robbery at a cafe.
    Gonzalez immediately reported the crime to his manager, Nelson Aleman, who had briefly seen the defendant earlier.
    Aleman chased the defendant into the subway and onto a train, where the defendant was arrested by a transit police officer.
    At the pretrial Wade hearing, Gonzalez mentioned giving a description of the robber to police officers (Reycraft and Mosely) who responded to the cafe immediately after the robbery.
    Officer Reycraft testified that Officer Mosely wrote down Gonzalez’s description, possibly in his memo book or on a “scratch 61” sheet, and immediately broadcast the description over the radio.
    Officer Mosely was unavailable at trial, and his notes and any follow-up report could not be located despite intensive investigation.
    The defendant was given the Sprint tape of the radio transmission containing the description.

    Procedural History

    After the jury was sworn, the defense moved to preclude Gonzalez from testifying because the written record of his statement to the investigating police had not been provided.
    The trial court held a hearing and denied the motion to preclude Gonzalez’s testimony.
    However, the court instructed the jury that they could draw an adverse inference against the prosecution for failing to produce Officer Mosely’s notes.
    Defendant appealed the Rosario ruling, and the Appellate Division affirmed.
    The case then went to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by delivering an adverse inference charge rather than precluding the witness’s testimony as a sanction for the prosecution’s failure to produce Rosario material (Officer Mosely’s notes).

    Holding

    No, because the adverse inference charge was an appropriate sanction to mitigate any potential prejudice to the defendant arising from the loss of the Rosario material, given that a description of the defendant had been contemporaneously broadcast over the police radio and disclosed to the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals outlined three categories of Rosario violations: (1) delayed disclosure, (2) complete failure to disclose material in the People’s possession, and (3) loss or destruction of evidence.
    Regarding lost or destroyed evidence, the court stated that the People have an obligation to preserve evidence until a request for disclosure is made, citing People v. Kelly, 62 N.Y.2d 516, 520 (1984).
    The court emphasized that it is not a sufficient response to a demand for production to say that the material has been lost or destroyed.
    If the People fail to preserve evidence and the defendant is prejudiced, the court must impose an appropriate sanction. “The determination of what is appropriate is committed to the trial court’s sound discretion, and while the degree of prosecutorial fault may be considered, the court’s attention should focus primarily on the overriding need to eliminate prejudice to the defendant” (quoting People v. Kelly, 62 N.Y.2d at 520-521).
    In this case, the trial court’s decision to deny preclusion and instead deliver an adverse inference charge was deemed appropriate.
    The court reasoned that the prosecution was apparently unaware of the Rosario material until trial, and the risk of prejudice to the defendant was remote, because the defendant had a tape of the radio transmission containing the description of the defendant.
    Under the circumstances, any risk of prejudice was overcome by the adverse inference instruction.

  • People v. Goins, 73 N.Y.2d 983 (1989): Consequences of Delayed Rosario Material Disclosure

    People v. Goins, 73 N.Y.2d 983 (1989)

    A delay in disclosing Rosario material (prior statements of a prosecution witness) that prejudices the defendant’s trial strategy warrants a new trial.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of burglary, sodomy, and related offenses. His defense hinged on inconsistencies in the complainant’s statements. The prosecution, aware of a memo book entry from a hospital interview with the complainant that corroborated her trial testimony, did not disclose it until after the defense had built its strategy around the statement’s supposed non-existence. This late disclosure significantly undermined the defense’s strategy, as it rehabilitated the complainant’s credibility. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order and ordered a new trial, holding that the delayed disclosure of the Rosario material prejudiced the defendant.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with burglary, sodomy, and related offenses. The complainant provided an initial statement to the police. Later, she was interviewed at the hospital. The arresting officer testified about interviewing the complainant in her apartment and at the hospital. He stated that the hospital interview did not cause him to change his original memo book entry. The prosecutor knew of a memo book entry memorializing the hospital interview. The prosecutor elicited testimony that the complainant’s hospital version was substantially similar to her trial testimony.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The defense appealed, arguing that the delayed disclosure of Rosario material prejudiced his defense. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s delay in disclosing Rosario material (a prior consistent statement of the complaining witness) until after the defense had committed to a particular trial strategy prejudiced the defendant to warrant a new trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the delayed disclosure of the statement recorded in the hospital prejudiced the defendant substantially by undermining his defense strategy which depended on the statement’s nonexistence and rehabilitated the complaining witness’s credibility.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principles established in People v. Perez, 65 N.Y.2d 154, 159 (1985); People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56 (1986); and People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 289 (1961). The court reasoned that the prosecution’s failure to disclose the memo book entry memorializing the hospital interview prejudiced the defendant’s ability to effectively cross-examine the complaining witness and construct his defense. The defense strategy was based on highlighting inconsistencies between the complainant’s initial version and her later testimony. The undisclosed memo book entry, which corroborated her trial testimony and refuted any claim of recent fabrication, directly undermined this strategy. By the time the defense learned of the memo book entry, they had already committed to a line of questioning that was severely weakened by the new information. The court emphasized that the “People’s delay in turning over the statement recorded in the hospital — revealed as it was only after defense counsel had moved forward on a strategy that depended on the statement’s nonexistence — substantially prejudiced the defendant.” This prejudice warranted a new trial to ensure the defendant had a fair opportunity to present his defense with full knowledge of the evidence against him.